A14350:605
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
3 Now the place serveth to speak somewhat of pleasure; and that we may not think that all kind of pleasure is secluded from the chiefest good, or from felicity. For in very deed, felicity, whether we understand it for natural or theological, is either pleasure, or else is joined therewith; so as they cannot be plucked one from another. First I will show those things, which I have gathered thereof out of Plato's doctrine; afterward I will briefly comprehend what Aristotle hath of the same. Plato divided our soul at the least into two parts; to wit, the mind, and the sense: of these parts, as the one is high and most excellent, and whereby we approach very near unto God; so the other is gross, and in a manner brutish, and by it we communicate with beasts. This distinction of the mind being put and confirmed, he attributed unto the mind gladness and joy; but unto the sense, pleasure. But what the difference is between joy and gladness (as me thinks I find by his opinion) I will declare. He will have it, that gladness is sometimes good and commendable; but sometimes, if it shall pass the limits, he affirmeth it to be a vice, and that it is to be despised. 1Which will appear the more plain, if it be defined: for it is a certain haughtiness of the mind, because of the presentness of some good thing: but every man doth see that gladness is right, if we be lifted up by reason of some present good, that is neither less nor more than the thing it self deserveth. Wherefore they be foolish, which puff up themselves for false good things, or be too much elevated for the obtainment of vile and simple goods. But those men are to be detested, which rejoice at wickedness committed, which thorough the corruption of judgment seems good unto their minds. But on the other side, gladness is then praised and commended, when the mind is no more merrier nor puffed up, than agreeth with the good that is gotten. And Cicero in his second book De finibus, as he had learned of the Stoics, comprehended naughty gladness under these words, saying that the same is an exalting of the mind, which without reason thinks it enjoyeth a great good.
3 Now the place serueth to speake somwhat of pleasure; and that we may not thinke that all kind of pleasure is secluded from the chéefest good, or from felicitie. For in verie déed, felicitie, whether we vnderstand it for naturall or theologicall, is either pleasure, or else is ioined therewith; so as they cannot be plucked one from another. First I will shew those things, which I haue gathered thereof out of Platos doctrine; afterward I will bréeflie comprehend what Aristotle hath of the same. Plato diuided our soule at the least into two parts; to wit, the mind, and the sense: of these parts, as the one is high and most excellent, and whereby we approch verie néere vnto God; so the other is grosse, and in a maner brutish, and by it we communicate with beasts. This distinction of the mind being put and confirmed, hée attributed vnto the mind gladnes and ioie; but vnto the sense, pleasure. But what the difference is betwéene ioie and gladnes (as me thinks I find by his opinion) I wil declare. He will haue it, that gladnes is somtimes good and commendable; but sometimes, if it shall passe the limits, he affirmeth it to be a vice, and that it is to be despised. 1Which will appéere the more plaine, if it be defined: for it is a certeine hautines of the mind, bicause of the presentnes of some good thing: but euerie man dooth sée that gladnes is right, if we be lifted vp by reason of some present good, that is neither lesse nor more than the thing it selfe deserueth. Wherefore they be foolish, which puffe vp themselues for false good things, or be too much eleuated for the obtainment of vile and simple goods. But those men are to be detested, which reioise at wickednes committed, which thorough the corruption of iudgment séemes good vnto their minds. But on the other side, gladnes is then praised and commended, when the mind is no more merier nor puffed vp, than agréeth with the good that is gotten. And Cicero in his second booke De finibus, as he had learned of the Stoikes, comprehended naughtie gladnes vnder these words, saieng that the same is an exalting of the mind, which without reason thinks it enioieth a great good.
