A14350:644
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
20 In the definition of Felicity, action of the ⟨p. 146⟩mind was the general word under which it was contained; 1which very well agreeth with the old writers, who divided good things into three parts, 2and among those things gave the principal and chief place unto the goods of the mind. Wherefore, seeing felicity is the chiefest good, it is well assigned to belong unto the actions of the mind. That same distinction of good things, proceeded from the Academics, and before them from Socrates, as it may appear in Plato's fift book De legibus: albeit afterward followed the Stoics, which only made one kind of good things; though Aristotle made no mention of them, because they flourished after his time. The goods of the mind are distinguished; 3for either they are referred to that which is to be understood, or to that which is to be desired: unto the former part are referred sharpness of wit, quickness of spirit, speediness of perceiving, fast holding in the memory, prudence, wisdom, and also knowledges and right opinions: but as for the will and desire, all the moral virtues do adorn. The goods of the body are distinguished; 4for some of them are dispersed over all the body, as health, strength, and beauty: for these settle not in one part of the body, but generally in the whole. But there be other things which are proper unto some of the members; namely, swift running, unto the feet; to the hands, strength in holding fast, in driving in, in drawing to, and in casting from; volubility or readiness unto the tongue, and to all the senses. Outward good things are distributed into friends, 5nobility, honours, riches, and such like. But why the goods of the mind have the first place, many reasons may be brought; but now it shall be sufficient to say, that in good right those are the better properties, which are of a better matter that is subject. But the argument of Aristotle may thus be gathered; Those be the chiefest good things, which belong to felicity; 6But the goods of the mind be the chiefest; Justly therefore are they comprehended in the definition of blessedness. Wherefore, since the actions of the mind obtain the first place among the good things thereof, they are rightly set down to be the general word, under which felicity is contained.
20 In the definition of Felicitie, action of the ⟨p. 146⟩mind was the generall word vnder which it was conteined; 1which verie well agréeth with the old writers, who diuided good things into thrée parts, 2and among those things gaue the principall and chéefe place vnto the goods of the mind. Wherefore, séeing felicitie is the chéefest good, it is well assigned to belong vnto the actions of the mind. That same distinction of good things, procéeded from the Academikes, and before them from Socrates, as it may appéere in Platos fift booke De legibus: albeit afterward followed the Stoikes, which onelie made one kind of good things; though Aristotle made no mention of them, bicause they flourished after his time. The goods of the mind are distinguished; 3for either they are referred to that which is to be vnderstood, or to that which is to be desired: vnto the former part are referred sharpenes of wit, quicknes of spirit, spéedinesse of perceiuing, fast holding in the memorie, prudence, wisedome, and also knowledges and right opinions: but as for the will and desire, all the morall vertues doo adorne. The goods of the bodie are distinguished; 4for some of them are dispersed ouer all the bodie, as health, strength, and beautie: for these settle not in one part of the bodie, but generallie in the whole. But there be other things which are proper vnto some of the members; namelie, swift running, vnto the féete; to the hands, strength in holding fast, in driuing in, in drawing to, and in casting from; volubilitie or readines vnto the toong, and to all the senses. Outward good things are distributed into fréends, 5nobilitie, honours, riches, and such like. But whie the goods of the mind haue the first place, manie reasons may be brought; but now it shall be sufficient to saie, that in good right those are the better properties, which are of a better matter that is subiect. But the argument of Aristotle may thus be gathered; Those be the chéefest good things, which belong to felicitie; 6But the goods of the mind be the chéefest; Iustlie therefore are they comprehended in the definition of blessednes. Wherefore, since the actions of the mind obteine the first place among the good things thereof, they are rightlie set downe to be the generall word, vnder which felicitie is conteined.
