A14350:619
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
and so the hurt is not to be accounted of both alike.
9 But this of some is counted a hard matter, 1that these pleasures must be shunned, seeing pleasure by it self is good, & to be desired. Wherefore to avoid this, they are wont to say, that They are not pleasures indeed, but only seem so to be; and although they seem so, yet that of wise men they ought not to be accounted pleasures. Even as those things are not said to be white, which so appear unto blear eyes; neither sweet or bitter, which those that are sick do so affirm. But me thinks it should not so be answered; because both Plato and Aristotle do call them pleasures, whereupon the definition before alleged doth truly agree unto them. Therefore would I rather say to the argument, that pleasure indeed is of his own nature good, and to be desired, but not to be taken of all things: even as we desire to satisfy hunger, yet not by every kind of meat. Just men also would become rich, but yet not by every kind of gain; we also desire health, but yet not by every kind of medicine; and so we would have pleasures, but yet not those which arise of actions that be dishonest and filthy, and which do hurt the body, and all the good things which we have. 2But seeing this kind of pleasures is both hurtful, and to be shunned, how happeneth it that it is desired of so many? Because pleasure in his own nature hath some certain divine thing in it, and is desired of all men. Howbeit it comes to pass, that seeing nature in many is not yet full perfect and confirmed, as in children, or else when men be endued with naughty and lewd habits of mind, as be drunkards and fleshly persons, they be deceived, and seek for pleasures where they ought not. Wherefore I marvel at Epicurus, which taketh his argument from children, whose nature is not yet become full perfect, neither are they endued with any virtue, & therefore may easily be deceived. Again, it must be considered, that men do perpetually labour, and are wearied with sundry exercises; and therefore to be recreated and refreshed, they turn themselves to divers pleasures; and when they cannot have honest, pure, and simple pleasures, they will be satisfied with those grosser and hurtful pleasures. And men have a compounded nature, not simply one and unmixed; and thereof it comes, that they embrace sundry kinds of pleasures.
9 But this of some is counted a hard matter, 1that these pleasures must be shunned, séeing pleasure by it selfe is good, & to be desired. Wherfore to auoid this, they are wont to say, that They are not pleasures indéed, but onlie séeme so to be; and although they séeme so, yet that of wise men they ought not to be accounted pleasures. Euen as those things are not said to be white, which so appeare vnto bleare eies; neither swéet or bitter, which those that are sicke doo so affirme. But me thinks it should not so be answered; bicause both Plato and Aristotle doo call them pleasures, wherevpon the definition before alledged dooth trulie agrée vnto them. Therefore would I rather saie to the argument, that pleasure indéed is of his owne nature good, and to be desired, but not to be taken of all things: euen as we desire to satisfie hunger, yet not by euerie kind of meate. Iust men also would become rich, but yet not by euerie kind of gaine; we also desire health, but yet not by euerie kind of medicine; and so we would haue pleasures, but yet not those which arise of actions that be dishonest and filthie, and which doo hurt the bodie, and all the good things which we haue. 2But séeing this kind of pleasures is both hurtfull, and to be shunned, how happeneth it that it is desired of so manie? Bicause pleasure in his owne nature hath some certeine diuine thing in it, and is desired of all men. Howbeit it coms to passe, that séeing nature in manie is not yet full perfect and confirmed, as in children, or else when men be indued with naughtie and lewd habits of mind, as be drunkards and fleshlie persons, they be deceiued, and séeke for pleasures where they ought not. Wherefore I maruell at Epicurus, which taketh his argument from children, whose nature is not yet become full perfect, neither are they indued with any vertue, & therfore may easilie be deceiued. Againe, it must be considered, that men doo perpetuallie labour, and are wearied with sundrie exercises; and therefore to be recreated and refreshed, they turne themselues to diuers pleasures; and when they cannot haue honest, pure, and simple pleasures, they will be satisfied with those grosser and hurtfull pleasures. And men haue a compounded nature, not simplie one and vnmixed; and thereof it coms, that they imbrace sundrie kinds of pleasures.
