A14350:677
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Wherefore we must note, that Aristotle in the place above mentioned, neither affirmeth nor denieth that felicity is given of God. He affirmeth it not, because he saith, that this work belongeth to another treatise; namely, to the metaphysics, or treatise of supernatural things, wherein is treated of the providence of God, without which doctrine, this question can not be defined. Neither yet doth he deny felicity to be given of God, least he should fall into an absurdity. For it seems to be contrary to reason, that the rest of the gifts should be given by God, and felicity not to be given by him. Wherefore he teacheth it under a condition, namely, If other things be had from God, felicity likewise doth proceed from him: but he affirmeth nothing at all. But I see not how fitly he putteth over this treatise to another place; ⟨p. 155⟩for if this definition do depend of providence, might he not in the mean time have borrowed so much of his metaphysical treatise, as should have been sufficient for the explaining of his mind? This he did as touching the soul, and took from his treatise of natural things so much as served unto moral doctrine, and saith, that The soul as we shall shortly see, hath divers parts. So likewise might he here have written of this, although he had not here purposely proved it, but taken it from some other treatise; that God by his providence doth give many gifts unto men; than the which gifts seeing felicity is far more excellent, it is meet that the same also should belong unto it. Howbeit, dissembling this, he passed it over, and saith it belonged to an other treatise. But I beseech you, what more convenient place had there been, seeing in that book he was to treat of manners and virtues, the understanding whereof dependeth altogether of the knowledge of felicity? Now was it time to affirm thereof simply, that he might no less have expected the same of God, than other gifts. Now then, when he speaketh on this wise, he seemeth to shun the hatred of ungodliness, but deserved no praise for a plain and sincere confession. If he had meant well and honestly, he should not have used these ambiguities. But what should he have done? He could not by philosophy know any thing of the will of God towards men;
Wherefore we must note, that Aristotle in the place aboue mentioned, neither affirmeth nor denieth that felicitie is giuen of God. He affirmeth it not, bicause he saith, that this worke belongeth to another treatise; namelie, to the metaphysicks, or treatise of supernaturall things, wherein is treated of the prouidence of God, without which doctrine, this question can not be defined. Neither yet doth he denie felicitie to be giuen of God, least he should fall into an absurditie. For it séemes to be contrarie to reason, that the rest of the gifts should be giuen by God, and felicitie not to be giuen by him. Wherefore he teacheth it vnder a condition, namelie, If other things be had from God, felicitie likewise doth procéed from him: but he affirmeth nothing at all. But I sée not how fitlie he putteth ouer this treatise to another place;