Many there were, and those not of the vulgar sort, 1which held riches in estimation, as the chiefest good; and therefore Aristotle for two causes removed those things from felicity, the first is, for that they belong unto violence; for that which is violent, hath no respect of felicity. But that the possession and obtaining of riches is a violent thing, use and experience doth teach us; for there is none that can get great and abundant riches, or can long keep them, unless there be a violence, and that no small violence used. Another reason is, because they tend to profit, and are referred to another thing; wherefore the state of them is servile. For we have them to this end, that they may help us to other things which we desire: neither would any man esteem them the value of an hear, unless he knew them to be profitable unto those things that he would have. And how strange this is from the nature of the chief good, all they are not ignorant, which know that the same should be desired for it self sake. Very much therefore are they deceived, which have riches in the greatest honour, because they be profitable unto all things. This if Midas had set before his eyes, he would not have so addicted himself to the study of heaping up riches, that he was justly called [Greek or Hebrew], that is, 2even mad for the desire of gold. Neither is he alone among princes and kings to be reproved, seeing now the greatest part of them is infected with this vice, who nevertheless might have bin admonished, not only by these two reasons of Aristotle, but by many other reasons, to set down some moderation of their desire. 3For it is without reason, so greatly to esteem that kind of good, which is external, and in a manner pertaineth nothing to the mind; but is only reckoned among the instruments, whereby men are holpen to do those things which they have purposed. Also, this kind of good doth besot men, if it happen upon them that be unwise: they be very careful to attain unto riches, but have no care of their children, to whom they shall leave them; nor yet of themselves, who should use them. They are like unto him, which would have many shoes, and in the mean time went barefoot. Besides this, the nature of riches is doubtful, in so much as they serve no less to the accomplishing of lewd desires and wickedness, than of honest and just duties.
Moreover, if virtue be therefore not the chiefest good, because it may be with them which be asleep, and which be in misery, whom no man judging prudently would call happy; how shall felicity be attributed unto riches, seeing they be oftentimes possessed of most miserable men; yea rather, of them which be monsters and wonderments of the world, who hate all honest arts and all virtues? Unto honour it is denied, and that justly, that it should not be accounted blessedness; because it is not in their power which be had in honour. Which if we shall affirm, no doubt but we may judge the same of riches; seeing the possession of them is subject to infinite perils: they are gotten and lost well-near in an hour. One man boasted of exceeding great riches, which his ships had brought unto him: another hearing ⟨p. 147⟩him, answered, that he made no account of goods which hung on gables and winds. And that they be not the chief good indeed, it seems they very well knew, which termed riches a gilded felicity. Indeed I deny not, but that riches be good; 1but that they be the chiefest good, that we deny. That they be violent, & are referred to another thing, the holy scriptures in one word testify; Make ye friends of unrighteous Mammon. That they do hurt the unwise, it is said; The root of all evils is covetousness; They which will become rich fall into snares & tentation, &c. And as for the inconstancy of them, [Paul saith to Timothy;] Command that they trust not in the uncertainty of riches; 2[and Christ said] This night will they fetch away thy soul from thee. Finally, they are a hinderance unto men, as in the gospel; And the young man being rich, 3went his ways: so as they be good things, but yet in their own degree.
Moreouer, if vertue be therefore not the chéefest good, bicause it may be with them which be asléepe, and which be in miserie, whom no man iudging prudentlie would call happie; how shall felicitie be attributed vnto riches, séeing they be oftentimes possessed of most miserable men; yea rather, of them which be monsters and woonderments of the world, who hate all honest arts and all vertues? Vnto honour it is denied, and that iustlie, that it should not be accounted blessednes; bicause it is not in their power which be had in honour. Which if we shall affirme, no doubt but we may iudge the same of riches; séeing the possession of them is subiect to infinit perils: they are gotten and lost well-néere in an houre. One man boasted of excéeding great riches, which his ships had brought vnto him: another hearing
Certainly this word [Greek or Hebrew], that is, 1do comprehend, must be diligently considered of; for we easily understand thereby, that the elder fathers thought not that the abundance of outward goods belonged to the nature of felicity: but only called the same a thing added for a help. Riches make not the nature of felicity, they are not placed in the definition thereof, they are not counted among the goods of the mind; wherein it is said, that felicity chiefly standeth. To what end are they then? First they are therefore added, to the intent they may further many actions of an happy man; for neither a liberal man, nor a man of valiant courage, nor he that is honourable can do any thing of their own virtue; if they want money, if they lack store of things, and finally if they be needy and poor. And moreover, without riches, a happy man not only cannot help another man, but can be at no leisure to give himself to contemplation; because with his travel he must provide for his daily sustenance.