Sometimes they take those which belong unto the mind, and sometime those which be of the body; since that they consist as well of the ⟨p. 139⟩mind as of the body. Yea, and the body it self, because it hath many humours, and is endued with many senses, therefore are we sometimes moved to these pleasures, and sometimes to those, according as the humours stir them up, or as the sundry objects do fall into the senses. But God, since he is one and most pure, he enjoyeth one and the self-same pure and eternal pleasure.
Somtimes they take those which belong vnto the mind, and sometime those which be of the bodie; since that they consist as well of the ⟨p. 139⟩mind as of the bodie. Yea, and the bodie it selfe, bicause it hath manie humors, and is indued with manie senses, therefore are we somtimes mooued to these pleasures, and sometimes to those, according as the humors stir them vp, or as the sundrie obiects doo fall into the senses. But God, since he is one and most pure, he enioieth one and the selfe-same pure and eternall pleasure.
1But to those pleasures of the body, they that be young, and melancholic men are most inclined. In them, while their stature is increased, the humours are disturbed, and nature is wearied and haled; and therefore do they fly unto pleasures, as unto a certain medicine and recreation. Likewise doth the melancholic humour disquiet and vex melancholic persons, and suffereth them not to rest; so as they being weary, return to pleasures, whereby they somewhat restore and exhilarate themselves. Whereupon it appeareth, that nature, yea God himself, 2did not unprofitably give unto mankind these pleasures, that the immoderate use of them might be avoided. For by them we lead the more commodious life, and we take more willingly in hand the necessary labours of life, and the preservation of mankind, and are the more readily healed of our daily infirmities. Moreover, young men, by certain honest and moderate pleasures, are stirred up unto honest duties, and excellent virtues; and by griefs they are terrified from sins and wickedness. 3And Augustine addeth, that these base pleasures are certain steps of good, and as it were a little shadow of the nature of felicity, and of the chief good, whereby we may be stirred up to an earnest desire thereof: wherefore they be of force to awaken us, wherein nevertheless we are not to stay, but must rather rise up unto better things. And that we should not dwell in these things, God is so good, that he with these kinds of pleasures hath mingled many bitter things.
1But to those pleasures of the bodie, they that be yoong, and melancholike men are most inclined. In them, while their stature is increased, the humors are disturbed, and nature is wearied and haled; and therefore doo they flie vnto pleasures, as vnto a certeine medicine and recreation. Likewise dooth the melancholike humor disquiet and vexe melancholike persons, and suffereth them not to rest; so as they being wearie, returne to pleasures, whereby they somewhat restore and exhilerate themselues. Wherevpon it appéereth, that nature, yea God himselfe,
1As touching those pure, unmixed, and no bodily pleasures, and which have no excess, let this be the proposition. They ought not to be refused, but since they are of the better sort, they draw not a little near unto the nature of the chiefest good: for they be desired; not for themselves, but for another thing. I said that they draw near to the nature of the chiefest good; because in very deed, the chiefest good is not in pleasure, no not of this kind: for that consisteth in the most perfect action, and unto it is pleasure joined, as a perpetual companion: wherefore it cannot be plucked from the chiefest good, so as it should not be comprehended in the nature thereof. We verily grant, that the same is wished for of all men, since there is none, but desireth both to live, and to live well. And as to live, is to work; so to live well, is to be occupied in a very good action: whereunto when excellent pleasure is joined, all men wish for the same, when they wish for that whereof it is a perpetual companion. But an excellent action it cannot be, unless it be conversant about the most noble object; whereof as of a fountain our perfection dependeth. Which that it may evidently be perceived, we must understand, that we are made perfect by a most excellent object, as by the efficient cause, whereby our mind and will is carried, or is allured unto it. Again, we are made perfect through pleasure, which is an affect and quality, that is instilled into our mind. 2But it is called into doubt by some, whether pleasure must be wished for the life sake, or life for pleasure sake. And to omit those things which may be said on the other part, that which to me seemeth good, I thus set down; Pleasure is desired for the life sake, not the life for pleasures sake; because pleasure hereof ariseth, that the action agreeth with nature, and this we both feel and know. Wherefore that above all is to be wished, to the intent that the action may be counted most perfect. Neither is any man ignorant, that perfection is instituted for that thing sake, which doth make it perfect, especially when in his own nature it hath no stability. And all men see, that meat it self is better than the sauce thereof.
