Chapter 3
pp. 44–134134 passagespart 2 of 4
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Nor is propagation of their own kind by the creatures that have that faculty implanted in them, less admirable, or more possible to be imitated by any humane device. Such productions stay in their first descent. Who can by his own contrivance find out a way of making any thing that can produce-another like it self. What machine did ever man invent that had this power? And the ways and means by which it is done, are such (though he that can do all things well knew how to compass his ends by them) as do exceed not our understanding only, but our wonder.
And what shall we say of spontaneous motion wherewith we find also creatures endowed that are so mean and despicable in our eyes (as well as our selves) that is, that so silly a thing as a fly, a gnat, &c. should have a power in it to move it self, or stop its own motion, at its own pleasure! How far have all attempted imitations in this kind fallen short of this perfection? and how much more excellent a thing is the smallest and most contemptible insect, than the most admired machine we ever heard or read of (as Archytas Tarintinus his Dove so anciently celebrated, or more lately Regiomontanus his Fly, or his Eagle, or any the like.) Not only as having this peculiar power above ⟨p. 80⟩any thing of this sort, but as having the sundry other powers besides meeting in it, whereof these are wholly destitute.
And what shall we say of spontaneous motion wherewith we find also creatures endowed that are so mean and despicable in our eyes (as well as our selves) that is, that so silly a thing as a fly, a gnat, &c. should have a power in it to move it self, or stop its own motion, at its own pleasure! How far have all attempted imitations in this kind fallen short of this perfection? and how much more excellent a thing is the smallest and most contemptible insect, than the most admired machine we ever heard or read of (as Archytas Tarintinus his Dove so anciently celebrated, or more lately Regiomontanus his Fly, or his Eagle, or any the like.) Not only as having this peculiar power above ⟨p. 80⟩any thing of this sort, but as having the sundry other powers besides meeting in it, whereof these are wholy destitute.
And should we go on to instance further in the several powers of sensation, both external and internal, the various instincts, appetitions, passions, sympathies, antipathies, the powers of memory, and (we might add) of speech, that we find the inferior orders of creatures, either necessarily furnished with, or some of them as to this last disposed unto. How should we even over-do the present business? and too needlessly insult over humane wit (which we must suppose to have already yielded the cause) in challenging it to produce and offer to view, an hearing, seeing-engine, that can imagine, talk, is capable of hunger, thirst, of desire, anger, fear, grief, &c. as its own creature, concerning which it may glory and say, I have done this?
And should we go on to instance further in the several powers of sensation, both external and internal, the various instincts, appetitions, passions, sympathies, antipathies, the powers of memory, and (we might add) of speech, that we find the inferiour orders of creatures, either necessarily furnish'd with, or some of them as to this last dispos'd unto. How should we even over-do the present business? and too needlesly insult over humane wit (which we must suppose to have already yeilded the cause) in challenging it to produce and offer to view, an hearing, seeing-engine, that can imagine, talk, is capable of hunger, thirst, of desire, anger, fear, grief, &c. as its own creature, concerning which it may glory and say, I have done this?
Is it so admirable a performance, and so ungainsayable an evidence of skill and wisdom, with much labour and long travel of mind, a busy, restless, agitation of working thoughts, the often renewal of frustrated attempts, the varying of defeated trials; this way and that, at length to hit upon, and by much pains, and with a slow gradual progress, by the use of who can tell how many sundry sorts of instruments or tools, managed by more (possibly) than a few hands, by long hewing, hammering, turning, filing, to compose one only single machine of such a frame and structure, as that ⟨p. 81⟩by the frequent re-enforcement of a skilful hand, it may be capable of some (and that, otherwise, but a very short-lived) motion: And is it no argument, or effect of wisdom so easily and certainly, without labour, error, or disappointment to frame both so infinite a variety of kinds, and so innumerable individuals of every such kind of living creatures, that cannot only with the greatest facility move themselves with so many sorts of motion, downwards, upwards (many of them) to, and fro, this way or that, with a progressive, or circular, a swifter or a slower motion at their own pleasure, but can also grow, propagate, see, hear, desire, joy, &c. Is this no work of wisdom, but only blind either, fate or chance? of how strangely perverse and odd a complexion is that understanding (if yet it may be called an understanding) that can make this judgment!
