A14350:631
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
14 Now that we have disputed of pleasures, it followeth that we speak of honours; and for good cause are these joined together, seeing both of them do accompany actions, though after a divers manner. For seeing that action agreeth with nature, and that we mark it, & are made glad with pleasure; even to those actions, when they shall be good, and just, and honest, honour is joined. And that it may be made the plainer, which we treat of; I will speak somewhat of the nature of honour, and of those things which belong unto the same. And first of all we will set forth the definition thereof. 1Aristotle in his first book of Rhetorics, will have it to be a signifying of the opinion, which is had of a mans honesty; and that consisteth of outward signs. To make this definition perfect, I think good to add thereunto the cause of the end, which since I cannot draw from the philosophers, I will borrow of our divinity. We therefore testify by manifest signs, that we judge well of honest men, to the intent that God, the author of all justice and goodness, may be honoured in them: secondly, that the authority and example of them may profit others. Now do we comprehend all the causes of honour. The form is the signification, declaration, 2and testimony of our opinion touching good men. The efficient cause is touched, when we added thereto, the mans honesty: for by it are men stirred up to judge well. But the matter shall be in all those signs, whereby we give a testimony to good and just men. And these things, since they be manifold, are mentioned in the book of Rhetorics now alleged; namely, monuments, images, government, verses, sepulchres, a living of the public treasury, gifts; and we may ad thereto, the uncovering of our head, the giving of place, and rising up to our betters, &c.
14 Now that we haue disputed of pleasures, it followeth that we speake of honours; and for good cause are these ioined togither, séeing both of them doo accompanie actions, though after a diuers maner. For séeing that action agréeth with nature, and that we marke it, & are made glad with pleasure; euen to those actions, when they shall be good, and iust, and honest, honour is ioined. And that it may be made the plainer, which we treat of; I will speake somewhat of the nature of honour, and of those things which belong vnto the same. And first of all we will set foorth the definition thereof. 1Aristotle in his first booke of Rhetoriks, will haue it to be a signifieng of the opinion, which is had of a mans honestie; and that consisteth of outward signes. To make this definition perfect, I thinke good to adde therevnto the cause of the end, which since I cannot drawe from the philosophers, I will borowe of our diuinitie. We therefore testifie by manifest signes, that we iudge well of honest men, to the intent that God, the authour of all iustice and goodnes, may be honoured in them: secondlie, that the authoritie and example of them may profit others. Now doo we comprehend all the causes of honour. The forme is the signification, declaration, 2and testimonie of our opinion touching good men. The efficient cause is touched, when we added thereto, the mans honestie: for by it are men stirred vp to iudge well. But the matter shall be in all those signes, whereby we giue a testimonie to good and iust men. And these things, since they be manifold, are mentioned in the booke of Rhetoriks now alledged; namelie, monuments, images, gouernement, verses, sepulchres, a liuing of the publike treasurie, gifts; and we may ad thereto, the vncouering of our head, the giuing of place, and rising vp to our betters, &c.
And as all these things are many in number, so must we appoint as many parts, forms, or kinds of honour. And the difference of them is in respect of the matter of them. And we have also added the ends, that this testimony of ours may redound unto God, and that by our honours we may make the good examples of just men to be the more famous; or else that unto them which behave themselves well, there may be given an authority, and that thereby many others may be holpen. From the sense ⟨p. 142⟩of this definition did Augustine not much vary, 1who saith, that Glory is a judgement of men, which have a good opinion of [other] men. Hereunto we have added certain outward testimonies of this judgement, and have expressed unto what men those testimonies must be given; that is to wit, unto honest men, and to those which order themselves aright. But this is wanting as well in Aristotle, as in Augustine, who should be those, that should signify their opinion. Certainly, those ought to be (as we gather out of the first book of Ethics) wise men, and such as do know us well. Quintilian yet more briefly, and in a certain compendious manner, 2hath thus expounded the matter; Glory (saith he) is the praise of good men consenting in one: where that word [of good men] may be joined both to them that are praised, and to them that do praise: for it behooveth them both to be good. Which to make more plain, we will thus divide honours; so that some of them we make to be of small importance, and but overshadowed, which all, only are raised by a brute of the people: and these, since they proceed not of a sound judgement, are neither firm, nor yet yielded unto them, to whom they ought to be given. But others (as said Quintilian) proceed of the consent of good men; wherefore they be sound, and good men only are honoured with them. But we have experience, that those former are so light and inconstant, as thou mayest see that well-near in one day, some are both justified, and condemned of the people: wherefore he that likened this kind of good to a glass, because it is very brittle and frail, strayed not much from the truth.