1As touching those pure, vnmixt, and no bodilie pleasures, and which haue no excesse, let this be the proposition. They ought not to be refused, but since they are of the better sort, they drawe not a little néere vnto the nature of the chéefest good: for they be desired; not for themselues, but for another thing. I said that they drawe néere to the nature of the chéefest good; bicause in verie déed, the chéefest good is not in pleasure, no not of this kind: for that consisteth in the most perfect action, and vnto it is pleasure ioined, as a perpetuall companion: wherefore it cannot be plucked from the chéefest good, so as it should not be comprehended in the nature thereof. We verelie grant, that the same is wished for of all men, since there is none, but desireth both to liue, and to liue well. And as to liue, is to worke; so to liue well, is to be occupied in a verie good action: wherevnto when excellent pleasure is ioined, all men wish for the same, when they wish for that whereof it is a perpetuall companion. But an excellent action it cannot be, vnlesse it be conuersant about the most noble obiect; whereof as of a fountaine our perfection dependeth. Which that it may euidentlie be perceiued, we must vnderstand, that we are made perfect by a most excellent obiect, as by the efficient cause, whereby our mind and will is carried, or is allured vnto it. Againe, we are made perfect through pleasure, which is an affect and qualitie, that is instilled into our mind.
10 But how those things, 1which Aristotle bringeth, do agree with the holy scriptures, we may easily perceive. First he saith, that this opinion, as touching the grosser sort of pleasures, is the opinion of many, and that of the vulgar sort of men. Which also Christ taught, affirming that the way of perdition is large, 2and many do go that way. He addeth moreover, that they which judge this, are [Greek or Hebrew], that is, most burdensome. And in Isaiah we know, that it was said to wicked Ahaz; 3Is it a small matter unto you to be grievous unto men? Aristotle calleth them bond-slaves. And the Lord said; 4He that doth sin, is the servant of sin. Also Peter said; Every man is his servant, 5of whom he is overcome. Aristotle saith, that they choose a beastly life. And we have it in the Psalms; Man, when he should be in honour, 6is compared unto the brute beasts, and is made like unto them. Also Jeremiah; 7Every man neigheth at his neighbours wife. And again in the psalm; Be ye not like horse and mule, 8in whom there is no understanding. They which so think (saith the philosopher) do defend themselves by the authority of princes, which live after the manner of Sardanapalus. Neither doth this disagree with the holy scriptures, wherein we read, that such in a manner were the people, as were the kings ⟨p. 140⟩whom they had. 9And in Hosea we read; Such people, such priest. In the Proverbs, the 29. chapter; When the wicked shall bear rule, transgression shall be multiplied. And in the Gospels as touching Herod,
11 Aristotle disputing yet further of pleasure saith, 1that the same must not be counted strange from felicity, and so proveth it, because it is of those kind of good things, which belong unto the mind, unless we will say, that stones, stocks, & metals rejoice and be glad. Let us first declare his general sentence; That is pleasant to every man, whereunto he is said to be, and thereof is named desirous. Hereby Aristotle meant, that pleasure seemeth to be of those kind of things, which have relation one to another. And it is no marvel, for those things which be sweet, must of necessity be sweet to some body. But what he is, to whom pleasure is referred, is declared by affection, while he saith; A horse, a show, just things, and virtues do delight those men, which have bin desirous of horses, shows, a just thing, and of virtues. The manner of all Syllogisms is, that first should be brought forth the cause in general, and then it is wont to be applied unto that thing whereof it is spoken. So in this matter, the general cause is set forth for which any thing is pleasant and sweet unto any man; namely, for because he loveth it. This general cause is here restrained unto him that is happy, because he is a lover of honest and good actions, whereupon of necessity it followeth, that he is very much delighted with them.
