A14350:614
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But it is to be understood, that those also may take pleasure, though they have not bin first offended or removed from their natural state. For if there happen to come a pleasant colour, or delightful sound, the sight and hearing is delighted, though it have not bin first removed from the constitution thereof. Galen proceedeth in those things which he said, and showeth, that there is a degree of greater or less pureness in these actions of the senses, and in pleasures; and declareth that the same standeth in the means that the senses use. The sight worketh by light; hearing, by the air; smelling, by savour; these things be pure, and have little of the grosser and thicker kind of matter. Those things, wherein feeling is occupied, hold the lowest place; those be gross and terrestrial things. From thence we come to tasting; that also is exercised about watery humours, which be somewhat thick. Smelling is elevated unto vapours, far more pure than water. Unto hearing is the air, and that a pure air more near. Lastly, we come unto the light, which among those things that be perceived, is most fine, and hath a great deal of pureness. Howbeit, we are not there to rest, but after these things we come to imagination, cogitation, memory, and understanding, which are occupied about the similitudes and images of things far more pure. Wherefore by these things appeareth, that first distinction of pleasures, that one is purer, and another grosser, and out of Galen we have expounded the ground of the division.
But it is to be vnderstood, that those also may take pleasure, though they haue not bin first offended or remooued from their naturall state. For if there happen to come a pleasant colour, or delightfull sound, the sight and hearing is delighted, though it haue not bin first remooued from the constitution thereof. Galen procéedeth in those things which he said, and sheweth, that there is a degrée of greater or lesse purenes in these actions of the senses, and in pleasures; and declareth that the same standeth in the meanes that the senses vse. The sight worketh by light; hearing, by the aire; smelling, by sauour; these things be pure, and haue little of the grosser and thicker kind of matter. Those things, wherin féeling is occupied, hold the lowest place; those be grosse and terrestriall things. From thence we come to tasting; that also is exercised about waterie humors, which bée somewhat thicke. Smelling is eleuated vnto vapours, far more pure than water. Vnto hearing is the aire, and that a pure aire more néere. Lastlie, we come vnto the light, which among those things that be perceiued, is most fine, and hath a great deale of purenes. Howbeit, we are not there to rest, but after these things we come to imagination, cogitation, memorie, and vnderstanding, which are occupied about the similitudes and images of things far more pure. Wherefore by these things appeareth, that first distinction of pleasures, that one is purer, and another grosser, and out of Galen wée haue expounded the ground of the diuision.
7 After this division there followeth another, that some pleasures are bodily, 1others not bodily. Of the bodily, thus we affirm in general, that neither they be good, nor yet bad; as also are not the actions about meat, drink, and carnal pleasure. But as touching the kinds and parts, we must say, that if they exceed measure, they be evil; but if they contain themselves within just and due limits, they are indifferent, since that men may use them both rightly, that is, according to virtue, and also unto good and laudable ends. They do also abuse them sometimes, namely, upon an ill determination & corruptly, as Catiline, when he tempered himself from delights and pleasures, to the intent he might destroy his country: but yet, if they shall be weighed in their own nature, they be rather good, according to civill goodness, than evil. 2We come now to a third distinction of pleasures. There be some, wherein there is excess; but there be others, wherein it cannot be, as it also happeneth in actions. For who did ever rightly or justly more than is requisite? And so in contemplations of the truth, be it of things natural, or mathematical, or divine; no man can rejoice, or take pleasure of them more than is requisite; neither can he in like manner, as touching things rightly done, and of the works of justice. But in being angry, in ambitious desire of promotion, in giving, in hearing, we may exceed measure, no less than in eating, drinking, and procreation.
