A14350:2178
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
30 It remaineth, 1that I now come to treat of a lie. Augustine, 2who wrote thereof to Consentius, affirmeth; that A lie is the false signification of the speech. And undoubtedly, of this vice may all those things be spoken by a contrary position, which are before declared of truth. And first, contrary to that, which Tully affirmed of truth; that that is true, whereby things which are, which have been, and which shall be, are said to be unaltered. And a lie is that, whereby is signified that, which is not: for Augustine defined truth by the contrary. This vice is so hurtful, that it maketh a man, which is infected therewith, to rejoice, and be glad in falsehood. The general word of truth, is equality; 3and the general of this vice, inequality. And as truth is very near joined with simplicity, so a lie belongeth to doubleness. Truth is a part of justice, but a lie is a part of injustice. By truth, the society of man is preserved; but by lying, it is hurt and overthrown. But return we to Augustine, who writeth; that He is said to lie, which with a will to deceive speaketh that, which is false: & that, To lie, is nothing else, but to go against the mind; for liars speak another thing than they have in their mind. But the desire to deceive is utterly against justice, love, and amity; which we mutually owe one towards another. So then there be three things in a lie; first, 4to speak that which is false; secondly, his will in speaking; and thirdly, a desire to deceive. The first part belongeth to the matter of a lie; the other two parts pertain unto the form.
30 It remaineth, 1that I now come to treat of a lie. Augustine, 2who wrote thereof to Consentius, affirmeth; that A lie is the false signification of the spéech. And vndoubtedlie, of this vice may all those things be spoken by a contrarie position, which are before declared of truth. And first, contrarie to that, which Tullie affirmed of truth; that that is true, whereby things which are, which haue béene, and which shall be, are said to be vnaltered. And a lie is that, whereby is signified that, which is not: for Augustine defined truth by the contrarie. This vice is so hurtfull, that it maketh a man, which is infected therewith, to reioise, and be glad in falsehood. The generall word of truth, is equalitie; 3and the generall of this vice, inequalitie. And as truth is verie néere ioined with simplicitie, so a lie belongeth to doublenesse. Truth is a part of iustice, but a lie is a part of iniustice. By truth, the societie of man is preserued; but by lieng, it is hurt and ouerthrowne. But returne we to Augustine, who writeth; that He is said to lie, which with a will to deceiue speaketh that, which is false: & that, To lie, is nothing else, but to go against the mind; for liers speake another thing than they haue in their mind. But the desire to deceiue is vtterlie against iustice, loue, and amitie; which we mutuallie owe one towards another. So then there be thrée things in a lie; first, 4to speake that which is false; secondlie, his will in speaking; and thirdlie, a desire to deceiue. The first part belongeth to the matter of a lie; the other two parts perteine vnto the forme.
31 A lie is distinguished into an officious lie, a sporting lie, and a pernicious lie. 1And this division cometh of no other thing, but of the effects, or of the ends. For this is evermore true, that the ends themselves may have the nature both of the cause, and of the effect: seeing lies do either profit, or delight, or else hurt. The end of a pernicious lie, is to hurt; the end of a sporting lie, is to delight; and the end of an officious lie, is to profit. But, forsomuch as in virtue, 2Aristotle hath respect chiefly unto the mean, if then in speaking thou exceed that mean, 3he calleth it boasting: but if thou come short, he nameth it dissimulation or mocking. And in this evil, that most of all hurteth; because an evil or false opinion is engendered in the mind of our neighbour. For which cause it seemeth, that the same Aristotle said well; that Lying is a wicked thing, 4and must be avoided. Which we may prove by testimonies of the holy scriptures. For hereunto belong all those things, which we rehearsed before, for provoking of us to speak the truth. And there be many other places dispersed here and there, which detest lying. David saith; 5Thou shalt ⟨p. 544⟩destroy all those which speak lies. 6There be reasons also, which persuade the same: whereof one is, 7that in a lie there is an abuse of signs. And for so much as it is not lawful to abuse the gifts of GOD: a lie also is understood to be forbidden.