11 Aristotle disputing yet further of pleasure saith, 1that the same must not be counted strange from felicitie, and so prooueth it, bicause it is of those kind of good things, which belong vnto the mind, vnlesse we will saie, that stones, stocks, & mettalles reioice and be glad. Let vs first declare his generall sentence; That is pleasant to euerie man, wherevnto he is said to be, and therof is named desirous. Héereby Aristotle meant, that pleasure séemeth to be of those kind of things, which haue relation one to another. And it is no maruell, for those things which be swéet, must of necessitie be swéet to some bodie. But what he is, to whome pleasure is referred, is declared by affection, while he saith; A horsse, a shew, iust things, and vertues doo delight those men, which haue bin desirous of horsses, shewes, a iust thing, and of vertues. The maner of all Syllogismes is, that first should be brought foorth the cause in generall, and then it is woont to be applied vnto that thing wherof it is spoken. So in this matter, the generall cause is set foorth for which anie thing is pleasant and swéet vnto anie man; namelie, for bicause he loueth it. This generall cause is héere restreined vnto him that is happie, bicause he is a louer of honest and good actions, wherevpon of necessitie it followeth, that he is verie much delighted with them.
For the confirmation of that general cause, he useth divers and manifold examples; and first, he allegeth the pleasure that men have in riding of horses, wherewith, how fondly and earnestly some men are otherwhile delighted, the young man Strepsiades in Aristophanes doth testify. He bringeth forth them also, which are desirous to behold shows, unto whom we may add those, which give their mind to philosophy, wine, and money: all which men (we see) are wonderfully delighted, when at any time they enjoy their desires. By these examples the form of the argument, which the Logicians call Induction, being the major proposition, which comprehendeth the general cause, is plainly confirmed and showed, which is straightway applied to the matter in hand, whereas he saith, that The like reason is to be had of those causes that are of a just thing, and of good actions, and are referred to good and happy men, to wit, that those things be loved of them, and that they rejoice not a little in them. Whereof it plainly cometh, that blessed and good men, if they either see or hear any to live well and honestly, they take great pleasure therein: but without doubt much more, while they themselves exercise themselves in just, good, and honest actions. By these things we now understand, that the life of happy men is not severed from pleasure; and we see, that they did not utterly stray from the right way, which joined themselves unto this felicity.
For the confirmation of that generall cause, he vseth diuers and manifold examples; and first, he alledgeth the pleasure that men haue in riding of horsses, wherewith, how fondlie and earnestlie some men are otherwhile delighted, the yong man Strepsiades in Aristophanes doth testifie. He bringeth foorth them also, which are desirous to behold shewes, vnto whome we may adde those, which giue their mind to philosophie, wine, and monie: all which men (we sée) are wonderfullie delighted, when at anie time they enioie their desires. By these examples the fourme of the argument, which the Logicians call Induction, being the maior proposition, which comprehendeth the generall cause, is plainelie confirmed and shewed, which is straitwaie applied to the matter in hand, whereas he saith, that The like reason is to be had of those causes that are of a iust thing, and of good actions, and are referred to good and happie men, to wit, that those things be loued of them, and that they reioice not a little in them. Whereof it plainelie commeth, that blessed and good men, if they either sée or heare anie to liue well and honestlie, they take great pleasure therein: but without doubt much more, while they themselues exercise themselues in iust, good, and honest actions. By these things we now vnderstand, that the life of happie men is not seuered from pleasure; and we sée, that they did not vtterlie straie from the right waie, which ioined themselues vnto this felicitie.
12 But the question is, 1whether all pleasures have fellowship with felicity, and if that all have not, as it should seem we must affirm, then, what pleasure shall we join therewith? To this we answer by distinction. Some things are pleasant in their own nature, and by themselves; but some have it not of their own property to delight, but taketh delight by a certain corruption or viciousness of him that is caught therewith. Wisdom, virtues, honest actions, remembrance of good deeds, prudent government of things, finding out of profitable counsels, doctrine, contemplation, and such like, are delightful even of their own goodness, which if otherwhiles they be not liked of some, that happeneth through their own unskilfulness and rudeness. But on the other side, immoderate wine, gorgeous sights, surfeitings and lusts, are not in their own nature pleasant and sweet, but do only delight them which of themselves be caught by such things. It is the common sort, which hunt after things not pleasant in their own nature, which things are divers and in sundry sort, & those repugnant one to another. No man doubteth, but that there is a great number of pleasures of the common sort; for there be many minds, and every one hath his own delight, which certainly is then not lawful, when it passeth his bounds, and when it detaineth men too much therein, or doth stir up and disquiet their minds. These, and other pleasures of the senses, if they hold themselves within their bounds and limits, and do not pass them, are both natural, and by right cannot be condemned.