Is it so admirable a performance, and so ungainsayable an evidence of skill and wisdom, with much labour and long travel of mind, a busie, restless, agitation of working thoughts, the often renewal of frustrated attempts, the varying of defeated trials; this way and that, at length to hit upon, and by much pains, and with a slow gradual progress, by the use of who can tell how many sundry sorts of instruments or tools, managed by more (possibly) than a few hands, by long hewing, hammering, turning, filing, to compose one only single machine of such a frame and structure, as that ⟨p. 81⟩by the frequent re-inforcement of a skilful hand, it may be capable of some (and that, otherwise, but a very short-liv'd) motion: And is it no argument, or effect of wisdom so easily and certainly, without labour, error, or disappointment to frame both so infinite a variety of kinds, and so innumerable individuals of every such kind of living creatures, that cannot only with the greatest facility move themselves with so many sorts of motion, downwards, upwards (many of them) to, and fro, this way or that, with a progressive, or circular, a swifter or a slower motion at their own pleasure, but can also grow, propagate, see, hear, desire, joy, &c. Is this no work of wisdom, but only blind either, fate or chance? of how strangely perverse and odd a complexion is that understanding (if yet it may be called an understanding) that can make this judgment!
And they think they have found out a rare knack, and that gives a great relief to their 1diseased minds, who have learned to call the bodies of living creatures (even the humane not excepted) by way of diminution machines or engines too.
And they think they have found out a rare knack, and that gives a great relief to their 1diseased minds, who have learn'd to call the bodies of living creatures (even the humane not excepted) by way of diminution machines or engines too.
- 1X.
But how little cause there is to hug or be fond of this fancy would plainly appear,
But how little cause there is to hug or be fond of this fansie would plainly appear,
If first, we would allow our selves leisure to examine with how small pretence this appellation is so placed, and applied. And next if it be applied rightly, to how little purpose it is alleged, or that it signifies nothing to the exclusion of divine wisdom from the formation of them.
If first, we would allow our selves leasure to examine with how small pretence this appellation is so placed, and applied. And next if it be applied rightly, to how little purpose it is alledg'd, or that it signifies nothing to the exclusion of divine wisdom from the formation of them.
And for the first, because we know not a better, let it be considered how defective and unsatisfying the account is, which the great and (justly admired) master in this faculty, 1gives, how divers of those things which he would have to be so, are performed only in the mechanical way.
- 1D. Cartes de passionibus animae. part. 1. atque alibi.
For though his ingenuity must be acknowledged in his modest exception of some nobler operations belonging to our selves from coming under those rigid necessitating laws, yet certainly to the severe enquiry of one not partially addicted to the sentiments of so great a wit because they were his, it would appear there are great defects, and many things yet wanting, in the account which is given us of some of the meaner of those functions which he would attribute only to organized matter, or (to use his own expression) to the conformation of the members of the body, and the course of the spirits excited by the heat of the heart, &c.
For though his ingenuity must be acknowledged in his modest exception of some nobler operations belonging to our selves from coming under those rigid necessitating laws, yet certainly to the severe enquiry of one not partially addicted to the sentiments of so great a wit because they were his, it would appear there are great defects, and many things yet wanting, in the account which is given us of some of the meaner of those functions which he would attribute only to organiz'd matter, or (to use his own expression) to the conformation of the members of the body, and the course of the spirits excited by the heat of the heart, &c.
For howsoever accurately he describes the instruments and the way, his account seems very little satisfying of the principle, either of spontaneous motion, or of sensation.