But I return to Plato, who also ascribeth joy unto the mind; but yet so, 1as there can no evil cleave thereunto, because he defineth the same to be a pleasantness, which floweth either from the contemplation of a wise man, or else from the actions of virtue. This pleasantness can suffer no evil access: for those things which be just, right, and as best becometh, cannot please any man too much. And he so commended joy, as in his book De pulchro, when he speaketh of heavenly & true blessed life, he affirmeth that thereby the minds of the faithful are nourished. And he will have it, that the poets did cunningly call that kind of meat Ambrosia & Nectar. But the pleasure, whereby the senses alone (as he thinketh) are replenished, is a sweet motion, which tickleth the senses. From which opinion Cicero nothing disagreeth, who in the second book De finibus saith, that All men think this to be pleasure, which the sense receiving is moved, and is replenished with a certain pleasantness: and after a few words between, he misliked not to repeat the same. That pleasant motion, wherewith the senses is made merry, all men call in Greek [Greek or Hebrew]; in Latin Voluptatem; that is pleasure. By these things which I now show, ye must observe this, that as well ⟨p. 135⟩Plato, as the Stoics, and other ancient writers judged pleasure to be a motion or action: for afterward we shall see what truth this may have in it.
But I returne to Plato, who also ascribeth ioie vnto the mind; but yet so, 1as there can no euill cleaue therevnto, bicause he defineth the same to be a pleasantnes, which floweth either from the contemplation of a wise man, or else from the actions of vertue. This pleasantnes can suffer no euill accesse: for those things which be iust, right, and as best becommeth, cannot please anie man too much. And he so commended ioie, as in his booke De pulchro, when he speaketh of heauenlie & true blessed life, he affirmeth that thereby the minds of the faithfull are nourished. And he will haue it, that the poets did cunninglie call that kind of meate Ambrosia & Nectar. But the pleasure, whereby the senses alone (as he thinketh) are replenished, is a swéet motion, which tickleth the senses. From which opinion Cicero nothing disagréeth, who in the second booke De finibus saith, that All men think this to be pleasure, which the sense receiuing is mooued, and is replenished with a certeine pleasantnes: and after a few words betwéene, hée misliked not to repeate the same. That pleasant motion, wherewith the senses is made merie, all men call in Gréeke ; in Latine Voluptatem; that is pleasure. By these things which I now shew, ye must obserue this, that as well
1Plato thinketh, that this pleasure of the senses riseth of the infirmity of nature: for the same if it be spent, beginneth to desire those things wherewith it judgeth that it may be restored and renewed; & while we satisfy the want of nature, the senses are tickled and tempered with pleasantness. And contrariwise, while nature cannot obtain those things that it hath need of, both it languisheth, and thorough want is marvellously grieved. Whereupon the same author in Phileto said, that pleasures are the avoiding of sorrows, and thereof concludeth, that the pleasures of them that be sick are greater and more vehement than of them that be in good health: for when they be greatly tormented with griefs, they do exceedingly burn with the desire of medicines, I mean with the desire of all pleasures; therefore when they obtain them, they are delighted above measure. As we may perceive in them which are sick of most sharp fevers, and be in a manner consumed with intolerable thirst, to whom when the physician giveth leave to satisfy themselves with cold, or some other kind of drink; it cannot be said what exceeding pleasure they take. 2Hereunto in that place he addeth, that these grosser sort of pleasures, which belong unto the senses, are not single but mixed; for they have always some sorrow joined with them: for (as we have said) the neediness of nature breedeth griefs. Neither are the pleasures of this kind brought forth any longer, when the natural want is satisfied: for meat liketh not them that be satisfied and have their fill; neither is drink welcome to them which have drunk abundantly. But and if it happen to be otherwise, 3as otherwhile we see it doth to them which be drunkards & gluttons, there is another cause of the pleasure than natural want; namely an ill disposition, or else some other thing, which is not now fit time to declare, seeing we treat of natural pleasures.