Certeinlie this word 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, that is, 1doo comprehend, must be diligentlie considered of; for we easilie vnderstand thereby, that the elder fathers thought not that the abundance of outward goods belonged to the nature of felicitie: but onlie called the same a thing added for a helpe. Riches make not the nature of felicitie, they are not placed in the definition therof, they are not counted among the goods of the mind; wherein it is said, that felicitie chéefelie standeth. To what end are they then? First they are therfore added, to the intent they may further manie actions of an happie man; for neither a liberall man, nor a man of valiant courage, nor he that is honourable can doo anie thing of their owne vertue; if they want monie, if they lacke store of things, and finallie if they be néedie and poore. And moreouer, without riches, a happie man not onlie cannot helpe another man, but can be at no leisure to giue himselfe to contemplation; bicause with his trauell he must prouide for his dailie sustenance.
121 But some do not allow of it, that so excellent a thing as felicity is, should have need of goods far inferior unto it: howbeit this knot is undone by our distinction. In it self and of his own nature it hath no need of them: for if in it self it should have need of these things, nothing might be happy, unless it abounded with these things: which must not be granted, seeing God and the angels are blessed without the small help of these goods. This poor lack, which is of a corruptible and mortal man, is joined to this felicity. Even as our power of understanding is not able, by consideration, to do any thing at all, without the senses and similitudes which we contemplate: which in very deed happeneth unto it, not in respect it is a mind or understanding: for if it were on this wise, neither God nor angels should understand any thing without senses and imagination. So then, the mind and understanding require those things, not by themselves, or their own nature; but in respect they belong unto men. It is to be noted moreover, that the matter which is subject, may be understood two ways: for either it representeth that matter, about which our actions are occupied; or else it is the matter wherein our mind is, namely the body, to the nourishing, sustaining and feeding whereof these outward goods are in any wise required; wherefore in these two respects felicity hath need of the outward good things.
121 But some doo not allow of it, that so excellent a thing as felicitie is, should haue néed of goods far inferiour vnto it: howbeit this knot is vndoone by our distinction. In it selfe and of his owne nature it hath no néed of them: for if in it selfe it should haue néed of these things, nothing might be happie, vnlesse it abounded with these things: which must not be granted, séeing God and the angels are blessed without the small helpe of these goods. This poore lacke, which is of a corruptible and mortall man, is ioined to this felicitie. Euen as our power of vnderstanding is not able, by consideration, to doo anie thing at all, without the senses and similitudes which we contemplate: which in verie déed happeneth vnto it, not in respect it is a mind or vnderstanding: for if it were on this wise, neither God nor angels should vnderstand anie thing without senses and imagination. So then, the mind and vnderstanding require those things, not by themselues, or their owne nature; but in respect they belong vnto men. It is to be noted moreouer, that the matter which is subiect, may be vnderstood two waies: for either it representeth that matter, about which our actions are occupied; or else it is the matter wherein our mind is, namelie the bodie, to the nourishing, sustaining and féeding whereof these outward goods are in anie wise required; wherefore in these two respects felicitie hath néed of the outward good things.
Besides, we see in arts, that many things are done, not only by the art, which is placed in the mind of the artificers, and in the members of their body; but by the help also of outward instruments. The smith useth fire, tongs, a hammer, and an anvil: the carpenter a rule, a saw, an axe, and such other things, and that because of the matter which is subject: and so oftentimes it sufficeth not artificers to have art, and the members of the body. In like manner doth it come to pass touching felicity; although the mind be endued with excellent virtues, and that it will and can show forth excellent actions, and is not destitute of bodily power, yet hath it need of friends, riches, and civill power. By civill power I understand honours, good will, favours, protection, and such like. As for riches, they are divided some into natural, 1and some into artificial: natural are counted whatsoever things do grow out of the earth, and which the breed of cattle produceth: but artificial consisteth on money, which in very deed was invented, that it should be indifferent to both parties in the exchange of things. And both these kinds being called faculties, 2we gather by the etymology of the word, that they are a great furtherance unto doing.
