A14350:664
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I am not ignorant, 1that they which are wont to hold with the Stoics, have been accustomed to object against the Peripatetics, saying that they, while they appoint virtue to be the chiefest good, do not understand it, as it is in the power, and lieth without act; but do take the same as it is joined with her action: & so laugh Aristotle to scorn, which objected not against them, but ⟨p. 151⟩an idle virtue, and severed from right action. This answer at the first sight seems unto some to be just, and likely to be true: but if the thing be more narrowly considered, and that we shall more diligently look into the same, it is rather a shift, than a true dissolving of the argument; because whether they will or no, action, and virtue, from whence it proceedeth, are distinguished [one from another:] for they be contained in sundry Predicaments, and are many times severed one from another. For virtue, when it is an habit, belongeth unto quality; but the act which it worketh, is comprehended under the Predicament of action. But how they be severed one from another, I think no man that diligently considereth the matter, is ignorant: for he which is endued with knowledge or wisdom, doth neither contemplate always, nor yet is always occupied about those things which he knoweth. Whereupon it cometh to pass, that they which comprehend two for one, and distinguish them not, do easily swerve from the mark, whereunto they should have an aim; and in stead of an absolute and perfect doctrine, do follow that which is confused and not plain. This Aristotle perceiving distinguished and severed one of them from another, and when he seeth that one of them is referred to the other, he denieth that that which tendeth to another end can be the chief: which reason of his opinion is so evident, as I think nothing can be more manifest than the same. But they which cannot confute the reason, do return the argument upon Aristotle himself, who denieth that felicity is therefore placed in virtue, because virtue may easily & many ways be hindered.
I am not ignorant, 1that they which are woont to hold with the Stoiks, haue béene accustomed to obiect against the Peripatetikes, saieng that they, while they appoint vertue to be the chéefest good, doo not vnderstand it, as it is in the power, and lieth without act; but doo take the same as it is ioined with hir action: & so laugh Aristotle to scorne, which obiected not against them, but ⟨p. 151⟩an idle vertue, and seuered from right action. This answer at the first sight séemes vnto some to be iust, and likelie to be true: but if the thing be more narrowlie considered, and that we shall more diligentlie looke into the same, it is rather a shift, than a true dissoluing of the argument; bicause whether they will or no, action, and vertue, from whence it procéedeth, are distinguished [one from another:] for they be conteined in sundrie Predicaments, and are manie times seuered one from another. For vertue, when it is an habit, belongeth vnto qualitie; but the act which it worketh, is comprehended vnder the Predicament of action. But how they be seuered one from another, I thinke no man that diligentlie considereth the matter, is ignorant: for he which is indued with knowledge or wisedome, dooth neither contemplate alwaies, nor yet is alwaies occupied about those things which he knoweth. Wherevpon it commeth to passe, that they which comprehend two for one, and distinguish them not, doo easilie swarue from the marke, wherevnto they should haue an aime; and in stead of an absolute and perfect doctrine, doo followe that which is confused and not plaine. This Aristotle perceiuing distinguished and seuered one of them from another, and when he séeth that one of them is referred to the other, he denieth that that which tendeth to another end can be the chéefe: which reason of his opinion is so euident, as I thinke nothing can be more manifest than the same. But they which cannot confute the reason, doo returne the argument vpon Aristotle himselfe, who denieth that felicitie is therefore placed in vertue, bicause vertue may easilie & manie waies be hindered.
1If this argument (say they) like thee so well, neither canst thou indeed defend the most perfect action to be the chiefest good; because the same also is as many ways subject to impediments, as thou didst object against virtue. For he which sleepeth doth not contemplate; neither can he do the same, which is vexed with grievous torments; and he cannot endure any perils, which liveth in quiet & peaceable commonweals. Wherefore thou that sayest that virtue, for these causes, is not the chiefest good; thou shalt also say, that the most perfect action must not be accounted for felicity. A show indeed of truth this hath, which is objected, but it maketh no matter at all; because the Peripatetics will easily grant, that the same most perfect action, which they say is felicity, is not continued so as it cannot be broken off; but so long as it is, they would not grant it to be no felicity, and much less will they yield that the same is referred to a better end. Both which things cannot be said of the habit which is virtue. For the same, as it is in a man that sleepeth, or is vexed with most painful griefs, can neither he called felicity, nor yet can make him blessed in whose mind it is: for the habit may remain, when the action is taken away; but an action being let from breaking forth, neither is it, nor yet remaineth it. And besides this, an habit, while it yet remaineth hindered, who seeth not that it is still referred unto action, when as it inclineth the mind and desire thereunto. Moreover, that should be accounted our felicity, which approacheth most near unto the divine felicity; but God, seeing he is not only perfect, but even perfection it self, hath felicity in act, not in power; in very deed, not in habit; therefore our felicity also shall be an action: which notwithstanding is requisite to be less than the blessedness of God, which therefore happeneth; because his act cannot fail him, but ours is very oftentimes broken off.