1Plato thinketh, that this pleasure of the senses riseth of the infirmitie of nature: for the same if it be spent, beginneth to desire those things wherewith it iudgeth that it may be restored and renewed; & while we satisfie the want of nature, the senses are tickled and tempered with pleasantnes. And contrariwise, while nature cannot obteine those things that it hath néed of, both it languisheth, and thorough want is maruelouslie gréeued. Wherevpon the same authour in Phileto said, that pleasures are the auoiding of sorrowes, and thereof concludeth, that the pleasures of them that be sicke are greater and more vehement than of them that be in good health: for when they be greatlie tormented with gréefs, they doo excéedingly burne with the desire of medicins, I meane with the desire of all pleasures; therefore when they obteine them, they are delighted aboue measure. As we may perceiue in them which are sicke of most sharpe feuers, and be in a maner consumed with intollerable thirst, to whom when the physician giueth leaue to satisfie themselues with cold, or some other kind of drinke; it cannot be said what excéeding pleasure they take.
14 Howbeit Aristotle put not these differences of words; but those delectations which as well belong unto the mind or reason, as those which be of the senses he called pleasures, that is, [Greek or Hebrew]. Yea, and in the seventh book the eleventh chapter, he will that [Greek or Hebrew], that is, happy, is so called of [Greek or Hebrew], which is to rejoice; and he speaketh of pleasure, which he joineth with blessedness. Certainly he speaketh not of this pleasure, wherewith the sense and grosser part of the mind is possessed: for that is only joined with the felicity which shall be of the mind, which as I have said, of a mingled word, is named pleasure. And perhaps Aristotle would not change the name, because he thought to speak as most men did, although he agreed with Plato as touching the difference of the thing. 2But yet herein they differ one from another, that Aristotle thinketh not (as Plato and the old philosophers did) that pleasure is a motion or action; but rather an affect cleaving unto the motion or operation. Wherefore these differ after a sort, although in the subject they agree. And if at any time Aristotle himself, or any Peripatetic, called pleasure a motion; that proposition, which commonly in the Schools they call Identica, must be ascribed unto them: for as it hath been said, both the affect, and motion or action; are in subject all one. Wherefore the general word thereof is the Predicament of quality, 3and pleasure belongeth to the third kind thereof, and the same is called a passion; or passible quality. It is called in Greek [Greek or Hebrew]; whereby we are sweetly affected with the presence of some good thing agreeing with our nature. And as beauty is a quality which riseth of a just and right temperature of the body, of well-favouredness, and of a comely colour; so pleasure ariseth of a convenient motion and action. Wherefore thus it shall be lawful to define the same.
Pleasure is an affect, wherewith we are sweetly moved, 1by reason of an action which proceedeth from a nature that is of good constitution, or else from an habit according to nature without impediment. For the actions both of eating, and drinking, and procreating, seeing they arise of nature, do always to him that is in health bring pleasure with them; for they be not hindered by sickness, nor weakness, nor yet by saturitie and fullness. Even so contemplations, and the actions of virtues, since they spring from an habit of the mind, they be ready and easy, and are a present good thing, which agreeth with the nature of man; & therefore have pleasure always joined with them. Aristotle in the tenth book of Ethics proveth, 2that pleasure is not a motion, because it is all whole together, as is a vision: and pleasure hath no succession, except it be accidentally. For if it follow actions, which have success, the same in like manner is prolonged, as it happeneth in eating and drinking; but if the action be momentany, as is a vision, hearing and understanding, then is all the pleasure had at once: even as the whole vision is at once; if the virtue and power of seeing be perfect, if the thing that is seen be set before the eyesight all at once, if the light going between be not obscured, and a convenient distance come between. A motion is not perfect in his parts, but pleasure is whole all at once; therefore it is no motion. Motion cannot be at one moment or instant, but pleasure may. The properties of motion be swiftness, and slowness; and these things are not answerable ⟨p. 136⟩to pleasure. For while a man rejoiceth, he neither rejoiceth the swifter, nor the slower; for if pleasure endure for an hour, it is all whole at once, while the hour lasteth.