As to the former, though it be very apparent that the muscles seated in that opposite posture wherein they are mostly found paired throughout the body, the nerves, and the animal spirits in the brain, and (suppose we) that glandule seated in the inmost parts of it, are the instruments of the motion of the limbs, and the ⟨p. 83⟩whole body; yet what are all these to the prime causation or much more, to the spontaneity of this motion? And whereas, with us (who are acknowledged to have such a faculty independent on the body) an act of will doth so manifestly contribute, so that, when we will our body is moved with so admirable facility, and we feel not the cumbersome weight of an arm to be lift up, or of our whole corporeal bulk to be moved this way or that, by a slower or swifter motion. Yea, and when as also, if we will, we can on the sudden in a very instant start up out of the most composed sedentary posture, and put our selves, upon occasion, into the most violent course of motion or action. But if we have no such will, though we have the same agile spirits about us, we find no difficulty to keep in a posture of rest; and are, for the most part, not sensible of any endeavour or urgency of those active particles, as if they were hardly to be restrained from putting us into motion; and against a reluctant act of our will, we are not moved but with great difficulty to them that will give themselves and us the trouble. This being, I say, the case with us; and it being also obvious to our observation, that it is so very much alike in these mentioned respects, with brute creatures, how unconceivable is it that the directive principle of their motions and ours should be so vastly, and altogether unlike? (whatsoever greater perfection is required with us, as to those more noble and perfect functions and operations which are ⟨p. 84⟩found to belong to us,) That is, that in us, an act of will should signify so very much, and be for the most part necessary to the beginning, the continuing, the stopping, or the varying of our motions; and in them, nothing like it, nor any thing else, besides only that corporal principle, 1which he assigns as common to them and us, the continual heat in the heart (which he calls a sort of fire) nourished by the blood of the veins;
As to the former, though it be very apparent that the muscles seated in that opposite posture wherein they are mostly found paired throughout the body, the nerves, and the animal spirits in the brain, and (suppose we) that glandule seated in the inmost parts of it, are the instruments of the motion of the limbs, and the
the instruments of motion, already mentioned, and the various representations and impressions of external objects as there and elsewhere he expresses himself! upon 1which last (though much is undoubtedly to be attributed to it) that so main a stress should be laid as to the diversifying of motion seems strange; when we may observe so various motions of some silly creatures, as of a fly in our window, while we cannot perceive, and can scarce imagine any change in external objects about them: yea, a swarm of flies, so variously frisking, and plying to and fro, some this way, others that; with a thousand diversities and interferings in their motion: and some resting while things are in the same state externally to them all. So that what should cause or cease, or so strangely vary such motions, is, from thence, or any thing else he hath said, left unimaginable. As it is much more, how, in creatures of much strength, as a Bear or a Lion, a paw should be moved sometimes so gently, and sometimes with so mighty force, only by mere mechanism, without any directive principle ⟨p. 85⟩that is not altogether corporal. But most of all how the strange regularity of motion in some creatures, as of the Spider in making its web, and the like should be owing to no other than such causes as he hath assigned of the motions in general of brute creatures. And what though some motions of our own seem wholly involuntary (as that of our eye-lids, in the case which he supposes) doth it therefore follow 2they must proceed from a principle only corporal? as if our soul had no other act belonging to it, but that of willing? which he doth not down-right say; but that it is its only, or its chief act; and if it be its chief act only, what hinders but that such a motion may proceed from an act that is not chief? or that it may have a power that may sometimes step forth into act (and in greater matters than that) without any formal deliberated command or direction of our will. So little reason is there to conclude that all our motions common to us with beasts, or even their motions themselves depend on nothing else than 3the conformation of the members, and the course which the spirits, excited by the heat of the heart, do naturally follow, in the brain, the nerves, and the muscles, after the same manner with the motion of an automation, &c.
