Many there were, and those not of the vulgar sort, 1which held riches in estimation, as the chiefest good; and therefore Aristotle for two causes removed those things from felicity, the first is, for that they belong unto violence; for that which is violent, hath no respect of felicity. But that the possession and obtaining of riches is a violent thing, use and experience doth teach us; for there is none that can get great and abundant riches, or can long keep them, unless there be a violence, and that no small violence used. Another reason is, because they tend to profit, and are referred to another thing; wherefore the state of them is servile. For we have them to this end, that they may help us to other things which we desire: neither would any man esteem them the value of an hear, unless he knew them to be profitable unto those things that he would have. And how strange this is from the nature of the chief good, all they are not ignorant, which know that the same should be desired for it self sake. Very much therefore are they deceived, which have riches in the greatest honour, because they be profitable unto all things. This if Midas had set before his eyes, he would not have so addicted himself to the study of heaping up riches, that he was justly called [Greek or Hebrew], that is, 2even mad for the desire of gold. Neither is he alone among princes and kings to be reproved, seeing now the greatest part of them is infected with this vice, who nevertheless might have bin admonished, not only by these two reasons of Aristotle, but by many other reasons, to set down some moderation of their desire. 3For it is without reason, so greatly to esteem that kind of good, which is external, and in a manner pertaineth nothing to the mind; but is only reckoned among the instruments, whereby men are holpen to do those things which they have purposed. Also, this kind of good doth besot men, if it happen upon them that be unwise: they be very careful to attain unto riches, but have no care of their children, to whom they shall leave them; nor yet of themselves, who should use them. They are like unto him, which would have many shoes, and in the mean time went barefoot. Besides this, the nature of riches is doubtful, in so much as they serve no less to the accomplishing of lewd desires and wickedness, than of honest and just duties.
Manie there were, and those not of the vulgar sort, 1which held riches in estimation, as the chéefest good; and therefore Aristotle for two causes remooued those things from felicitie, the first is, for that they belong vnto violence; for that which is violent, hath no respect of felicitie. But that the possession and obteining of riches is a violent thing, vse and experience doth teach vs; for there is none that can get great and abundant riches, or can long kéepe them, vnlesse there be a violence, and that no small violence vsed. Another reason is, bicause they tend to profit, and are referred to another thing; wherefore the state of them is seruile. For we haue them to this end, that they may helpe vs to other things which we desire: neither would anie man estéeme them the value of an heare, vnlesse he knew them to be profitable vnto those things that he would haue. And how strange this is from the nature of the chéefe good, all they are not ignorant, which knowe that the same should be desired for it selfe sake. Verie much therefore are they deceiued, which haue riches in the greatest honor, bicause they be profitable vnto all things. This if Midas had set before his eies, he would not haue so adicted himselfe to the studie of heaping vp riches, that he was iustlie called 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, that is, 2euen mad for the desire of gold. Neither is he alone among princes and kings to be reprooued, séeing now the greatest part of them is infected with this vice, who neuertheles might haue bin admonished, not onlie by these two reasons of Aristotle, but by manie other reasons, to set downe some moderation of their desire. 3For it is without reason, so greatlie to estéeme that kind of good, which is externall, and in a manner perteineth nothing to the mind; but is onelie reckoned among the instruments, whereby men are holpen to doo those things which they haue purposed. Also, this kind of good doth besot men, if it happen vpon them that be vnwise: they be verie carefull to atteine vnto riches, but haue no care of their children, to whome they shall leaue them; nor yet of themselues, who should vse them. They are like vnto him, which would haue manie shooes, and in the meane time went barefoote. Besides this, the nature of riches is doubtfull, in so much as they serue no lesse to the accomplishing of lewd desires and wickednes, than of honest and iust duties.
- 1Riches are removed from felicity.Riches are remooued from felicitie.
- 2[Greek or Hebrew].〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
- 3Reasons why riches be not the chief good.Reasons why riches be not the cheefe good.