Chapter 3
pp. 44–134134 passagespart 1 of 4
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CHAP. III.
Wisdom asserted to belong to this Being. The production of this world by a mighty Agent destitute of Wisdom impossible. On consideration of, 1. What would be adverse to this production. 2. What would be wanting some effects to which a designing cause will, on all hands, be confessed necessary, as having manifest characters of skill and design upon them. Absurd here to except the works of nature. Wherein at least equal characters of Wisdom and design to be seen, as in any the most confessed pieces of Art, Instanced in the frame and Motion of heavenly bodies. A mean, unphilosophical temper to be more taken with novelties than common things of greater importance. Further instance in the composition of the bodies of Animals. Two contrary causes of mens not acknowledging the Wisdom of their Maker herein. Progress is made from the consideration of the parts and frame, to powers and functions of Terrestrial Creatures. Growth, Nutrition, Propagation of kind. ⟨p. 45⟩Spontaneous motion, Sensation. The pretence considered, that the bodies of Animals are machines. 1. How improbable it is. 2. How little to the purpose. The powers of the humane soul. It appears, notwithstanding them, it had a cause; By them, a wise and intelligent cause. It is not matter. That not capable of Reason. They not here reflected on who think reasonable souls made of refined matter by the Creator. Not being matter, nor arising from thence it must have a Cause that is intelligent. 9. Goodness also belonging to this Being.
WE therefore add, That this being is 1Wise and Intelligent as well as powerful; upon the very view of this world it will appear so vast power was guided by equal wisdom in the framing of it; Though this is wont to be the principal labour in evincing the existence of a Deity, viz. the proving that this universe owes its rise to a wise and designing cause; as may be seen in Cicero's excellent performance in this kind, and in divers later Writers. Yet the placing so much of their endeavour herein, seems in great part to have proceeded hence, that this hath been chosen for the great medium to prove that it had a cause divers from it self. But if that once be done a shorter way, and it fully appear that this world is not it self a necessary Being, having the power of all the action and motion to be found in it, of it self; (which already ⟨p. 46⟩seems plain enough.) And it do most evidently thence also appear to have had a cause foreign to, or distinct from it self; though we shall not therefore the more carelessly consider this subject; yet no place of doubt seems to remain, but that this was an Intelligent cause, and that this world was the product of wisdom and counsel, and not of mere power alone. For what imagination can be more grossly absurd, than to suppose this orderly frame of things to have been the result of so mighty power, not accompanied or guided by wisdom and counsel? that is (as the case must now unavoidably be understood) that there is some being necessarily existent, of an essentially active nature, of unconceivably vast and mighty power and vigour, destitute of all understanding and knowledge, and consequently of any self-moderating-principle, but acting always by the necessity of its own nature, and therefore to its very uttermost, that raised up all the alterable matter of the universe (to whose nature it is plainly repugnant to be of it self, or exist necessarily) out of nothing; and by the utmost exertion of that ungoverned power, put all the parts and particles of that matter into a wild hurry of impetuous motion, by which they have been compacted and digested into particular beings in that variety and order which we now behold. And surely to give this account of the worlds original, is, as Cicero, speaks, not to consider, but to cast lots what to say.
WE therefore add, That this being is 1Wise and Intelligent as well as powerful; upon the very view of this world it will appear so vast power was guided by equal wisdom in the framing of it; Though this is wont to be the principal labour in evincing the existence of a Deity, viz. the proving that this universe owes its rise to a wise and designing cause; as may be seen in Cicero's excellent performance in this kind, and in divers later Writers. Yet the placing so much of their endeavour herein, seems in great part to have proceeded hence, that this hath been chosen for the great medium to prove that it had a cause divers from it self. But if that once be done a shorter way, and it fully appear that this world is not it self a necessary Being, having the power of all the action and motion to be found in it, of it self; (which already
And were as mad a supposition, As if ⟨p. 47⟩one should suppose the one and twenty Letters, formed (as the same Author elsewhere speaks) in great numbers, of Gold, or what you please else, and cast of any careless fashion together, and that of these loosely shaken out upon the ground, Ennius his Annals should result, so as to be distinctly legible, as now we see them. Nay it were the supposition of a thing a thousand fold more manifestly impossible.
2. For before we consider the gross absurdity of such a supposed production, that is, that 1a thing should be brought to pass by so mere a casualty, that so evidently requires an exquisitely formed, and continued design, even though there were nothing positively to resist or hinder it. Let it be considered what there will be that cannot but most certainly hinder any such production. To this purpose we are to consider, That it is a vast power which so generally moves the diffused matter of the Universe.
2. For before we consider the gross absurdity of such a supposed production, that is, that 1a thing should be brought to pass by so meer a casualty, that so evidently requires an exquisitely formed, and continued design, even though there were nothing positively to resist or hinder it. Let it be considered what there will be that cannot but most certainly hinder any such production. To this purpose we are to consider, That it is a vast power which so generally moves the diffused matter of the Universe.
- 1II.
Hereof make an estimate by considering what is requisite to the continual whirling about of such huge bulks as this whole massive globe of earth (according to some.) Or, which is much more strange, the Sun (according to others) with that unconceivably swift motion which this supposition makes necessary, together with the other Planets, and the innumerable heavenly Bodies besides, that are subject to the laws of a continual motion. Adding hereto how mighty power it is which must be ⟨p. 48⟩sufficient to all the productions, motions, and actions of all other things.
Hereof make an estimate by considering what is requisite to the continual whirling about of such huge bulks as this whole massie globe of earth (according to some.) Or, which is much more strange, the Sun (according to others) with that unconceiveably swift motion which this supposition makes necessary, together with the other Planets, and the innumerable heavenly Bodies besides, that are subject to the laws of a continual motion. Adding hereto how mighty power it is which must be ⟨p. 48⟩sufficient to all the productions, motions, and actions of all other things.
Again, consider that all this motion, and motive power must have some source and fountain diverse from the dull and sluggish matter moved thereby, unto which it already hath appeared impossible it should originally and essentially belong.
Next that the mighty active being which hath been proved necessarily existent, and whereto it must first belong, if we suppose it destitute of the self-moderating principle of Wisdom and Counsel, cannot but be always exerting its motive power, invariably and to the same degree: that is, to its very utmost, and can never cease or fail to do so. For its act knows no limit but that of its power (if this can have any) and its power is essential to it, and its essence is necessary.
Further that the motion imprest upon the matter of the universe must hereupon necessarily have received a continual increase, ever since it came into being.
That supposing this motive power to have been exerted from eternity, it must have been increased long ago to an infinite excess.
That hence the coalition of the particles of matter for the forming of any thing had been altogether impossible. For let us suppose this exerted motive power to have been any instant, but barely sufficient for such a formation, because that could not be dispatched in an instant, it would by its continual momently increase, ⟨p. 49⟩be grown so over-sufficient as in the next instant to dissipate the particles, but now beginning to unite.