But as to the matter of sensation, his account seems much more defective and unintelligible, that is, how it should be performed (as he supposes every thing common to us with beasts may be) without a soul. For, admit that it be ⟨p. 86⟩(as who doubts but it is) by the instruments which he assigns, we are still to seek what is the sentient, or what useth these instruments, and doth sentire, or exercise sense by them? That is, suppose it be performed in the brain, and that (as he says) by the help of the nerves, 1which from thence like small strings are stretched forth unto all the other members; suppose we have the three things to consider in the nerves which he recites; Their interior 2substance, which extends it self like very slender threads from the brain to the extremities of all the other members into which they are knit. The very thin little skins which enclose these, and which being continued with those that inwrap the brain do compose the little pipes which contain these threads; and lastly, the animal spirits which are conveyed down from the brain through these pipes. Yet which of these is most subservient unto sense? That he undertakes elsewhere to declare, viz. that we 3are not to think (which we also suppose) some nerves to serve for sense, others for motion only, as some have thought, but that the enclosed spirits serve for the motion of the members, and those little threads (also enclosed) for sense. Are we yet any nearer our purpose? Do these small threads sentire? are these the things that ultimately receive and discern the various impressions of objects? And since they are all of one sort of substance, how comes it to pass that some of them are seeing threads, others hearing threads, others tasting, &c. Is it from the divers ⟨p. 87⟩and commodious figuration of the organs unto which these descend from the brain? But though we acknowledge and admire the curious and exquisite formation of those organs, and their most apt usefulness (as organs or instruments) to the purposes for which they are designed; yet what do they signify without a proportionably apt and able agent to use them, or percipient to entertain and judge of the several notices which by them are only transmitted from external things?
That is, suppose we a drop of never so pure and transparent liquor, or let it be three, diversly tinctured or coloured, and (lest they mingle) kept asunder by their distinct infolding coats, let these encompass one the other, and, together, compose one little shining globe: are we satisfied that now this curious pretty ball can see? nay, suppose we it never so conveniently situate, suppose we the forementioned strings fastened to it, and these, being hollow, well replenished with as pure air, or wind, or gentle flame as you can imagine; yea, and all the before described little threads to boot, can it yet do the feat? nay, suppose we all things else to concur, that we can suppose, except a living principle (call that by what name you will) and is it not still as uncapable of the act of seeing, as a ball of clay, or a pebble stone? or can the substance of the brain it self perform that or any other act of sense (for it is superfluous to speak distinctly of the rest) any more than the pulp of an apple, or a dish of curds? So that trace this matter ⟨p. 88⟩whither you will within the compass of your assigned limits, and you are still at the same loss, range through the whole body and what can you find but flesh, and bones, marrow, and blood, strings and threads, humour and vapour; and which of these is capable of sense? These are your materials and such like, order them as you will, put them into what method you can devise, and except you can make it live, you cannot make it so much as feel, much less perform all other acts of sense besides, unto which these tools alone seem as unproportionable as a plough-share to the most curious sculpture, or a pair of tongs to the most melodious music.
That is, suppose we a drop of never so pure and transparent liquor, or let it be three, diversly tinctured or coloured, and (lest they mingle) kept asunder by their distinct infolding coats, let these encompass one the other, and, together, compose one little shining globe: are we satisfied that now this curious pretty ball can see? nay, suppose we it never so conveniently situate, suppose we the forementioned strings fastned to it, and these, being hollow, well replenisht with as pure air, or wind, or gentle flame as you can imagine; yea, and all the before described little threds to boot, can it yet do the feat? nay, suppose we all things else to concur, that we can suppose, except a living principle (call that by what name you will) and is it not still as uncapable of the act of seeing, as a ball of clay, or a pebble stone? or can the substance of the brain it self perform that or any other act of sense (for it is superfluous to speak distinctly of the rest) any more than the pulp of an apple, or a dish of curds? So that trace this matter
But how much more unconceivable it is that the figuration and concurrence of the forementioned organs can alone suffice to produce the several passions of love, fear, anger, &c. whereof we find so evident indications in brute creatures, it is enough but to hint. And (but that all persons do not read the same Books) it were altogether unnecessary to have said so much; after so plain demonstration already extant that matter, howsoever modified, is uncapable of sense.1
But how much more unconceivable it is that the figuration and concurrence of the foremention'd organs can alone suffice to produce the several passions of love, fear, anger, &c. whereof we find so evident indications in brute creatures, it is enough but to hint. And (but that all persons do not read the same Books) it were altogether unnecessary to have said so much; after so plain demonstration already extant that matter, howsoever modified, is uncapable of sense.1
- 1In Doctor More's Immortality of the Soul.
