A14350:667
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
A poor man (say they) may be liberal, while he desireth to give unto them, to whom he thinketh it meet to be given. But I would fain learn of these Stoics, whether they that be endued with virtue, and being hindered, do desire to work by it; for what cause they desire this? Do they it not for blessedness sake? This if they shall deny, they will declare themselves to be unwise in desiring of those things which they refer not unto the chiefest good. But if they will grant, that they wish those works for felicity sake, it shall be lawful to say that felicity is perfectly gotten, not in virtue, but in action. I will easily grant, that virtue shineth, and is more glorious in the midst of flames, and in most cruel torments; and him that with a valiant courage suffereth these things, I will extol with praises among good and wise men; but yet so, as I will deny him, in the mean time, to enjoy whole and perfect felicity. He shall very well by his example instruct and teach others, yet shall he not perfectly and all manner of ways be blessed. These things be so very true, as even they, which profess the Stoical discipline, must whether they will or no yield unto this opinion. For Cicero in his fifth book of Tusculan questions, at the beginning saith; If virtue be not of such strength, that it can defend it self, I fear me least we are not so much to lean to the hope of a blessed life, upon confidence of virtue, as it may seem that we have more need to pray for it. Verily I my self, when I consider those chances, wherein fortune hath exceedingly exercised me, I begin to mistrust this opinion, and otherwhiles also stand in great fear of mans weakness and frailty. For I fear least that when nature gave unto us weak bodies, and with them joined uncurable diseases, and intolerable griefs; it also gave minds agreeable to the griefs of the bodies, and severally entangled with the vexations and troubles thereof. But herein I reform my self, that I judge of the strength of virtue according to other mens niceness, and peradventure according to mine own, not according to virtue it self, &c. How he doubted, and in a manner became of this opinion, he plainly expressed in these words: and it maketh no matter, that he saith he reformed himself, because that is uncertain: and, he addeth this word Peradventure, which is a token of doubting.
A poore man (say they) may be liberall, while he desireth to giue vnto them, to whom he thinketh it méet to be giuen. But I would faine learne of these Stoiks, whether they that be indued with vertue, and being hindered, doo desire to worke by it; for what cause they desire this? Doo they it not for blessednes sake? This if they shall denie, they will declare themselues to be vnwise in desiring of those things which they refer not vnto the chéefest good. But if they will grant, that they wish those works for felicitie sake, it shall be lawfull to saie that felicitie is perfectlie gotten, not in vertue, but in action. I will easilie grant, that vertue shineth, and is more glorious in the midst of flames, and in most cruell torments; and him that with a valiant courage suffereth these things, I will extoll with praises among good and wise men; but yet so, as I will denie him, in the meane time, to inioie whole and perfect felicitie. He shall verie well by his example instruct and teach others, yet shall he not perfectlie and all maner of waies be blessed. These things be so verie true, as euen they, which professe the Stoicall discipline, must whether they will or no yéeld vnto this opinion. For Cicero in his fift booke of Tusculane questions, at the beginning saith; If vertue be not of such strength, that it can defend it selfe, I feare me least we are not so much to leane to the hope of a blessed life, vpon confidence of vertue, as it may séeme that we haue more néed to praie for it. Verelie I my selfe, when I consider those chances, wherein fortune hath excéedinglie exercised me, I begin to mistrust this opinion, and otherwhiles also stand in great feare of mans weakenes and frailtie. For I feare least that when nature gaue vnto vs weake bodies, and with them ioined vncurable diseases, and intollerable gréefs; it also gaue minds agréeable to the gréefs of the bodies, and seuerallie intangled with the vexations and troubles therof. But herein I reforme my selfe, that I iudge of the strength of vertue according to other mens nicenes, and peraduenture according to mine owne, not according to vertue it selfe, &c. How he doubted, and in a manner became of this opinion, he plainelie expressed in these words: and it maketh no matter, that he saith he reformed himselfe, bicause that is vncerteine: and, he addeth this word Peraduenture, which is a token of doubting.