That hence the coalition of the particles of matter for the forming of any thing had been altogether impossible. For let us suppose this exerted motive power to have been any instant, but barely sufficient for such a formation, because that could not be dispatcht in an instant, it would by its continual momently increase, ⟨p. 49⟩be grown so over-sufficient as in the next instant to dissipate the particles, but now beginning to unite.
At least it would be most apparent, that if ever such a frame of things as we now behold could have been produced; that motive power, increased to so infinite an excess, must have shattered the whole frame in pieces many an age ago; or rather never have permitted that such a thing as we call an age, could possibly have been.
At least it would be most apparent, that if ever such a frame of things as we now behold could have been produc'd; that motive power, increased to so infinite an excess, must have shattered the whole frame in pieces many an age ago; or rather never have permitted that such a thing as we call an age, could possibly have been.
Our experience gives us not to observe any so destructive or remarkable changes in the course of nature. And this (as was long ago foretold) is the great argument of the Atheistical scoffers in these latter days, that things are as they were from the beginning of the Creation to this day. But let it be soberly weighed how it is possible the general consistency which we observe things are at throughout the universe, and their steady orderly posture can stand with this momently increase of motion.
Our experience gives us not to observe any so destructive or remarkable changes in the course of nature. And this (as was long ago foretold) is the great argument of the Atheistical scoffers in these latter days, that things are as they were from the beginning of the Creation to this day. But let it be soberly weigh'd how it is possible the general consistency which we observe things are at throughout the universe, and their steady orderly posture can stand with this momently increase of motion.
And that such an increase could not (upon the supposition we are now opposing) but have been, is most evident. For, not to insist that nothing of imprest motion is ever lost, but only imparted to other things (which they that suppose it do not therefore suppose, as if they thought being once imprest it could continue of it self, but that there is a constant equal supply from the first mover) we will admit that there is a continual decrease or loss, but never to the degree of its continual increase. For we ⟨p. 50⟩see when we throw a stone out of our hand, whatever of the imprest force it do impart to the air through which it makes its way, it yet retains apart a considerable time, that carries it all the length of its journey, and all does not vanish and die away on the sudden. Therefore when we here consider the continual momently renewal of the same force, always necessarily going forth from the same mighty Agent without any moderation or restraint, every following impetus doth so immediately overtake the former, that whatever we can suppose lost, is yet so abundantly over-supplied, that upon the whole it cannot fail to be ever growing, and to have grown to that all-destroying excess before-mentioned. Whence therefore that famed restorer, and improver of some principles of the ancient Philosophy, hath seen a necessity to acknowledge it, as a manifest thing, That God himself is the universal and primary cause of all the motions that are in the 1world, who in the beginning created matter, together with motion and rest; and doth now by his ordinary concourse only, continue so much of motion and rest in it as he first put into it.—For (saith he) we understand it as a perfection in God, not only that he is unchangeable in himself, but that he works after a most constant and unchangeable manner. So that, excepting those changes, which either evident Experience, or Divine Revelation renders certain, and which we know or believe to be without change in ⟨p. 51⟩the Creator, we ought to suppose none in his Works, lest thereby any inconstancy should be argued in himself. Whereupon he grounds the laws and rules concerning motion which he afterwards lays down, whereof we referred to one a little above.
And that such an increase could not (upon the supposition we are now opposing) but have been, is most evident. For, not to insist that nothing of imprest motion is ever lost, but only imparted to other things (which they that suppose it do not therefore suppose, as if they thought being once imprest it could continue of it self, but that there is a constant equal supply from the first mover) we will admit that there is a continual decrease or loss, but never to the degree of its continual increase. For we
It is therefore evident, that as without the supposition of a self-active Being there could be no such thing as motion. So without the supposition of an Intelligent Being (that is, that the same Being be both self-active and intelligent) there could be no regular motion, such as is absolutely necessary to the forming and continuing of any the compacted bodily substances which our eyes behold every day: Yea, or of any whatsoever, suppose we their figures or shapes to be as rude, deformed, and useless, as we can imagine; much less such as the exquisite compositions, and the exact order of things in the Universe do evidently require, and discover.
And if there were no such thing carried in this supposition, as is positively adverse to the 1thing supposed, so as most certainly to hinder it (as we see plainly there is) yet the mere want of what is necessary to such a production is enough to render it impossible, and the supposition of it absurd. For it is not only absurd to suppose a production, which somewhat shall certainly resist and hinder, but which wants a cause to effect it: And it is not less absurd to suppose it effected by a manifestly insufficient and unproportionable cause, than by none at all ⟨p. 52⟩For as nothing can be produced without a cause, so no cause can work above or beyond its own capacity, and natural aptitude. Whatsoever therefore is ascribed to any cause, above and beyond its ability, all that surplusage is ascribed to no cause at all. And so an effect, in that part at least, were supposed without a cause. And if then it follow when an effect is produced that it had a cause; why doth it not equally follow, when an effect is produced, having manifest characters of wisdom and design upon it, that it had a wise and designing cause? If it be said, there be some fortuitous or casual (at least undesigned) productions that look like the effects of wisdom and contrivance, but indeed are not, as the Birds so orderly and seasonable making their Nests, the Bees their Comb, and the Spider its Web, which are capable of no design. That exception needs to be well proved before it be admitted; and that it be plainly demonstrated both that these creatures are not capable of design; and that there is not an universal designing cause, from whose directive as well as operative influence no imaginable effect or event can be exempted; (In which case it will no more be necessary that every creature that is observed steadily to work towards an end should it self design and know it, than that an Artificers tools should know what he is doing with them, but if they do not, 'tis plain he must.) And surely it lies upon them who so except, to prove in this case what they say, ⟨p. 53⟩and not be so precarious as to beg, or think us so easy as to grant so much, only because they have thought fit to say it, or would fain have it so. That is, that this or that strange event happened, without any designing cause.