Nor would it seem necessary to attempt any thing in this kind, in particular and direct opposition to the very peculiar sentiments of this most ingenious Author (as he will undoubtedly be reckoned in all succeeding time) who when he undertakes to show what sense is, and how it is performed, makes it the proper ⟨p. 89⟩business of the Soul, comprehends it under the name of Cogitation, naming himself a thinking 1thing, adds by way of question, what is that? and answers, a thing doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, nilling, and also imagining, and exercising sense, says expressly it is evident to all that it is the Soul that exercises 2sense, not the body, in as direct words as 3the so much celebrated Poet of old. The only wonder is that under this general name of Cogitation he denies it unto Brutes; under which name he may be thought less fitly to have included it, than to have affirmed them uncapable of any thing to which that name ought to be applied, as he doth not only affirm, but esteems himself by most firm reasons to have proved.*
Nor would it seem necessary to attempt any thing in this kind, in particular and direct opposition to the very peculiar sentiments of this most ingenious Author (as he will undoubtedly be reckon'd in all succeeding time) who when he undertakes to shew what sense is, and how it is performed, makes it the proper ⟨p. 89⟩business of the Soul, comprehends it under the name of Cogitation, naming himself a thinking 1thing, adds by way of question, what is that? and answers, a thing doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, nilling, and also imagining, and exercising sense, says expresly it is evident to all that it is the Soul that exercises 2sense, not the body, in as direct words as
And yet that particular reason seems a great deal more pious, than it is cogent; which he gives for his choosing this particular way of differencing brutes from humane creatures, viz. lest any prejudice should be done to the doctrine of the humane souls immortality: There being nothing, as he truly says, that doth more easily turn off weak minds from the path of virtue, than if they should think the souls of brutes to be of the same nature with our own; and therefore that nothing remains to be hoped or feared after this life, more by us than by flies or pismires. For, sure there were other ways of providing against that danger; besides that of denying them so much as sense (other than merely organical as he somewhere alleviates the harshness of that position, but ⟨p. 90⟩1without telling us what use's these organs) and the making them nothing else but well formed machines.
And yet that particular reason seems a great deal more pious, than it is cogent; which he gives for his chusing this particular way of differencing brutes from humane creatures, viz. lest any prejudice should be done to the doctrine of the humane souls immortality: There being nothing, as he truly says, that doth more easily turn off weak minds from the path of virtue, than if they should think the souls of brutes to be of the same nature with our own; and therefore that nothing remains to be hoped or feared after this life, more by us than by flies or pismires. For, sure there were other ways of providing against that danger; besides that of denying them so much as sense (other than meerly organical as he somewhere alleviates the harshness of that position, but ⟨p. 90⟩1without telling us what use's these organs) and the making them nothing else but well formed machines.
- 1Resp. sextae.
But yet if we should admit the propriety of this appellation, and acknowledge (the thing it self intended to be signified by it) that all the powers belonging to mere brutal nature are purely mechanical and no more; To what purpose is it here alleged? or what can it be understood to signify? what is lost from our cause by it? And what have Atheists whereof to glory? For was the contrivance of these machines theirs? were they the Authors of this rare invention, or of any thing like it? or can they show any product of humane device and wit, that shall be capable of vying with the strange powers of those machines? or can they imagine what so highly exceeds all humane skill to have fallen by chance, and without any contrivance or design at all, into a frame capable of such powers and operations?
But yet if we should admit the propriety of this appellation, and acknowledge (the thing it self intended to be signified by it) that all the powers belonging to meer brutal nature are purely mechanical and no more; To what purpose is it here alledg'd? or what can it be understood to signifie? what is lost from our cause by it? And what have Atheists whereof to glory? For was the contrivance of these machines theirs? were they the Authors of this rare invention, or of any thing like it? or can they shew any product of humane device and wit, that shall be capable of vying with the strange powers of those machines? or can they imagine what so highly exceeds all humane skill to have fallen by chance, and without any contrivance or design at all, into a frame capable of such powers and operations?
