A14350:659
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
That virtue is not the chiefest good; and wherein the same agreeth with it.
That vertue is not the cheefest good; and wherein the same agreeth with it.
24 Among some of the philosophers virtue was taken to be the chiefest good, 1which Aristotle refelled on this wise; It behooveth that the chief good be perfect, But virtue is not perfect, Therefore it must not be counted the chiefest good. The major proposition appeareth: for if it be not a perfect chief good, our desire resteth not therein, but will desire moreover some other chief good. The minor proposition; namely, that virtue is not perfect, is proved; because it is an habit, that is, a power not in act: & it may oftentimes be in the subject without the action thereof, as a thing that many ways may be stopped; as by sleep, & by taking away of the occasion, if matter be wanting, and when afflictions, sickness, and misfortunes do disquiet us. This opinion, which placeth the chiefest good in virtue it self, is of all other that we have heretofore recited most near unto truth, and therefore it hath had great and grave patrons. But how it draweth near unto the truth, hereby we easily gather; that there is none more certain nor surer preparation unto felicity than virtue: for from the habit of virtue proceedeth that action, which is affirmed by Aristotle to be very felicity: virtue therefore is the nearest power or faculty unto felicity. 2But why the same cannot be the chiefest good, & felicity it self, it is cause enough, that it is referred unto a further end. For to what purpose do we procure unto our selves the habits of virtues, but that we may the more easily and readily do well? Wherefore, since that virtue is directed unto action, action shall be better and more to be desired than it.