7 After this diuision there followeth another, that some pleasures are bodilie, 1others not bodilie. Of the bodilie, thus we affirme in generall, that neither they be good, nor yet bad; as also are not the actions about meate, drinke, and carnall pleasure. But as touching the kinds and parts, we must saie, that if they excéed measure, they be euill; but if they conteine themselues within iust and due limits, they are indifferent, since that men may vse them both rightlie, that is, according to vertue, and also vnto good and laudable ends. They doo also abuse them sometimes, namelie, vpon an ill determination & corruptlie, as Catiline, when he tempered himselfe from delights and pleasures, to the intent he might destroie his countrie: but yet, if they shall be weied in their owne nature, they be rather good, according to ciuill goodnes, than euill.
Finally, the fourth distinction is, 1that of pleasures, some be single, and by themselves; because they have no sorrows mingled with them, nor yet be sweet, in respect they fill and restore nature, being wasted and consumed. Neither be they at one time pleasant, and at another time unpleasant, but are ever in their own nature to be wished and desired: and these pleasures are chiefly those, which are perceived in the mind; but others be mixed, namely with sorrows, and for that cause are pleasant, because they refresh and renew nature decaying, and therefore are not to be desired always and at all times.
Finallie, the fourth distinction is, 1that of pleasures, some be single, and by themselues; bicause they haue no sorrowes mingled with them, nor yet be swéet, in respect they fill and restore nature, being wasted and consumed. Neither be they at one time pleasant, and at another time vnpleasant, but are euer in their owne nature to be wished and desired: and these pleasures are chéefelie those, which are perceiued in the mind; but others be mixed, namelie with sorowes, and for that cause are pleasant, bicause they refresh and renew nature decaieng, and therefore are not to be desired alwaies and at all times.
8 These things being thus determined, 1let us go in hand with the pleasures which be unpure, bodily, and which have excess, and which be mixed; and let this be the first proposition of them: If they exceed measure, they must be altogether avoided; for such do either arise of a corrupt nature (for some men are even by a propriety of nature, fierce, wild, and cruel; and others be beastly, and altogether intemperate) or else these evil actions and pleasures do come from a vicious habit, brought in by a naughty custom, as we see it in drunkards, gluttons, and lascivious men: wherefore from such shameful and wicked causes, nothing can happen which (as we have said) must not be avoided. Furthermore, since that pleasures of this kind, as it hath bin already said, have bin invented to be as it were medicines unto us, when we suffer them to exceed measure; 2so far is it off that they be medicines, as they are even hurtful unto us, and that in all kind of good things, and especially those things which come of fortune. For how many riotous men be there, which having spent their great and ample patrimonies, are constrained miserably to live in want? I speak nothing of the goods of the body, seeing gluttony and fleshly pleasure killeth far more than the ⟨p. 138⟩sword, or any ordinary sickness, or defect of nature. Yea, and Galen in his second book De semine wrote, that Pleasure is sometime by it self the cause of dissolving the force and strength which giveth life. And there have been many, which have yielded up the ghost thorough too much pleasure. But & if that all abuse of things must be avoided, such kind of immoderate pleasures as these must be utterly shunned, seeing by this means they cure not the body, but do exceedingly destroy it. I let pass the goods of the mind, since nothing doth more harm unto wisdom, nor any thing more weaken the right judgement of doing things, than these immoderate pleasures.