Moreover, what is so certain, as that Cicero himself in his fourth book De finibus disputed against Cato, who had before in the third book extolled the opinion of Zeno and the Stoics to the heavens? Yea and the Stoics as in virtue alone they boasted, that they were blessed, 1yet did they not repose themselves in that alone; but called the powers of the body, the pureness of the senses, dignities, riches and such like [Greek or Hebrew]; that is, Things coming naturally without any other beginning: which Cicero calleth Things produced, promoted, principal, advanced above other. With the sense of which words if we would urge the Stoics, we shall say, that they attribute more unto this kind of things, than the Peripatetics; as they which do name those things principal, and above others; whereas the Peripatetics call them indeed good things, but yet of the lowest degree, and which are not of much account, being compared with just and honest things; and therefore, as the time serves, to be contemned, and not much to be desired. I know indeed that the Stoics do call these things principal and chief, while they be compared with their contraries; not when they be compared with virtues: but yet by these their new and made words they attribute very much to this order of things, when they call these things, Commodities, things to be preferred, & of chief regard; and their contraries [Greek or Hebrew]: as who should say Discommodities, and things rejected. Wherefore, though the Stoics would contend with the Peripatetics in talk, yet in reason and in the thing it self they agree with them. The Stoics delight in a magnifical kind of speech, and only in words bring in an unsensiblenes of passion, which when they come afterward to the matter, all men feel by experience, that it is quite differing from our senses, and from our tried customs, and also very far from the strength of our humane nature.
Moreouer, what is so certeine, as that Cicero himselfe in his fourth booke De finibus disputed against Cato, who had before in the third booke extolled the opinion of Zeno and the Stoiks to the heauens? Yea and the Stoiks as in vertue alone they boasted, that they were blessed, 1yet did they not repose themselus in that alone; but called the powers of the bodie, the purenes of the senses, dignities, riches and such like 〈non-Latin alphabet〉; that is, Things comming naturallie without anie other beginning: which Cicero calleth Things produced, promoted, principall, aduanced aboue other. With the sense of which words if we would vrge the Stoiks, we shall say, that they attribute more vnto this kind of things, than the Peripatetiks; as they which doo name those things principall, and aboue others; whereas the Peripatetiks call them indéed good things, but yet of the lowest degrée, and which are not of much account, being compared with iust and honest things; and therefore, as the time serues, to be contemned, and not much to be desired. I knowe indéed that the Stoiks doo call these things principall and chéefe, while they be compared with their contraries; not when they be compared with vertues: but yet by these their new and made words they attribute verie much to this order of things, when they call these things, Commodities, things to be preferred, & of chéefe regard; and their contraries : as who should saie Discommodities, and things reiected. Wherefore, though the Stoiks would contend with the Peripatetiks in talke, yet in reason and in the thing it selfe they agrée with them. The Stoiks delight in a magnificall kind of speach, and onlie in words bring in an vnsensiblenes of passion, which when they come afterward to the matter, all men féele by experience, that it is quite differing from our senses, and from our tried customs, and also verie far from the strength of our humane nature.
26 And I do not think, that I should lightly pass over those things, which I cited a little before, out of the fifth book of Tusculan questions; If (saith Cicero) virtue had not help enough in it self, that then we must make our prayers for the same. What is this we hear? As though if virtue were sufficient in it self, is there nothing then to be wished for, or to be desired of God; as if we had all things consisting in our own selves? Shall Tully on this wise, in making more of virtue than is requisite, take away godliness, which is the chief virtue of all others, by abolishing the invocation of God? Truly even thus did the Stoics think. 1For Seneca writeth, that Jupiter can do no more than a good man. Wherefore the Stoics used no less magnifical kind of speech, than their doctrine ⟨p. 153⟩was altogether differing from religion. Which I do not therefore say, as though I endeavoured to pronounce Aristotle's opinion to be godly and religious; but to give warning, that the Stoics are not so to be esteemed, 2as though in praising of their virtues, they drew very near (as some think) unto the christian doctrine. Yet will I bear more in this behalf with the Stoics, than with the Epicures; because they speak in a manner always that which is agreeable to their own opinion, whereas the Epicures many times affirm things not agreeable to their own rules. Because Epicurus accounteth grief for the chiefest evil, he also placeth pleasure of the body, or voidness of sorrow to be the chiefest good. If he be tormented, or descend into Phalaris bull, and tell me how sweet this is, as he boasteth that His wise man will say, without doubt he shall speak most inconstantly, and such things as no manner of way accord in themselves.