And if there were no such thing carried in this supposition, as is positively adverse to the
But however I would demand of such as make this exception, whether they think there 1be any effect at all, to which a designing cause was necessary? or which they will judge impossible to have been otherwise produced than by the direction and contrivance of wisdom and counsel? I little doubt but there are thousands of things, laboured and wrought by the hand of man, concerning which they would presently, upon first sight, pronounce, they were the effects of skill, and not of chance: yea, if they only considered their frame and shape, though they yet understood not their use and end. They would surely think (at least) some effects or other sufficient to argue to us a designing cause. And would they but soberly consider and resolve, what characters or footsteps of wisdom, and design might be reckoned sufficient to put us out of doubt, would they not, upon comparing, be brought to acknowledge; there are no where any, more conspicuous and manifest; than in the things daily in view, that go ordinarily with us under the name of the works of nature? whence it is plainly consequent, that what men commonly call universal Nature, if they would be content no longer to lurk in the darkness of an obscure and uninterpreted word, they must ⟨p. 54⟩confess is nothing else but common Providence, that is the universal power which is every where active in the world, in conjunction with the unerring wisdom, which guides and moderates all its exertions and operations; or the wisdom which directs and governs that power. Otherwise when they see cause to acknowledge that such an exact order and disposition of parts, in very neat and elegant compositions, doth plainly argue wisdom and skill in the contrivance; only they will distinguish and say, it is so in the effects of art, but not of nature. What is this but to deny in particular what they granted in general? to make what they have said signify nothing, more than if they had said, such exquisite order of parts is the effect of wisdom, where it is the effect of wisdom, but it is not the effect of wisdom, where it is not the effect of wisdom? and to trifle instead of giving a reason why things are so and so? And whence take they their advantage for this trifling, or do hope to hide their folly in it; but that they think while what is meant by art is known, what is meant by nature cannot be known?
But however I would demand of such as make this exception, whether they think there
But if it be not known, how can they tell but their distinguishing members are co-incident, and run into one? yea, and if they would allow the thing it self to speak, and the effect to confess, and dictate the name of its own cause; how plain is it that they do run into one, and that the expression imports no impropriety which we somewhere find in Cicero, The art of Nature, or rather ⟨p. 55⟩that nature is nothing else but Divine Art, at least in as near an analogy as there can be, between any things Divine and Humane? For, that this matter (even the thing it self, waving for the present the consideration of names) may be a little more narrowly discussed, and searched into: Let some curious piece of workmanship be offered to such a Sceptic's view, the making whereof he did not see, nor of any thing like it, and we will suppose him not told that this was made by the hand of any man, nor that he hath any thing to guide his judgment about the way of its becoming what it is; but only his own view of the thing it self; and yet he shall presently without hesitation pronounce, This was the effect of much skill. I would here enquire why do you so pronounce? or what is the reason of this your judgment? surely he would not say he hath no reason at all, for this so confident, and unwavering determination. For then he would not be determined, but speak by chance, and be indifferent to say that or any thing else. Somewhat or other there must be that when he is asked, is this the effect of skill? shall so suddenly, and irresistibly captivate him into an assent that it is, that he cannot think otherwise. Nay, if a thousand men were asked the same question, they would as undoubtingly say the same thing? and then since there is a reason for this judgment, what can be devised to be the reason, but that there are so manifest characters and evidences of skill in the composure, as are not attributable to ⟨p. 56⟩any thing else? Now here I would further demand, is there any thing in this reason yea or no? Doth it signify any thing, or is it of any value to the purpose for which it is alleged? surely it is of very great, in as much as when it is considered, it leaves it not in a mans power to think any thing else; and what can be said more potently and efficaciously to demonstrate? But now if this reason signify any thing, it signifies thus much;
But if it be not known, how can they tell but their distinguishing members are co-incident, and run into one? yea, and if they would allow the thing it self to speak, and the effect to confess, and dictate the name of its own cause; how plain is it that they do run into one, and that the expression imports no impropriety which we somewhere find in Cicero, The art of Nature, or rather
that wheresoever there are equal characters and evidences of skill (at least where there are equal) a skilful Agent must be acknowledged. And so it will (in spite of cavil) conclude universally (and abstractly from what we can suppose distinctly signified by the terms of Art and Nature) that whatsoever effect hath such or equal characters of skill upon it, did proceed from a skilful cause. That is, that if this effect be said to be from a skilful cause, as such, (viz. as having manifest characters of skill upon it) then, every such effect (viz. that hath equally manifest characters of skill upon it) must be with equal reason concluded to be from a skilful cause.
that wheresoever there are equal characters and evidences of skill (at least where there are equal) a skilful Agent must be acknowledged. And so it will (in spight of cavil) conclude universally (and abstractly from what we can suppose distinctly signified by the terms of Art and Nature) that whatsoever effect hath such or equal characters of skill upon it, did proceed from a skilful cause. That is, that if this effect be said to be from a skilful cause, as such, (viz. as having manifest characters of skill upon it) then, every such effect (viz. that hath equally manifest characters of skill upon it) must be with equal reason concluded to be from a skilful cause.
We will acknowledge skill to act, and wit to contrive, very distinguishable things, and in reference to some works (as the making some curious automaton or self-moving Engine) are commonly lodged in divers subjects, that is the contrivance exercises the wit and invention of one, and the making, the manual dexterity and skill of others. But the manifest characters ⟨p. 57⟩of both will be seen in the effect. That is the curious elaborateness of each several part shows the later, and the order and dependence of parts, and their conspiracy to one common end, the former. Each betokens design (or at least the Smith or Carpenter must be understood to design his own part, that is, to do, as he was directed.) Both together do plainly bespeak an Agent that knew what he did. And that the thing was not done by chance, or was not the casual product, of only being busy at random, or making a careless stir without aiming at any thing. And this no man that is in his wits would upon sight of the whole frame, more doubt to assent unto, than that two and two make four. And he would certainly be thought mad, that should profess to think that only by some one's making a blustering stir among several small fragments of brass, iron, and wood, these parts happened to be thus curiously formed, and came together into this frame of their own accord.
We will acknowledge skill to act, and wit to contrive, very distinguishable things, and in reference to some works (as the making some curious automaton or self-moving Engine) are commonly lodg'd in divers subjects, that is the contrivance exercises the wit and invention of one, and the making, the manual dexterity and skill of others. But the manifest characters ⟨p. 57⟩of both will be seen in the effect. That is the curious elaborateness of each several part shews the later, and the order and dependence of parts, and their conspiracy to one common end, the former. Each betokens design (or at least the Smith or Carpenter must be understood to design his own part, that is, to do, as he was directed.) Both together do plainly bespeak an Agent that knew what he did. And that the thing was not done by chance, or was not the casual product, of only being busie at random, or making a careless stir without aiming at any thing. And this no man that is in his wits would upon sight of the whole frame, more doubt to assent unto, than that two and two make four. And he would certainly be thought mad, that should profess to think that only by some one's making a blustering stir among several small fragments of brass, iron, and wood, these parts happened to be thus curiously formed, and came together into this frame of their own accord.