The reason which I have brought, that by these gross and immoderate pleasures, all the kinds of good things belonging to man be destroyed, is written by Cicero in his book called Hortensius, which book is lost; yet will I rehearse his words as they be recited of Augustine in his fourth book against Julian the 14. chapter; 1But are those pleasures of the body to be desired, which truly and gravely are of Plato called the allurements and baits of evils? For what destroying (saith he) of health, what deforming of the colour and the body, what foul loss, what dishonour is there, that is not called and brought forth by pleasure? Every motion whereof, the greater it is, the more is it enemy unto philosophy. For the pleasures of the body cannot agree with any great cogitation of the mind. For who is he, that when he useth the greatest pleasure he can, is able to apply his mind to make an account, or to think of any manner of thing? But who is so unsatiable a person, that day and night, without any intermission of time, will have his senses so to be moved, as they be moved in the chiefest pleasures? What man endued with a good mind, had not rather that no pleasures at all should be given us of nature? Thus much said he. Under which sentence of his are comprehended the hurts, which are wont to be brought in through these pleasures of the body, which exceed measure. But thou wilt say, that If this reason were of force, 2it will condemn pleasures which spring of contemplation, and also that which ariseth of just actions; because both the body is hurt by too much study and contemplation: and that Socrates and also Aristides perished for their honesty sake. I answer, that this was accidentally; because Socrates lighted among evil men. Again, that the powers of the head, which do serve unto cogitation, are sometimes overmuch consumed. But some witty fellow will reply, that this also is accidental, as touching the pleasures of the body; which in very deed do arise of those actions, which destroy the body, and our good things, which the very pleasures by themselves would not do. Howbeit to this we answer, that it comes not always to pass, that a man perisheth for righteousness; nor yet that contemplation doth always harm. But these grosser and mixed pleasures, so oft as they exceed the mean, it cannot be but they do hurt:
The reason which I haue brought, that by these grosse and immoderate pleasures, all the kinds of good things belonging to man be destroied, is written by Cicero in his booke called Hortensius, which booke is lost; yet will I reherse his words as they be recited of Augustine in his fourth booke against Iulian the 14. chapter;
and so the hurt is not to be accounted of both alike.
9 But this of some is counted a hard matter, 1that these pleasures must be shunned, seeing pleasure by it self is good, & to be desired. Wherefore to avoid this, they are wont to say, that They are not pleasures indeed, but only seem so to be; and although they seem so, yet that of wise men they ought not to be accounted pleasures. Even as those things are not said to be white, which so appear unto blear eyes; neither sweet or bitter, which those that are sick do so affirm. But me thinks it should not so be answered; because both Plato and Aristotle do call them pleasures, whereupon the definition before alleged doth truly agree unto them. Therefore would I rather say to the argument, that pleasure indeed is of his own nature good, and to be desired, but not to be taken of all things: even as we desire to satisfy hunger, yet not by every kind of meat. Just men also would become rich, but yet not by every kind of gain; we also desire health, but yet not by every kind of medicine; and so we would have pleasures, but yet not those which arise of actions that be dishonest and filthy, and which do hurt the body, and all the good things which we have. 2But seeing this kind of pleasures is both hurtful, and to be shunned, how happeneth it that it is desired of so many? Because pleasure in his own nature hath some certain divine thing in it, and is desired of all men. Howbeit it comes to pass, that seeing nature in many is not yet full perfect and confirmed, as in children, or else when men be endued with naughty and lewd habits of mind, as be drunkards and fleshly persons, they be deceived, and seek for pleasures where they ought not. Wherefore I marvel at Epicurus, which taketh his argument from children, whose nature is not yet become full perfect, neither are they endued with any virtue, & therefore may easily be deceived. Again, it must be considered, that men do perpetually labour, and are wearied with sundry exercises; and therefore to be recreated and refreshed, they turn themselves to divers pleasures; and when they cannot have honest, pure, and simple pleasures, they will be satisfied with those grosser and hurtful pleasures. And men have a compounded nature, not simply one and unmixed; and thereof it comes, that they embrace sundry kinds of pleasures.
9 But this of some is counted a hard matter, 1
Sometimes they take those which belong unto the mind, and sometime those which be of the body; since that they consist as well of the ⟨p. 139⟩mind as of the body. Yea, and the body it self, because it hath many humours, and is endued with many senses, therefore are we sometimes moved to these pleasures, and sometimes to those, according as the humours stir them up, or as the sundry objects do fall into the senses. But God, since he is one and most pure, he enjoyeth one and the self-same pure and eternal pleasure.