1If this argument (saie they) like thée so well, neither canst thou indéed defend the most perfect action to be the chéefest good; bicause the same also is as manie waies subiect to impediments, as thou didst obiect against vertue. For he which sléepeth dooth not contemplate; neither can he doo the same, which is vexed with gréeuous torments; and he cannot endure anie perils, which liueth in quiet & peaceable commonweales. Wherefore thou that saiest that vertue, for these causes, is not the chéefest good; thou shalt also saie, that the most perfect action must not be accounted for felicitie. A shew indéed of truth this hath, which is obiected, but it maketh no matter at all; bicause the Peripatetikes will easilie grant, that the same most perfect action, which they saie is felicitie, is not continued so as it cannot be broken off; but so long as it is, they would not grant it to be no felicitie, and much lesse will they yéeld that the same is referred to a better end. Both which things cannot be said of the habit which is vertue. For the same, as it is in a man that sléepeth, or is vexed with most painfull gréefes, can neither he called felicitie, nor yet can make him blessed in whose mind it is: for the habit may remaine, when the action is taken awaie; but an action being let from breaking foorth, neither is it, nor yet remaineth it. And besides this, an habit, while it yet remaineth hindered, who séeth not that it is still referred vnto action, when as it inclineth the mind and desire therevnto. Moreouer, that should be accounted our felicitie, which approcheth most néere vnto the diuine felicitie; but God, séeing he is not onelie perfect, but euen perfection it selfe, hath felicitie in act, not in power; in verie déed, not in habit; therfore our felicitie also shall be an action: which notwithstanding is requisite to be lesse than the blessednes of God, which therefore happeneth; bicause his act cannot faile him, but ours is verie oftentimes broken off.
25 After those things, 1which we have now spoken, must their cavil also be confuted, which laugh at the argument, brought as touching the impediments, whereby the action of virtue is repressed, that it cannot be effectual. Ye feign (say they) that the work of virtues pertaineth to the body; but it is not so: because the whole action of virtue is in the soul, and therein it standeth full and whole: the goods of the body, or instruments of fortune belong nothing thereunto. And without doubt, a poor man may be liberal, by wishing to give unto them to whom he thinketh meet to be given. Again, in the middest of torments, and in the very flames themselves, fear doth shine the more, and becometh more glorious. According to which opinion Seneca unto Lucillus, the seventy epistle writeth many things, and among others saith; Virtue hath also place in the bed: overcome thou thy sickness with a valiant courage, because, if others that be present, shall perceive thee to be courageous, great, and upright in torments, they will wonder at the brightness of thy virtue; and thou, whilst thou art so vexed, shalt rightly instruct them, and thorough virtue shalt not only help thy self very much, but them also. What manner of things these be, now will we more narrowly consider. They declare, that the action of virtue is whole, full, and perfect in the mind: that we deny. For if we shall declare the nature of an habit, the same is nothing else, than a quality brought in by long exercise, by the benefit whereof the powers of the mind and body are made more ready and fit to occupy themselves. Neither doth virtue in the mind alone express her action. They which say that virtue doth bear rule in eating, drinking, fleshly desire, and such like; those also will say, that the action of that virtue is expressed in the body also, ⟨p. 152⟩not in the soul only. So it may be lawful to say, as touching fortitude, liberality, and many other virtues; to show that the body and goods of fortune were not given by God unto mankind. Howbeit, these men perhaps persuade themselves, that the nature of man is fulfilled, and made perfect in the soul only: which how far it is from the truth, your selves without me may perceive.