12 But the question is, 1whether all pleasures haue fellowship with felicitie, and if that all haue not, as it should séeme we must affirme, then, what pleasure shall we ioine therewith? To this we answere by distinction. Some things are pleasant in their owne nature, and by themselues; but some haue it not of their owne propertie to delight, but taketh delight by a certeine corruption or viciousnes of him that is caught therewith. Wisedome, vertues, honest actions, remembrance of good déeds, prudent gouernment of things, finding out of profitable counsels, doctrine, contemplation, and such like, are delightfull euen of their owne goodnes, which if otherwhiles they be not liked of some, that hapneth through their owne vnskilfulnes and rudenes. But on the other side, immoderate wine, gorgeous sights, surfetings and lusts, are not in their owne nature pleasant and swéete, but doo onelie delight them which of themselues bée caught by such things. It is the common sort, which hunt after things not pleasant in their owne nature, which things are diuers and in sundrie sort, & those repugnant one to another. No man doubteth, but that there is a great number of pleasures of the common sort; for there be manie minds, and euerie one hath his owne delight, which certeinlie is then not lawfull, when it passeth his bounds, and when it deteineth men too much therein, or doth stir vp and disquiet their minds. These, and other pleasures of the senses, if they hold themselues within their bounds and limits, and doo not passe them, are both naturall, and by right cannot be condemned.
And what contrariety there is of pleasures between the vulgar sort, 1Eustratius thus showeth; One is delighted with salt meat, another with sweet, one with drink somewhat bitter, another with sower, which tastes be one contrary to another, and cannot be had together in one ⟨p. 141⟩and the same thing. But here a man may say, that this also may be seen among the pleasures which ye call natural; some are delighted in the mathematical sciences, others in the knowledge of natural things, some in logic, others only in prudent actions.
And what contrarietie there is of pleasures betwéene the vulgar sort, 1Eustratius thus sheweth; One is delighted with salt meate, another with swéet, one with drinke somewhat bitter, another with sower, which tasts be one contrarie to another, and cannot be had togither in one ⟨p. 141⟩and the same thing. But here a man may saie, that this also may be séene among the pleasures which ye call naturall; some are delighted in the mathematicall sciences, others in the knowledge of naturall things, some in logicke, others onlie in prudent actions.
Wherefore since there is a variety as well here as there, this difference of contrariety after that manner interpreted, seems not to put a distinction between pleasures, seeing it is found alike on both parts. Unless thou wilt say, there is a great variety & multitude of vulgar pleasures, which are contraries; as sweet and sower, harsh and mild are one repugnant to another; which contrariety is not in the honest pleasures that we have now recited. For the mathematical sciences are not against the knowledge of natural things; nor logic against prudence. But the difference is more truly declared, if we mark the repugnancy in the appetite of one & the self-same man: for even he that delighted in a thing, straightway hateth the same; and he that desired meat, doth by and by loath it. Whereupon Terence said; In love are all these faults, injuries, suspicions of enmity, truce, war, and peace again. Here we see a contrariety of things among themselves, and against the mind. But those things are pleasant indeed, wherewith the lovers of honesty are delighted: for they which give credit to reason, and not to the senses, take counsel of the better judge. Thou shalt moreover perceive those to be constant, and of one mind; and that the right things which once liked them, will never mislike them: neither do they suffer the true opinion to be wrong from them. Again, they say all one thing with men of their own profession: for so many as be lovers of honesty, allow the self-same virtues, and the same actions.