Pleasure is an affect, wherwith we are swéetlie mooued, 1by reason of an action which procéedeth from a nature that is of good constitution, or else from an habit according to nature without impediment. For the actions both of eating, and drinking, and procreating, séeing they arise of nature, doo alwaies to him that is in health bring pleasure with them; for they be not hindred by sicknes, nor weakenes, nor yet by saturitie and fulnes. Euen so contemplations, and the actions of vertues, since they spring from an habit of the mind, they be readie and easie, and are a present good thing, which agréeth with the nature of man; & therefore haue pleasure alwaies ioined with them. Aristotle in the tenth booke of Ethiks prooueth,
15 Since we understand by the definition now brought, that the power must be perfect, and the habit firm; and that the action must be without impediment, and the object principal and excellent: it is gathered how long pleasure can endure. It so long abideth, as the object and ablenes, or power of doing doth remain whole: for if the object fall from the excellency thereof, or that the faculty be not vehement and earnestly bent, delectation doth not follow. Hereof it cometh, that when in working men be tired, pleasures are oftentimes diminished. Which thing also happeneth, when any thing is taken away from the excellency of the object. 2It appeareth also, why new things do so greatly delight; because the mind, so soon as any noble and excellent thing offereth it self to be beheld, doth behold the same earnestly and attentively; which, after it is known, the mind rebateth his earnestness, and so the pleasure ceaseth: but if any other new thing be put in place of the former object, then the understanding enforceth his study again in beholding of the same, and the pleasure returneth, and by this means we ever delight our selves in new things. Besides this, it is showed hereby, that the actions which are done before we attain to an habit, breed not pleasure; because they be not easily and readily done, but with some difficulty and labour. These things are opened by that definition.
15 Since we vnderstand by the definition now brought, that the power must be perfect, and the habit firme; and that the action must be without impediment, and the obiect principall and excellent: it is gathered how long pleasure can endure. It so long abideth, as the obiect and ablenes, or power of dooing doth remaine whole: for if the obiect fall from the excellencie thereof, or that the facultie be not vehement and earnestlie bent, delectation dooth not followe. Hereof it commeth, that when in working men be tired, pleasurs are oftentimes diminished. Which thing also happeneth, when anie thing is taken awaie from the excellencie of the obiect. 2It appéereth also, why new things doo so greatlie delight; bicause the mind, so soone as anie noble and excellent thing offereth it selfe to be beheld, dooth behold the same earnestlie and attentiuelie; which, after it is knowne, the mind rebateth his earnestnes, and so the pleasure ceasseth: but if anie other new thing be put in place of the former obiect, then the vnderstanding enforceth his studie againe in beholding of the same, and the pleasure returneth, and by this meanes we euer delight our selues in new things. Besides this, it is shewed héereby, that the actions which are doone before we attaine to an habit, bréed not pleasure; bicause they be not easilie and readilie doone, but with some difficultie and labour. These things are opened by that definition.
1Now must we show what pleasure is by her forms and kinds. Neither is it any doubt, but that pleasures are divided among themselves in kind, seeing actions do differ. But pleasure (as we know) is the perfection of an action; and the thing which should be done, being changed, the perfection also thereof is changed. For these be of those sort of things, which be compared one with another. Neither is any man ignorant, that there is one perfection of a chest, another of an house, another of a plant, and another of a man. Wherefore since that actions be divided one from another, so shall the pleasures, whereby they are performed, differ. Furthermore, they strive one against another, & one extinguisheth or letteth another; whereof it cometh that they are distinguished. That pleasure, which shall come of music, will take away that which ariseth of speeches: and those, which be the grosser sort, do withstand and let the delights of the understanding and reason. Again, of actions some be evil, some good, and some between both; whereby it is brought to pass, that the pleasures which follow them have variety and difference. The which also by this means cometh to pass, because the desires of actions are sundry: for if the desires be varied, much more be the pleasures, which are more joined with the actions, than be the desires: for desires are oftentimes plucked away from the work, whereas pleasures cannot be separated from their actions. No doubt but some pleasures there be of horses, some of lions, some of bears, and therefore also there be some of men: and not only have they them diverse from other living creatures, but even men themselves also have them not alike among them. For those pleasures, which be naughty, do please naughty men; and those which be honest, do delight good men.