Or lest this should be thought to intimate too rude a representation of their conceit, who think this world to have fallen into this frame and order wherein it is by the agitation of the moving parts or particles of matter without the direction of a wise mover; and that we may also make the case as plain as is possible to the most ordinary capacity. We will suppose (for instance) that one who had never before seen a watch, or any thing of that sort, hath now this little engine first offered to his view; ⟨p. 58⟩can we doubt, but he would upon the mere sight of its figure, structure, and the very curious workmanship which we will suppose appearing in it, presently acknowledge the Artificers hand? But if he were also made to understand the use and purpose for which it serves; and it were distinctly shown him, how each thing contributes, and all things in this little fabric, concur to this purpose, the exact measuring and dividing of time, by minutes, hours, and months, he would certainly both confess and praise the great ingenuity of the first inventer. But now if a by-stander, beholding him in this admiration, would undertake to show a profounder reach and strain of wit, and should say, Sir, you are mistaken concerning the composition of this so much admired piece; it was not made or designed by the hand or skill of any one; there were only an innumerable company of little atoms, or very small bodies, much too small to be perceived by your sense, that were busily frisking and plying to and fro about the place of its nativity; and by a strange chance (or a stranger fate, and the necessary laws of that motion which they were unavoidably put into, by a certain boisterous, undesigning mover) they fell together into this small bulk, so as to compose it into this very shape and figure, and with this same number and order of parts, which you now behold. One squadron of these busy particles (little thinking what they were about) agreeing to make up one wheel, and another, ⟨p. 59⟩some other, in that proportion which you see. Others of them also falling and becoming fixed in so happy a posture and situation as to describe the several figures by which the little moving fingers, point out the hour of the day, and day of the month.
Or lest this should be thought to intimate too rude a representation of their conceit, who think this world to have fallen into this frame and order wherein it is by the agitation of the moving parts or particles of matter without the direction of a wise mover; and that we may also make the case as plain as is possible to the most ordinary capacity. We will suppose (for instance) that one who had never before seen a watch, or any thing of that sort, hath now this little engine first offered to his view;
And all conspired to fall together, each into its own place, in so lucky a juncture, as that the regular motion failed not to ensue, which we see is now observed in it. What man is either so wise or so foolish (for it is hard to determine whether the excess or defect should best qualify him to be of this faith) as to be capable of being made believe this piece of natural history? And if one should give this account of the production of such a trifle, would he not be thought in jest? But if he persist and solemnly profess that thus he takes it to have been, would he not be thought in good earnest mad? And let but any sober reason judge whether we have not unspeakably more manifest madness to contend against in such as suppose this world, and the bodies of living creatures to have fallen into this frame and orderly disposition of parts wherein they are, without the direction of a wise and designing cause? And whether there be not an incomparably greater number of most wild and arbitrary suppositions, in their fiction, than in this? Besides the innumerable supposed repetitions of the same strange chances all the world over; even as numberless, not only as productions, but as the changes that continually happen to all the things produced. And if ⟨p. 60⟩the concourse of atoms could make this world, why not (for it is but little to mention such a thing as this) a Porch, or a Temple, or an House, or a City, (as Tully speaks in the before recited place) which were less operous and much more easy performances?
And all conspired to fall together, each into its own place, in so lucky a juncture, as that the regular motion failed not to ensue, which we see is now observed in it. What man is either so wise or so foolish (for it is hard to determine whether the excess or defect should best qualifie him to be of this faith) as to be capable of being made believe this piece of natural history? And if one should give this account of the production of such a trifle, would he not be thought in jest? But if he persist and solemnly profess that thus he takes it to have been, would he not be thought in good earnest mad? And let but any sober reason judge whether we have not unspeakably more manifest madness to contend against in such as suppose this world, and the bodies of living creatures to have fallen into this frame and orderly disposition of parts wherein they are, without the direction of a wise and designing cause? And whether there be not an incomparably greater number of most wild and arbitrary suppositions, in their fiction, than in this? Besides the innumerable supposed repetitions of the same strange chances all the world over; even as numberless, not only as productions, but as the changes that continually happen to all the things produced. And if
It is not to be supposed that all should be 1Astronomers, Anatomists, or natural Philosophers that shall read these lines. And therefore it is intended not to insist upon particulars, and to make as little use as is possible of terms, that would only be agreeable to that supposition. But surely such general easy reflections on the frame of the universe, and the order of parts in the bodies of all sorts of living creatures, as the meanest ordinary understanding is capable of, would soon discover incomparably greater evidence of wisdom, and design in the contrivance of these, than in that of a watch or a clock. And if there were any whose understandings are but of that size and measure, as to suppose that the whole frame of the heavens serves to no other purpose than to be of some such use as that to us mortals here on earth; if they would but allow themselves leisure to think and consider, might discern the most convincing and amazing discoveries of wise contrivance and design (as well as of vastest might and power) in disposing things into so apt a subserviency to that meaner end. And that so exact a knowledge is had thereby of times and seasons, days and years, as that the simplest Idiot in a Country may be able to tell you, when the light of ⟨p. 61⟩the Sun is withdrawn from his eyes, at what time it will return, and when it will look in at such a window, and when at the other. And by what degrees his days and nights shall either increase, or be diminished. And what proportion of time he shall have for his labours in this season of the year, and what in that; without the least suspicion or fear that it shall ever fall out, otherwise.
It is not to be supposed that all should be 1Astronomers, Anatomists, or natural Philosophers that shall read these lines. And therefore it is intended not to insist upon particulars, and to make as little use as is possible of terms, that would only be agreeable to that supposition. But surely such general easie reflections on the frame of the universe, and the order of parts in the bodies of all sorts of living creatures, as the meanest ordinary understanding is capable of, would soon discover incomparably greater evidence of wisdom, and design in the contrivance of these, than in that of a watch or a clock. And if there were any whose understandings are but of that size and measure, as to suppose that the whole frame of the heavens serves to no other purpose than to be of some such use as that to us mortals here on earth; if they would but allow themselves leasure to think and consider, might discern the most convincing and amazing discoveries of wise contrivance and design (as well as of vastest might and power) in disposing things into so apt a subserviency to that meaner end. And that so exact a knowledge is had thereby of times and seasons, days and years, as that the simplest Idiot in a Country may be able to tell you, when the light of
But that some in later days whose more enlarged minds have by diligent search, and artificial helps got clearer notices (even then most of the more learned of former times) concerning the true frame and vastness of the Universe, the matter, nature, and condition of the heavenly bodies, their situation, order, and laws of motion; and the great probability of their serving to nobler purposes than the greater part of learned men have ever dreamt of before; That I say any of these should have chosen it for the employment of their great intellects, to devise ways of excluding intellectual power from the contrivance of this frame of things, having so great advantages beyond the most of mankind besides, to contemplate and adore the great Author and Lord of all; is one of the greatest wonders that comes under our notice. And might tempt even a sober mind to prefer vulgar and popular ignorance before their learned philosophical deliration.
Though yet, indeed, not their Philosophy, by which they would be distinguished from the 1common sort, but what they have in common ⟨p. 62⟩with them ought in justice to bear the blame. For it is not evident, how much soever they reckon themselves exalted above the vulgar sort; that their miserable shifting in this matter proceeds only from what is most meanly so, i. e. their labouring under the most vulgar and meanest diseases of the mind, disregard of what is common, and an aptness to place more in the strangeness of new, unexpected, and surprising events, than in things unspeakably more considerable, that are of every days observation? Than which nothing argues a more abject, unphilosophical temper.