Wherefore since there is a varietie as well here as there, this difference of contrarietie after that manner interpreted, séemes not to put a distinction betwéene pleasures, séeing it is found alike on both parts. Vnlesse thou wilt saie, there is a great varietie & multitude of vulgar pleasures, which are contraries; as swéet and sower, harsh and mild are one repugnant to another; which contrarietie is not in the honest pleasures that we haue now recited. For the mathematicall sciences are not against the knowledge of naturall things; nor logicke against prudence. But the difference is more trulie declared, if we marke the repugnancie in the appetite of one & the selfe-same man: for euen he that delighted in a thing, straightwaie hateth the same; and he that desired meate, dooth by and by loath it. Whervpon Terence said; In loue are all these faults, iniuries, suspicions of enimitie, truce, war, and peace againe. Here we sée a contrarietie of things among themselues, and against the mind. But those things are pleasant indéed, wherewith the louers of honestie are delighted: for they which giue credit to reason, and not to the senses, take counsell of the better iudge. Thou shalt moreouer perceiue those to be constant, and of one mind; and that the right things which once liked them, will neuer mislike them: neither doo they suffer the true opinion to be wroong from them. Againe, they saie all one thing with men of their owne profession: for so manie as be louers of honestie, allow the selfe-same vertues, and the same actions.
113 Finally, this have we learned out of the holy scriptures to concur with Aristotle, that Paul exhorted the godly, as being happy men, to true and perfect gladness, when he wrote; Rejoice in the Lord always, and again I say rejoice. Also in the 21. chapter of the Proverbs; The just man delighteth to do judgement. 2And David doth many times stir up the just and godly to gladness, and rejoicing. And so true is this opinion, that even those good actions, which by the sense of nature, and judgement of the common sort seem to be repelled, do delight happy men. And therefore we read that the Apostles went away merry and rejoicing from the sight of the council, because they were counted worthy of rebukes for the name of Christ. 3And we know, that not only many christians suffered death with a joyful mind for the testimony of their faith, but that many Ethnics also, with great joy and cheerfulness, gave their life for the liberty of their country.
113 Finallie, this haue we learned out of the holie scriptures to concurre with Aristotle, that Paule exhorted the godlie, as being happie men, to true and perfect gladnes, when he wrote; Reioise in the Lord alwaies, and againe I saie reioise. Also in the 21. chapter of the Prouerbs; The iust man delighteth to doo iudgement. 2And Dauid dooth manie times stir vp the iust and godlie to gladnes, and reioising. And so true is this opinion, that euen those good actions, which by the sense of nature, and iudgement of the common sort séeme to be repelled, doo delight happie men. And therefore we read that the Apostles went awaie merie and reioising from the sight of the councell, bicause they were counted woorthie of rebukes for the name of Christ. 3And we knowe, that not onlie manie christians suffered death with a ioifull mind for the testimonie of their faith, but that manie Ethniks also, with great ioie and chéerefulnes, gaue their life for the libertie of their countrie.
14 Now that we have disputed of pleasures, it followeth that we speak of honours; and for good cause are these joined together, seeing both of them do accompany actions, though after a divers manner. For seeing that action agreeth with nature, and that we mark it, & are made glad with pleasure; even to those actions, when they shall be good, and just, and honest, honour is joined. And that it may be made the plainer, which we treat of; I will speak somewhat of the nature of honour, and of those things which belong unto the same. And first of all we will set forth the definition thereof. 1Aristotle in his first book of Rhetorics, will have it to be a signifying of the opinion, which is had of a mans honesty; and that consisteth of outward signs. To make this definition perfect, I think good to add thereunto the cause of the end, which since I cannot draw from the philosophers, I will borrow of our divinity. We therefore testify by manifest signs, that we judge well of honest men, to the intent that God, the author of all justice and goodness, may be honoured in them: secondly, that the authority and example of them may profit others. Now do we comprehend all the causes of honour. The form is the signification, declaration, 2and testimony of our opinion touching good men. The efficient cause is touched, when we added thereto, the mans honesty: for by it are men stirred up to judge well. But the matter shall be in all those signs, whereby we give a testimony to good and just men. And these things, since they be manifold, are mentioned in the book of Rhetorics now alleged; namely, monuments, images, government, verses, sepulchres, a living of the public treasury, gifts; and we may ad thereto, the uncovering of our head, the giving of place, and rising up to our betters, &c.