Somtimes they take those which belong vnto the mind, and sometime those which be of the bodie; since that they consist as well of the ⟨p. 139⟩mind as of the bodie. Yea, and the bodie it selfe, bicause it hath manie humors, and is indued with manie senses, therefore are we somtimes mooued to these pleasures, and sometimes to those, according as the humors stir them vp, or as the sundrie obiects doo fall into the senses. But God, since he is one and most pure, he enioieth one and the selfe-same pure and eternall pleasure.
1But to those pleasures of the body, they that be young, and melancholic men are most inclined. In them, while their stature is increased, the humours are disturbed, and nature is wearied and haled; and therefore do they fly unto pleasures, as unto a certain medicine and recreation. Likewise doth the melancholic humour disquiet and vex melancholic persons, and suffereth them not to rest; so as they being weary, return to pleasures, whereby they somewhat restore and exhilarate themselves. Whereupon it appeareth, that nature, yea God himself, 2did not unprofitably give unto mankind these pleasures, that the immoderate use of them might be avoided. For by them we lead the more commodious life, and we take more willingly in hand the necessary labours of life, and the preservation of mankind, and are the more readily healed of our daily infirmities. Moreover, young men, by certain honest and moderate pleasures, are stirred up unto honest duties, and excellent virtues; and by griefs they are terrified from sins and wickedness. 3And Augustine addeth, that these base pleasures are certain steps of good, and as it were a little shadow of the nature of felicity, and of the chief good, whereby we may be stirred up to an earnest desire thereof: wherefore they be of force to awaken us, wherein nevertheless we are not to stay, but must rather rise up unto better things. And that we should not dwell in these things, God is so good, that he with these kinds of pleasures hath mingled many bitter things.
1But to those pleasures of the bodie, they that be yoong, and melancholike men are most inclined. In them, while their stature is increased, the humors are disturbed, and nature is wearied and haled; and therefore doo they flie vnto pleasures, as vnto a certeine medicine and recreation. Likewise dooth the melancholike humor disquiet and vexe melancholike persons, and suffereth them not to rest; so as they being wearie, returne to pleasures, whereby they somewhat restore and exhilerate themselues. Wherevpon it appéereth, that nature, yea God himselfe, 2did not vnprofitablie giue vnto mankind these pleasures, that the immoderate vse of them might be auoided. For by them we lead the more commodious life, and we take more willinglie in hand the necessarie labours of life, and the preseruation of mankind, and are the more readilie healed of our dailie infirmities. Moreouer, yoong men, by certeine honest and moderate pleasures, are stirred vp vnto honest duties, and excellent vertues; and by gréefes they are terrified from sinnes and wickednes.
1As touching those pure, unmixed, and no bodily pleasures, and which have no excess, let this be the proposition. They ought not to be refused, but since they are of the better sort, they draw not a little near unto the nature of the chiefest good: for they be desired; not for themselves, but for another thing. I said that they draw near to the nature of the chiefest good; because in very deed, the chiefest good is not in pleasure, no not of this kind: for that consisteth in the most perfect action, and unto it is pleasure joined, as a perpetual companion: wherefore it cannot be plucked from the chiefest good, so as it should not be comprehended in the nature thereof. We verily grant, that the same is wished for of all men, since there is none, but desireth both to live, and to live well. And as to live, is to work; so to live well, is to be occupied in a very good action: whereunto when excellent pleasure is joined, all men wish for the same, when they wish for that whereof it is a perpetual companion. But an excellent action it cannot be, unless it be conversant about the most noble object; whereof as of a fountain our perfection dependeth. Which that it may evidently be perceived, we must understand, that we are made perfect by a most excellent object, as by the efficient cause, whereby our mind and will is carried, or is allured unto it. Again, we are made perfect through pleasure, which is an affect and quality, that is instilled into our mind. 2But it is called into doubt by some, whether pleasure must be wished for the life sake, or life for pleasure sake. And to omit those things which may be said on the other part, that which to me seemeth good, I thus set down; Pleasure is desired for the life sake, not the life for pleasures sake; because pleasure hereof ariseth, that the action agreeth with nature, and this we both feel and know. Wherefore that above all is to be wished, to the intent that the action may be counted most perfect. Neither is any man ignorant, that perfection is instituted for that thing sake, which doth make it perfect, especially when in his own nature it hath no stability. And all men see, that meat it self is better than the sauce thereof.