26 And I doo not thinke, that I should lightlie passe ouer those things, which I cited a little before, out of the fift booke of Tusculane questions; If (saith Cicero) vertue had not helpe inough in it selfe, that then we must make our praiers for the same. What is this we heare? As though if vertue were sufficient in it selfe, is there nothing then to be wished for, or to be desired of God; as if we had all things consisting in our own selues? Shall Tullie on this wise, in making more of vertue than is requisit, take awaie godlines, which is the chéefe vertue of all others, by abolishing the inuocatiō of God? Trulie euen thus did the Stoiks thinke.
Let these words so glorious and worthy of memory be left unto the Stoics, which so boast of their virtues, as they think that a wise man endued with them, shall never be without happiness. Neither can they persuade their mind, that seeing felicity doth evermore accompany virtues, it will then forsake them, and that it will stay upon the threshold, wherein they enter into the prison; as though it may not be lawful for it to enter into a sorrowful place, nor (as said Theophrastus) to ascend upon the rock or wheel of torment. Theophrastus, no doubt, was far wiser than Epicurus. For he which saw, that by the Peripatetics doctrine, was required unto civill felicity, whereof we now entreat, both the goods of the body, and the goods external; the very same man understood, how unpossible it was, that even the wisest man should be blessed in torments & misery. But Epicurus, who was delighted with such a chief good, as we have now declared, will speak things neither meet nor agreeable to his purpose, while he speaketh so magnifically, and useth such glorious sentences. But yet this is no marvel; for he contemned Logic, which is the right means of disputing: but of this thing we have spoken enough.
Let these words so glorious and woorthie of memorie be left vnto the Stoiks, which so boast of their vertues, as they thinke that a wise man indued with them, shall neuer bée without happines. Neither can they persuade their mind, that séeing felicitie dooth euermore accompanie vertues, it will then forsake them, and that it will staie vpon the threshold, wherein they enter into the prison; as though it may not be lawfull for it to enter into a sorrowfull place, nor (as said Theophrastus) to ascend vpon the rocke or whéele of torment. Theophrastus, no doubt, was far wiser than Epicurus. For he which sawe, that by the Peripatetiks doctrine, was required vnto ciuill felicitie, whereof we now intreate, both the goods of the bodie, and the goods externall; the verie same man vnderstood, how vnpossible it was, that euen the wisest man should be blessed in torments & miserie. But Epicurus, who was delighted with such a chéefe good, as we haue now declared, will speake things neither méete nor agréeable to his purpose, while he speaketh so magnificallie, and vseth such glorious sentences. But yet this is no maruell; for he contemned Logike, which is the right meanes of disputing: but of this thing we haue spoken enough.
126 Let us now see what the holy scriptures say hereunto: truly they make no mention of virtues, when they show the felicity of man. In the psalm, wherein is rehearsed the opinion of the common sort, which thought him to be happy that hath abundance, and who is replenished with infinite store of the goods of this world; we are otherwise persuaded by the voice of God. 2For it is added; Blessed is the people whose God is the Lord. Here an act is showed, not a power; 3Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord; 4blessed is the man that walketh in the law of the Lord. Further, that even the good habits of the mind may be sometime idle and unprofitable, hereby it is evident; 5that Paul warneth us to take heed, that we receive not the grace of God in vain. And Paul adviseth Timothy, To stir up the gifts of God, which were in him, by laying on of hands by authority of the eldership. Seeing then the gifts of the spirit, which are more excellent than moral virtues, are referred unto action, that others may be holpen and instructed, (otherwise we should not become the better for them) this must be judged much truer, and more certain as touching humane virtues. Where it is said of Aristotle, that Calamities and miseries do let, that men cannot be counted happy; if this should be considered by it self, 6as it is said without any distinction, it agreeth not with the holy scriptures. For they which suffer for Christ, are in great penury, and are troubled with grievous punishments; yet do they enjoy that blessedness, which in this life is possible to be attained unto: 7because their sins are not imputed unto them, and their soul and body are then exceedingly renewed toward the attainment of eternal life. Howbeit, seeing the felicity of this life is not yet full, but begun; therefore we will grant it, that the saints, which be so afflicted, are not in perfect and absolute blessedness; seeing they look shortly to have the same, wherein they shall feel none of these miseries. For the oracles of God say;
Wherefore we say with Aristotle, that between perfect and full felicity, and miseries and calamities there is no agreement, which nevertheless disagreeth not with that felicity, which we have here begun.