1Now must we shew what pleasure is by hir forms and kinds. Neither is it anie doubt, but that pleasures are diuided among themselues in kind, séeing actions doo differ. But pleasure (as we knowe) is the perfection of an action; and the thing which should be doone, being changed, the perfection also thereof is changed. For these be of those sort of things, which be compared one with another. Neither is anie man ignorant, that there is one prefection of a chest, another of an house, another of a plant, and another of a man. Wherefore since that actions be diuided one from another, so shall the pleasures, whereby they are performed, differ. Furthermore, they striue one against another, & one extinguisheth or letteth another; wherof it commeth that they are distinguished. That pleasure, which shall come of musicke, will take awaie that which ariseth of spéeches: and those, which be the grosser sort, doo withstand and let the delights of the vnderstanding and reason. Again, of actions some be euill, some good, and some betwéene both; whereby it is brought to passe, that the pleasures which followe them haue varietie and difference. The which also by this meanes commeth to passe, bicause the desires of actions are sundrie: for if the desires be varied, much more be the pleasures, which are more ioined with the actions, than be the desires: for desires are oftentimes plucked awaie from the worke, whereas pleasures cannot be separated from their actions. No doubt but some pleasures there be of horses, some of lions, some of beares, and therefore also there be some of men: and not onelie haue they them diuerse from other liuing creatures, but euen men themselues also haue them not alike among them. For those pleasures, which be naughtie, doo please naughtie men; and those which be honest, doo delight good men.
6 Wherefore now (as I think) it is sufficiently confirmed, 1that pleasures must be distinguished. Let this then be the first distinction. Of pleasures some be pure, and some unpure. And this division is taken from works and actions; so as of them some be about the objects more severed from matter, or more joined with the same. Which how true it is, Galen hath very well declared in his second book De causis symptomatum; There are found (saith he) griefs and pleasures in all the senses: griefs (as he saith) come hereupon, that the senses are removed from their own constitution and natural state; but pleasures come, when they return to the same. And that this may the more plainly appear, he thus runneth thorough all the senses. Feeling is removed from his own estate, if there happen too much heat, or too much cold; or else, if it incur those things which do strike, or gnaw, or break, &c. hereof do arise griefs unto it. Tasting is grieved with the self-same things, which it doth communicate with feeling: but as it is taste, it is offended with tastes, which be too tart, sower, sharp, and bitter; for by these the natural constitution thereof is disturbed, and the continuance broken off. Smelling is disturbed by the dissolution of over vehement vapours; for by them the continuance is broken off. Again, hearing is put from his state, by a voice too high, or too low, or too great, or too swift, and also by every violent noise. Finally, the sight is offended, when it happeneth upon most bright lights and colours; for these things do scatter and disperse the virtue thereof. With all these same things the senses are grieved, because through them they depart from their own measurable and quiet state. Again, they are delighted and take pleasure, when they are reduced to their proper & natural state. Whereof the sight hath trial, when it turneth it self to a brown colour, whereby the power thereof is more gathered and knit together into one; or else when it beholdeth pleasant colours, as ⟨p. 137⟩green, golden, blue, or sky colours. The hearing delighteth in a mild and treatable voice. The smelling, when those vapours be dissolved, which with a certain sweetness do strengthen and confirm the instruments of smelling. Unto tasting are fat and sweet relishes pleasant.
6 Wherefore now (as I thinke) it is sufficientlie confirmed, 1
And though we be sick, yet are we for a little while delighted with somewhat sharp and sower tastes. Feeling is delighted with qualities which be temperate, soft, and somewhat warm. Thus are the senses delighted, and do take pleasure, when they be reduced to their natural and proper constitution.
And though we be sicke, yet are we for a little while delighted with somewhat sharpe and sower tasts. Féeling is delighted with qualities which be temperate, soft, and somewhat warme. Thus are the senses delighted, and doo take pleasure, when they be reduced to their naturall and proper constitution.
