A14350:701
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1Moreover Aristotle saith, that we must not regard fortune when we treat of felicity; seeing the good and evil of man is not placed therein. A very grave sentence truly is this, that the good and evil of man standeth not in casual things. What (saith Eustratius) would it profit to have any being at all, if to be happy and in good plight depend of fortune, and not of our selves? And yet of these, which we call the goods of fortune, the life of man hath need. For some man might say; Since thou sayest that felicity is not put in these casual goods of man, why do we desire them? Why didst thou seek those things? Because (saith he) mans life hath need of them. But virtues, in very deed, & the actions of them, obtain the dominion and chief place in felicity. And a reason may be brought, why blessedness dependeth not of these things which be not in us, such as fortune is; but hath the originals thereof placed in our own selves. And as the actions, which proceed of virtue, are the beginnings of felicity; so the contraries, namely those which come of vices be of a contrary effect; to wit, the originals of calamity and misery: so as it is concluded, that felicity is not of fortune, because there we do not choose or deliberate of those things; but in these actions which proceed of virtue, both our choice and deliberation have place. But and if that the common sort do think, that felicity is to be placed in good things, they must not be heard, seeing they err in many other things. And this only will we receive of Solon, that felicity stayeth it self upon a stable & firm matter, and since it is so perfect, and so absolute a thing, it must be sought from causes which are of themselves, and not from those which are called accidental causes.
1Moreouer Aristotle saith, that we must not regard fortune when we treat of felicitie; séeing the good and euill of man is not placed therein. A verie graue sentence trulie is this, that the good and euill of man standeth not in casuall things. What (saith Eustratius) would it profit to haue anie being at all, if to be happie and in good plight depend of fortune, and not of our selues? And yet of these, which we call the goods of fortune, the life of man hath néed. For some man might saie; Since thou saist that felicitie is not put in these casuall goods of man, whie doo we desire them? Why didst thou séeke those things? Bicause (saith he) mans life hath néed of them. But vertues, in very déed, & the actions of them, obteine the dominion and chéefe place in felicitie. And a reason may be brought, whie blessednes dependeth not of these things which be not in vs, such as fortune is; but hath the originals therof placed in our own selues. And as the actions, which procéed of vertue, are the beginnings of felicitie; so the contraries, namelie those which come of vices be of a contrarie effect; to wit, the originals of calamitie and miserie: so as it is concluded, that felicitie is not of fortune, bicause there we do not choose or deliberate of those things; but in these actions which procéed of vertue, both our choise and deliberation haue place. But and if that the common sort doo thinke, that felicitie is to be placed in good things, they must not be heard, séeing they erre in many other things. And this onlie will we receiue of Solon, that felicitie staieth it selfe vpon a stable & firme matter, and since it is so perfect, and so absolute a thing, it must be sought from causes which are of themselues, and not from those which are called accidentall causes.