Wherfore we saie with Aristotle, that betwéene perfect and full felicitie, and miseries and calamities there is no agréement, which neuertheles disagréeth not with that felicitie, which we haue here begun.
And Paul saw the displeasures of this life to be so repugnant unto perfect blessedness, and that they could not abide together, as he said unto the Corinthians; If the dead rise not again, 1we are more unhappy than all men. And if that Christ pronounced them blessed, which mourn, and which suffer persecution for his name; 2that must not so be understood, as though we should be blessed, because we weep, and sigh, and suffer persecution; but because we wait for better things hereafter, and are saved by hope. Neither do I deny, but that in the middest of the troubles of the flesh, God will give marvellous comforts to them that be his: which I persuade my self passeth all the delights of civill happiness. Yet cometh it not to pass thereby, that perfect felicity is joined with these calamities. After this manner did Paul comfort the soldiers ⟨p. 154⟩of Christ; 3The things (saith he) which we suffer in this life, are not equal and of like value with those things, which at length shall be revealed in us, when we reign together with Christ. But Aristotle was constrained to judge as he said, because he was ignorant of the blessedness to come, and saw that the civill happiness, which he treated of, was obscured and diminished by adversities and afflictions. And unto him were unknown those heavenly comforts, which God, above the power of nature, bringeth to the confessors of the truth, even in the very torments. Wherefore, if as touching this matter, the Stoics seem somewhat to disagree from us, this they did unadvisedly; seeing they also knew nothing of the life to come, neither had they ever trial of the consolations of God in the midst of miseries and death.
And Paule sawe the displeasures of this life to be so repugnant vnto perfect blessednes, and that they could not abide togither, as he said vnto the Corinthians; If the dead rise not againe, 1we are more vnhappie than all men. And if that Christ pronounced them blessed, which mourne, and which suffer persecution for his name; 2
27 Now that we have largely enough disputed as touching the nature of felicity, we will inquire of the cause thereof. Aristotle reckoneth up five causes, which may be gathered into two; for either they be inward, or outward. They are reckoned inward, because discipline, custom, and exercise do proceed from us. But the outward causes are thought to be God and fortune. 1Between custom and exercise this is the difference, that custom is referred unto virtues, which are bred by often and continual actions. But exercises and labours are to be applied to a sure obtaining and keeping of riches, honour, and health; in which things many (as it hath bin said) have placed felicity. And first as touching discipline, it belongeth unto them, which have thought that virtues are learned by applying of doctrines. Wherefore if there be need of discipline, it must be learned; if of custom, we must not desist from honest actions; if it be ascribed to exercise, there must of necessity be no labour spared; if it be expected of God, he must be prayed unto; but if of fortune, since we are able to do nothing concerning it, all must wholly be committed unto the same. The Stoics, and especially Epictetus, distinguish all things which are found either to be in us, or not to be within us. By those things that are in us, they understand the things which we can rule by our counsel, and obtain by our strength: and those things that are said to be not within us, are the same that we have not in our power; as nobility, health, and riches.