And as all these things are manie in number, so must we appoint as manie parts, forms, or kinds of honour. And the difference of them is in respect of the matter of them. And we haue also added the ends, that this testimonie of ours may redound vnto God, and that by our honours wée may make the good examples of iust men to be the more famous; or else that vnto them which behaue themselues well, there may be giuen an authoritie, and that thereby manie others may be holpen. From the sense
115 But now there riseth a question, Whether honour (to speak of the same which is sincere and constant) be the good of him that doth give the honour, or of him to whom the honour is given? This did Seneca handle in his 103. epistle to Lucillus. I affirm it to be the good of them both. Without doubt it is his that is the praiser, seeing that his action is just and right. Neither think I it doubtful, that every good action is his good, whose action it is. Furthermore, since he, who is honoured, hath in himself honesty, justice, and goodness, whereby both good and wise men are allured and provoked to commend him; therefore is his good also called honour: for he hath the beginning and cause thereof in himself. Moreover, he himself reapeth fruit of that honour, when his authority increaseth, and he is made the abler to persuade others, what shall best become them, and the better to retain them in their duty. Thirdly, also it is his good for this cause, that while he perceiveth good, honest, and thankful judges, to judge rightly of those things which he hath very well done, he greatly rejoiceth. Wherefore I have showed the reason why I judge, that honour is the good, as well of him that is praised, as of him that praiseth. And yet for this cause am I not contrary to Aristotle, which saith, that the same is in him which doth the honour, not in him which receiveth the honour: because he (as it is now brought in the definition) saith, that honour is a signifying of a mans opinion and mind; and therefore he judgeth rightly, seeing as well the opinion as signification thereof proceed from him that honoureth, and rest on him, as on a certain foundation and matter subject thereunto. But yet I have respect to the original, whereupon this opinion was raised, and this judgement is stirred up in the minds of the wise; and moreover, I note the fruits of this opinion, and I see all these things to be in the man that is praised, that is to say, a greater authority & gladness. Neither hath this my definition only place in honours; but it must be no otherwise esteemed of the lawful judgement of a judge, and of a just sentence, when he pronounceth the law. For these are the proper good things of him, which therewithal turn to his good, on whose side the matter is judged. And no otherwise should we say of justice;
the same without doubt is his good that is just, but it is also good unto him, to whom, by the same justice, that which is due is rendered and paid. Now by these examples it plainly appeareth, how honour is a certain good thing, pertaining as well unto him which is had in estimation, as unto him which did give the same.
the same without doubt is his good that is iust, but it is also good vnto him, to whom, by the same iustice, that which is due is rendered and paid. Now by these examples it plainlie appéereth, how honour is a certeine good thing, perteining as well vnto him which is had in estimation, as vnto him which did giue the same.
They doubt in like manner, 1whether the testimony of one honest and wise man be sufficient unto true and perfect honour; or rather that a signification from many is not required. I think it may be said, that according to the nature of true and sincere honour, the testimony of one wise and good man, and who knoweth us well, is sufficient; because in one which is of this sort, we have all others like unto him: for there is one mouth and one judgement of all wise and good men. Howbeit, to this end, that the example may be made manifest, and that the authority may grow and be confirmed to him that is praised, the testimony of one man is not of force; because a very great furtherance hereto is fame and good name, which things do require the testimonies of many. Now must this be seen, 2whether at any time honour be severed from virtues and just deeds. Some say it is, and some say it is not. Certainly the more common opinion among the learned is, that honour followeth virtue, as a shadow followeth the body, which similitude in my judgement, expoundeth the question. The shadow accompanieth the body, but yet not always after one manner; sometime ⟨p. 143⟩it goeth before, sometime it is upon one side, and goeth together, but sometime it followeth after: so the virtue of some men is had in honour, straightway after the beginning; of others it is not regarded, till it be increased and made perfect. Finally, thou mayest see some, which are not honoured, till they be quite gone: for then are men wont otherwhile to perceive, though over-late, how great a good they have forgone. Which we know happened in old time to the prophets and apostles, and also in our times to many most just princes, good pastors, and godly preachers. While there were plenty of them, they were contemned; but when they were now taken away, then did they stir up an incredible desire of them. Wherefore honour doth accompany virtue, but not always in the same step: sometime before, otherwhile together, and oftentimes after. And besides this, the testimony and signification of wise men is never wanting unto true virtue, and just actions, except there be a want of the wise, and such as have seen and known these things.