Though yet, indeed, not their Philosophy, by which they would be distinguished from the 1common sort, but what they have in common ⟨p. 62⟩with them ought in justice to bear the blame. For it is not evident, how much soever they reckon themselves exalted above the vulgar sort; that their miserable shifting in this matter proceeds only from what is most meanly so, i. e. their labouring under the most vulgar and meanest diseases of the mind, disregard of what is common, and an aptness to place more in the strangeness of new, unexpected, and surprizing events, than in things unspeakably more considerable, that are of every days observation? Than which nothing argues a more abject, unphilosophical temper.
- 1VI.
For let us but suppose (what no man can pretend is more impossible, and what any man must confess is less considerable, than what our eyes daily see) that in some part of the air, near this earth, and within such limits as that the whole Scene might be conveniently beheld at one view, there should suddenly appear a little globe of pure flaming light resembling that of the Sun, and suppose it sixth as a centre to another body, or moving about that other, as its centre (as this or that hypothesis best pleases us) which we could plainly perceive to be a proportionably-little earth, beautified with little Trees and Woods, flowery Fields, and flowing rivulets; with larger lakes into which these discharge themselves, And suppose we the other Planets all of proportionable bigness to the narrow limits assigned them, placed at their due distances, and playing about this supposed earth or Sun, so as to measure their ⟨p. 63⟩shorter, and soon absolved days, months, and years, or two, twelve, or thirty years, according to their supposed lesser circuits. Would they not presently, and with great amazement, confess an intelligent contriver and maker of this whole frame, above a Posidonius, or any mortal? And have we not in the present frame of things, a demonstration of Wisdom and Counsel, as far exceeding that which is now supposed, as the making some toy or bauble to please a child, is less an argument of wisdom, than the contrivance of somewhat that is of apparent and universal use? Or, if we could suppose this present state of things to have but newly begun, and our selves preexistent, so that we could take notice of the very passing of things out of horrid confusion into the comely order they are now in, would not this put the matter out of doubt? (And that this state had once a beginning needs not be proved over again.) But might, what would yesterday have been the effect of wisdom, better have been brought about by chance five or six thousand years, or any longer time ago? It speaks not want of evidence in the thing, but want of consideration, and of exercising our understandings, if what were new would not only convince but astonish, and what is old, of the same importance, doth not so much as convince.
For let us but suppose (what no man can pretend is more impossible, and what any man must confess is less considerable, than what our eyes daily see) that in some part of the air, near this earth, and within such limits as that the whole Scene might be conveniently beheld at one view, there should suddenly appear a little globe of pure flaming light resembling that of the Sun, and suppose it fixt as a center to another body, or moving about that other, as its centre (as this or that hypothesis best pleases us) which we could plainly perceive to be a proportionably-little earth, beautified with little Trees and Woods, flowry Fields, and flowing rivulets; with larger lakes into which these discharge themselves, And suppose we the other Planets all of proportionable bigness to the narrow limits assigned them, placed at their due distances, and playing about this supposed earth or Sun, so as to measure their
And let them that understand any thing of 1the composition of an humane body (or indeed of any living creature) but bethink themselves ⟨p. 64⟩whether there be not equal contrivance, at least, appearing in the composure of that admirable fabric, as of any the most admired machine or engine devised and made by humane wit and skill. If we pitch upon any thing of known and common use, as suppose again a Clock or Watch, which is no sooner seen than it is acknowledged (as hath been said) the effect of a designing cause; will we not confess as much of the body of a man? Yea, what comparison is there when in the structure of some one single member, as an hand, a foot, an eye, or ear, there appears, upon a diligent search, unspeakably greater curiosity, whether we consider the variety of parts, their exquisite figuration, or their apt disposition to the distinct uses and ends these members serve for, than is to be seen in any Clock or Watch? Concerning which uses of the several parts in mans body, Galen so largely discoursing in seventeen Books inserts on the by, this Epiphonema, 2upon the mention of one particular instance of our most wise Makers provident care; Unto whom (saith he) I compose these Commentaries (meaning his present work of unfolding the useful figuration of the humane body) as certain Hymns (or Songs of praise) esteeming true Piety more to consist in this, that I first may know, and then declare to others, his Wisdom, Power, Providence and Goodness, than in sacrificing to him many Hecatombs.—And in the ignorance whereof there is greatest impiety, rather than in abstaining ⟨p. 65⟩from Sacrifice. Nor (as he adds in 3the close of that excellent work) is the most perfect natural Artifice to be seen in man only, but you may find the like industrious design and wisdom of the Author, in any living creature which you shall please to dissect. And by how much the less it is, so much the greater admiration shall it raise in you, which those Artists show that describe some great thing (contractedly) in a very small space: As that person (saith he) who lately engraved Phaeton carried, in his Chariot, with his four horses, upon a little Ring. A most incredible sight! But there is nothing in matters of this nature, more strange than in the structure of the leg of a Flea? (How much more might it be said of all its inward parts?)
Therefore (as he adds) The greatest commodity of such a work, accrues not to Physicians, but to them who are studious of nature, viz. the knowledge of our Makers perfection, and that (as he had said a little above) it establishes the principle of the most perfect Theology; which Theology (saith he) is much more excellent than all Medicine.
It were too great an undertaking, and beyond the designed limits of this discourse (though it would be to excellent purpose, if it could be done without amusing terms, and in that easy, familiar way as to be capable of common use) to pursue, and trace distinctly the prints and foot-steps of the admirable Wisdom, ⟨p. 66⟩which appears in the structure and frame of this outer Temple. (For even our bodies 1themselves are said to be the Temples of the Holy Ghost.) And to dwell, a while, in the contemplation, and discovery of those numerous instances of most apparent, ungainsayable sagacity and providence which offer themselves to view in every part and particle of this fabric. How most commodiously all things are ordered in it? with how strangely cautious circumspection, and foresight, not only destructive, but even (perpetually) vexatious and afflicting incongruities are avoided and provided against? To pose our selves upon the sundry obvious questions that might be put for the evincing of such provident foresight. As for instance, how comes it to pass that the several parts which we find to be double in our bodies, are not single only? is this altogether by chance? That there are two eyes, ears, nostrils, hands, feet, &c. what a miserable shiftless creature had man been, if there had only been allowed him one foot? a seeing, hearing, talking, unmoving statue! That the hand is divided into fingers? those so conveniently situate, one in so fitly opposite a posture to the rest?