Besides, we sée in arts, that manie things are doone, not onlie by the art, which is placed in the mind of the artificers, and in the members of their bodie; but by the helpe also of outward instruments. The smith vseth fire, tongs, a hammer, and an anuile: the carpenter a rule, a sawe, an axe, and such other things, and that bicause of the matter which is subiect: and so oftentimes it sufficeth not artificers to haue art, and the members of the bodie. In like maner dooth it come to passe touching felicitie; although the mind be indued with excellent vertues, and that it will and can shew foorth excellent actions, and is not destitute of bodilie power, yet hath it néed of fréends, riches, and ciuill power. By ciuill power I vnderstand honours, good will, fauours, protection, and such like. As for riches, they are diuided some into naturall, 1and some into artificiall: naturall are counted whatsoeuer things doo growe out of the earth, and which the bréed of cattell produceth: but artificiall consisteth on monie, which in verie déed was inuented, that it should be indifferent to both parties in the exchange of things. And both these kinds béeing called faculties,
Aristotle, to the furtherance of a mans felicity, required a beautifulness of the body, nobility, store of children, and of true friends. 1Neither (as I suppose) doth he here mean a pleasant physiognomy, but that a man be not altogether deformed: and this is the meaning of [Greek or Hebrew], 2as it is in Greek. The reason of this saying (as Eustratius thinketh) may be, because mens minds are prone to love & esteem them, whom they perceive to excel other mortal men in some goodly form: of which inclination moreover ariseth, that they willingly obey and follow them, which are thus beautiful. And a man, having the minds of the people thus affected towards him, doth undoubtedly help very much forward to the execution of excellent things: for the people bring many things to pass, when they be moved of their own accord, and when ⟨p. 148⟩they fulfil the mind of one man with an earnest love and voluntary good will. And therefore that king, whom God first set over the Israelites; 3namely, Saul, was of so tall a stature, as he was higher than other of the Hebrews by the shoulder upward. And of David, whom he also commanded to be anointed king, it is written; that He was ruddy, and of an excellent beauty. Another thing moreover there is, whereby men are moved to love them that be beautiful; because the beauty of the body is a certain image of the mind: which mind, since above all things we must seek to have it honest and good, and that it cannot be discerned by the eye, it remaineth that the common sort follow the form of the body: after which manner if they were led, which are the lovers of our bodies, they should not be blamed. But at this day there is in a manner nothing done with moderation, but all things are wrought with uncleanness and lust.
Aristotle, to the furtherance of a mans felicitie, required a beautifulnes of the bodie, nobilitie, store of children, and of true fréends. 1Neither (as I suppose) dooth he here meane a pleasant physnomie, but that a man be not altogither deformed: and this is the meaning of 〈non-Latin alphabet〉,
1Also unto blessedness, he requireth nobility; because the people obey and reverence noble personages: for nobility is in that kind, out of which have proceeded many famous and excellent men: and virtues, which shined in the ancestors, are wont to be looked for in their posterity. I know indeed, that some do think, that nobility is but riches preserved of long time in some family: but the former opinion liketh me much better. Eustratius moreover addeth, that the nobleness of a stock is therefore available unto civill felicity: for the people are wont to esteem of new men, when they start up, not only according to their present virtues or excellent acts; but according to that which they were a little before. Wherefore the former baseness, while it is considered of, doth somewhat obscure the present glory; which cometh so much the more to pass, as men be exceedingly given unto backbiting. 2[Greek or Hebrew] is a doubtful word, because it signifieth not so much a store of children, as it doth their goodness. And indeed as touching store of children, 3they which abound in them, are both grateful unto the city, and are feared of others: grateful truly they be, because they increase the Common-weal. Wherefore among the Romans there was a privilege for those that had five or seven children. And a young man of the Lacedaemonians would not rise up unto an ancient, who otherwise had deserved well of the Common-weal; Because (saith he) he leaveth not behind him, one that may rise and uncover his head unto me, when I shall be old. But then only children do further unto felicity, if they shall be well instructed: for otherwise they shall be rotten impostumes and cankers; as Octavius Augustus spake of his daughter and niece, when they were unchaste. Also Tiberius sorrowed, that he did nourish in his house for the people of Rome Caligula, a most cruel snake.