27 Now that we haue largelie inough disputed as touching the nature of felicitie, we will inquire of the cause therof. Aristotle reckoneth vp fiue causes, which may be gathered into two; for either they be inward, or outward. They are reckoned inward, bicause discipline, custome, and exercise doo procéed from vs. But the outward causes are thought to be God and fortune. 1Betwéene custome and exercise this is the difference, that custome is referred vnto vertues, which are bred by often and continuall actions. But exercises and labours are to be applied to a sure obteining and kéeping of riches, honour, and health; in which things manie (as it hath bin said) haue placed felicitie. And first as touching discipline, it belongeth vnto them, which haue thought that vertues are learned by applieng of doctrines. Wherefore if there be néed of discipline, it must be learned; if of custome, we must not desist from honest actions; if it be ascribed to exercise, there must of necessitie be no labour spared; if it be expected of God, he must be praied vnto; but if of fortune, since we are able to doo nothing concerning it, all must wholie bée committed vnto the same. The Stoiks, and especiallie Epictetus, distinguish all things which are found either to be in vs, or not to be within vs. By those things that are in vs, they vnderstand the things which we can rule by our counsell, and obteine by our strength: and those things that are said to be not within vs, are the same that we haue not in our power; as nobilitie, health, and riches.
Whether God be the cause of felicity, Aristotle in his first book of his Ethics speaketh very ambiguously, 1& bringeth a conditional proposition, but absolves not the argument. If any gift (saith he) be of God, felicity shall be given of him. And he showeth a reason of the conclusion, because the same hath the chiefest place among all humane things. But to the making up of the argument, there may be added a double minor proposition: that the felicity of the godly, and ours is all one; But many things are given unto men by God, therefore must felicity be expected from him. And that many things are given unto men by God, we doubt nothing at all, who do also extol his providence in every thing: and since from him, as from the chief good, and fountain of goodness, is derived whatsoever is good, we do not once imagine, that this doth flow without his pleasure, will, and election. 2But there be some, and those indeed Peripatetics, which do deem far otherwise of the providence of God: for they think that his providence, as touching particular things, stretcheth not lower than the moon; because so far, all things are done constantly, and in singular order. But, as touching the things which are beneath the moon, they make providence to be only of general things, not of particular. Wherefore they should take this for the minor proposition; But no gifts are distributed by God unto men, neither therefore is felicity given. And they say, that gifts are not given by God unto men, not because they acknowledge him not to be the first efficient cause, from whence all good things do arise; but they take the word of giving or bestowing from election, will, and free choice. The good things, which we have, and felicity, they will grant do depend of God, and of the motion of the heaven, and that they cannot otherwise be had; but they think that those be not given by him, by a certain distribution which he considereth of, or which he giveth by a free disposition. For they think that God dealeth necessarily, and by a natural impulsion.
Whether God be the cause of felicitie, Aristotle in his first booke of his Ethiks speaketh verie ambiguouslie, 1& bringeth a conditionall proposition, but absolues not the argument. If anie gift (saith he) be of God, felicitie shall be giuen of him. And he sheweth a reason of the conclusion, bicause the same hath the chéefest place among all humane things. But to the making vp of the argument, there may be added a double minor proposition: that the felicitie of the godlie, and ours is all one; But manie things are giuen vnto men by God, therefore must felicitie be expected from him. And that manie things are giuen vnto men by God, we doubt nothing at all, who doo also extoll his prouidence in euerie thing: and since from him, as from the chéefe good, and fountaine of goodnes, is deriued whatsoeuer is good, we doo not once imagine, that this doth flowe without his pleasure, will, and election.
