A14350:694
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
12 The saying of Solon may be understood two manner of ways. The first sense is, that it should be meant of the thing it self, and should be signified, that no man is blessed before death, but that now at length after death men be called happy. In this respect first this sentence is reproved as absurd, and most repugnant to the definition alleged of felicity. For if felicity be an action, and that a perfect action, it ought not to be given to the dead; who, since they have no longer being, are able to do nothing. This is a special place to testify, that Aristotle thought the soul to be mortal: for if it remain safe after death, assuredly it can work, and that much more readily than being joined with the body. Wherefore he should neither rightly nor orderly withdraw action from it, as he doth when he bringeth forth such a reason, as cannot be firm; unless it shall be granted, that they which depart do nothing. He seemeth to say, that this would be so absurd, as the self-same men, at one and the self-same time, both do and not do. If they shall be counted happy, then they do; but if they be dead, they do not. Neither is it convenient, that they which be not happy, should be called happy. I know indeed, that some so defend Aristotle, that he speaketh in this place of civill felicity, such as is not to be expected of us in an other life. But what felicity soever it be, whether civill, or perfect, and eternal, it must needs be an action. Besides, if he had judged rightly, he might in one word have signified the same, by testifying that there is an other felicity to be looked for after this life, of which he did not presently speak. Again, when he showeth a little after, that the dead as yet are subject unto good and evil, he turneth all his disputation to the good and evil things of this life. Thus did not Plato speak, in his last book of the common-weal, where he showeth, that then chiefly do remain pure and happy actions for us, when we be called away from this life. And in his book of the immortality of the soul, he appointeth philosophy to be a sound and sincere meditation of death; namely, that we should always seek to remove the mind from the body, the plucking away whereof from the senses, we shall then at the last attain, when we shall be departed from hence.
12 The saieng of Solon may be vnderstood two manner of waies. The first sense is, that it should be ment of the thing it selfe, and should be signified, that no man is blessed before death, but that now at length after death men be called happie. In this respect first this sentence is reprooued as absurd, and most repugnant to the definition alledged of felicitie. For if felicitie be an action, and that a perfect action, it ought not to be giuen to the dead; who, since they haue no longer being, are able to doo nothing. This is a speciall place to testifie, that Aristotle thought the soule to be mortall: for if it remaine safe after death, assuredlie it can worke, and that much more readilie than being ioined with the bodie. Wherefore he should neither rightlie nor orderlie withdrawe action from it, as he dooth when he bringeth foorth such a reason, as cannot be firme; vnlesse it shall be granted, that they which depart doo nothing. He séemeth to saie, that this would be so absurd, as the selfe-same men, at one and the selfe-same time, both doo and not doo. If they shall be counted happie, then they doo; but if they be dead, they doo not. Neither is it conuenient, that they which be not happie, should be called happie. I know indéed, that some so defend Aristotle, that he speaketh in this place of ciuill felicitie, such as is not to be expected of vs in an other life. But what felicitie soeuer it be, whether ciuill, or perfect, and eternall, it must néeds be an action. Besides, if he had iudged rightlie, he might in one word haue signified the same, by testifieng that there is an other felicitie to be looked for after this life, of which he did not presentlie speake. Againe, when he sheweth a little after, that thedead as yet are subiect vnto good and euill, he turneth all his disputation to the good and euill things of this life. Thus did not Plato speake, in his last booke of the common-weale, where he sheweth, that then chéeflie doo remaine pure and happie actions for vs, when we be called awaie from this life. And in his booke of the immortalitie of the soule, he appointeth philosophie to be a sound and sincere meditation of death; namelie, that we should alwaies séeke to remooue the mind frō the bodie, the plucking awaie whereof from the senses, we shall then at the last atteine, when we shall be departed from hence.