But methinks when we consider their necessitous indigent state, their wants and cravings, their pressures and groans, their grievances and complaints, we should find enough to convince us they are not the self-originate or self-sufficient being. And might even despair any thing should be plain and easy to them with whom it is a difficulty to distinguish themselves from God. Why are they in a state which they ⟨p. 97⟩dislike? wherefore are they not full and satisfied? why do they wish, and complain, is this God-like? But if any have a doubt hanging in their minds concerning the unity of souls with one another, or with the soul of the world, let them read what is already extant. And supposing them thereupon, distinct Beings; 1there needs no more to prove them not to be necessary, independent, uncaused ones, than their subjection to so frequent changes; their ignorance, doubts, irresolution, and gradual progress to knowledge, certainty, and stability in their purposes; their very being united with these bodies in which they have been but a little while, as we all know; whereby they undergo no small change (admitting them, to have been, pre-existent) and wherein they experience so many. Yea, whether those changes import any immutation of their very essence or no; the repugnancy being so plainly manifest of the very terms, necessary and changeable. And inasmuch as it is so evident that a necessary being can receive no accession to it self; than it must always have or keep it self, after the same manner, and in the same state; that if it be necessarily such, or such, (as we cannot conceive it to be, but we must, in our own thoughts, affix to it some determinate state or other) it must be eternally such, and ever in that particular unchanged state.
But methinks when we consider their necessitous indigent state, their wants and cravings, their pressures and groans, their grievances and complaints, we should find enough to convince us they are not the self-originate or selfsufficient being. And might even despair any thing should be plain and easie to them with whom it is a difficulty to distinguish themselves from God. Why are they in a state which they ⟨p. 97⟩dislike? wherefore are they not full and satisfied? why do they wish, and complain, is this God-like? But if any have a doubt hanging in their minds concerning the unity of souls with one another, or with the soul of the world, let them read what is already extant. And supposing them thereupon, distinct Beings; 1there needs no more to prove them not to be necessary, independent, uncaused ones, than their subjection to so frequent changes; their ignorance, doubts, irresolution, and gradual progress to knowledge, certainty, and stability in their purposes; their very being united with these bodies in which they have been but a little while, as we all know; whereby they undergo no small change (admitting them, to have been, pre-existent) and wherein they experience so many. Yea, whether those changes import any immutation of their very essence or no; the repugnancy being so plainly manifest of the very terms, necessary and changeable. And inasmuch as it is so evident that a necessary being can receive no accession to it self; than it must always have or keep it self, after the same manner, and in the same state; that if it be necessarily such, or such, (as we cannot conceive it to be, but we must, in our own thoughts, affix to it some determinate state or other) it must be eternally such, and ever in that particular unchanged state.
- 1Dr. More's Poem. Antimonopsuchia. His Immortality of the Soul. Mr. Baxter's Appendix to the Reasons of Christian Religion, &c.