Wherefore we must note, that Aristotle in the place above mentioned, neither affirmeth nor denieth that felicity is given of God. He affirmeth it not, because he saith, that this work belongeth to another treatise; namely, to the metaphysics, or treatise of supernatural things, wherein is treated of the providence of God, without which doctrine, this question can not be defined. Neither yet doth he deny felicity to be given of God, least he should fall into an absurdity. For it seems to be contrary to reason, that the rest of the gifts should be given by God, and felicity not to be given by him. Wherefore he teacheth it under a condition, namely, If other things be had from God, felicity likewise doth proceed from him: but he affirmeth nothing at all. But I see not how fitly he putteth over this treatise to another place; ⟨p. 155⟩for if this definition do depend of providence, might he not in the mean time have borrowed so much of his metaphysical treatise, as should have been sufficient for the explaining of his mind? This he did as touching the soul, and took from his treatise of natural things so much as served unto moral doctrine, and saith, that The soul as we shall shortly see, hath divers parts. So likewise might he here have written of this, although he had not here purposely proved it, but taken it from some other treatise; that God by his providence doth give many gifts unto men; than the which gifts seeing felicity is far more excellent, it is meet that the same also should belong unto it. Howbeit, dissembling this, he passed it over, and saith it belonged to an other treatise. But I beseech you, what more convenient place had there been, seeing in that book he was to treat of manners and virtues, the understanding whereof dependeth altogether of the knowledge of felicity? Now was it time to affirm thereof simply, that he might no less have expected the same of God, than other gifts. Now then, when he speaketh on this wise, he seemeth to shun the hatred of ungodliness, but deserved no praise for a plain and sincere confession. If he had meant well and honestly, he should not have used these ambiguities. But what should he have done? He could not by philosophy know any thing of the will of God towards men;
Wherefore we must note, that Aristotle in the place aboue mentioned, neither affirmeth nor denieth that felicitie is giuen of God. He affirmeth it not, bicause he saith, that this worke belongeth to another treatise; namelie, to the metaphysicks, or treatise of supernaturall things, wherein is treated of the prouidence of God, without which doctrine, this question can not be defined. Neither yet doth he denie felicitie to be giuen of God, least he should fall into an absurditie. For it séemes to be contrarie to reason, that the rest of the gifts should be giuen by God, and felicitie not to be giuen by him. Wherefore he teacheth it vnder a condition, namelie, If other things be had from God, felicitie likewise doth procéed from him: but he affirmeth nothing at all. But I sée not how fitlie he putteth ouer this treatise to another place;
for whatsoever we know thereof, we are all wholly beholding for it unto the holy scriptures, and especially to the gospel.
for whatsoeuer we knowe thereof, we are all wholie beholding for it vnto the holie scriptures, and especiallie to the gospell.
28 When Aristotle had after a sort denied, that felicity cometh from God, in that he would not confess it; this nevertheless he granteth, that it is a thing most divine, that is, most perfect, which also God enjoyeth. For he, although not as men be, yet after a certain manner of his own, is blessed. here Eustratius added [of his own] that God doth give felicity, but not without the means which we have rehearsed, I mean learning, 1custom and exercise. And undoubtedly, there be certain things given unto us by God, without any labour or endeavour of us. For when did ever any man labour that he might be borne witty, noble, or of a sound body, or of a perfect complexion? Assuredly no man. As for other things, God so giveth them, as we should attain unto them by certain means. Howbeit this must be diligently considered, that if we will think well and godly of the matter, even the very means are given unto us by GOD himself: for no man shall be moved to receive sound doctrine, nor to take in hand a good custom nor a profitable exercise, 2unless he be stirred up by God. If felicity have those three things, for causes and certain principles, it may soon be common unto many; except those which have not their senses perfect, which be feeble, and borne lame, and for that cause cannot attain unto felicity. For there be some, which be borne fools, and of an ill temperature of the body; and therefore they which be deaf, dumb, or which be overcome with great griefs & weakness, cannot learn good arts and literature, neither are they fit for exercises; nor yet to procure unto themselves good manners. And doctrine is not admitted for moral virtues sake; but because of the faculties & sciences which be contemplative, in which things for the most part felicity doth consist. And because it is said, that felicity is common unto many; hearers & readers be encouraged to think, that if they fall from it, it must be imputed to their own default which would not learn and accustom themselves to good actions, and painful exercises.