25 After those things, 1which we haue now spoken, must their cauill also be confuted, which laugh at the argument, brought as touching the impediments, whereby the action of vertue is repressed, that it cannot be effectuall. Ye feigne (saie they) that the worke of vertues perteineth to the bodie; but it is not so: bicause the whole action of vertue is in the soule, and therein it standeth full and whole: the goods of the bodie, or instruments of fortune belong nothing thervnto. And without doubt, a poore man may be liberall, by wishing to giue vnto them to whom he thinketh méete to be giuen. Againe, in the middest of torments, and in the verie flames themselues, feare dooth shine the more, and becommeth more glorious. According to which opinion Seneca vnto Lucillus, the seuentie epistle writeth manie things, and among others saith; Vertue hath also place in the bed: ouercome thou thy sicknes with a valiant courage, bicause, if others that be present, shall perceiue thée to be couragious, great, and vpright in torments, they will woonder at the brightnes of thy vertue; and thou, whilest thou art so vexed, shalt rightlie instruct them, and thorough vertue shalt not onelie helpe thy selfe verie much, but them also. What maner of things these be, now will we more narrowlie consider. They declare, that the action of vertue is whole, full, and perfect in the mind: that we denie. For if we shall declare the nature of an habit, the same is nothing else, than a qualitie brought in by long exercise, by the benefite whereof the powers of the mind and bodie are made more readie and fit to occupie themselues. Neither dooth vertue in the mind alone expresse hir action. They which saie that vertue dooth beare rule in eating, drinking, fleshlie desire, and such like; those also will saie, that the action of that vertue is expressed in the bodie also,
A poor man (say they) may be liberal, while he desireth to give unto them, to whom he thinketh it meet to be given. But I would fain learn of these Stoics, whether they that be endued with virtue, and being hindered, do desire to work by it; for what cause they desire this? Do they it not for blessedness sake? This if they shall deny, they will declare themselves to be unwise in desiring of those things which they refer not unto the chiefest good. But if they will grant, that they wish those works for felicity sake, it shall be lawful to say that felicity is perfectly gotten, not in virtue, but in action. I will easily grant, that virtue shineth, and is more glorious in the midst of flames, and in most cruel torments; and him that with a valiant courage suffereth these things, I will extol with praises among good and wise men; but yet so, as I will deny him, in the mean time, to enjoy whole and perfect felicity. He shall very well by his example instruct and teach others, yet shall he not perfectly and all manner of ways be blessed. These things be so very true, as even they, which profess the Stoical discipline, must whether they will or no yield unto this opinion. For Cicero in his fifth book of Tusculan questions, at the beginning saith; If virtue be not of such strength, that it can defend it self, I fear me least we are not so much to lean to the hope of a blessed life, upon confidence of virtue, as it may seem that we have more need to pray for it. Verily I my self, when I consider those chances, wherein fortune hath exceedingly exercised me, I begin to mistrust this opinion, and otherwhiles also stand in great fear of mans weakness and frailty. For I fear least that when nature gave unto us weak bodies, and with them joined uncurable diseases, and intolerable griefs; it also gave minds agreeable to the griefs of the bodies, and severally entangled with the vexations and troubles thereof. But herein I reform my self, that I judge of the strength of virtue according to other mens niceness, and peradventure according to mine own, not according to virtue it self, &c. How he doubted, and in a manner became of this opinion, he plainly expressed in these words: and it maketh no matter, that he saith he reformed himself, because that is uncertain: and, he addeth this word Peradventure, which is a token of doubting.
Moreover, what is so certain, as that Cicero himself in his fourth book De finibus disputed against Cato, who had before in the third book extolled the opinion of Zeno and the Stoics to the heavens? Yea and the Stoics as in virtue alone they boasted, that they were blessed, 1yet did they not repose themselves in that alone; but called the powers of the body, the pureness of the senses, dignities, riches and such like [Greek or Hebrew]; that is, Things coming naturally without any other beginning: which Cicero calleth Things produced, promoted, principal, advanced above other. With the sense of which words if we would urge the Stoics, we shall say, that they attribute more unto this kind of things, than the Peripatetics; as they which do name those things principal, and above others; whereas the Peripatetics call them indeed good things, but yet of the lowest degree, and which are not of much account, being compared with just and honest things; and therefore, as the time serves, to be contemned, and not much to be desired. I know indeed that the Stoics do call these things principal and chief, while they be compared with their contraries; not when they be compared with virtues: but yet by these their new and made words they attribute very much to this order of things, when they call these things, Commodities, things to be preferred, & of chief regard; and their contraries [Greek or Hebrew]: as who should say Discommodities, and things rejected. Wherefore, though the Stoics would contend with the Peripatetics in talk, yet in reason and in the thing it self they agree with them. The Stoics delight in a magnifical kind of speech, and only in words bring in an unsensiblenes of passion, which when they come afterward to the matter, all men feel by experience, that it is quite differing from our senses, and from our tried customs, and also very far from the strength of our humane nature.