31 A lie is distinguished into an officious lie, a sporting lie, and a pernicious lie. 1
Moreover, as it is before said; a lie is enemy unto the society of man. For in lying, the understanding of the mind is not communicated unto our brethren; but lies. Wherefore, seeing by nature man is made unto society and communication, when he speaketh that which is false, he striveth against his own nature. And (as Augustine saith;1) Faith herein is harmed, because he which heareth, believeth those things which are spoken. Wherefore, that faith, which he giveth unto others words, is made void: and so notable a thing cannot be hurt without blame. And to conclude, every man by lying looseth his own credit; for being taken in a lie, he shall be ever after suspected of it. Wherefore, though he would, he shall not be able, by admonition or correction, to help his neighbour. So the fault that is in a lie, not only respecteth the loss or hurt of our neighbour, but it is in it of his own kind: as manifestly appeareth by that, which we have already said. 2But among lies, that seemeth to be most heinous, which is in matter of religion, doctrine, and godliness: for in no other thing can guile be more hurtful and pernicious. For if we shall err therein, we be cast from everlasting felicity. Wherefore Augustine, in his Enchiridion, the 18. chapter, hath very well written; that They indeed sin grievously, which deceive travelling men, in showing them a contrary way. But they be much more detestable, which in lying about matters of religion, do bring men into error.
Moreouer, as it is before said; a lie is enimie vnto the societie of man. For in lieng, the vnderstanding of the mind is not communicated vnto our brethren; but lies. Wherefore, séeing by nature man is made vnto societie and communication, when he speaketh that which is false, he striueth against his owne nature. And (as Augustine saith;1) Faith héerein is harmed, bicause he which heareth, beléeueth those things which are spoken. Wherefore, that faith, which he giueth vnto others words, is made void: and so notable a thing cannot be hurt without blame. And to conclude, euerie man by lieng looseth his owne credit; for being taken in a lie, he shall be euer after suspected of it. Wherefore, though he would, he shall not be able, by admonition or correction, to helpe his neighbour. So the fault that is in a lie, not onelie respecteth the losse or hurt of our neighbour, but it is in it of his owne kind: as manifestlie appéereth by that, which we haue alreadie said.
32 If the three kinds of lies should be compared together, I mean the pernicious lie, the sporting lie, and the officious lie; the pernicious lie should justly be counted the more detestable. Because in it are two evils: one is, the abuse of signs; 1an other is, the hurt of our neighbour, and that both of the mind that is deceived (which is common to all lies,) and also of the thing which is lost. But as for other lies, although they be not without fault; yet is the same fault much diminished by the benefit either of delight, or of supply of the help. 2And indeed, a sporting lie hath in it but a small and slender nature of a lie: for so much as the falsehood is straightway found out, neither can it be long hidden from the hearers. 3Yea Augustine writeth, that such lies are not to be counted for lies. But as touching an officious lie, 4the judgement thereof is more hard and obscure; seeing some deny it to be sin: for they say it hath a respect unto helping of our neighbour, whom we ought in words and deeds to relieve as much as we can. So as they think that therein is no abuse of the signs: forsomuch as all our doings ought to have respect to the commodity of our brethren. Neither do they think, that therein is offence committed against mans society: because through this kind of lie, men are made safe, and kept harmless.
32 If the thrée kinds of lies should be compared togither, I meane the pernicious lie, the sporting lie, and the officious lie; the pernicious lie should iustlie be counted the more detestable. Bicause in it are two euils: one is, the abuse of signes; 1an other is, the hurt of our neighbour, and that both of the mind that is deceiued (which is common to all lies,) and also of the thing which is lost. But as for other lies, although they be not without fault; yet is the same fault much diminished by the benefit either of delight, or of supplie of the helpe.