14 Now that we haue disputed of pleasures, it followeth that we speake of honours; and for good cause are these ioined togither, séeing both of them doo accompanie actions, though after a diuers maner. For séeing that action agréeth with nature, and that we marke it, & are made glad with pleasure; euen to those actions, when they shall be good, and iust, and honest, honour is ioined. And that it may be made the plainer, which we treat of; I will speake somewhat of the nature of honour, and of those things which belong vnto the same. And first of all we will set foorth the definition thereof.
And as all these things are many in number, so must we appoint as many parts, forms, or kinds of honour. And the difference of them is in respect of the matter of them. And we have also added the ends, that this testimony of ours may redound unto God, and that by our honours we may make the good examples of just men to be the more famous; or else that unto them which behave themselves well, there may be given an authority, and that thereby many others may be holpen. From the sense ⟨p. 142⟩of this definition did Augustine not much vary, 1who saith, that Glory is a judgement of men, which have a good opinion of [other] men. Hereunto we have added certain outward testimonies of this judgement, and have expressed unto what men those testimonies must be given; that is to wit, unto honest men, and to those which order themselves aright. But this is wanting as well in Aristotle, as in Augustine, who should be those, that should signify their opinion. Certainly, those ought to be (as we gather out of the first book of Ethics) wise men, and such as do know us well. Quintilian yet more briefly, and in a certain compendious manner, 2hath thus expounded the matter; Glory (saith he) is the praise of good men consenting in one: where that word [of good men] may be joined both to them that are praised, and to them that do praise: for it behooveth them both to be good. Which to make more plain, we will thus divide honours; so that some of them we make to be of small importance, and but overshadowed, which all, only are raised by a brute of the people: and these, since they proceed not of a sound judgement, are neither firm, nor yet yielded unto them, to whom they ought to be given. But others (as said Quintilian) proceed of the consent of good men; wherefore they be sound, and good men only are honoured with them. But we have experience, that those former are so light and inconstant, as thou mayest see that well-near in one day, some are both justified, and condemned of the people: wherefore he that likened this kind of good to a glass, because it is very brittle and frail, strayed not much from the truth.
And as all these things are manie in number, so must we appoint as manie parts, forms, or kinds of honour. And the difference of them is in respect of the matter of them. And we haue also added the ends, that this testimonie of ours may redound vnto God, and that by our honours wée may make the good examples of iust men to be the more famous; or else that vnto them which behaue themselues well, there may be giuen an authoritie, and that thereby manie others may be holpen. From the sense
115 But now there riseth a question, Whether honour (to speak of the same which is sincere and constant) be the good of him that doth give the honour, or of him to whom the honour is given? This did Seneca handle in his 103. epistle to Lucillus. I affirm it to be the good of them both. Without doubt it is his that is the praiser, seeing that his action is just and right. Neither think I it doubtful, that every good action is his good, whose action it is. Furthermore, since he, who is honoured, hath in himself honesty, justice, and goodness, whereby both good and wise men are allured and provoked to commend him; therefore is his good also called honour: for he hath the beginning and cause thereof in himself. Moreover, he himself reapeth fruit of that honour, when his authority increaseth, and he is made the abler to persuade others, what shall best become them, and the better to retain them in their duty. Thirdly, also it is his good for this cause, that while he perceiveth good, honest, and thankful judges, to judge rightly of those things which he hath very well done, he greatly rejoiceth. Wherefore I have showed the reason why I judge, that honour is the good, as well of him that is praised, as of him that praiseth. And yet for this cause am I not contrary to Aristotle, which saith, that the same is in him which doth the honour, not in him which receiveth the honour: because he (as it is now brought in the definition) saith, that honour is a signifying of a mans opinion and mind; and therefore he judgeth rightly, seeing as well the opinion as signification thereof proceed from him that honoureth, and rest on him, as on a certain foundation and matter subject thereunto. But yet I have respect to the original, whereupon this opinion was raised, and this judgement is stirred up in the minds of the wise; and moreover, I note the fruits of this opinion, and I see all these things to be in the man that is praised, that is to say, a greater authority & gladness. Neither hath this my definition only place in honours; but it must be no otherwise esteemed of the lawful judgement of a judge, and of a just sentence, when he pronounceth the law. For these are the proper good things of him, which therewithal turn to his good, on whose side the matter is judged. And no otherwise should we say of justice;