Moreouer, what is so certeine, as that Cicero himselfe in his fourth booke De finibus disputed against Cato, who had before in the third booke extolled the opinion of Zeno and the Stoiks to the heauens? Yea and the Stoiks as in vertue alone they boasted, that they were blessed, 1yet did they not repose themselus in that alone; but called the powers of the bodie, the purenes of the senses, dignities, riches and such like 〈non-Latin alphabet〉; that is, Things comming naturallie without anie other beginning: which Cicero calleth Things produced, promoted, principall, aduanced aboue other. With the sense of which words if we would vrge the Stoiks, we shall say, that they attribute more vnto this kind of things, than the Peripatetiks; as they which doo name those things principall, and aboue others; whereas the Peripatetiks call them indéed good things, but yet of the lowest degrée, and which are not of much account, being compared with iust and honest things; and therefore, as the time serues, to be contemned, and not much to be desired. I knowe indéed that the Stoiks doo call these things principall and chéefe, while they be compared with their contraries; not when they be compared with vertues: but yet by these their new and made words they attribute verie much to this order of things, when they call these things, Commodities, things to be preferred, & of chéefe regard; and their contraries : as who should saie Discommodities, and things reiected. Wherefore, though the Stoiks would contend with the Peripatetiks in talke, yet in reason and in the thing it selfe they agrée with them. The Stoiks delight in a magnificall kind of speach, and onlie in words bring in an vnsensiblenes of passion, which when they come afterward to the matter, all men féele by experience, that it is quite differing from our senses, and from our tried customs, and also verie far from the strength of our humane nature.
26 And I do not think, that I should lightly pass over those things, which I cited a little before, out of the fifth book of Tusculan questions; If (saith Cicero) virtue had not help enough in it self, that then we must make our prayers for the same. What is this we hear? As though if virtue were sufficient in it self, is there nothing then to be wished for, or to be desired of God; as if we had all things consisting in our own selves? Shall Tully on this wise, in making more of virtue than is requisite, take away godliness, which is the chief virtue of all others, by abolishing the invocation of God? Truly even thus did the Stoics think. 1For Seneca writeth, that Jupiter can do no more than a good man. Wherefore the Stoics used no less magnifical kind of speech, than their doctrine ⟨p. 153⟩was altogether differing from religion. Which I do not therefore say, as though I endeavoured to pronounce Aristotle's opinion to be godly and religious; but to give warning, that the Stoics are not so to be esteemed, 2as though in praising of their virtues, they drew very near (as some think) unto the christian doctrine. Yet will I bear more in this behalf with the Stoics, than with the Epicures; because they speak in a manner always that which is agreeable to their own opinion, whereas the Epicures many times affirm things not agreeable to their own rules. Because Epicurus accounteth grief for the chiefest evil, he also placeth pleasure of the body, or voidness of sorrow to be the chiefest good. If he be tormented, or descend into Phalaris bull, and tell me how sweet this is, as he boasteth that His wise man will say, without doubt he shall speak most inconstantly, and such things as no manner of way accord in themselves.
26 And I doo not thinke, that I should lightlie passe ouer those things, which I cited a little before, out of the fift booke of Tusculane questions; If (saith Cicero) vertue had not helpe inough in it selfe, that then we must make our praiers for the same. What is this we heare? As though if vertue were sufficient in it selfe, is there nothing then to be wished for, or to be desired of God; as if we had all things consisting in our own selues? Shall Tullie on this wise, in making more of vertue than is requisit, take awaie godlines, which is the chéefe vertue of all others, by abolishing the inuocatiō of God? Trulie euen thus did the Stoiks thinke.