But it is to be understood, that those also may take pleasure, though they have not bin first offended or removed from their natural state. For if there happen to come a pleasant colour, or delightful sound, the sight and hearing is delighted, though it have not bin first removed from the constitution thereof. Galen proceedeth in those things which he said, and showeth, that there is a degree of greater or less pureness in these actions of the senses, and in pleasures; and declareth that the same standeth in the means that the senses use. The sight worketh by light; hearing, by the air; smelling, by savour; these things be pure, and have little of the grosser and thicker kind of matter. Those things, wherein feeling is occupied, hold the lowest place; those be gross and terrestrial things. From thence we come to tasting; that also is exercised about watery humours, which be somewhat thick. Smelling is elevated unto vapours, far more pure than water. Unto hearing is the air, and that a pure air more near. Lastly, we come unto the light, which among those things that be perceived, is most fine, and hath a great deal of pureness. Howbeit, we are not there to rest, but after these things we come to imagination, cogitation, memory, and understanding, which are occupied about the similitudes and images of things far more pure. Wherefore by these things appeareth, that first distinction of pleasures, that one is purer, and another grosser, and out of Galen we have expounded the ground of the division.
But it is to be vnderstood, that those also may take pleasure, though they haue not bin first offended or remooued from their naturall state. For if there happen to come a pleasant colour, or delightfull sound, the sight and hearing is delighted, though it haue not bin first remooued from the constitution thereof. Galen procéedeth in those things which he said, and sheweth, that there is a degrée of greater or lesse purenes in these actions of the senses, and in pleasures; and declareth that the same standeth in the meanes that the senses vse. The sight worketh by light; hearing, by the aire; smelling, by sauour; these things be pure, and haue little of the grosser and thicker kind of matter. Those things, wherin féeling is occupied, hold the lowest place; those be grosse and terrestriall things. From thence we come to tasting; that also is exercised about waterie humors, which bée somewhat thicke. Smelling is eleuated vnto vapours, far more pure than water. Vnto hearing is the aire, and that a pure aire more néere. Lastlie, we come vnto the light, which among those things that be perceiued, is most fine, and hath a great deale of purenes. Howbeit, we are not there to rest, but after these things we come to imagination, cogitation, memorie, and vnderstanding, which are occupied about the similitudes and images of things far more pure. Wherefore by these things appeareth, that first distinction of pleasures, that one is purer, and another grosser, and out of Galen wée haue expounded the ground of the diuision.
7 After this division there followeth another, that some pleasures are bodily, 1others not bodily. Of the bodily, thus we affirm in general, that neither they be good, nor yet bad; as also are not the actions about meat, drink, and carnal pleasure. But as touching the kinds and parts, we must say, that if they exceed measure, they be evil; but if they contain themselves within just and due limits, they are indifferent, since that men may use them both rightly, that is, according to virtue, and also unto good and laudable ends. They do also abuse them sometimes, namely, upon an ill determination & corruptly, as Catiline, when he tempered himself from delights and pleasures, to the intent he might destroy his country: but yet, if they shall be weighed in their own nature, they be rather good, according to civill goodness, than evil. 2We come now to a third distinction of pleasures. There be some, wherein there is excess; but there be others, wherein it cannot be, as it also happeneth in actions. For who did ever rightly or justly more than is requisite? And so in contemplations of the truth, be it of things natural, or mathematical, or divine; no man can rejoice, or take pleasure of them more than is requisite; neither can he in like manner, as touching things rightly done, and of the works of justice. But in being angry, in ambitious desire of promotion, in giving, in hearing, we may exceed measure, no less than in eating, drinking, and procreation.