1As touching those pure, vnmixt, and no bodilie pleasures, and which haue no excesse, let this be the proposition. They ought not to be refused, but since they are of the better sort, they drawe not a little néere vnto the nature of the chéefest good: for they be desired; not for themselues, but for another thing. I said that they drawe néere to the nature of the chéefest good; bicause in verie déed, the chéefest good is not in pleasure, no not of this kind: for that consisteth in the most perfect action, and vnto it is pleasure ioined, as a perpetuall companion: wherefore it cannot be plucked from the chéefest good, so as it should not be comprehended in the nature thereof. We verelie grant, that the same is wished for of all men, since there is none, but desireth both to liue, and to liue well. And as to liue, is to worke; so to liue well, is to be occupied in a verie good action: wherevnto when excellent pleasure is ioined, all men wish for the same, when they wish for that whereof it is a perpetuall companion. But an excellent action it cannot be, vnlesse it be conuersant about the most noble obiect; whereof as of a fountaine our perfection dependeth. Which that it may euidentlie be perceiued, we must vnderstand, that we are made perfect by a most excellent obiect, as by the efficient cause, whereby our mind and will is carried, or is allured vnto it. Againe, we are made perfect through pleasure, which is an affect and qualitie, that is instilled into our mind.
10 But how those things, 1which Aristotle bringeth, do agree with the holy scriptures, we may easily perceive. First he saith, that this opinion, as touching the grosser sort of pleasures, is the opinion of many, and that of the vulgar sort of men. Which also Christ taught, affirming that the way of perdition is large, 2and many do go that way. He addeth moreover, that they which judge this, are [Greek or Hebrew], that is, most burdensome. And in Isaiah we know, that it was said to wicked Ahaz; 3Is it a small matter unto you to be grievous unto men? Aristotle calleth them bond-slaves. And the Lord said; 4He that doth sin, is the servant of sin. Also Peter said; Every man is his servant, 5of whom he is overcome. Aristotle saith, that they choose a beastly life. And we have it in the Psalms; Man, when he should be in honour, 6is compared unto the brute beasts, and is made like unto them. Also Jeremiah; 7Every man neigheth at his neighbours wife. And again in the psalm; Be ye not like horse and mule, 8in whom there is no understanding. They which so think (saith the philosopher) do defend themselves by the authority of princes, which live after the manner of Sardanapalus. Neither doth this disagree with the holy scriptures, wherein we read, that such in a manner were the people, as were the kings ⟨p. 140⟩whom they had. 9And in Hosea we read; Such people, such priest. In the Proverbs, the 29. chapter; When the wicked shall bear rule, transgression shall be multiplied. And in the Gospels as touching Herod,
11 Aristotle disputing yet further of pleasure saith, 1that the same must not be counted strange from felicity, and so proveth it, because it is of those kind of good things, which belong unto the mind, unless we will say, that stones, stocks, & metals rejoice and be glad. Let us first declare his general sentence; That is pleasant to every man, whereunto he is said to be, and thereof is named desirous. Hereby Aristotle meant, that pleasure seemeth to be of those kind of things, which have relation one to another. And it is no marvel, for those things which be sweet, must of necessity be sweet to some body. But what he is, to whom pleasure is referred, is declared by affection, while he saith; A horse, a show, just things, and virtues do delight those men, which have bin desirous of horses, shows, a just thing, and of virtues. The manner of all Syllogisms is, that first should be brought forth the cause in general, and then it is wont to be applied unto that thing whereof it is spoken. So in this matter, the general cause is set forth for which any thing is pleasant and sweet unto any man; namely, for because he loveth it. This general cause is here restrained unto him that is happy, because he is a lover of honest and good actions, whereupon of necessity it followeth, that he is very much delighted with them.