They doubt in like maner, 1
16 Now at the length let us come nearer to the matter, 1and consider ye together with me, whether the desire of honour should be accounted among good things, or among evil things. Shall we not commend honour, seeing it is planted in us by God and by nature; seeing God promiseth it unto them that be his, & that not seldom; They that glorify me (saith he) I will glorify them? 2And The elders are by Paul pronounced worthy of double honour. And therefore it seems, 3that God planted this desire in mens minds, that we might be more and more stirred up to live well and justly. Neither is that common proverb rashly to be rejected; Honour nourisheth arts. Again Virtue commended increaseth. Moreover, there is none which hath but a spark of godliness can deny, but that all our works must be so ordered, as they may be allowed both of God and of men; namely that men, by the seeing of them, should (as meet it is) glorify God. Wherefore seeing honour, for the things that be well done stayeth not in us, but redoundeth unto God himself, how many soever be desirous of his glory, as we ought all to be, we may, at the least-wise for this cause, desire honour. Over this, 4who ought not to wish, but that all the brethren should not fail of doing their duty and office? Verily this hath God commanded all men, that they should honour their parents, and by the same reason the magistrates. And by Paul he commandeth; In giving honour go one before an other. Also in the first epistle to Timothy the fifth chapter; Honour widows, which be widows indeed. In the first of Peter, the second chapter; Honour all men, love brotherly fellowship. And of Epaphroditus he said in the epistle to the Philippians; 5And such as he is have ye in honour. Such places as these be I may bring many; but seeing these be sufficient, it appeareth that when any man hath honour given him, that is worthy of it, the commandments of God are obeyed. Which thing that it may be done, ought not they which be honest, and behave themselves well, commend it and be glad of it, and also wish that it may be done? Why do we pray; Let thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven?
Hereunto add, 1that in giving honour unto good men, we shall obtain rewards and benefits; That thou mayest (saith God) live long upon the earth. And on the other side, in contemning of them, they procure destruction to themselves; as the children which derided the prophet Elizaeus were rent in sunder of bears. Which seeing it is thus, he loveth not his neighbour, which desireth not that he may avoid these punishments, and obtain these commodities and rewards. Wherefore even as with the good favour of God we may wish for due honours; so are we driven to the very same thing by that charity wherewith we ought to love our neighbour. And this doth David very well confirm in the 15. Psalm, when he spake of him which should dwell in the house of God, and in the everlasting habitation, among other his virtues this he reckoneth; He that is lowly in his own eyes, & glorifieth them that fear God. Therefore since without controversy, eternal life is to be wished unto our neighbours; this is to be wished for with most ardent prayers; that the godly, and those which fear God may be had in honour: which is this kind of honour, namely to have them in estimation, to be delighted with their company, to maintain their good name, and cheerfully to relieve their necessities: all which things, since they be so coldly done in these days, they which be godly cannot choose but earnestly sorrow, and wish that at the length it may be done even as God hath commanded. Augustine in his Soliloquijs the first book, and eleventh chapter judgeth, that since of honours authority doth increase, and that authority doth much further to induce men unto honesty, and to drive men as well unto true opinions, as unto holiness of life, therefore honours are to be desired. Yea, & for their sakes, whom we ought by our ministry to help; if we see our authority to be despised, we ought for just & honest causes to defend the same, least in very deed it become unprofitable. To this belongeth that which Paul wrote unto Timothy; Let no man despise thy youth.2
Herevnto adde, 1that in giuing honour vnto good men, we shall obteine rewards and benefits; That thou maist (saith God) liue long vpon the earth. And on the other side, in contemning of them, they procure destruction to themselues; as the children which derided the prophet Elizaeus were rent in sunder of beares. Which séeing it is thus, he loueth not his neighbour, which desireth not that he may auoid these punishments, and obteine these commodities and rewards. Wherefore euen as with the good fauour of God we may wish for due honours; so are we driuen to the very same thing by that charitie wherwith we ought to loue our neighbour. And this dooth Dauid verie well confirme in the 15. Psalme, when he spake of him which should dwell in the house of God, and in the euerlasting habitation, among other his vertues this he reckoneth; He that is lowlie in his owne eies, & glorifieth them that feare God. Therefore since without controuersie, eternall life is to be wished vnto our neighbours; this is to be wished for with most ardent praiers; that the godlie, and those which feare God may be had in honour: which is this kind of honour, namelie to haue them in estimation, to be delighted with their companie, to maintaine their good name, and chéerfullie to reléeue their necessities: all which things, since they be so coldlie doone in these daies, they which be godlie cannot choose but earnestlie sorrowe, and wish that at the length it may be doone euen as God hath commanded. Augustine in his Soliloquijs the first booke, and eleuenth chapter iudgeth, that since of honours authoritie dooth increase, and that authoritie dooth much further to induce men vnto honestie, and to driue men as well vnto true opinions, as vnto holines of life, therefore honours are to be desired. Yea, & for their sakes, whom we ought by our ministerie to helpe; if we sée our authoritie to be despised, we ought for iust & honest causes to defend the same, least in verie déed it become vnprofitable. To this belongeth that which Paul wrote vnto Timothie; Let no man despise thy youth.