1Also vnto blessednes, he requireth nobilitie; bicause the people obeie and reuerence noble personages: for nobilitie is in that kind, out of which haue procéeded manie famous and excellent men: and vertues, which shined in the ancestors, are woont to be looked for in their posteritie. I knowe indéed, that some doo thinke, that nobilitie is but riches preserued of long time in some familie: but the former opinion liketh me much better. Eustratius moreouer addeth, that the noblenes of a stocke is therefore auailable vnto ciuill felicitie: for the people are woont to estéeme of new men, when they start vp, not onelie according to their present vertues or excellent acts; but according to that which they were a little before. Wherefore the former basenes, while it is considered of, dooth somewhat obscure the present glorie; which commeth so much the more to passe, as men be excéedinglie giuen vnto backbiting.
22 Furthermore, 1how friendship doth fortify men with excellent helps, to the leading of a good life, may be gathered sufficiently by good writers, and by humane custom. But he is far more to be reproved, which hath ill friends, than he which hath corrupt children. For sometimes it may so happen, that through an ill nature, what diligence so ever be used in education, we cannot have such children as we would: but there is no excuse, if we have ill friends; because we make a choice of them, and they may be forsaken. Moreover, the loss of these (I mean of honest children and friends) Aristotle testifieth, may be a great hinderance unto blessedness; because their death cannot be without great sorrow and mourning. And although we suffer those calamities with an indifferent mind, if we be endued with the virtue of fortitude; yet are we subject thereunto not without detriment, which detriment no doubt doth not a little blemish our felicity.
22 Furthermore, 1how fréendship dooth fortifie men with excellent helps, to the leading of a good life, may be gathered sufficientlie by good writers, and by humane custome. But he is far more to be reprooued, which hath ill fréends, than he which hath corrupt children. For sometimes it may so happen, that through an ill nature, what diligence so euer be vsed in education, we cannot haue such children as we would: but there is no excuse, if we haue ill fréends; bicause we make a choise of them, and they may be forsaken. Moreouer, the losse of these (I meane of honest children and fréends) Aristotle testifieth, may be a great hinderance vnto blessednes; bicause their death cannot be without great sorrowe and mourning. And although we suffer those calamities with an indifferent mind, if we be indued with the vertue of fortitude; yet are we subiect therevnto not without detriment, which detriment no doubt dooth not a little blemish our felicitie.
Neither doth the holy scripture disagree touching the commendation of outward good things: for as concerning children, 1they be promised of GOD; Thy children shall be like the olive branches. And among other blessings, this is reckoned up, that there should not be untimely births in Israel. 2And in many places there is promised abundance of children to them that fear him. Which self-same thing we may easily know as touching riches. God enriched Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and the rest of their friends. He granted of his own accord riches unto Solomon, 3which desired wisdom. And he would that his people, if they behaved themselves well, should so abound in riches, that they might lend unto other nations; but not borrow of them. Nobility was in such estimation with the people of God, as every family would have his own genealogies, wherein they reckoned up their ancestors among the heads of the tribes of the children of Israel. And the priests, which in the time of Esdras could not do this, were removed from their place and office. Yea, and the Evangelists Luke and Matthew rehearsed the genealogy of Christ, 4least he should seem to be of an unknown stock according to the flesh. Again, the apostle in the ninth chapter to the Romans described what nobility the Israelites were of; 5To whom pertaineth the adoption, and the glory, and the law that was given, and the covenant, and the service of God; of whom are the fathers, of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came, which is above all things, &c.