7 After this diuision there followeth another, that some pleasures are bodilie, 1others not bodilie. Of the bodilie, thus we affirme in generall, that neither they be good, nor yet bad; as also are not the actions about meate, drinke, and carnall pleasure. But as touching the kinds and parts, we must saie, that if they excéed measure, they be euill; but if they conteine themselues within iust and due limits, they are indifferent, since that men may vse them both rightlie, that is, according to vertue, and also vnto good and laudable ends. They doo also abuse them sometimes, namelie, vpon an ill determination & corruptlie, as Catiline, when he tempered himselfe from delights and pleasures, to the intent he might destroie his countrie: but yet, if they shall be weied in their owne nature, they be rather good, according to ciuill goodnes, than euill.
Finally, the fourth distinction is, 1that of pleasures, some be single, and by themselves; because they have no sorrows mingled with them, nor yet be sweet, in respect they fill and restore nature, being wasted and consumed. Neither be they at one time pleasant, and at another time unpleasant, but are ever in their own nature to be wished and desired: and these pleasures are chiefly those, which are perceived in the mind; but others be mixed, namely with sorrows, and for that cause are pleasant, because they refresh and renew nature decaying, and therefore are not to be desired always and at all times.
Finallie, the fourth distinction is, 1that of pleasures, some be single, and by themselues; bicause they haue no sorrowes mingled with them, nor yet be swéet, in respect they fill and restore nature, being wasted and consumed. Neither be they at one time pleasant, and at another time vnpleasant, but are euer in their owne nature to be wished and desired: and these pleasures are chéefelie those, which are perceiued in the mind; but others be mixed, namelie with sorowes, and for that cause are pleasant, bicause they refresh and renew nature decaieng, and therefore are not to be desired alwaies and at all times.
8 These things being thus determined, 1let us go in hand with the pleasures which be unpure, bodily, and which have excess, and which be mixed; and let this be the first proposition of them: If they exceed measure, they must be altogether avoided; for such do either arise of a corrupt nature (for some men are even by a propriety of nature, fierce, wild, and cruel; and others be beastly, and altogether intemperate) or else these evil actions and pleasures do come from a vicious habit, brought in by a naughty custom, as we see it in drunkards, gluttons, and lascivious men: wherefore from such shameful and wicked causes, nothing can happen which (as we have said) must not be avoided. Furthermore, since that pleasures of this kind, as it hath bin already said, have bin invented to be as it were medicines unto us, when we suffer them to exceed measure; 2so far is it off that they be medicines, as they are even hurtful unto us, and that in all kind of good things, and especially those things which come of fortune. For how many riotous men be there, which having spent their great and ample patrimonies, are constrained miserably to live in want? I speak nothing of the goods of the body, seeing gluttony and fleshly pleasure killeth far more than the ⟨p. 138⟩sword, or any ordinary sickness, or defect of nature. Yea, and Galen in his second book De semine wrote, that Pleasure is sometime by it self the cause of dissolving the force and strength which giveth life. And there have been many, which have yielded up the ghost thorough too much pleasure. But & if that all abuse of things must be avoided, such kind of immoderate pleasures as these must be utterly shunned, seeing by this means they cure not the body, but do exceedingly destroy it. I let pass the goods of the mind, since nothing doth more harm unto wisdom, nor any thing more weaken the right judgement of doing things, than these immoderate pleasures.