Further, they say, that whereas it is written in the holy scriptures; 1that God will destroy all those that speak lies: the same is not to be understood of every kind of lie; but of a pernicious lie only. Which Augustine also, in his Enchiridion, the 18. chapter, seemeth to grant. They allege also the opinion of Plato, 2in his book De Repub. who, as he did fray the common people from lies; yet he gave magistrates liberty to lie: especially in making of laws. But in my judgement, the thing is far otherwise. Neither can I easily grant, that an officious lie is without the abuse of the signs. For Aristotle, 3in his book [Greek or Hebrew], in defining of words, saith; that They are notes of those affections, which we have in our mind. Whereby it followeth, that all they abuse words, which signify things to be otherwise, than they think in their mind. Further, that reason, which they bring of love, is very weak. For we ought to help our neighbours; but that must be by just and honest means: otherwise we will suffer our selves to steal, to the intent to bestow it in giving of alms. But the sentence of the apostle must stand fast, which is; that Evil must not be done, 4to the intent that good may come thereof. Neither do I think it to be true, that by those kind of lies, the society of man is not hurt: seeing that, if fidelity be taken away, there remaineth no dealing of one man with an other.
Further, they saie, that whereas it is written in the holie scriptures; 1that God will destroie all those that speake lies: the same is not to be vnderstood of euerie kind of lie; but of a pernicious lie onelie. Which Augustine also, in his Enchiridion, the 18. chapter, séemeth to grant. They alledge also the opinion of Plato, 2in his booke De Repub. who, as he did fraie the common people from lies; yet he gaue magistrates libertie to lie: especiallie in making of lawes. But in my iudgement, the thing is farre otherwise. Neither can I easilie grant, that an officious lie is without the abuse of the signes. For Aristotle,
33 But as touching that sentence of the holy scriptures, wherein it is said; Thou shalt destroy all them that speak lies: we grant with Augustine, that that sentence is not universally spoken. For, so long as the strength of our faith, and joining together with Christ endureth; so long those sins are not imputed: which otherwise of their own nature would be our destruction. And this also I may easily grant touching officious and sporting lies: because they are not so much against charity, as pernicious lies be. But this no man can deny, but that in making of a lie, we deal against faith. And we must wholly grant, that he which lieth, doth loose his own credit thereby: so that afterward he cannot profitably admonish, reprove, or fruitfully give counsel, as he ought to do. For they, which hear him, will soon think that he lieth officiously; to call them again into the way, and not that the thing is so in very deed.
33 But as touching that sentence of the holie scriptures, wherein it is said; Thou shalt destroie all them that speake lies: we grant with Augustine, that that sentence is not vniuersallie spoken. For, so long as the strength of our faith, and ioining togither with Christ indureth; so long those sinnes are not imputed: which otherwise of their owne nature would be our destruction. And this also I may easilie grant touching officious and sporting lies: bicause they are not so much against charitie, as pernicious lies be. But this no man can denie, but that in making of a lie, we deale against faith. And we must wholie grant, that he which lieth, dooth loose his owne credit thereby: so that afterward he cannot profitablie admonish, reprooue, or fruitfullie giue counsell, as he ought to doo. For they, which heare him, will soone thinke that he lieth officiouslie; to call them againe into the waie, and not that the thing is so in verie déed.
Certainly, this was the cause that Augustine was against Jerome, who in a manner fathered an ⟨p. 545⟩officious lie upon the holy scriptures: If this (saith he) should be so, the authority of the holy scriptures would soon be impaired; for the readers thereof would soon say, that the thing is not so, but that it is so written for the keeping of men in their duty. Neither ought the authority of Plato to move us much; 1seeing in that place he erred greatly, granting, that in things pertaining to GOD, they might feign fables, which should serve to bring forth and keep a good opinion of them. Doubtless we must not jest in divine matters. Further, the law of God is equal, and evermore one: and as it will not have the common people to lie; so doth it also forbid the same to magistrates. Howbeit, they cannot justly be accused of a lie, which in their talk be far from double meaning. For otherwhile it cometh to pass, that some speak that which is false; and yet they thought the same to be true. 2Among which men they also are to be excused, who have given a promise to do a thing; which afterward they be not able to perform: because at the beginning, when they promised it, they were fully minded to do that, which they had promised: and therefore they have not lied. If they afterward do not accomplish those things, which they spake, the same happeneth by some other occasion.