1And when we do well, it doth not a little further to the confirming of us, if we have the commendation of good men. For even as we are in a manner all troubled with the disease of self-love, we are easily deceived in affairs & actions; and those things which we do least commendably, we make most account of them. And because this doth not seldom happen, it causeth the more ignorant sort to become more doubtful and ambiguous in their doing, unto the which men, honour, praise, and approbation would do much good, if by outward signs the same were yielded: for by these things their mind and judgement is established. But those which be not doubtful, nay rather be assured, that those things which they do, be right, when they are adorned by wise and good men with a just kind of honour, they cannot choose but exceedingly rejoice and be glad in themselves, that they have gotten so good and just judges; wherefore honours do also profit these men. Neither do these things, which we have said, differ from the opinion of Aristotle. For albeit he deny honour to be the chiefest good, yet doth he not exclude it from the number of good things. Touching those things, which I have spoken of firm and perfect honour, there is nothing so agreeable, 2as that that shall be the chiefest, which the faithful in the last day of judgement shall have of Christ, when he shall say unto them; Come ye blessed of my father, &c. For that praise shall proceed from the most wise judge, to whom all justice is best known, neither can our doings any way be hidden from him.
1And when we doo well, it doth not a little further to the confirming of vs, if we haue the commendation of good men. For euen as we are in a maner all troubled with the disease of selfe-loue, we are easilie deceiued in affaires & actions; and those things which we doo least commendablie, wée make most account of them. And bicause this doth not seldome happen, it causeth the more ignorant sort to become more doubtfull and ambiguous in their dooing, vnto the which men, honor, praise, and approbation would doo much good, if by outward signes the same were yéelded: for by these things their mind and iudgement is established. But those which be not doubtfull, nay rather be assured, that those things which they doo, be right, when they are adorned by wise and good men with a iust kind of honor, they cannot choose but excéedinglie reioise and be glad in themselues, that they haue gotten so good and iust iudges; wherefore honors doo also profit these men. Neither doo these things, which we haue said, differ from the opinion of Aristotle. For albeit he denie honor to be the chéefest good, yet doth he not exclude it from the number of good things. Touching those things, which I haue spoken of firme and perfect honor, there is nothing so agréeable,
17 Wherefore I think it is now sufficiently concluded, and made apparent, that the moderate desire of honours is not to be blamed: yet because many do soon over-reach themselves herein, and that the place is slippery, therefore must we declare some things, which we ought to take heed of, least in seeking for virtue, we shamefully fall into vices. To this must we have a special regard, that even Aristotle being an Ethnic saw, that we desire not honour for it self: 1for this were of a mean good, to make the principal good, and to enjoy those things which we ought but to use. Let the same desire therefore tend both to the glory of God, and to the edifying of our brethren. Next of all let us beware, that we take not too much care for honour; 2for so would the mind be soon disquieted, which when many, who were accounted civill, did not avoid, they with the desire of praise became in a manner mad. We know with what a fury Alexander of Macedonia was carried in a manner through the world, seeking glory without measure and reason, who at length was brought to that pass, as he thought that there were other worlds to be conquered besides this; One world sufficeth not for young Pellaeus. With the very which disease, Julius Caesar being infected, set upon his country, and rashly violated the laws and liberty thereof. So then let this desire be moderate, and let it be bounded within certain and just limits. And in receiving of honours, let us follow Augustine's counsel; Neither receive thou (saith he) all that is offered, nor yet refuse thou all: for he that rejecteth all the honour, which is yielded unto him, for the things that he hath rightly and very well done, seems as it were to suppress the gifts of God, and that he would not have them acknowledged, which in very deed is against true godliness. And on the other side, he that embraceth whatsoever is offered him, doth many times pass the limits of modesty.