Let these words so glorious and worthy of memory be left unto the Stoics, which so boast of their virtues, as they think that a wise man endued with them, shall never be without happiness. Neither can they persuade their mind, that seeing felicity doth evermore accompany virtues, it will then forsake them, and that it will stay upon the threshold, wherein they enter into the prison; as though it may not be lawful for it to enter into a sorrowful place, nor (as said Theophrastus) to ascend upon the rock or wheel of torment. Theophrastus, no doubt, was far wiser than Epicurus. For he which saw, that by the Peripatetics doctrine, was required unto civill felicity, whereof we now entreat, both the goods of the body, and the goods external; the very same man understood, how unpossible it was, that even the wisest man should be blessed in torments & misery. But Epicurus, who was delighted with such a chief good, as we have now declared, will speak things neither meet nor agreeable to his purpose, while he speaketh so magnifically, and useth such glorious sentences. But yet this is no marvel; for he contemned Logic, which is the right means of disputing: but of this thing we have spoken enough.
Let these words so glorious and woorthie of memorie be left vnto the Stoiks, which so boast of their vertues, as they thinke that a wise man indued with them, shall neuer bée without happines. Neither can they persuade their mind, that séeing felicitie dooth euermore accompanie vertues, it will then forsake them, and that it will staie vpon the threshold, wherein they enter into the prison; as though it may not be lawfull for it to enter into a sorrowfull place, nor (as said Theophrastus) to ascend vpon the rocke or whéele of torment. Theophrastus, no doubt, was far wiser than Epicurus. For he which sawe, that by the Peripatetiks doctrine, was required vnto ciuill felicitie, whereof we now intreate, both the goods of the bodie, and the goods externall; the verie same man vnderstood, how vnpossible it was, that euen the wisest man should be blessed in torments & miserie. But Epicurus, who was delighted with such a chéefe good, as we haue now declared, will speake things neither méete nor agréeable to his purpose, while he speaketh so magnificallie, and vseth such glorious sentences. But yet this is no maruell; for he contemned Logike, which is the right meanes of disputing: but of this thing we haue spoken enough.
126 Let us now see what the holy scriptures say hereunto: truly they make no mention of virtues, when they show the felicity of man. In the psalm, wherein is rehearsed the opinion of the common sort, which thought him to be happy that hath abundance, and who is replenished with infinite store of the goods of this world; we are otherwise persuaded by the voice of God. 2For it is added; Blessed is the people whose God is the Lord. Here an act is showed, not a power; 3Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord; 4blessed is the man that walketh in the law of the Lord. Further, that even the good habits of the mind may be sometime idle and unprofitable, hereby it is evident; 5that Paul warneth us to take heed, that we receive not the grace of God in vain. And Paul adviseth Timothy, To stir up the gifts of God, which were in him, by laying on of hands by authority of the eldership. Seeing then the gifts of the spirit, which are more excellent than moral virtues, are referred unto action, that others may be holpen and instructed, (otherwise we should not become the better for them) this must be judged much truer, and more certain as touching humane virtues. Where it is said of Aristotle, that Calamities and miseries do let, that men cannot be counted happy; if this should be considered by it self, 6as it is said without any distinction, it agreeth not with the holy scriptures. For they which suffer for Christ, are in great penury, and are troubled with grievous punishments; yet do they enjoy that blessedness, which in this life is possible to be attained unto: 7because their sins are not imputed unto them, and their soul and body are then exceedingly renewed toward the attainment of eternal life. Howbeit, seeing the felicity of this life is not yet full, but begun; therefore we will grant it, that the saints, which be so afflicted, are not in perfect and absolute blessedness; seeing they look shortly to have the same, wherein they shall feel none of these miseries. For the oracles of God say;
Wherefore we say with Aristotle, that between perfect and full felicity, and miseries and calamities there is no agreement, which nevertheless disagreeth not with that felicity, which we have here begun.
Wherfore we saie with Aristotle, that betwéene perfect and full felicitie, and miseries and calamities there is no agréement, which neuertheles disagréeth not with that felicitie, which we haue here begun.