28 When Aristotle had after a sort denied, that felicitie commeth from God, in that he would not confesse it; this neuertheles he granteth, that it is a thing most diuine, that is, most perfect, which also God inioieth. For he, although not as men be, yet after a certeine maner of his owne, is blessed. here Eustratius added [of his owne] that God dooth giue felicitie, but not without the meanes which we haue rehearsed, I meane learning,
From felicity he in like manner exempted children; because they, in respect of their age, 1which in them is very young and tender, cannot execute that action to all intents and purposes. But the reason which he maketh, why they cannot be blessed, let us examine it as it is produced by Aristotle; There is need (saith he) unto felicity, both virtue, and a perfect life. Touching life, there is no controversy; because as one swallow maketh not the spring time, so one day maketh not a man happy. Wherefore, if one should become happy, it is requisite that his age be lengthened, and his time produced. There is also required a perfect virtue; for unless it shall take deep root, it will soon slip away, as having small fastening. Briefly, Aristotle will that a happy man should be in such a state, as he cannot easily be removed therefrom; whereunto all men see, that a full age and perfect virtue is requisite. This opinion pleased the Pelagians, which placed righteousness, and the kingdom of heaven in the power of men. Also it pleased the schoolmen; for as the Pelagians denied grace, & said that nature doth suffice: so these men likewise affirming grace in bare name, have in very deed quite taken it away, as they which have made the same common and open to all men, as though it were in every man, either to receive it, or to put it from him. And when they be asked who doth give grace to them, which accept it, in such sort as they both desire it, and receive it, when it is offered to them; they fly unto free will: and of all these is Pighius the standard-bearer.
From felicitie he in like manner exempted children; bicause they, in respect of their age, 1which in them is verie yoong and tender, cannot execute that action to all intents and purposes. But the reason which he maketh, why they cannot be blessed, let vs examine it as it is produced by Aristotle; There is néed (saith he) vnto felicitie, both vertue, and a perfect life. Touching life, there is no controuersie; bicause as one swalowe maketh not the spring time, so one day maketh not a man happie. Wherefore, if one should become happie, it is requisite that his age be lengthened, and his time produced. There is also required a perfect vertue; for vnlesse it shall take déepe roote, it will soone slip awaie, as hauing small fastening. Bréefelie, Aristotle will that a happie man should be in such a state, as he cannot easilie be remooued therefrom; whervnto all men sée, that a full age and perfect vertue is requisite. This opinion pleased the Pelagians, which placed righteousnes, and the kingdome of heauen in the power of men. Also it pleased the schoolmen; for as the Pelagians denied grace, & said that nature dooth suffice: so these men likewise affirming grace in bare name, haue in verie déed quite taken it awaie, as they which haue made the same common and open to all men, as though it were in euerie man, either to receiue it, or to put it from him. And when they be asked who dooth giue grace to them, which accept it, in such sort as they both desire it, and receiue it, when it is offered to them; they flie vnto frée will: and of all these is Pighius the standerd-bearer.
Wherefore, if either thou ask of Aristotle, or of them; Since felicity is thus common, as ye say, how comes it to pass, that so few obtain the same? Because few (say they) will learn, few will labour, few will accustom themselves to honest and good exercises. But we will here ⟨p. 156⟩note a general and a certain proposition; To every nature or kind there is a purposed end, the which all that be comprehended in it may attain. And surely, that which Aristotle answered, as touching them that have not their perfect senses, be lame, and feeble, why they cannot be partakers of felicity; namely, because of their natural defect; that proposition may be understood, when the powers shall be perfect: so do we answer, that men cannot now by themselves be perfect, because nature was corrupted even from the beginning, and that we have not the powers as well of the mind, as of the body perfect. So that now, when we hear these things, let us think that we hear Aristotle, not Paul, or Christ. Here have we three things that are spoken of felicity; It is a divine thing, 1it may be obtained by the three principal things, which he have already rehearsed, and it is common in a manner to all men.