Neither dooth the holie scripture disagrée touching the commendation of outward good things: for as concerning children, 1they be promised of GOD; Thy children shall be like the oliue branches. And among other blessings, this is reckoned vp, that there should not be vntimelie births in Israel. 2And in manie places there is promised abundance of children to them that feare him. Which selfe-same thing we may easilie knowe as touching riches. God inriched Abraham, Isaac, Iacob, and the rest of their fréends. He granted of his owne accord riches vnto Salomon,
A beauty of the body I showed before, was granted unto those two kings Saul and David. I showed also that the same was so requisite in the priests, as none that was lame, blind, crook-backed, 1or blemished with any notable deformity, might execute the room of high priest. Moreover, that friendship might increase among the Hebrews, God provided specially by his laws: all which, if they be narrowly considered, do serve very much for the joining of men together. Wherefore these things, which Aristotle hath rehearsed, must not be rejected; yet as touching felicity, there must be no more ascribed to them than is meet. It is said indeed in the book of Ecclesiastes, the tenth chapter, that Unto money all things are obedient. 2But that sentence is rehearsed as a common saying of the people, not as a true saying, but that thereby mans error might be reproved. Nay rather, the scriptures else-where do teach, namely, in the 17. chapter of the Proverbs; What do riches profit a fool, 3seeing he cannot buy wisdom for himself? These things then being some-what narrowly and diligently considered, we say that these gifts of God are not to be contemned, seeing they further very much to the good and right execution of many civill duties belonging to blessedness; but we must not rely altogether upon them: yea rather, if at any time we want these good things, the true and perfect felicity, which we seek for, is not for this cause taken away. And if we, for the name of Christ, and confession of his faith, be deprived of these things; so far is it off, that true blessedness is blemished, as it is rather made a great deal the more excellent.
A beautie of the bodie I shewed before, was graunted vnto those two kings Saule and Dauid. I shewed also that the same was so requisit in the préests, as none that was lame, blind, crooke-backed, 1or blemished with anie notable deformitie, might execute the roome of high préest. Moreouer, that frendship might increase among the Hebrues, God prouided speciallie by his lawes: all which, if they be narrowlie considered, doo serue verie much for the ioining of men together. Wherefore these things, which Aristotle hath rehearsed, must not be reiected; yet as touching felicitie, there must be no more ascribed to them than is méet. It is said indéed in the booke of Ecclesiastes, the tenth chapter, that Vnto monie all things are obedient.
First that poverty is no let unto us, it appeareth, seeing not the least part of the saints was collected of poor men. And Christ commanded the young man, 1that he should sell that which he had, and give it to the poor; whom nevertheless he would without all doubt have made happy, which in very deed could not have bin done [if poverty had bin a hinderance unto felicity.] Yea, and Antisthenes and Crates the Theban, that they might in their philosophy be made the more happy, cast from them their money and treasure. And the Lord promised a hundred fold, 2and eternal life to them, which for his sake should lose all things which are of this kind. What shall we say as touching nobility? 3Look to your calling (saith Paul) not many wise, not many mighty, not many noble are called, &c. Also, the lack of children is no let, for in the 56. chapter of Isaiah, the Eunuchs are said to have the better place in the house of God, not in respect they be Eunuchs, or lead a single life; 4but in as much as they shall more diligently keep the commandments of God than other men. In like manner, if friendships fail, they exclude not men from true felicity; seeing it cometh to pass sometime, that for the name of Christ, the godly are become hated of all men, which nevertheless is not against Aristotle, seeing he writeth but of a politic or civill blessedness.
First that pouertie is no let vnto vs, it appeareth, séeing not the least part of the saincts was collected of poore men. And Christ commanded the yoong man, 1that he should sell that which he had, and giue it to the poore; whome neuerthelesse he would without all doubt haue made happie, which in verie déed could not haue bin done [if pouertie had bin a hinderance vnto felicitie.] Yea, and Antisthenes and Crates the Theban, that they might in their philosophie be made the more happie, cast from them their monie and treasure. And the Lord promised a hundreth fold, 2and eternall life to them, which for his sake should lose all things which are of this kind. What shall we saie as touching nobilitie?
23 Eustratius in expounding of Aristotle, (who in the tenth book of his Ethics affirmeth contemplation to be the chiefest perfection of our felicity) saith, that There be some which are not men exercised in civill and politic administration, but altogether given to contemplation, and these separate themselves from domesticall and civill cares, and do fly from company and society; yea, and they study all that they can, to be severed even from their own flesh, whereof it comes to pass, that to the obtaining of felicity, there needeth not (as Aristotle would) the goods of the mind, for the teaching, counselling, and ruling of others; nor the goods of the body, for defending of their country; nor yet the goods of fortune, for relieving, succouring, and helping of the poor: and that only it is enough to apply the mind to understanding and contemplation. And he saith, that these men have a hard felicity, because they be as it were at war with nature, not seeking in deed to destroy the body or flesh; but provide this, that those things may be no impediment to their contemplation. And therefore, since this is a more private life, it needeth not many things. But he saith, that Aristotle spake not of these men, which he testified when he saith, that By nature a man is civill: and they which are of this sort, unless they minister to their elders and parents those things which be necessary, and also unto their posterity, wife, friends, and citizens, they have a maimed and unperfect felicity, although they be furnished with many good things. And the diminishing of their felicity is either more or less, according as they shall more or less want those good things which we have recited. It belongeth therefore unto a happy man, to have a care of all those things, which I have recited; which if he may commodiously do, he hath enough, and may be content; otherwise he shall not be counted happy.