And Paul saw the displeasures of this life to be so repugnant unto perfect blessedness, and that they could not abide together, as he said unto the Corinthians; If the dead rise not again, 1we are more unhappy than all men. And if that Christ pronounced them blessed, which mourn, and which suffer persecution for his name; 2that must not so be understood, as though we should be blessed, because we weep, and sigh, and suffer persecution; but because we wait for better things hereafter, and are saved by hope. Neither do I deny, but that in the middest of the troubles of the flesh, God will give marvellous comforts to them that be his: which I persuade my self passeth all the delights of civill happiness. Yet cometh it not to pass thereby, that perfect felicity is joined with these calamities. After this manner did Paul comfort the soldiers ⟨p. 154⟩of Christ; 3The things (saith he) which we suffer in this life, are not equal and of like value with those things, which at length shall be revealed in us, when we reign together with Christ. But Aristotle was constrained to judge as he said, because he was ignorant of the blessedness to come, and saw that the civill happiness, which he treated of, was obscured and diminished by adversities and afflictions. And unto him were unknown those heavenly comforts, which God, above the power of nature, bringeth to the confessors of the truth, even in the very torments. Wherefore, if as touching this matter, the Stoics seem somewhat to disagree from us, this they did unadvisedly; seeing they also knew nothing of the life to come, neither had they ever trial of the consolations of God in the midst of miseries and death.
And Paule sawe the displeasures of this life to be so repugnant vnto perfect blessednes, and that they could not abide togither, as he said vnto the Corinthians; If the dead rise not againe, 1we are more vnhappie than all men. And if that Christ pronounced them blessed, which mourne, and which suffer persecution for his name; 2
27 Now that we have largely enough disputed as touching the nature of felicity, we will inquire of the cause thereof. Aristotle reckoneth up five causes, which may be gathered into two; for either they be inward, or outward. They are reckoned inward, because discipline, custom, and exercise do proceed from us. But the outward causes are thought to be God and fortune. 1Between custom and exercise this is the difference, that custom is referred unto virtues, which are bred by often and continual actions. But exercises and labours are to be applied to a sure obtaining and keeping of riches, honour, and health; in which things many (as it hath bin said) have placed felicity. And first as touching discipline, it belongeth unto them, which have thought that virtues are learned by applying of doctrines. Wherefore if there be need of discipline, it must be learned; if of custom, we must not desist from honest actions; if it be ascribed to exercise, there must of necessity be no labour spared; if it be expected of God, he must be prayed unto; but if of fortune, since we are able to do nothing concerning it, all must wholly be committed unto the same. The Stoics, and especially Epictetus, distinguish all things which are found either to be in us, or not to be within us. By those things that are in us, they understand the things which we can rule by our counsel, and obtain by our strength: and those things that are said to be not within us, are the same that we have not in our power; as nobility, health, and riches.
27 Now that we haue largelie inough disputed as touching the nature of felicitie, we will inquire of the cause therof. Aristotle reckoneth vp fiue causes, which may be gathered into two; for either they be inward, or outward. They are reckoned inward, bicause discipline, custome, and exercise doo procéed from vs. But the outward causes are thought to be God and fortune. 1Betwéene custome and exercise this is the difference, that custome is referred vnto vertues, which are bred by often and continuall actions. But exercises and labours are to be applied to a sure obteining and kéeping of riches, honour, and health; in which things manie (as it hath bin said) haue placed felicitie. And first as touching discipline, it belongeth vnto them, which haue thought that vertues are learned by applieng of doctrines. Wherefore if there be néed of discipline, it must be learned; if of custome, we must not desist from honest actions; if it be ascribed to exercise, there must of necessitie be no labour spared; if it be expected of God, he must be praied vnto; but if of fortune, since we are able to doo nothing concerning it, all must wholie bée committed vnto the same. The Stoiks, and especiallie Epictetus, distinguish all things which are found either to be in vs, or not to be within vs. By those things that are in vs, they vnderstand the things which we can rule by our counsell, and obteine by our strength: and those things that are said to be not within vs, are the same that we haue not in our power; as nobilitie, health, and riches.