17 Wherefore I thinke it is now sufficientlie concluded, and made apparant, that the moderate desire of honors is not to be blamed: yet bicause manie doo soone ouer-reach themselues héerein, and that the place is slipperie, therefore must we declare some things, which we ought to take héed of, least in séeking for vertue, wée shamefullie fall into vices. To this must we haue a speciall regard, that euen Aristotle being an Ethnike sawe, that we desire not honor for it selfe:
And heerewithall must heed be taken, that the kind of honour, which is brought, 1be not greater than the dignity of men can sustain; which when it happeneth, must not be abidden: for thereat is God angry, and doth severely take vengeance for his honours usurped by men. Herod was most grievously punished, 2when the people cried unto him with voices not fit for a man, but such as were meet for God. And for the same fault is Domitian, Nero, and many other most insolent Emperors justly condemned, which would not be worshipped as princes, but as God. Those things which belong to God, let them be rendered unto God; and let good men receive humane honours rightly and moderately when they be offered. Also, let there be kept a just and right measure in obtaining of honours. 3There is only one way and mean commended, and that is by well bringing of things to effect, which the Grecians call *[Greek or Hebrew], which things hypocrites do counterfeit, and while by outward signs they endeavour to declare themselves godly and holy, they be had in estimation of the people. But of them Christ said; 5They have received their reward. And there be others, which are carried so far forth, as they buy honours, which vice without doubt is condemned by all just laws, and of the Latins it is called Ambitus, that is, 6Ambition: for it is a most vile thing to crave the peoples voices by great gifts. Hereof in the digests Ad legem Juliam, de ambitu, are many things extant. Those which were convicted, were condemned of infamy, and also in a payment of money. And the punishments of this fault were many times in the commonweal of Rome increased; for the fault did grow on without measure. Yea, and the ecclesiastical Canons did imitate the Roman laws. And because this vice grew mightily in the church, ⟨p. 145⟩and at this day reigneth every-where, many laws were decreed, which are in the first cause, quest. 1. throughout the whole question: and in the fifth book of the decretals, in the title De Simonia, & in another title, that the prelates should not grant their own places, or places of the church,
Neither is only money, but words, & every kind of flattery, if they be done only unto that end, to obtain ecclesiastical honours, to be esteemed as a price. And the fathers did so persecute this vice, as against those that commit Simony, they admitted any sort of accusers, even those that were infamous, dishonest persons, & harlots, and such other sort of men, which is not suffered in the complaint of other crimes. Lastly, must be regarded, that we use honours well when they be gotten, 1which I therefore speak, because we may see some every-where, which abuse them, to obtain power to compass riches, and follow pleasures, unto all which things they make the way easy to themselves by dignities and honours, as well civill, as ecclesiastical.
Neither is only monie, but words, & euerie kind of flatterie, if they be done onlie vnto that end, to obteine ecclesiasticall honors, to be estéemed as a price. And the fathers did so persecute this vice, as against those that commit Simonie, they admitted anie sort of accusers, euen those that were infamous, dishonest persons, & harlots, and suth other sort of men, which is not suffered in the complaint of other crimes. Lastlie, must be regarded, that we vse honors well when they be gotten, 1which I therefore speake, bicause we may sée some euerie-where, which abuse them, to obteine power to compasse riches, and follow pleasures, vnto all which things they make the waie easie to themselues by dignities and honors, as well ciuill, as ecclesiasticall.