Certeinlie, this was the cause that Augustine was against Ierom, who in a maner fathered an ⟨p. 545⟩officious lie vpon the holie scriptures: If this (saith he) should be so, the authoritie of the holie scriptures would soone be impaired; for the readers thereof would soone saie, that the thing is not so, but that it is so written for the kéeping of men in their dutie. Neither ought the authoritie of Plato to mooue vs much; 1séeing in that place he erred greatlie, granting, that in things perteining to GOD, they might feine fables, which should serue to bring foorth and kéepe a good opinion of them. Doubtles we must not ieast in diuine matters. Further, the lawe of God is equall, and euermore one: and as it will not haue the common people to lie; so dooth it also forbid the same to magistrates. Howbeit, they cannot iustlie be accused of a lie, which in their talke be farre from double meaning. For otherwhile it commeth to passe, that some speake that which is false; and yet they thought the same to be true.
And otherwhile it cometh to pass, that he which delivereth his sword to a man to keep, falleth afterward mad: wherefore he that hath the custody of the sword, ought not to redeliver it unto him; because (as the lawyers say) a new case requireth a new help. 1After the very same sort is Paul excused, who said, that he would go into Spain; when as nevertheless he went not thither. 2Paul also promised to the Corinthians, that he would come unto them; which he performed not, but yet he lied not: because, when he spake those words, he was minded so to do: but God had otherwise appointed it, as Gelasius hath well written, as we find in the 22. cause, question the second, in the chapter Beatus. Undoubtedly, the disposition of God breaketh and dissolveth all bonds: as it is written in the 19. cause, question the second, chapter Duae sunt.
And otherwhile it commeth to passe, that he which deliuereth his sword to a man to kéepe, falleth afterward mad: wherefore he that hath the custodie of the sword, ought not to redeliuer it vnto him; bicause (as the lawiers saie) a new case requireth a new helpe. 1After the verie same sort is Paule excused, who said, that he would go into Spaine; when as neuerthelesse he went not thither. 2Paule also promised to the Corinthians, that he would come vnto them; which he performed not, but yet he lied not: bicause, when he spake those words, he was minded so to doo: but God had otherwise appointed it, as Gelasius hath well written, as we find in the 22. cause, question the second, in the chapter Beatus. Vndoubtedlie, the disposition of God breaketh and dissolueth all bonds: as it is written in the 19. cause, question the second, chapter Duae sunt.
34 But what shall we say touching the hyperbolical speeches, which are in the holy scriptures, which at the first sight seem to be lies? I answer, that although there in signification the sentence keep not a mean in respect of quantity; yet, as touching the manner, it doth. For those excessive speeches amplify a matter, because their nature is not only to set forth a thing, but also to lead men into an admiration, which by that manner of speech they most commodiously attain unto. Neither have lies any place there, forsomuch as they breed not in the the minds of the readers and hearers any false or corrupt sense. A mean therefore must there be kept; undoubtedly, not of the thing, but of the manner. The evangelists also are not to be holden as liars, when as they, setting forth the acts of Christ, do not all use the self same words. For it is sufficient unto the truth, that a thing be set forth as it was: but it is not required to be expressed by the self same words. Yea, it is oftentimes done through the goodness of the holy Ghost, that the manner of the narration should differ. For by such means, those things, which are not sufficiently expressed by one, are more plainly showed by an other.
34 But what shall we saie touching the hyperbolicall spéeches, which are in the holie scriptures, which at the first sight séeme to be lies? I answer, that although there in signification the sentence kéepe not a meane in respect of quantitie; yet, as touching the maner, it dooth. For those excessiue spéeches amplifie a matter, bicause their nature is not onelie to set foorth a thing, but also to lead men into an admiration, which by that maner of spéech they most commodiouslie atteine vnto. Neither haue lies anie place there, forsomuch as they bréed not in the the minds of the readers and hearers anie false or corrupt sense. A meane therefore must there be kept; vndoubtedlie, not of the thing, but of the maner. The euangelists also are not to be holden as liers, when as they, setting foorth the acts of Christ, doo not all vse the selfe same words. For it is sufficient vnto the truth, that a thing be set foorth as it was: but it is not required to be expressed by the selfe same words. Yea, it is oftentimes doone through the goodnesse of the holie Ghost, that the maner of the narration should differ. For by such meanes, those things, which are not sufficientlie expressed by one, are more plainelie shewed by an other.