11 Aristotle disputing yet further of pleasure saith, 1that the same must not be counted strange from felicitie, and so prooueth it, bicause it is of those kind of good things, which belong vnto the mind, vnlesse we will saie, that stones, stocks, & mettalles reioice and be glad. Let vs first declare his generall sentence; That is pleasant to euerie man, wherevnto he is said to be, and therof is named desirous. Héereby Aristotle meant, that pleasure séemeth to be of those kind of things, which haue relation one to another. And it is no maruell, for those things which be swéet, must of necessitie be swéet to some bodie. But what he is, to whome pleasure is referred, is declared by affection, while he saith; A horsse, a shew, iust things, and vertues doo delight those men, which haue bin desirous of horsses, shewes, a iust thing, and of vertues. The maner of all Syllogismes is, that first should be brought foorth the cause in generall, and then it is woont to be applied vnto that thing wherof it is spoken. So in this matter, the generall cause is set foorth for which anie thing is pleasant and swéet vnto anie man; namelie, for bicause he loueth it. This generall cause is héere restreined vnto him that is happie, bicause he is a louer of honest and good actions, wherevpon of necessitie it followeth, that he is verie much delighted with them.
For the confirmation of that general cause, he useth divers and manifold examples; and first, he allegeth the pleasure that men have in riding of horses, wherewith, how fondly and earnestly some men are otherwhile delighted, the young man Strepsiades in Aristophanes doth testify. He bringeth forth them also, which are desirous to behold shows, unto whom we may add those, which give their mind to philosophy, wine, and money: all which men (we see) are wonderfully delighted, when at any time they enjoy their desires. By these examples the form of the argument, which the Logicians call Induction, being the major proposition, which comprehendeth the general cause, is plainly confirmed and showed, which is straightway applied to the matter in hand, whereas he saith, that The like reason is to be had of those causes that are of a just thing, and of good actions, and are referred to good and happy men, to wit, that those things be loved of them, and that they rejoice not a little in them. Whereof it plainly cometh, that blessed and good men, if they either see or hear any to live well and honestly, they take great pleasure therein: but without doubt much more, while they themselves exercise themselves in just, good, and honest actions. By these things we now understand, that the life of happy men is not severed from pleasure; and we see, that they did not utterly stray from the right way, which joined themselves unto this felicity.
For the confirmation of that generall cause, he vseth diuers and manifold examples; and first, he alledgeth the pleasure that men haue in riding of horsses, wherewith, how fondlie and earnestlie some men are otherwhile delighted, the yong man Strepsiades in Aristophanes doth testifie. He bringeth foorth them also, which are desirous to behold shewes, vnto whome we may adde those, which giue their mind to philosophie, wine, and monie: all which men (we sée) are wonderfullie delighted, when at anie time they enioie their desires. By these examples the fourme of the argument, which the Logicians call Induction, being the maior proposition, which comprehendeth the generall cause, is plainelie confirmed and shewed, which is straitwaie applied to the matter in hand, whereas he saith, that The like reason is to be had of those causes that are of a iust thing, and of good actions, and are referred to good and happie men, to wit, that those things be loued of them, and that they reioice not a little in them. Whereof it plainelie commeth, that blessed and good men, if they either sée or heare anie to liue well and honestlie, they take great pleasure therein: but without doubt much more, while they themselues exercise themselues in iust, good, and honest actions. By these things we now vnderstand, that the life of happie men is not seuered from pleasure; and we sée, that they did not vtterlie straie from the right waie, which ioined themselues vnto this felicitie.