Wherefore, if either thou aske of Aristotle, or of them; Since felicitie is thus common, as ye say, how coms it to passe, that so few obteine the same? Bicause few (saie they) will learne, few will labour, few will accustome themselues to honest and good exercises. But we will here ⟨p. 156⟩note a generall and a certeine proposition; To euerie nature or kind there is a purposed end, the which all that be comprehended in it may atteine. And surelie, that which Aristotle answered, as touching them that haue not their perfect senses, be lame, and féeble, why they cannot be partakers of felicitie; namelie, bicause of their naturall defect; that proposition may be vnderstood, when the powers shall be perfect: so doo we answer, that men cannot now by themselues be perfect, bicause nature was corrupted euen from the beginning, and that we haue not the powers as well of the mind, as of the bodie perfect. So that now, when we heare these things, let vs thinke that we heare Aristotle, not Paule, or Christ. Here haue we thrée things that are spoken of felicitie; It is a diuine thing,
29 There remaineth fortune, which Aristotle removeth from the causes of felicity; because it is thought unworthy that it should be admitted to open so excellent a gift unto men. But before I show the reason brought by Aristotle, 1I will endeavour to declare what fortune is. As it is written in the second book of natural philosophy; It is an accidental cause, and then it cometh in place, when any thing is joined to any man, which is author of the effect following; unto the producing of which effect, that which is joined thereunto, worketh nothing, but only giveth sometimes an occasion; and the effect may well come to pass without it. This is made plain by a similitude; If a man, by reason of an ague, become temperate, we will say that this fell out by fortune: for temperance cometh of the will as of her own proper cause, which will bridleth the affection of lust. The ague might have bin the occasion whereby this came to pass, but the cause it could not be. And because these things, to wit, the will of temperate government, and the ague, meet by fortune in one and the same man; therefore doth temperance spring by fortune from the ague. But it appeareth plainly enough, that the fever is not by it self the cause of the temperance; otherwise, all that be grieved with a fever, would become temperate. According to this manner of speaking must the sentence of Paul be examined and understood; 2Knowledge puffeth up. Pride, which immediately preferreth our own things above other mens, proceedeth from the will; hereby we become vain and puffed up. And because knowledge giveth an occasion unto some that this is done, therefore knowledge is said to puff up, but yet by fortune; because in one self man, are joined together by chance these two things, to wit, the desire of passing and excelling others, and also some knowledge of things. And as these things be joined together at all adventures; so doth vain puffing up proceed by fortune from knowledge. Also it happeneth, that when unto that effect, which we desire by it self, and by our own advise, another effect by chance is joined therewith; then the same cometh of fortune, not purposely, whereas we in very deed sought for another thing.
29 There remaineth fortune, which Aristotle remooueth from the causes of felicitie; bicause it is thought vnwoorthie that it should be admitted to open so excellent a gift vnto men. But before I shew the reason brought by Aristotle,
126 Let vs now sée what the holie scriptures saie herevnto: trulie they make no mention of vertues, when they shew the felicitie of man. In the psalme, wherin is rehearsed the opinion of the common sort, which thought him to be happie that hath abundance, and who is replenished with infinite store of the goods of this world; we are otherwise persuaded by the voice of God. 2For it is added; Blessed is the people whose God is the Lord. Here an act is shewed, not a power; 3Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord; 4blessed is the man that walketh in the lawe of the Lord. Further, that euen the good habits of the mind may be somtime idle and vnprofitable, hereby it is euident; 5that Paule warneth vs to take héed, that we receiue not the grace of God in vaine. And Paule aduiseth Timothie, To stir vp the gifts of God, which were in him, by laieng on of hands by authoritie of the eldership. Séeing then the gifts of the spirit, which are more excellent than morall vertues, are referred vnto action, that others may be holpen and instructed, (otherwise we should not become the better for them) this must be iudged much truer, and more certeine as touching humane vertues. Where it is said of Aristotle, that Calamities and miseries doo let, that men cannot be counted happie; if this should be considered by it selfe, 6as it is said without anie distinction, it agréeth not with the holie scriptures. For they which suffer for Christ, are in great penurie, and are troubled with gréeuous punishments; yet doo they enioie that blessednes, which in this life is possible to be atteined vnto: 7bicause their sinnes are not imputed vnto them, and their soule and bodie are then excéedinglie renewed toward the attainment of eternall life. Howbeit, séeing the felicitie of this life is not yet full, but begun; therefore we will grant it, that the saints, which be so afflicted, are not in perfect and absolute blessednes; séeing they looke shortlie to haue the same, wherein they shall féele none of these miseries. For the oracles of God saie; 8God shall wipe awaie all teares from the eies of his saints, neither shall there be mourning nor lamentation anie more: for these former things are parted awaie.