35 But they use to object the midwives of the Hebrews, which although they lied, 1yet God rewarded them. 2The same also happened to Rahab the harlot, or victualler. Augustine answereth, 3that it was not the lie which the midwives made, but the faith and fear that they had towards God, and the mercy showed unto the Israelites, that pleased the Lord: which the holy history by express words doth testify. And no otherwise must we think of Rahab. 4But I never like of the opinion of Gregory, who saith; that for the lie which they made, their eternal reward was turned to a temporal reward: because it is said, that God, for their everlasting blessedness, builded them houses. But I judge, that by reason of the true faith, which was effectual in them, in such sort, as it brought forth in them both love and the fear of God, (which be lawful and just fruits of that faith) the lie, which they made through infirmity, bereaved them not of eternal felicity.
35 But they vse to obiect the midwiues of the Hebrues, which although they lied, 1yet God rewarded them. 2The same also happened to Rahab the harlot, or vitler. Augustine answereth, 3that it was not the lie which the midwiues made, but the faith and feare that they had towards God, and the mercie shewed vnto the Israelits, that pleased the Lord: which the holie historie by expresse words dooth testifie. And no otherwise must we thinke of Rahab. 4But I neuer like of the opinion of Gregorie, who saith; that for the lie which they made, their eternall reward was turned to a temporall reward: bicause it is said, that God, for their euerlasting blessednesse, builded them houses. But I iudge, that by reason of the true faith, which was effectuall in them, in such sort, as it brought foorth in them both loue and the feare of God, (which be lawfull and iust fruits of that faith) the lie, which they made through infirmitie, béereaued them not of eternall felicitie.
36 Abraham also is objected, who said, 1that Sarah was his sister. Howbeit, therein (as Augustine teacheth) he lied not: he told that which was true, but yet he spake not all the truth. And that is of no man required, to utter all that he knoweth to be true. He did not say that she was his wife: yet, because she was his kinswoman, he might (according to the manner of the Hebrews) truly say that she was his sister. Notwithstanding, he seemeth not to be holden altogether excused: for although he lied not in calling of her sister; yet it appeareth that therein he fell, because, by not revealing that she was his wife, he put her in danger of loosing her chastity; sith he lest her void of that help, whereby only she might have been defended from falling into the love of strangers. Neither is it needful, that I should endeavour to excuse Abraham altogether: for he was a man, and by too much fear might easily do amiss. Howbeit, 2Augustine mentioneth; that Abraham was then in danger two manner of ways: the one, least he should be killed him self; the other, the adultery of his wife. The first he might shun, in calling ⟨p. 546⟩her his sister: the other; namely, least she should be polluted, he was not able to repel. For although he had said that he was her husband, that would not have served, to deliver her from the shameful lusts of the Egyptians. Wherefore, that which he himself was not able to shun, he committed unto God: and in that, which was in his own power, he would not tempt him. This seemeth to be the judgement of Augustine. But what I judge, I have before declared.