If they be machines they are (as that free-spirited Author speaks) to be considered as a sort of machine made by the hand of God, which is by infinite degrees better ordered, and 1hath in it more admirable motions, than any that could ever have been formed by the art of man. Yea, and we might add, so little disadvantage would accrue to the present cause (what ever might to some other) by this concession, that rather (if it were not a wrong to the cause which justly disdains we should allege ⟨p. 91⟩any thing false or uncertain for its support) this would add much, we will not say to its victory, but to its triumph, that we did acknowledge them nothing else than mere mechanical contrivances. For, since they must certainly either be such, or have each of them a soul to animate and enable them to their several functions; it seems a much more easy performance, and is more conceivable, and within the nearer reach of humane apprehension that they should be furnished with such a one, than be made capable of so admirable operations without it; and the former (though it were not a surer) were a more amazing, unsearchable, and less comprehensible discovery of the most transcendent wisdom, than the latter.
If they be machines they are (as that freespirited Author speaks) to be considered as a sort of machine made by the hand of God, which is by infinite degrees better ordered, and 1hath in it more admirable motions, than any that could ever have been formed by the art of man. Yea, and we might add, so little disadvantage would accrue to the present cause (what ever might to some other) by this concession, that rather (if it were not a wrong to the cause which justly disdains we should alledge ⟨p. 91⟩any thing false or uncertain for its support) this would add much, we will not say to its victory, but to its triumph, that we did acknowledge them nothing else than meer mechanical contrivances. For, since they must certainly either be such, or have each of them a soul to animate and inable them to their several functions; it seems a much more easie performance, and is more conceivable, and within the nearer reach of humane apprehension that they should be furnish'd with such a one, than be made capable of so admirable operations without it; and the former (though it were not a surer) were a more amazing, unsearchable, and less comprehensible discovery of the most transcendent wisdom, than the latter.
But because whatsoever comes under the 1name of cogitation is assigned to some higher cause than mechanism; and that there are operations belonging to man which lay claim to a reasonable soul as the immediate principle and author of them, we have yet this further step to advance; that is to consider the most apparent evidence we have of a wise designing Agent, in the powers and nature of this more excellent, and (among things more obvious to our notice) the noblest of his productions.
- 1XI.
And were it not for the slothful neglect of the most to study themselves; we should not here need to recount, unto men, the common and well-known abilities and excellencies, which peculiarly belong to their own nature; ⟨p. 92⟩They might take notice without being told, that first as to their intellectual faculty, they have somewhat about them that can think, understand, frame notions of things, that can rectify or supply the false or defective representations which are made to them by their external senses, and fancies, that can conceive of things far above the reach, and sphere of sense, the moral good or evil of actions or inclinations, what there is in them of rectitude or pravity; whereby they can animadvert and cast their eye inward upon themselves. Observe the good or evil acts or inclinations, the knowledge, ignorance, dullness, vigour, tranquility, trouble, and generally, the perfections or imperfections of their own minds. That can apprehend the general natures of things, the future existence of what yet is not, with the future appearance of that to us which as yet appears not.
And were it not for the slothful neglect of the most to study themselves; we should not here need to recount, unto men, the common and well-known abilities and excellencies, which peculiarly belong to their own nature; ⟨p. 92⟩They might take notice without being told, that first as to their intellectual faculty, they have somewhat about them that can think, understand, frame notions of things, that can rectifie or supply the false or defective representations which are made to them by their external senses, and fansies, that can conceive of things far above the reach, and sphere of sense, the moral good or evil of actions or inclinations, what there is in them of rectitude or pravity; whereby they can animadvert and cast their eye inward upon themselves. Observe the good or evil acts or inclinations, the knowledge, ignorance, dulness, vigour, tranquility, trouble, and generally, the perfections or imperfections of their own minds. That can apprehend the general natures of things, the future existence of what yet is not, with the future appearance of that to us which as yet appears not.