Whether God be the cause of felicity, Aristotle in his first book of his Ethics speaketh very ambiguously, 1& bringeth a conditional proposition, but absolves not the argument. If any gift (saith he) be of God, felicity shall be given of him. And he showeth a reason of the conclusion, because the same hath the chiefest place among all humane things. But to the making up of the argument, there may be added a double minor proposition: that the felicity of the godly, and ours is all one; But many things are given unto men by God, therefore must felicity be expected from him. And that many things are given unto men by God, we doubt nothing at all, who do also extol his providence in every thing: and since from him, as from the chief good, and fountain of goodness, is derived whatsoever is good, we do not once imagine, that this doth flow without his pleasure, will, and election. 2But there be some, and those indeed Peripatetics, which do deem far otherwise of the providence of God: for they think that his providence, as touching particular things, stretcheth not lower than the moon; because so far, all things are done constantly, and in singular order. But, as touching the things which are beneath the moon, they make providence to be only of general things, not of particular. Wherefore they should take this for the minor proposition; But no gifts are distributed by God unto men, neither therefore is felicity given. And they say, that gifts are not given by God unto men, not because they acknowledge him not to be the first efficient cause, from whence all good things do arise; but they take the word of giving or bestowing from election, will, and free choice. The good things, which we have, and felicity, they will grant do depend of God, and of the motion of the heaven, and that they cannot otherwise be had; but they think that those be not given by him, by a certain distribution which he considereth of, or which he giveth by a free disposition. For they think that God dealeth necessarily, and by a natural impulsion.
Whether God be the cause of felicitie, Aristotle in his first booke of his Ethiks speaketh verie ambiguouslie, 1& bringeth a conditionall proposition, but absolues not the argument. If anie gift (saith he) be of God, felicitie shall be giuen of him. And he sheweth a reason of the conclusion, bicause the same hath the chéefest place among all humane things. But to the making vp of the argument, there may be added a double minor proposition: that the felicitie of the godlie, and ours is all one; But manie things are giuen vnto men by God, therefore must felicitie be expected from him. And that manie things are giuen vnto men by God, we doubt nothing at all, who doo also extoll his prouidence in euerie thing: and since from him, as from the chéefe good, and fountaine of goodnes, is deriued whatsoeuer is good, we doo not once imagine, that this doth flowe without his pleasure, will, and election.
Wherefore we must note, that Aristotle in the place above mentioned, neither affirmeth nor denieth that felicity is given of God. He affirmeth it not, because he saith, that this work belongeth to another treatise; namely, to the metaphysics, or treatise of supernatural things, wherein is treated of the providence of God, without which doctrine, this question can not be defined. Neither yet doth he deny felicity to be given of God, least he should fall into an absurdity. For it seems to be contrary to reason, that the rest of the gifts should be given by God, and felicity not to be given by him. Wherefore he teacheth it under a condition, namely, If other things be had from God, felicity likewise doth proceed from him: but he affirmeth nothing at all. But I see not how fitly he putteth over this treatise to another place; ⟨p. 155⟩for if this definition do depend of providence, might he not in the mean time have borrowed so much of his metaphysical treatise, as should have been sufficient for the explaining of his mind? This he did as touching the soul, and took from his treatise of natural things so much as served unto moral doctrine, and saith, that The soul as we shall shortly see, hath divers parts. So likewise might he here have written of this, although he had not here purposely proved it, but taken it from some other treatise; that God by his providence doth give many gifts unto men; than the which gifts seeing felicity is far more excellent, it is meet that the same also should belong unto it. Howbeit, dissembling this, he passed it over, and saith it belonged to an other treatise. But I beseech you, what more convenient place had there been, seeing in that book he was to treat of manners and virtues, the understanding whereof dependeth altogether of the knowledge of felicity? Now was it time to affirm thereof simply, that he might no less have expected the same of God, than other gifts. Now then, when he speaketh on this wise, he seemeth to shun the hatred of ungodliness, but deserved no praise for a plain and sincere confession. If he had meant well and honestly, he should not have used these ambiguities. But what should he have done? He could not by philosophy know any thing of the will of God towards men;
Wherefore we must note, that Aristotle in the place aboue mentioned, neither affirmeth nor denieth that felicitie is giuen of God. He affirmeth it not, bicause he saith, that this worke belongeth to another treatise; namelie, to the metaphysicks, or treatise of supernaturall things, wherein is treated of the prouidence of God, without which doctrine, this question can not be defined. Neither yet doth he denie felicitie to be giuen of God, least he should fall into an absurditie. For it séemes to be contrarie to reason, that the rest of the gifts should be giuen by God, and felicitie not to be giuen by him. Wherefore he teacheth it vnder a condition, namelie, If other things be had from God, felicitie likewise doth procéed from him: but he affirmeth nothing at all. But I sée not how fitlie he putteth ouer this treatise to another place;
for whatsoever we know thereof, we are all wholly beholding for it unto the holy scriptures, and especially to the gospel.
for whatsoeuer we knowe thereof, we are all wholie beholding for it vnto the holie scriptures, and especiallie to the gospell.