36 Abraham also is obiected, who said, 1that Sara was his sister. Howbeit, therein (as Augustine teacheth) he lied not: he told that which was true, but yet he spake not all the truth. And that is of no man required, to vtter all that he knoweth to be true. He did not saie that she was his wife: yet, bicause she was his kinswoman, he might (according to the maner of the Hebrues) truelie saie that she was his sister. Notwithstanding, he séemeth not to be holden altogither excused: for although he lied not in calling of hir sister; yet it appéereth that therein he fell, bicause, by not reuealing that she was his wife, he put hir in danger of loosing hir chastitie; sith he lest hir void of that helpe, whereby onelie she might haue béene defended from falling into the loue of strangers. Neither is it néedfull, that I should indeuour to excuse Abraham altogither: for he was a man, and by too muth feare might easilie doo amisse. Howbeit,
37 But did not the same Abraham lie, when he said unto his servants; 1Tarry here, and we will return unto you: when nevertheless he was minded to sacrifice his son? Which if he had done, he might not have returned, having his son with him; but should have returned alone without him. Jacob also by express words lied, 2when he said unto his father; I am Esau thy son. Paul also (as it is written in the Acts) saith, that he knew him not to be the chief priest, which commanded him to be stricken; when for all that (as Augustine testifieth in his sermon of the Centurions son, and as it is written in the 23. cause, question the first, chapter Paratus) he knew him well enough. Paul (saith he) was brought up among the Jews, he had learned the law at the feet of Gamaliel: wherefore he very well knew the chief priest from other men. 3Jehu also lied manifestly, when he said, 4that he would worship Baal. Augustine writeth, that there be two kinds of men mentioned in the holy scriptures. For that there were some so perfect, as although they were not without sin, yet we may not rashly judge evil of them; but rather seek how we may defend those things, which in their works have a show of sin. They oftentimes were so moved by the holy Ghost, that God by their words and acts might make certain secrets known. And so we must believe, that oftentimes they both spake and did certain things by prophecy. So Abraham, when he said; We will return unto you, prophesied unawares, that which should come to pass: for he safely returned from the mountain with Isaac.
37 But did not the same Abraham lie, when he said vnto his seruants; 1Tarrie here, and we will returne vnto you: when neuerthelesse he was minded to sacrifice his sonne? Which if he had doone, he might not haue returned, hauing his sonne with him; but should haue returned alone without him. Iacob also by expresse words lied, 2when he said vnto his father; I am Esau thy sonne. Paule also (as it is written in the Acts) saith, that he knew him not to be the chéefe priest, which commanded him to be striken; when for all that (as Augustine testifieth in his sermon of the Centurions sonne, and as it is written in the 23. cause, question the first, chapter Paratus) he knew him well enough. Paule (saith he) was brought vp among the Iewes, he had learned the lawe at the féet of Gamaliel: wherefore he verie well knew the chéefe priest from other men.
And Jacob, in saying; I am Esau, meant to declare nothing else, but that he was the man, to whom the degree, blessing, and dignity was due: which seemed to pertain unto Esau, who was the first borne. Paul also prophesied, what should at the length become of the high priest; namely, that as a painted wall, and a thing altogether feigned and hypocritical, he should be taken away. Further (saith Augustine) there were other men, not so perfect, but were evil; which are spoken of in the old testament, either to have lied; or else to have done some thing, that might seem to be sin. But he thinketh, that we should not so greatly endeavour to defend the good name and opinion of those men. Of this sort of men was Jehu: for although that murder, which he executed upon Ahab, and his family, and also his weeding out of Baal, and the worshippers thereof, pleased God: yet nevertheless, he was a wicked king; neither forsook he the worshipping of golden calves. Wherefore it shall be lawful to confess, that in lying he committed sin. But in my judgement (and as I noted before) by this only distinction we may easily dissolve this doubt; namely, 1that those men were stirred up to lie, either by the spirit of man, or by the motion of God. When they did it as men, we will not deny, but that they sinned: but when they spake so by the inspiration of God, we marvel at their sayings and doings. But we will not take it as an example and president to follow.
