The xv. Chapter. Whether any man can be counted happy, while he liveth in this world.The xv. Chapter. Whether anie man can be counted happie, while he liueth in this world.
pp. 158–16631 passages
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The xv. Chapter. Whether any man can be counted happy, while he liveth in this world.
The xv. Chapter. Whether anie man can be counted happie, while he liueth in this world.
1Aristotle in his first book of Ethics, disputing whither a man may be accounted happy in this life, saith; that Since unto all men, though they live justly and well, may happen the same things that happened unto Priamus, 2there is left a doubt, whether any man, while he liveth, being subject to so many alterations, can rightly be called happy. And having secluded brute beasts and children, it seemeth for good cause to be doubted, whether any man should be accounted partaker of that blessedness: which as it might seem, is not rashly to be affirmed; because of the manifold alterations. For what sea or river is there, that can be tossed with so many storms, that can be disquieted with so many troublesome tossings, as is the life of men, which though it be wholly well settled; one day, or one unfortunate night doth not a little cast it under foot, yea ofttimes utterly bring it to naught? And not only the body is changed, which after a sort would be tolerable; but also the mind, whereby we now learn precepts, and now forget them; now receive counsels, now reject them; what within a while we decreed, we overthrow; what a little before pleased us, is now earnestly refused. These things Eustratius considering with himself, and perceiving the cause of alteration of all these things to be derived from the body, saith; that Our soul, when it is joined with it, is as if it should be let down into a water troubled and most swiftly running, whose whirlpools our mind is so far unable to resist, as it is rather most vehemently drawn by them. By which saying we may perceive the great infirmity of mans mind, wherewith he is so holden, as he is not able to rule the violent course of worldly alterations.
1ARistotle in his first booke of Ethiks, disputing whither a man may be accounted happie in this life, saith; that Since vnto all men, though they liue iustlie and well, may happen the same things that hapned vnto Priamus,