115 But now there riseth a question, Whether honour (to speake of the same which is sincere and constant) be the good of him that dooth giue the honour, or of him to whom the honour is giuen? This did Seneca handle in his 103. epistle to Lucillus. I affirme it to be the good of them both. Without doubt it is his that is the praiser, séeing that his action is iust and right. Neither thinke I it doubtfull, that euerie good action is his good, whose action it is. Furthermore, since he, who is honoured, hath in himselfe honestie, iustice, and goodnes, whereby both good and wise men are allured and prouoked to commend him; therefore is his good also called honour: for he hath the beginning and cause thereof in himselfe. Moreouer, he himselfe reapeth fruit of that honour, when his authoritie increaseth, and he is made the abler to persuade others, what shall best béecome them, and the better to reteine them in their dutie. Thirdlie, also it is his good for this cause, that while he perceiueth good, honest, and thankfull iudges, to iudge rightlie of those things which he hath verie well doone, hée greatlie reioiseth. Wherefore I haue shewed the reason why I iudge, that honour is the good, as well of him that is praised, as of him that praiseth. And yet for this cause am I not contrarie to Aristotle, which saith, that the same is in him which dooth the honour, not in him which receiueth the honour: bicause he (as it is now brought in the definition) saith, that honour is a signifieng of a mans opinion and mind; and therefore he iudgeth rightlie, séeing as well the opinion as signification thereof procéed from him that honoureth, and rest on him, as on a certeine foundation and matter subiect therevnto. But yet I haue respect to the originall, wherevpon this opinion was raised, and this iudgement is stirred vp in the minds of the wise; and moreouer, I note the fruits of this opinion, and I sée all these things to be in the man that is praised, that is to saie, a greater authoritie & gladnes. Neither hath this my definition onlie place in honours; but it must be no otherwise estéemed of the lawfull iudgement of a iudge, and of a iust sentence, when he pronounceth the lawe. For these are the proper good things of him, which therwithall turne to his good, on whose side the matter is iudged. And no otherwise should we saie of iustice;
10 But how those things, 1which Aristotle bringeth, doo agrée with the holie scriptures, we may easilie perceiue. First he saith, that this opinion, as touching the grosser sort of pleasures, is the opinion of manie, and that of the vulgar sort of men. Which also Christ taught, affirming that the waie of perdition is large, 2and manie doo go that waie. He addeth moreouer, that they which iudge this, are 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, that is, most burdensome. And in Esaie we knowe, that it was said to wicked Ahaz; 3Is it a small matter vnto you to be greeuous vnto men? Aristotle calleth them bond-slaues. And the Lord said; 4He that dooth sinne, is the seruant of sinne. Also Peter said; Euerie man is his seruant, 5of whom he is ouercome. Aristotle saith, that they choose a beastlie life. And we haue it in the Psalmes; Man, when he should be in honour, 6is compared vnto the brute beasts, and is made like vnto them. Also Ieremie; 7Euerie man neigheth at his neighbours wife. And againe in the psalme; Be ye not like horsse and mule, 8in whom there is no vnderstanding. They which so thinke (saith the philosopher) doo defend themselues by the authoritie of princes, which liue after the maner of Sardanapalus. Neither dooth this disagrée with the holie scriptures, wherein we read, that such in a maner were the people, as were the kings ⟨p. 140⟩whom they had. 9And in Osea we reade; Such people, such priest. In the Prouerbs, the 29. chapter; When the wicked shall beare rule, transgression shall be multiplied. And in the Gospels as touching Herod, 10when the wise men came to Ierusalem, we find that not onlie hée himselfe was troubled, but also the whole citie with him. Lastlie, it is concluded, that in these grosser sort of pleasures cannot be reposed the chéefest good. Which also the Apostle confirmeth to the Corinthians; 11Meate for the bellie, and the bellie for meate, God shall destroie both the one and the other. And Christ himselfe speaking of the pleasure of procreation; 12In the regeneration they neither marrie wiues, nor are married, but they shall be like vnto the angels.