23 Eustratius in expounding of Aristotle, (who in the tenth booke of his Ethiks affirmeth contemplation to be the chéefest perfection of our felicitie) saith, that There be some which are not men exercised in ciuill and politike administration, but altogether giuen to contemplation, and these separate themselues from domesticall and ciuill cares, and do flie from companie and societie; yea, and they studie all that they can, to be seuered euen from their owne flesh, whereof it coms to passe, that to the obteining of felicitie, there néedeth not (as Aristotle would) the goods of the mind, for the teaching, counselling, and ruling of others; nor the goods of the bodie, for defending of their countrie; nor yet the goods of fortune, for reléeuing, succouring, and helping of the poore: and that onlie it is inough to applie the mind to vnderstanding and contemplation. And he saith, that these men haue a hard felicitie, bicause they be as it were at war with nature, not séeking in déed to destroie the bodie or flesh; but prouide this, that those things may be no impediment to their contemplation. And therefore, since this is a more priuate life, it néedeth not manie things. But he saith, that Aristotle spake not of these men, which he testified when he saith, that By nature a man is ciuill: and they which are of this sort, vnlesse they minister to their elders and parents those things which be necessarie, and also vnto their posteritie, wife, frends, and citizens, they haue a maimed and vnperfect felicitie, although they be furnished with manie good things. And the diminishing of their felicitie is either more or lesse, according as they shall more or lesse want those good things which we haue recited. It belongeth therefore vnto a happie man, to haue a care of all those things, which I haue recited; which if he may commodiouslie doo, he hath inough, and may be content; otherwise he shall not be counted happie.
Manie there were, and those not of the vulgar sort, 1which held riches in estimation, as the chéefest good; and therefore Aristotle for two causes remooued those things from felicitie, the first is, for that they belong vnto violence; for that which is violent, hath no respect of felicitie. But that the possession and obteining of riches is a violent thing, vse and experience doth teach vs; for there is none that can get great and abundant riches, or can long kéepe them, vnlesse there be a violence, and that no small violence vsed. Another reason is, bicause they tend to profit, and are referred to another thing; wherefore the state of them is seruile. For we haue them to this end, that they may helpe vs to other things which we desire: neither would anie man estéeme them the value of an heare, vnlesse he knew them to be profitable vnto those things that he would haue. And how strange this is from the nature of the chéefe good, all they are not ignorant, which knowe that the same should be desired for it selfe sake. Verie much therefore are they deceiued, which haue riches in the greatest honor, bicause they be profitable vnto all things. This if Midas had set before his eies, he would not haue so adicted himselfe to the studie of heaping vp riches, that he was iustlie called 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, that is, 2euen mad for the desire of gold. Neither is he alone among princes and kings to be reprooued, séeing now the greatest part of them is infected with this vice, who neuertheles might haue bin admonished, not onlie by these two reasons of Aristotle, but by manie other reasons, to set downe some moderation of their desire. 3For it is without reason, so greatlie to estéeme that kind of good, which is externall, and in a manner perteineth nothing to the mind; but is onelie reckoned among the instruments, whereby men are holpen to doo those things which they haue purposed. Also, this kind of good doth besot men, if it happen vpon them that be vnwise: they be verie carefull to atteine vnto riches, but haue no care of their children, to whome they shall leaue them; nor yet of themselues, who should vse them. They are like vnto him, which would haue manie shooes, and in the meane time went barefoote. Besides this, the nature of riches is doubtfull, in so much as they serue no lesse to the accomplishing of lewd desires and wickednes, than of honest and iust duties.