8 These things being thus determined, 1let vs go in hand with the pleasures which be vnpure, bodilie, and which haue excesse, and which be mixed; and let this be the first proposition of them: If they excéed measure, they must be altogither auoided; for such doo either arise of a corrupt nature (for some men are euen by a proprietie of nature, fierce, wild, and cruell; and others be beastlie, and altogither intemperate) or else these euill actions and pleasures doo come from a vitious habit, brought in by a naughtie custome, as we sée it in drunkards, gluttons, and lasciuious men: wherefore from such shamefull and wicked causes, nothing can happen which (as we haue said) must not be auoided. Furthermore, since that pleasures of this kind, as it hath bin alreadie said, haue bin inuented to be as it were medicins vnto vs, when we suffer them to excéed measure;
The reason which I have brought, that by these gross and immoderate pleasures, all the kinds of good things belonging to man be destroyed, is written by Cicero in his book called Hortensius, which book is lost; yet will I rehearse his words as they be recited of Augustine in his fourth book against Julian the 14. chapter; 1But are those pleasures of the body to be desired, which truly and gravely are of Plato called the allurements and baits of evils? For what destroying (saith he) of health, what deforming of the colour and the body, what foul loss, what dishonour is there, that is not called and brought forth by pleasure? Every motion whereof, the greater it is, the more is it enemy unto philosophy. For the pleasures of the body cannot agree with any great cogitation of the mind. For who is he, that when he useth the greatest pleasure he can, is able to apply his mind to make an account, or to think of any manner of thing? But who is so unsatiable a person, that day and night, without any intermission of time, will have his senses so to be moved, as they be moved in the chiefest pleasures? What man endued with a good mind, had not rather that no pleasures at all should be given us of nature? Thus much said he. Under which sentence of his are comprehended the hurts, which are wont to be brought in through these pleasures of the body, which exceed measure. But thou wilt say, that If this reason were of force, 2it will condemn pleasures which spring of contemplation, and also that which ariseth of just actions; because both the body is hurt by too much study and contemplation: and that Socrates and also Aristides perished for their honesty sake. I answer, that this was accidentally; because Socrates lighted among evil men. Again, that the powers of the head, which do serve unto cogitation, are sometimes overmuch consumed. But some witty fellow will reply, that this also is accidental, as touching the pleasures of the body; which in very deed do arise of those actions, which destroy the body, and our good things, which the very pleasures by themselves would not do. Howbeit to this we answer, that it comes not always to pass, that a man perisheth for righteousness; nor yet that contemplation doth always harm. But these grosser and mixed pleasures, so oft as they exceed the mean, it cannot be but they do hurt:
The reason which I haue brought, that by these grosse and immoderate pleasures, all the kinds of good things belonging to man be destroied, is written by Cicero in his booke called Hortensius, which booke is lost; yet will I reherse his words as they be recited of Augustine in his fourth booke against Iulian the 14. chapter;
and so the hurt is not to be accounted of both alike.
9 But this of some is counted a hard matter, 1that these pleasures must be shunned, seeing pleasure by it self is good, & to be desired. Wherefore to avoid this, they are wont to say, that They are not pleasures indeed, but only seem so to be; and although they seem so, yet that of wise men they ought not to be accounted pleasures. Even as those things are not said to be white, which so appear unto blear eyes; neither sweet or bitter, which those that are sick do so affirm. But me thinks it should not so be answered; because both Plato and Aristotle do call them pleasures, whereupon the definition before alleged doth truly agree unto them. Therefore would I rather say to the argument, that pleasure indeed is of his own nature good, and to be desired, but not to be taken of all things: even as we desire to satisfy hunger, yet not by every kind of meat. Just men also would become rich, but yet not by every kind of gain; we also desire health, but yet not by every kind of medicine; and so we would have pleasures, but yet not those which arise of actions that be dishonest and filthy, and which do hurt the body, and all the good things which we have. 2But seeing this kind of pleasures is both hurtful, and to be shunned, how happeneth it that it is desired of so many? Because pleasure in his own nature hath some certain divine thing in it, and is desired of all men. Howbeit it comes to pass, that seeing nature in many is not yet full perfect and confirmed, as in children, or else when men be endued with naughty and lewd habits of mind, as be drunkards and fleshly persons, they be deceived, and seek for pleasures where they ought not. Wherefore I marvel at Epicurus, which taketh his argument from children, whose nature is not yet become full perfect, neither are they endued with any virtue, & therefore may easily be deceived. Again, it must be considered, that men do perpetually labour, and are wearied with sundry exercises; and therefore to be recreated and refreshed, they turn themselves to divers pleasures; and when they cannot have honest, pure, and simple pleasures, they will be satisfied with those grosser and hurtful pleasures. And men have a compounded nature, not simply one and unmixed; and thereof it comes, that they embrace sundry kinds of pleasures.
9 But this of some is counted a hard matter, 1