12 But the question is, 1whether all pleasures have fellowship with felicity, and if that all have not, as it should seem we must affirm, then, what pleasure shall we join therewith? To this we answer by distinction. Some things are pleasant in their own nature, and by themselves; but some have it not of their own property to delight, but taketh delight by a certain corruption or viciousness of him that is caught therewith. Wisdom, virtues, honest actions, remembrance of good deeds, prudent government of things, finding out of profitable counsels, doctrine, contemplation, and such like, are delightful even of their own goodness, which if otherwhiles they be not liked of some, that happeneth through their own unskilfulness and rudeness. But on the other side, immoderate wine, gorgeous sights, surfeitings and lusts, are not in their own nature pleasant and sweet, but do only delight them which of themselves be caught by such things. It is the common sort, which hunt after things not pleasant in their own nature, which things are divers and in sundry sort, & those repugnant one to another. No man doubteth, but that there is a great number of pleasures of the common sort; for there be many minds, and every one hath his own delight, which certainly is then not lawful, when it passeth his bounds, and when it detaineth men too much therein, or doth stir up and disquiet their minds. These, and other pleasures of the senses, if they hold themselves within their bounds and limits, and do not pass them, are both natural, and by right cannot be condemned.
12 But the question is, 1whether all pleasures haue fellowship with felicitie, and if that all haue not, as it should séeme we must affirme, then, what pleasure shall we ioine therewith? To this we answere by distinction. Some things are pleasant in their owne nature, and by themselues; but some haue it not of their owne propertie to delight, but taketh delight by a certeine corruption or viciousnes of him that is caught therewith. Wisedome, vertues, honest actions, remembrance of good déeds, prudent gouernment of things, finding out of profitable counsels, doctrine, contemplation, and such like, are delightfull euen of their owne goodnes, which if otherwhiles they be not liked of some, that hapneth through their owne vnskilfulnes and rudenes. But on the other side, immoderate wine, gorgeous sights, surfetings and lusts, are not in their owne nature pleasant and swéete, but doo onelie delight them which of themselues bée caught by such things. It is the common sort, which hunt after things not pleasant in their owne nature, which things are diuers and in sundrie sort, & those repugnant one to another. No man doubteth, but that there is a great number of pleasures of the common sort; for there be manie minds, and euerie one hath his owne delight, which certeinlie is then not lawfull, when it passeth his bounds, and when it deteineth men too much therein, or doth stir vp and disquiet their minds. These, and other pleasures of the senses, if they hold themselues within their bounds and limits, and doo not passe them, are both naturall, and by right cannot be condemned.
And what contrariety there is of pleasures between the vulgar sort, 1Eustratius thus showeth; One is delighted with salt meat, another with sweet, one with drink somewhat bitter, another with sower, which tastes be one contrary to another, and cannot be had together in one ⟨p. 141⟩and the same thing. But here a man may say, that this also may be seen among the pleasures which ye call natural; some are delighted in the mathematical sciences, others in the knowledge of natural things, some in logic, others only in prudent actions.
And what contrarietie there is of pleasures betwéene the vulgar sort, 1Eustratius thus sheweth; One is delighted with salt meate, another with swéet, one with drinke somewhat bitter, another with sower, which tasts be one contrarie to another, and cannot be had togither in one ⟨p. 141⟩and the same thing. But here a man may saie, that this also may be séene among the pleasures which ye call naturall; some are delighted in the mathematicall sciences, others in the knowledge of naturall things, some in logicke, others onlie in prudent actions.
