A14350:634
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
115 But now there riseth a question, Whether honour (to speak of the same which is sincere and constant) be the good of him that doth give the honour, or of him to whom the honour is given? This did Seneca handle in his 103. epistle to Lucillus. I affirm it to be the good of them both. Without doubt it is his that is the praiser, seeing that his action is just and right. Neither think I it doubtful, that every good action is his good, whose action it is. Furthermore, since he, who is honoured, hath in himself honesty, justice, and goodness, whereby both good and wise men are allured and provoked to commend him; therefore is his good also called honour: for he hath the beginning and cause thereof in himself. Moreover, he himself reapeth fruit of that honour, when his authority increaseth, and he is made the abler to persuade others, what shall best become them, and the better to retain them in their duty. Thirdly, also it is his good for this cause, that while he perceiveth good, honest, and thankful judges, to judge rightly of those things which he hath very well done, he greatly rejoiceth. Wherefore I have showed the reason why I judge, that honour is the good, as well of him that is praised, as of him that praiseth. And yet for this cause am I not contrary to Aristotle, which saith, that the same is in him which doth the honour, not in him which receiveth the honour: because he (as it is now brought in the definition) saith, that honour is a signifying of a mans opinion and mind; and therefore he judgeth rightly, seeing as well the opinion as signification thereof proceed from him that honoureth, and rest on him, as on a certain foundation and matter subject thereunto. But yet I have respect to the original, whereupon this opinion was raised, and this judgement is stirred up in the minds of the wise; and moreover, I note the fruits of this opinion, and I see all these things to be in the man that is praised, that is to say, a greater authority & gladness. Neither hath this my definition only place in honours; but it must be no otherwise esteemed of the lawful judgement of a judge, and of a just sentence, when he pronounceth the law. For these are the proper good things of him, which therewithal turn to his good, on whose side the matter is judged. And no otherwise should we say of justice;
115 But now there riseth a question, Whether honour (to speake of the same which is sincere and constant) be the good of him that dooth giue the honour, or of him to whom the honour is giuen? This did Seneca handle in his 103. epistle to Lucillus. I affirme it to be the good of them both. Without doubt it is his that is the praiser, séeing that his action is iust and right. Neither thinke I it doubtfull, that euerie good action is his good, whose action it is. Furthermore, since he, who is honoured, hath in himselfe honestie, iustice, and goodnes, whereby both good and wise men are allured and prouoked to commend him; therefore is his good also called honour: for he hath the beginning and cause thereof in himselfe. Moreouer, he himselfe reapeth fruit of that honour, when his authoritie increaseth, and he is made the abler to persuade others, what shall best béecome them, and the better to reteine them in their dutie. Thirdlie, also it is his good for this cause, that while he perceiueth good, honest, and thankfull iudges, to iudge rightlie of those things which he hath verie well doone, hée greatlie reioiseth. Wherefore I haue shewed the reason why I iudge, that honour is the good, as well of him that is praised, as of him that praiseth. And yet for this cause am I not contrarie to Aristotle, which saith, that the same is in him which dooth the honour, not in him which receiueth the honour: bicause he (as it is now brought in the definition) saith, that honour is a signifieng of a mans opinion and mind; and therefore he iudgeth rightlie, séeing as well the opinion as signification thereof procéed from him that honoureth, and rest on him, as on a certeine foundation and matter subiect therevnto. But yet I haue respect to the originall, wherevpon this opinion was raised, and this iudgement is stirred vp in the minds of the wise; and moreouer, I note the fruits of this opinion, and I sée all these things to be in the man that is praised, that is to saie, a greater authoritie & gladnes. Neither hath this my definition onlie place in honours; but it must be no otherwise estéemed of the lawfull iudgement of a iudge, and of a iust sentence, when he pronounceth the lawe. For these are the proper good things of him, which therwithall turne to his good, on whose side the matter is iudged. And no otherwise should we saie of iustice;