It were too great an undertaking, and beyond the designed limits of this discourse (though it would be to excellent purpose, if it could be done without amusing terms, and in that easie, familiar way as to be capable of common use) to pursue, and trace distinctly the prints and foot-steps of the admirable Wisdom, ⟨p. 66⟩which appears in the structure and frame of this outer Temple. (For even our bodies 1themselves are said to be the Temples of the Holy Ghost.) And to dwell, a while, in the contemplation, and discovery of those numerous instances of most apparent, ungainsayable sagacity and providence which offer themselves to view in every part and particle of this fabrick. How most commodiously all things are ordered in it? with how strangely cautious circumspection, and foresight, not only destructive, but even (perpetually) vexatious and afflicting incongruities are avoided and provided against? To pose our selves upon the sundry obvious questions that might be put for the evincing of such provident foresight. As for instance, how comes it to pass that the several parts which we find to be double in our bodies, are not single only? is this altogether by chance? That there are two eyes, ears, nostrils, hands, feet, &c. what a miserable shiftless creature had man been, if there had only been allow'd him one foot? a seeing, hearing, talking, unmoving statue! That the hand is divided into fingers? those so conveniently situate, one in so fitly opposite a posture to the rest?
And what if some one pair or other of these parts had been universally wanting? The hands, the feet, the eyes, the ears. How great a misery had it inferred upon mankind? and is it only a casualty that it is not so? That the back Bone is composed of so many joints ⟨p. 67⟩(twenty four, besides those of that which is the basis and sustainer of the whole) and is not all of a piece, by which stooping, or any motion of the head or neck, divers from that of the whole body, had been altogether impossible? That there is such variety and curiosity in the ways of joining the bones together in that and other parts of the body? That in some parts they are joined by mere adherence of one to another, 1either with or without an intervening medium, and both these ways so diversly. That others are fastened together by proper jointing, so as to suit, and be accompanied with motion, either more obscure, or more manifest. And this, either by a deeper, or more superficial insertion of one bone into another, or by a mutual insertion, and that so different ways. And that all these should be so exactly accommodated to the several parts and uses to which they belong and serve. Was all this without design? who that views the curious and apt texture of the eye, can think it was not made on purpose to see with, †and the ear, upon the like view, for hearing? when so many things must concur that these actions might be performed by these organs, and are found to do so? Or who can think that the sundry little engines belonging to the eye were not made with design to move it upwards, downwards, to this side, or ⟨p. 68⟩that, or whirl it about, as there should be occasion; without which instruments, and their appendages, no such motion could have been? who, that is not stupidly perverse, can think that the sundry inward parts (which it would require a volume distinctly to speak of, and but to mention them and their uses would too unproportionably swell this part of this Discourse) were not made, purposely, by a designing Agent, for the ends they so aptly and constantly serve for; the want of some one among divers whereof, or but a little misplacing, or if things had been but a little otherwise than they are, had inferred an impossibility, that such a creature as man could have subsisted, or been propagated upon the face of the earth.
As what if there had not been such a receptacle prepared as the stomach is, and so formed, and placed as it is, to receive and digest necessary nutriment? Had not the whole frame of man 1besides been in vain? Or what if the passage from it downward, had not been made somewhat, a little way, ascending, so as to detain a convenient time what is received, but that what was taken in were suddenly transmitted? it is evident the whole structure had been ruined as soon as made. What (to instance in what seems so small a matter) if that little cover had been wanting at the entrance of that passage through which we breath? (the depression whereof by the weight of what we eat or drink shuts it, and prevents meat and drink from going down that way) had not unavoidable suffocation ⟨p. 69⟩ensued? And who can number the instances that might be given besides? Now when there is a concurrence of so many things absolutely necessary (concerning which the common saying is as applicable, more frequently wont to be applied to matters of morality, Goodness is from the concurrence of all causes, evil from any defect) each so aptly and opportunely serving its own proper use, and all, one common end: Certainly to say that so manifold, so regular, and stated a subserviency to that end, and the end it self were undesigned, and things casually fell out thus, is to say we know or care not what.
As what if there had not been such a receptacle prepared as the stomach is, and so formed, and placed as it is, to receive and digest necessary nutriment? Had not the whole frame of man 1besides been in vain? Or what if the passage from it downward, had not been made somewhat, a little way, ascending, so as to detain a convenient time what is received, but that what was taken in were suddenly transmitted? it is evident the whole structure had been ruin'd as soon as made. What (to instance in what seems so small a matter) if that little cover had been wanting at the entrance of that passage through which we breath? (the depression whereof by the weight of what we eat or drink shuts it, and prevents meat and drink from going down that way) had not unavoidable suffocation ⟨p. 69⟩ensued? And who can number the instances that might be given besides? Now when there is a concurrence of so many things absolutely necessary (concerning which the common saying is as applicable, more frequently wont to be applied to matters of morality, Goodness is from the concurrence of all causes, evil from any defect) each so aptly and opportunely serving its own proper use, and all, one common end: Certainly to say that so manifold, so regular, and stated a subserviency to that end, and the end it self were undesigned, and things casually fell out thus, is to say we know or care not what.
