A14350:699
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
4 Neither could he rest himself in that which he last declared; For (saith he) it seemeth very absurd, that the matters of the posterity should not at any time belong unto their parents: but wherein this is absurd he showeth not. He leaveth it, as a thing known well enough, and so known, as the common sort were of that mind: for all men (in a manner) thought that the dead are careful about those things that we do. Hence came the fables of the poets, as touching Palinurus and Achilles, which would have their ghosts to be pacified by the chiefest sacrifice. And why he said [Not at any time] the reason is, because they might have made exception to the former reason; namely, that they did not affirm an infinite proceeding, so that all the alteration of things of all posterities should come unto the dead, but of near kinsfolks only; as if you should say, even to the fourth generation. Therefore Aristotle said, that it would seem absurd, if the matters of the living should not once at any time belong to them that be dead: he declareth not the reason of the absurdity. But Eustratius saith, that this seemeth to be against the nature of man, and without all affection, as though all communion between us and the dead were quite broken off. But let us return (saith he) to the doubt that was set down at the beginning; namely, Whether any man may be called happy while he liveth, or else after his death. For by the dissolving of that question, this perhaps that we now search will appear.
4 Neither could he rest himselfe in that which he last declared; For (saith he) it séemeth verie absurd, that the matters of the posteritie should not at anie time belong vnto their parents: but wherein this is absurd he sheweth not. He leaueth it, as a thing knowne well enough, and so knowne, as the common sort were of that mind: for all men (in a maner) thought that the dead are carefull about those things that we doo. Hence came the fables of the poets, as touching Palinurus and Achilles, which would haue their ghosts to be pacified by the chéefest sacrifice. And why he said [Not at anie time] the reason is, bicause they might haue made exception to the former reason; namelie, that they did not affirme an infinite procéeding, so that all the alteration of things of all posterities should come vnto the dead, but of néere kinsfolks onelie; as if you should saie, euen to the fourth generation. Therefore Aristotle said, that it would séeme absurd, if the matters of the liuing should not once at anie time belong to them that be dead: he declareth not the reason of the absurditie. But Eustratius saith, that this séemeth to be against the nature of man, and without all affection, as though all communion betwéene vs and the dead were quite broken off. But let vs returne (saith he) to the doubt that was set downe at the beginning; namelie, Whether anie man may be called happie while he liueth, or else after his death. For by the dissoluing of that question, this perhaps that we now search will appéere.