18 These things we thought good to be recited, 1as touching them which receive honours; now must we speak a few words of them, whose part is to yield honour unto others: for these also must be admonished, because herein men may sin diversly and manifoldly. I suppose there is none that doubteth, but they do greatly err, which deny just and meet honours to them, that well and rightly behave themselves, and yet we see that there be many such as deny this. And those men are a great deal worse than these, which in the stead of giving honour, do hate them, do diminish their deserts, be disquieted and grieved, if they shall see any thing go well with them: these men without doubt are to be accounted unjust, and most ungrateful. Some indeed there be, which frankly enough do honour good men, but this they do, to reap in like manner some benefit, favour, or help of them: and these pass not much of the well doings of honest men, but only seek their own good; wherefore they rather sell their honour, than make it a reward of virtues. Again we have known others, which are ready enough to give honours unto honest men, but in doing thereof, use a perverse judgement; for those good things which they ought to regard, they neglect, and do greatly esteem those things which be of less value. If a man do well over-see his church, bring sound doctrine, live godly, and showeth every-where good examples, in this respect they make small account of him: but if the same man give crafty and expert counsel to increase wealth, or show some unknown thing in husbandry, or in physic, then they have him in admiration, and with praises extol him to heaven. There be also those which do flatter, and which adorn even foul vices with the names of virtues. Also, there be some, which in giving of honours keep no mean, but either they give them sparingly, or else more than they should.
18 These things we thought good to be recited, 1as touching them which receiue honors; now must we speake a few words of them, whose part is to yéeld honor vnto others: for these also must be admonished, bicause héerein men may sin diuerslie and manifoldlie. I suppose there is none that doubteth, but they doo greatlie erre, which denie iust and méet honors to them, that well and rightlie behaue themselues, and yet we sée that there be manie such as denie this. And those men are a great deale worsse than these, which in the stead of giuing honor, doo hate them, doo diminish their deserts, be disquieted and gréeued, if they shall sée anie thing go well with them: these men without doubt are to be accounted vniust, and most vngratefull. Some indéed there be, which frankelie inough doo honour good men, but this they doo, to reape in like maner some benefit, fauour, or helpe of them: and these passe not much of the well doings of honest men, but onlie séeke their owne good; wherefore they rather sell their honor, than make it a reward of vertues. Againe wée haue knowne others, which are readie inough to giue honors vnto honest men, but in dooing thereof, vse a peruerse iudgement; for those good things which they ought to regard, they neglect, and doo greatlie estéeme those things which be of lesse value. If a man do well ouer-sée his church, bring sound doctrine, liue godlie, and sheweth euerie-where good examples, in this respect they make small account of him: but if the same man giue craftie and expert counsell to increase wealth, or shew some vnknowne thing in husbandrie, or in physicke, then they haue him in admiration, and with praises extoll him to heauen. There be also those which doo flatter, and which adorne euen foule vices with the names of vertues. Also, there be some, which in giuing of honors kéepe no meane, but either they giue them sparinglie, or else more than they should.
19 All these things, which I have rehearsed, 1must be diligently taken heed of; which since I have largely enough declared, now remaineth that we show how the doctrine of Aristotle agreeth with the holy scriptures, or else differeth from them. Indeed when he saith, that honour is not the chiefest good, he disagreeth not any thing from the holy scriptures: for the chiefest good cannot be desired more than is meet; but in wishing for honours we must temper our desire. I would not have you (saith the Lord to his apostles) be called Rabbi, or masters, or fathers; 2but rather regard this, that ye serve one another, and that with a lowly and moderate mind. Besides this, our saviour would not suffer his to be defrauded of the chiefest good, seeing he came purposely to make us happy. But he setteth us open in a manner unto rebukes, 3and he foreshowed that his children should have contumelies done unto them, whom he comforteth by his own example; Who abased himself, and taking upon him the form of a servant, was made obedient even to the death of the cross. And whereas it is affirmed, that our chiefest good should be firm, proper, and not easy to be removed, it maketh with that which Paul saith; that therefore our salvation and justification doth consist of grace and faith, 4but not of works, that the promise may be firm. That honours may soon be taken away, the holy scriptures do testify: for Christ said; 5that No prophet is without honour, save in his own country. And we see that the saints, having honour many-times done unto them, are within a while after accused & caught unto punishment. And finally, the holy scriptures teach, that honour is of the kind of those good things, which are referred to some other thing: because the Lord said; Let others see your good works, 6and glorify your father. Where we see, that glory and honour ought not to rest only in us; but must be referred unto divine honours and praises.