Wherefore since there is a variety as well here as there, this difference of contrariety after that manner interpreted, seems not to put a distinction between pleasures, seeing it is found alike on both parts. Unless thou wilt say, there is a great variety & multitude of vulgar pleasures, which are contraries; as sweet and sower, harsh and mild are one repugnant to another; which contrariety is not in the honest pleasures that we have now recited. For the mathematical sciences are not against the knowledge of natural things; nor logic against prudence. But the difference is more truly declared, if we mark the repugnancy in the appetite of one & the self-same man: for even he that delighted in a thing, straightway hateth the same; and he that desired meat, doth by and by loath it. Whereupon Terence said; In love are all these faults, injuries, suspicions of enmity, truce, war, and peace again. Here we see a contrariety of things among themselves, and against the mind. But those things are pleasant indeed, wherewith the lovers of honesty are delighted: for they which give credit to reason, and not to the senses, take counsel of the better judge. Thou shalt moreover perceive those to be constant, and of one mind; and that the right things which once liked them, will never mislike them: neither do they suffer the true opinion to be wrong from them. Again, they say all one thing with men of their own profession: for so many as be lovers of honesty, allow the self-same virtues, and the same actions.
Wherefore since there is a varietie as well here as there, this difference of contrarietie after that manner interpreted, séemes not to put a distinction betwéene pleasures, séeing it is found alike on both parts. Vnlesse thou wilt saie, there is a great varietie & multitude of vulgar pleasures, which are contraries; as swéet and sower, harsh and mild are one repugnant to another; which contrarietie is not in the honest pleasures that we haue now recited. For the mathematicall sciences are not against the knowledge of naturall things; nor logicke against prudence. But the difference is more trulie declared, if we marke the repugnancie in the appetite of one & the selfe-same man: for euen he that delighted in a thing, straightwaie hateth the same; and he that desired meate, dooth by and by loath it. Whervpon Terence said; In loue are all these faults, iniuries, suspicions of enimitie, truce, war, and peace againe. Here we sée a contrarietie of things among themselues, and against the mind. But those things are pleasant indéed, wherewith the louers of honestie are delighted: for they which giue credit to reason, and not to the senses, take counsell of the better iudge. Thou shalt moreouer perceiue those to be constant, and of one mind; and that the right things which once liked them, will neuer mislike them: neither doo they suffer the true opinion to be wroong from them. Againe, they saie all one thing with men of their owne profession: for so manie as be louers of honestie, allow the selfe-same vertues, and the same actions.
10 But how those things, 1which Aristotle bringeth, doo agrée with the holie scriptures, we may easilie perceiue. First he saith, that this opinion, as touching the grosser sort of pleasures, is the opinion of manie, and that of the vulgar sort of men. Which also Christ taught, affirming that the waie of perdition is large, 2and manie doo go that waie. He addeth moreouer, that they which iudge this, are 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, that is, most burdensome. And in Esaie we knowe, that it was said to wicked Ahaz; 3Is it a small matter vnto you to be greeuous vnto men? Aristotle calleth them bond-slaues. And the Lord said; 4He that dooth sinne, is the seruant of sinne. Also Peter said; Euerie man is his seruant, 5of whom he is ouercome. Aristotle saith, that they choose a beastlie life. And we haue it in the Psalmes; Man, when he should be in honour, 6is compared vnto the brute beasts, and is made like vnto them. Also Ieremie; 7Euerie man neigheth at his neighbours wife. And againe in the psalme; Be ye not like horsse and mule, 8in whom there is no vnderstanding. They which so thinke (saith the philosopher) doo defend themselues by the authoritie of princes, which liue after the maner of Sardanapalus. Neither dooth this disagrée with the holie scriptures, wherein we read, that such in a maner were the people, as were the kings ⟨p. 140⟩whom they had. 9And in Osea we reade; Such people, such priest. In the Prouerbs, the 29. chapter; When the wicked shall beare rule, transgression shall be multiplied. And in the Gospels as touching Herod, 10when the wise men came to Ierusalem, we find that not onlie hée himselfe was troubled, but also the whole citie with him. Lastlie, it is concluded, that in these grosser sort of pleasures cannot be reposed the chéefest good. Which also the Apostle confirmeth to the Corinthians; 11Meate for the bellie, and the bellie for meate, God shall destroie both the one and the other. And Christ himselfe speaking of the pleasure of procreation; 12In the regeneration they neither marrie wiues, nor are married, but they shall be like vnto the angels.