28 When Aristotle had after a sort denied, that felicity cometh from God, in that he would not confess it; this nevertheless he granteth, that it is a thing most divine, that is, most perfect, which also God enjoyeth. For he, although not as men be, yet after a certain manner of his own, is blessed. here Eustratius added [of his own] that God doth give felicity, but not without the means which we have rehearsed, I mean learning, 1custom and exercise. And undoubtedly, there be certain things given unto us by God, without any labour or endeavour of us. For when did ever any man labour that he might be borne witty, noble, or of a sound body, or of a perfect complexion? Assuredly no man. As for other things, God so giveth them, as we should attain unto them by certain means. Howbeit this must be diligently considered, that if we will think well and godly of the matter, even the very means are given unto us by GOD himself: for no man shall be moved to receive sound doctrine, nor to take in hand a good custom nor a profitable exercise, 2unless he be stirred up by God. If felicity have those three things, for causes and certain principles, it may soon be common unto many; except those which have not their senses perfect, which be feeble, and borne lame, and for that cause cannot attain unto felicity. For there be some, which be borne fools, and of an ill temperature of the body; and therefore they which be deaf, dumb, or which be overcome with great griefs & weakness, cannot learn good arts and literature, neither are they fit for exercises; nor yet to procure unto themselves good manners. And doctrine is not admitted for moral virtues sake; but because of the faculties & sciences which be contemplative, in which things for the most part felicity doth consist. And because it is said, that felicity is common unto many; hearers & readers be encouraged to think, that if they fall from it, it must be imputed to their own default which would not learn and accustom themselves to good actions, and painful exercises.
28 When Aristotle had after a sort denied, that felicitie commeth from God, in that he would not confesse it; this neuertheles he granteth, that it is a thing most diuine, that is, most perfect, which also God inioieth. For he, although not as men be, yet after a certeine maner of his owne, is blessed. here Eustratius added [of his owne] that God dooth giue felicitie, but not without the meanes which we haue rehearsed, I meane learning,
126 Let vs now sée what the holie scriptures saie herevnto: trulie they make no mention of vertues, when they shew the felicitie of man. In the psalme, wherin is rehearsed the opinion of the common sort, which thought him to be happie that hath abundance, and who is replenished with infinite store of the goods of this world; we are otherwise persuaded by the voice of God. 2For it is added; Blessed is the people whose God is the Lord. Here an act is shewed, not a power; 3Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord; 4blessed is the man that walketh in the lawe of the Lord. Further, that euen the good habits of the mind may be somtime idle and vnprofitable, hereby it is euident; 5that Paule warneth vs to take héed, that we receiue not the grace of God in vaine. And Paule aduiseth Timothie, To stir vp the gifts of God, which were in him, by laieng on of hands by authoritie of the eldership. Séeing then the gifts of the spirit, which are more excellent than morall vertues, are referred vnto action, that others may be holpen and instructed, (otherwise we should not become the better for them) this must be iudged much truer, and more certeine as touching humane vertues. Where it is said of Aristotle, that Calamities and miseries doo let, that men cannot be counted happie; if this should be considered by it selfe, 6as it is said without anie distinction, it agréeth not with the holie scriptures. For they which suffer for Christ, are in great penurie, and are troubled with gréeuous punishments; yet doo they enioie that blessednes, which in this life is possible to be atteined vnto: 7bicause their sinnes are not imputed vnto them, and their soule and bodie are then excéedinglie renewed toward the attainment of eternall life. Howbeit, séeing the felicitie of this life is not yet full, but begun; therefore we will grant it, that the saints, which be so afflicted, are not in perfect and absolute blessednes; séeing they looke shortlie to haue the same, wherein they shall féele none of these miseries. For the oracles of God saie; 8God shall wipe awaie all teares from the eies of his saints, neither shall there be mourning nor lamentation anie more: for these former things are parted awaie.