20 In the definition of Felicity, action of the ⟨p. 146⟩mind was the general word under which it was contained; 1which very well agreeth with the old writers, who divided good things into three parts, 2and among those things gave the principal and chief place unto the goods of the mind. Wherefore, seeing felicity is the chiefest good, it is well assigned to belong unto the actions of the mind. That same distinction of good things, proceeded from the Academics, and before them from Socrates, as it may appear in Plato's fift book De legibus: albeit afterward followed the Stoics, which only made one kind of good things; though Aristotle made no mention of them, because they flourished after his time. The goods of the mind are distinguished; 3for either they are referred to that which is to be understood, or to that which is to be desired: unto the former part are referred sharpness of wit, quickness of spirit, speediness of perceiving, fast holding in the memory, prudence, wisdom, and also knowledges and right opinions: but as for the will and desire, all the moral virtues do adorn. The goods of the body are distinguished; 4for some of them are dispersed over all the body, as health, strength, and beauty: for these settle not in one part of the body, but generally in the whole. But there be other things which are proper unto some of the members; namely, swift running, unto the feet; to the hands, strength in holding fast, in driving in, in drawing to, and in casting from; volubility or readiness unto the tongue, and to all the senses. Outward good things are distributed into friends, 5nobility, honours, riches, and such like. But why the goods of the mind have the first place, many reasons may be brought; but now it shall be sufficient to say, that in good right those are the better properties, which are of a better matter that is subject. But the argument of Aristotle may thus be gathered; Those be the chiefest good things, which belong to felicity;
115 But now there riseth a question, Whether honour (to speake of the same which is sincere and constant) be the good of him that dooth giue the honour, or of him to whom the honour is giuen? This did Seneca handle in his 103. epistle to Lucillus. I affirme it to be the good of them both. Without doubt it is his that is the praiser, séeing that his action is iust and right. Neither thinke I it doubtfull, that euerie good action is his good, whose action it is. Furthermore, since he, who is honoured, hath in himselfe honestie, iustice, and goodnes, whereby both good and wise men are allured and prouoked to commend him; therefore is his good also called honour: for he hath the beginning and cause thereof in himselfe. Moreouer, he himselfe reapeth fruit of that honour, when his authoritie increaseth, and he is made the abler to persuade others, what shall best béecome them, and the better to reteine them in their dutie. Thirdlie, also it is his good for this cause, that while he perceiueth good, honest, and thankfull iudges, to iudge rightlie of those things which he hath verie well doone, hée greatlie reioiseth. Wherefore I haue shewed the reason why I iudge, that honour is the good, as well of him that is praised, as of him that praiseth. And yet for this cause am I not contrarie to Aristotle, which saith, that the same is in him which dooth the honour, not in him which receiueth the honour: bicause he (as it is now brought in the definition) saith, that honour is a signifieng of a mans opinion and mind; and therefore he iudgeth rightlie, séeing as well the opinion as signification thereof procéed from him that honoureth, and rest on him, as on a certeine foundation and matter subiect therevnto. But yet I haue respect to the originall, wherevpon this opinion was raised, and this iudgement is stirred vp in the minds of the wise; and moreouer, I note the fruits of this opinion, and I sée all these things to be in the man that is praised, that is to saie, a greater authoritie & gladnes. Neither hath this my definition onlie place in honours; but it must be no otherwise estéemed of the lawfull iudgement of a iudge, and of a iust sentence, when he pronounceth the lawe. For these are the proper good things of him, which therwithall turne to his good, on whose side the matter is iudged. And no otherwise should we saie of iustice;
16 Now at the length let vs come néerer to the matter, 1and consider yée togither with me, whether the desire of honour should be accounted among good things, or among euill things. Shall we not commend honour, séeing it is planted in vs by God and by nature; séeing God promiseth it vnto them that be his, & that not seldome; They that glorifie me (saith he) I will glorifie them? 2And The elders are by Paule pronounced woorthie of double honour. And therefore it séemes, 3that God planted this desire in mens minds, that we might be more and more stirred vp to liue well and iustlie. Neither is that common prouerbe rashlie to be reiected; Honour nourisheth arts. Againe Vertue comended increaseth. Moreouer, there is none which hath but a sparke of godlines can denie, but that all our works must be so ordered, as they may be allowed both of God and of men; namelie that men, by the séeing of them, should (as méete it is) glorifie God. Wherefore séeing honour, for the things that be well doone staieth not in vs, but redoundeth vnto God himselfe, how manie soeuer be desirous of his glorie, as we ought all to be, we may, at the least-wise for this cause, desire honour. Ouer this, 4who ought not to wish, but that all the brethren should not faile of dooing their dutie and office? Verelie this hath God commanded all men, that they should honour their parents, and by the same reason the magistrats. And by Paule he commandeth; In giuing honour go one before an other. Also in the first epistle to Timothie the fift chapter; Honour widowes, which be widowes indeed. In the first of Peter, the second chapter; Honour all men, loue brotherlie fellowship. And of Epaphroditus he said in the epistle to the Philipians; 5And such as he is haue ye in honour. Such places as these be I may bring manie; but séeing these be sufficient, it appeareth that when anie man hath honour giuen him, that is woorthie of it, the commandements of God are obeied. Which thing that it may be doone, ought not they which be honest, and behaue themselues well, commend it and be glad of it, and also wish that it may be doone? Whie doo we praie; Let thy will be doone in earth, as it is in heauen?