We will only before we close this consideration, concerning the mere frame of an humane body (which hath been so hastily and superficially proposed) offer a supposition which is no more strange (excluding the vulgar notion by which nothing is strange, but what is not common) than the thing it self as it actually is, viz. That the whole more external covering of the body of a man were made, instead of skin, and flesh, of some very transparent substance, flexible, but clear as very Crystal; through which and the other more inward (and as transparent) integuments or unfoldings, we could plainly perceive the situation and order of all the internal parts, and how they each of them perform their distinct offices. If we could discern the continual motion of the blood, how it is conveyed by its proper conduits from its first source and fountain, ⟨p. 70⟩partly downwards to the lower entrails (if rather it ascend not from thence, as at least what afterwards becomes blood doth) partly upwards, to its admirable elaboratory, the heart: where it is refined and furnished with fresh vital spirits, and so transmitted thence by the distinct vessels prepared for this purpose; could we perceive the curious contrivance of those little doors by which it is let in and out, on this side and on that; the order and course of its circulation, its most commodious distribution, by two social channels, or conduit-pipes that every where accompany one another throughout the body. Could we discern the curious artifice of the brain its ways of purgation; and were it possible to pry into the secret chambers & receptacles of the less or more pure spirits there; perceive their manifold conveyances, and the rare texture of that net commonly called the wonderful one. Could we behold the veins, arteries, and nerves, all of them arising from their proper and distinct originals; and their orderly dispersion for the most part by pairs and conjugations on this side and that, from the middle of the back, with the curiously wrought branches, which supposing these to appear duly diversified, as so many more duskish strokes in this transparent frame, they would be found to make throughout the whole of it, were every smaller fibre thus made at once discernible; especially those innumerable threads into which the spinal marrow is distributed at the bottom of the back:
We will only before we close this consideration, concerning the meer frame of an humane body (which hath been so hastily and superficially proposed) offer a supposition which is no more strange (excluding the vulgar notion by which nothing is strange, but what is not common) than the thing it self as it actually is, viz. That the whole more external covering of the body of a man were made, instead of skin, and flesh, of some very transparent substance, flexible, but clear as very Crystal; through which and the other more inward (and as transparent) integuments or unfoldings, we could plainly perceive the situation and order of all the internal parts, and how they each of them perform their distinct offices. If we could discern the continual motion of the blood, how it is conveyed by its proper conduits from its first source and fountain,
and could we through the same medium perceive ⟨p. 71⟩those numerous little machines made to serve unto voluntary motions (which in the whole body are computed by some to the number 1of four hundred and thirty, or thereabouts, or so many of them as according to the present supposition could possibly come in view) and discern their composition; their various and elegant figures, round, square, long, triangular, &c. and behold them do their offices, and see how they ply to and fro, and work in their respective places, as any motion is to be performed by them. Were all these things, I say, thus made liable to an easy and distinct view; who would not admiringly cry out, how fearfully and wonderfully am I made? And sure there is no man sober, who would not upon such a sight pronounce that man mad that should suppose such a production to have been a mere undesigned casualty. At least if there be any thing in the world, that may be thought to carry sufficiently convincing evidences in it of its having been made industriously, and on purpose, not by chance, would not this composition, thus offered to view, be esteemed to do so much more? Yea, and if it it did only bear upon it characters equally evidential of wisdom and design, with what doth certainly so, though in the lowest degree, it were sufficient to evince our present purpose. For if one such instance as this would bring the matter no higher than to a bare equality, that would at least argue a maker of man's body, as wise, and as properly designing as the ⟨p. 72⟩Artificer of any such slighter piece of workmanship, that may yet, certainly, be concluded the effect of skill and design. And then enough might be said from other instances to manifest him unspeakably superior. And that the matter would be brought, at least, to an equality upon the supposition now made, there can be no doubt, if any one be judge that hath not abjured his understanding and his eyes together. And what then, if we Jay aside that supposition (which only somewhat gratifies fancy and imagination) doth that alter the case? or is there the less of wisdom and contrivance expressed in this work of forming mans body, only for that it is not so easily and suddenly obvious to our sight?
and could we through the same medium perceive ⟨p. 71⟩
Then we might with the same reason say concerning some curious piece of carved work, that is thought fit to be kept locked up in a Cabinet, when we see it, that there was admirable workmanship shown in doing it; but as soon as it is again shut up in its repository, that there was none at all. Inasmuch as we speak of the objective characters of wisdom and design that are in the thing it self (though they must some way or other come under our notice, otherwise we can be capable of arguing nothing from them, yet) since we have sufficient assurance, that there really are such characters in the structure of the body of man, as have been mentioned, and a thousand more than have been thought necessary to be mentioned here: It is plain that the greater or less facility of finding them out; so that we ⟨p. 73⟩be at a certainty that they are, (Whether by the slower and more gradual search of our own eyes; or by relying upon the testimony of such as have purchased themselves that satisfaction, by their own labour and diligence) is merely accidental to the thing it self we are discoursing of: And neither adds to, nor detracts from the rational evidence of the present argument. Or if it do either, the more abstruse paths of Divine Wisdom in this (as in other things) do rather recommend it the more to our adoration and reverence, than if every thing were obvious, and lay open to the first glance of a more careless eye. The things which we are sure (or may be, if we do not shut our eyes) the wise Maker of this world hath done, do sufficiently serve to assure us that he could have done this also, that is, have made everything in the frame and shape of our bodies conspicuous in the way but now supposed, if he had thought it fit. He hath done greater things. And since he hath not thought that fit, we may be bold to say the doing of it would signify more trifling, and less design. It gives us a more amiable and comely representation of the Being we are treating of, that his works are less for ostentation than use. And that his Wisdom and other Attributes appear in them rather to the instruction of sober, than the gratification of vain minds.
Then we might with the same reason say concerning some curious piece of carved work, that is thought fit to be kept lock'd up in a Cabinet, when we see it, that there was admirable workmanship shewn in doing it; but as soon as it is again shut up in its repository, that there was none at all. Inasmuch as we speak of the objective characters of wisdom and design that are in the thing it self (though they must some way or other come under our notice, otherwise we can be capable of arguing nothing from them, yet) since we have sufficient assurance, that there really are svch characters in the structure of the body of man, as have been mentioned, and a thousand more than have been thought necessary to be mentioned here: It is plain that the greater or less facility of finding them out; so that we
We may therefore confidently conclude that the figuration of the humane body carries with it, as manifest unquestionable evidences ⟨p. 74⟩of design, as any piece of humane artifice, that most confessedly in the judgment of any man doth so. And therefore, had, as certainly, a designing cause. We may challenge the world to show a disparity; unless it be that the advantage is unconceivably great on our side. For would not any one that hath not abandoned at once both his reason and his modesty, be ashamed to confess and admire the skill that is shown in making a Statue, or the picture of a man, that (as one ingeniously says) is but the shadow of his skin, and deny the wisdom that 1appears in the composure of his body it self, that contains so numerous and so various engines and instruments for sundry purposes in it, as that it is become an art, and a very laudable one, but to discover and find out the art and skill that is shown in the contrivance and formation of them.
We may therefore confidently conclude that the figuration of the humane body carries with it, as manifest unquestionable evidences ⟨p. 74⟩of design, as any piece of humane artifice, that most confessedly in the judgment of any man doth so. And therefore, had, as certainly, a designing cause. We may challenge the world to shew a disparity; unless it be that the advantage is unconceivably great on our side. For would not any one that hath not abandon'd at once both his reason and his modesty, be asham'd to confess and admire the skill that is shewn in making a Statue, or the picture of a man, that (as one ingeniously says) is but the shadow of his skin, and deny the wisdom that 1appears in the composure of his body it self, that contains so numerous and so various engines and instruments for sundry purposes in it, as that it is become an art, and a very laudable one, but to discover and find out the art and skill that is shewn in the contrivance and formation of them.
- 1Parker Tentam. Physico-Theolog.
It is in the mean time strange to consider from how different and contrary causes it proceeds, 1that the wise contriver of this fabric hath not his due acknowledgements on the account of it. For with some it proceeds from their supine and drowsy ignorance, and that they little know or think what prints and foot-steps of a Deity they carry about them, in their bone and flesh, in every part and vein and limb. With others (as if too much learning had made them mad, or an excess of light had struck them into a mopish blindness) these things are▪ so well known, and seem so common and obvious that they are the less regarded. ⟨p. 75⟩And because they can give a very punctual account that things are so, they think it, now, not worth the considering how they come to be so. They can trace all these hidden paths and footsteps, and therefore all seems very easy; and they give over wondering. As they that would detract from Columbus's acquist of glory by the discovery he had made of America; by pretending the achievement was easy; whom 2he ingeniously rebuked, by challenging them to make an egg stand erect, alone, upon a plain table; which when none of them could do, he only by a gentle bruising of one end of it, makes it stand on the table without other support, and then tells them this was more easy than his Voyage into America, now they had seen it done; before, they knew not how to go about it. Some may think the contrivance of the body of a man, or other animal, easy, now they know it; but had they been to project such a model without a pattern, or any thing leading thereto; how miserable a loss had they been at? How easy a confession had been drawn from them of the finger of God; and how silent a submission to his just triumph over their, and all humane wit! when as the most admired performances in this kind by any mortal have been only faint and infinitely distant imitations of the works of God. As is to be seen in the so much celebrated exploits of Posidonius, Regiomontanus, and others of this sort.