And Iacob, in saieng; I am Esau, ment to declare nothing else, but that he was the man, to whom the degrée, blessing, and dignitie was due: which séemed to perteine vnto Esau, who was the first borne. Paule also prophesied, what should at the length become of the high priest; namelie, that as a painted wall, and a thing altogither feigned and hypocriticall, he should be taken awaie. Further (saith Augustine) there were other men, not so perfect, but were euill; which are spoken of in the old testament, either to haue lied; or else to haue doone some thing, that might séeme to be sinne. But he thinketh, that we should not so greatlie indeuor to defend the good name and opinion of those men. Of this sort of men was Iehu: for although that murther, which he executed vpon Achab, and his familie, and also his wéeding out of Baal, and the worshippers thereof, pleased God: yet neuerthelesse, he was a wicked king; neither forsooke he the worshipping of golden calues. Wherefore it shall be lawfull to confesse, that in lieng he committed sinne. But in my iudgement (and as I noted before) by this onelie distinction we may easilie dissolue this doubt; namelie,
38 But there ariseth a harder doubt; 1namely, whether it be lawful to make a lie, for the preservation of our neighbours life? Augustine, 2De mendacio ad Consentium, saith; If a man should be in great peril of death, and the same man should also know, that his son were in extreme danger; who happening to die, thou having knowledge thereof, if the father ask thee; Doth my son live? And thou art sure that he also will die, if thou show him that his son is departed, what wouldest thou do in this case? Whether thou sayest, he liveth; or whether thou sayest, I cannot tell: thou liest. But if so be thou answer that he is dead, all men will cry out upon thee, as though thou haddest committed man-slaughter; and as though thou, by thy heavy news, haddest been the occasion of the death of this father, being sick, and lying at the point of death. Augustine granteth that the case is hard; neither denieth he, but that (as a man) he should be moved; and perhaps it might so chance, that affections would not suffer him to speak that, which is just and right. But at the length he concludeth, that he ought not to lie.
38 But there ariseth a harder doubt; 1namelie, whether it be lawfull to make a lie, for the preseruation of our neighbors life? Augustine, 2De mendacio ad Consentium, saith; If a man shuld be in great perill of death, and the same man should also knowe, that his sonne were in extreame danger; who happening to die, thou hauing knowledge thereof, if the father aske thée; Dooth my sonne liue? And thou art sure that he also will die, if thou shew him that his sonne is departed, what wouldest thou doo in this case? Whether thou saiest, he liueth; or whether thou saiest, I cannot tell: thou liest. But if so be thou answer that he is dead, all men will crie out vpon thée, as though thou haddest committed man-slaughter; and as though thou, by thy heauie newes, haddest béene the occasion of the death of this father, being sicke, and lieng at the point of death. Augustine granteth that the case is hard; neither denieth he, but that (as a man) he should be mooued; and perhaps it might so chance, that affections would not suffer him to speake that, which is iust and right. But at the length he concludeth, that he ought not to lie.
And he addeth moreover, that if thou know, that any unchaste woman loveth thee inordinately, which also threateneth to kill her self; 1yea and will do it indeed, except thou assent to her wicked lusts, whether herein thou oughtest to commit any shameful things against chastity? I think not. So likewise (saith he) thou oughtest not to offend against the truth, for saving of thy neighbours life. And moreover, what a window should be opened unto lying, if we ⟨p. 547⟩should determine to do otherwise? For that, which one should think to be lawful in respect of life, another would judge that he may do the same for money; another for estimation, or for defending of lands and possessions. And so it would come to pass, that there would be no measure nor end of lying. We may not suffer (saith Augustine) that any man should kill his own soul for the bodily life of another man. No, nor that it is lawful to lie for the salvation of any mans soul. Every lie (saith John) is not of GOD. But we ought not to speak those things, which are not of God.
And he addeth moreouer, that if thou knowe, that anie vnchast woman loueth thée inordinatelie, which also threateneth to kill hir selfe; 1yea and will doo it indéed, except thou assent to hir wicked lusts, whether herein thou oughtest to commit anie shamefull things against chastitie? I thinke not. So likewise (saith he) thou oughtest not to offend against the truth, for sauing of thy neighbors life. And moreouer, what a windowe should be opened vnto lieng, if we ⟨p. 547⟩should determine to doo otherwise? For that, which one should thinke to be lawfull in respect of life, another would iudge that he may doo the same for monie; another for estimation, or for defending of lands and possessions. And so it would come to passe, that there would be no measure nor end of lieng. We may not suffer (saith Augustine) that anie man should kill his owne soule for the bodilie life of another man. No, nor that it is lawfull to lie for the saluation of anie mans soule. Euerie lie (saith Iohn) is not of GOD. But we ought not to speake those things, which are not of God.