And héerewithall must héed be taken, that the kind of honor, which is brought, 1be not greater than the dignitie of men can sustaine; which when it happeneth, must not be abidden: for thereat is God angrie, and doth seuearelie take vengeance for his honors vsurped by men. Herod was most gréeuouslie punished, 2when the people cried vnto him with voices not fit for a man, but such as were méet for God. And for the same fault is Domitian, Nero, and manie other most insolent Emperours iustlie condemned, which would not be woorshipped as princes, but as God. Those things which belong to God, let them be rendred vnto God; and let good men receiue humane honors rightlie and moderatelie when they be offered. Also, let there be kept a iust and right measure in obteining of honors. 3There is onlie one waie and meane commended, and that is by well bringing of things to effect, which the Grecians call *〈non-Latin alphabet〉, which things hypocrits doo counterfet, and while by outward signes they indeuour to declare themselues godlie and holie, they be had in estimation of the people. But of them Christ said; 5They haue receiued their reward. And there be others, which are carried so far foorth, as they buie honors, which vice without doubt is condemned by all iust lawes, and of the Latins it is called Ambitus, that is, 6Ambition: for it is a most vile thing to craue the peoples voices by great gifts. Héerof in the digests Ad legem Iuliam, de ambitu, are manie things extant. Those which were conuicted, were condemned of infamie, and also in a paiment of monie. And the punishments of this fault were manie times in the commonweale of Rome increased; for the fault did growe on without measure. Yea, and the ecclesiasticall Canons did imitate the Romane lawes. And bicause this vice grew mightilie in the church, ⟨p. 145⟩and at this daie reigneth euerie-where, manie lawes were decréed, which are in the first cause, quest. 1. throughout the whole question: and in the fift booke of the decretals, in the title De Simonia, & in another title, that the prelats should not grant their owne places, or places of the church, 7for a yéerelie rent. They that sell ecclesiasticall dignities, followe Gehezi the seruant of Helizaeus, 8and they which buie them, are like vnto Simon Magus.
20 In the definition of Felicitie, action of the ⟨p. 146⟩mind was the generall word vnder which it was conteined; 1which verie well agréeth with the old writers, who diuided good things into thrée parts, 2and among those things gaue the principall and chéefe place vnto the goods of the mind. Wherefore, séeing felicitie is the chéefest good, it is well assigned to belong vnto the actions of the mind. That same distinction of good things, procéeded from the Academikes, and before them from Socrates, as it may appéere in Platos fift booke De legibus: albeit afterward followed the Stoikes, which onelie made one kind of good things; though Aristotle made no mention of them, bicause they flourished after his time. The goods of the mind are distinguished; 3for either they are referred to that which is to be vnderstood, or to that which is to be desired: vnto the former part are referred sharpenes of wit, quicknes of spirit, spéedinesse of perceiuing, fast holding in the memorie, prudence, wisedome, and also knowledges and right opinions: but as for the will and desire, all the morall vertues doo adorne. The goods of the bodie are distinguished; 4for some of them are dispersed ouer all the bodie, as health, strength, and beautie: for these settle not in one part of the bodie, but generallie in the whole. But there be other things which are proper vnto some of the members; namelie, swift running, vnto the féete; to the hands, strength in holding fast, in driuing in, in drawing to, and in casting from; volubilitie or readines vnto the toong, and to all the senses. Outward good things are distributed into fréends, 5nobilitie, honours, riches, and such like. But whie the goods of the mind haue the first place, manie reasons may be brought; but now it shall be sufficient to saie, that in good right those are the better properties, which are of a better matter that is subiect. But the argument of Aristotle may thus be gathered; Those be the chéefest good things, which belong to felicitie; 6But the goods of the mind be the chéefest; Iustlie therefore are they comprehended in the definition of blessednes. Wherefore, since the actions of the mind obteine the first place among the good things thereof, they are rightlie set downe to be the generall word, vnder which felicitie is conteined.