It is in the mean time strange to consider from how different and contrary causes it proceeds, 1that the wise contriver of this fabrick hath not his due acknowledgments on the account of it. For with some it proceeds from their supine and drowsie ignorance, and that they little know or think what prints and foot-steps of a Deity they carry about them, in their bone and flesh, in every part and vein and limb. With others (as if too much learning had made them mad, or an excess of light had struck them into a mopish blindness) these things are so well known, and seem so common and obvious that they are the less regarded.
And now if any should be either so incurably ⟨p. 76⟩1blind as not to perceive, or so perversely wilful as not to acknowledge an appearance of Wisdom in the frame and figuration of the body of an animal (peculiarly of man) more than equal to what appears in any the most exquisite piece of humane artifice, and which no wit of man can ever fully imitate; although as hath been said an acknowledged equality would suffice to evince a wise maker thereof; yet because it is the existence of God we are now speaking of; and that it is therefore not enough to evince, but to magnify the wisdom we would ascribe to him: we shall pass from the parts and frame to the consideration of the more principal powers and functions of terrestrial creatures; ascending from such as agree to the less perfect orders of these, to those of the more perfect, viz. of man himself. And surely to have been the Author of faculties that shall enable to such functions, will evidence a wisdom that defies our imitation, and will dismay the attempt of it.
And now if any should be either so incurably ⟨p. 76⟩1blind as not to perceive, or so perversly wilful as not to acknowledge an appearance of Wisdom in the frame and figuration of the body of an animal (peculiarly of man) more than equal to what appears in any the most exquisite piece of humane artifice, and which no wit of man can ever fully imitate; although as hath been said an acknowledg'd equality would suffice to evince a wise maker thereof; yet because it is the existence of God we are now speaking of; and that it is therefore not enough to evince, but to magnifie the wisdom we would ascribe to him: we shall pass from the parts and frame to the consideration of the more principal powers and functions of terrestrial creatures; ascending from such as agree to the less perfect orders of these, to those of the more perfect, viz. of man himself. And surely to have been the Author of faculties that shall enable to such functions, will evidence a wisdom that defies our imitation, and will dismay the attempt of it.
- 1IX.
We begin with that of growth. Many sorts of rare engines we acknowledge contrived by the wit of man, but who hath ever made one that could grow? or that had in it a self-improving power? A tree, an herb, a pile of grass may upon this account challenge all the world to make such a thing. That is to implant the power of growing into any thing to which it doth not natively belong, or to make a thing to which it doth.
By what art would they make a seed? and ⟨p. 77⟩which way would they inspire it with a seminal form? And they that think this whole globe of the earth was compacted by the casual (or fatal) coalition of particles of matter, by what magic would they conjure so many to come together as should make one clod? we vainly hunt with a lingering mind after Miracles, if we did not (more vainly) mean by them nothing else but novelties, we are compassed about with such. And the greatest miracle is, that we see them not. You with whom the daily productions of nature (as you call it) are so cheap, see if you can do the like. Try your skill upon a Rose. Yea, but you must have pre-existent matter? But can you ever prove the Maker of the world had so? or even defend the possibility of uncreated matter? And suppose they had the free grant of all the matter between the crown of their head and the Moon, could they tell what to do with it? or how to manage it, so as to make it yield them one single flower, that they might glory in as their own production?
By what art would they make a seed? and ⟨p. 77⟩which way would they inspire it with a seminal form? And they that think this whole globe of the earth was compacted by the casual (or fatal) coalition of particles of matter, by what magick would they conjure so many to come together as should make one clod? we vainly hunt with a lingering mind after Miracles, if we did not (more vainly) mean by them nothing else but novelties, we are compass'd about with such. And the greatest miracle is, that we see them not. You with whom the daily productions of nature (as you call it) are so cheap, see if you can do the like. Try your skill upon a Rose. Yea, but you must have pre-existent matter? But can you ever prove the Maker of the world had so? or even defend the possibility of uncreated matter? And suppose they had the free grant of all the matter between the crown of their head and the Moon, could they tell what to do with it? or how to manage it, so as to make it yield them one single flower, that they might glory in as their own production?
And what mortal man that hath reason enough about him to be serious, and to think a while, would not even be amazed at the Miracle of Nutrition? or that there are things in the world capable of nourishment, or who would attempt an imitation here? or not despair to perform any thing like it. That is to make any nourishable thing? Are we not here infinitely out-done? Do not we see our selves compassed about with wonders, and are we ⟨p. 78⟩not cur selves such, in that we see, and are creatures from all whose parts there is a continual defluxion, and yet that receive a constant gradual supply and renovation by which they are continued in the same state! As the Bush burning, but not consumed. 'Tis easy to give an artificial frame to a thing that shall gradually decay and wast, till it quite be gone and disappear. You can raise a structure of Snow that would soon do that. But can your manual skill compose a thing that like our bodies shall be continually melting away, and be continually repaired through so long a tract of time? Nay, but you can tell how it is done, you know in what method, and by what instruments food is received, concocted, separated, and so much as must serve for nourishment turned into chyle, and that into blood, first grosser, and then more refined, and that distributed into all parts for this purpose. Yea, and what then? therefore you are as wise as your Maker? could you have made such a thing as the stomach, a liver, an heart, a vein, an artery? or are you so very sure what the digestive quality is? or if you are, and know what things best serve to maintain, to repair, or strengthen it, who implanted that quality? both where it is so immediately useful, or in the other things you would use for the service of that? or how, if such things had not been prepared to your hand, would you have devised to persuade the particles of matter into so useful and happy a conjuncture, as that such a quality might result? ⟨p. 79⟩or (to speak more suitably to the most) How, if you had not been shown the way, would you have thought it were to be done, or which way would you have gone to work, to turn meat and drink into flesh and blood?
And what mortal man that hath reason enough about him to be serious, and to think a while, would not even be amaz'd at the Miracle of Nutrition? or that there are things in the world capable of nourishment, or who would attempt an imitation here? or not despair to perform any thing like it. That is to make any nourishable thing? Are we not here infinitely out-done? Do not we see our selves compass'd about with wonders, and are we