Of which last sort of power, the confident assertion no man can have a conception of the 1future, needs not, against our experience, make us doubt; especially being enforced by no better than that pleasant reason there subjoined, for, the future is not yet; that is to say, because it is future; and so (which is all this reason amounts to) we cannot conceive it, because we cannot. For though our conceptions of former things guide us in forming notions of what is future, yet sure our conception of any thing as future, is much another sort of conception, from what we have of the same thing ⟨p. 93⟩as past, as appears from its different effects; for if an object be apprehended good, we conceive of it as past with sorrow, as future with hope and joy. If evil, with joy as past, with fear and sorrow, as future.
Of which last sort of power, the confident assertion no man can have a conception of the 1future, needs not, against our experience, make us doubt; especially being inforced by no better than that pleasant reason there subjoyned, for, the future is not yet; that is to say, because it is future; and so (which is all this reason amounts to) we cannot conceive it, because we cannot. For though our conceptions of former things guide us in forming notions of what is future, yet sure our conception of any thing as future, is much another sort of conception, from what we have of the same thing ⟨p. 93⟩as past, as appears from its different effects; for if an object be apprehended good, we conceive of it as past with sorrow, as future with hope and joy. If evil, with joy as past, with fear and sorrow, as future.
- 1Hobbs's Humane Nature.
And (which above all the rest discovers and magnifies the intellectual power of the humane soul) that they can form a conception (howsoever imperfect) of this absolute perfect Being, whereof we are discoursing. Which even they that acknowledge not its existence cannot deny, except they will profess themselves blindly and at a venture to deny they know not what? or what they have not so much as thought of?
They may take notice of their power of comparing things, of discerning and making a judgment of their agreements and disagreements, their proportions and disproportions to one another. Of affirming, or denying this or that concerning such or such things; and of pronouncing with more or less confidence concerning the truth or falsehood of such affirmations or negations.
They may take notice of their power of comparing things, of discerning and making a judgment of their agreements and disagreements, their proportions and disproportions to one another. Of affirming, or denying this or that concerning such or such things; and of pronouncing with more or less confidence concerning the truth or falshood of such affirmations or negations.
And moreover of their power of arguing and inferring one thing from another, so as from one plain and evident principle to draw forth a long chain of consequences that may be discerned to be linked therewith.
They have withal to consider the liberty and the large capacity of the humane will; which, when it is its self, rejects the dominion of any ⟨p. 94⟩other than the supreme Lord; and refuses satisfaction in any other than the supreme and most comprehensive good.
And upon, even, so hasty, and transient a view, of a thing furnished with such powers and faculties; we have sufficient occasion to bethink our selves; How came such a thing as this into being? whence did it spring, or to what original doth it owe it self?
More particularly we have here two things to be discoursed:
First, that notwithstanding so high excellencies, the soul of man doth yet appear to be a caused being, that sometime had a beginning.
Secondly, That by them, it is sufficiently evident that it owes it self to a wise and intelligent cause.
As to the former of these we need say the less, because that sort of Atheists with whom we have chiefly now to do, deny not humane souls to have had a beginning, as supposing them to be produced by the bodies they animate by the same generation, and that such generation did sometimes begin. That only rude and wildly moving matter was from eternity, and that by infinite alterations and commixtures in that eternity, it fell at last into this orderly frame and state wherein things now are, and became prolific, so as to give beginning to the several ⟨p. 95⟩sorts of living things, which do now continue to propagate themselves. The mad folly of which random fancy we have been so largely contending against hitherto. The other sort who were for an eternal succession of generations have been sufficiently refuted by divers others, and partly by what hath been already said in this discourse; and we may further meet with them ere it be long. We in the mean time find not any professing Atheism to make humane souls as such necessary and self-original beings.
As to the former of these we need say the less, because that sort of Atheists with whom we have chiefly now to do, deny not humane souls to have had a beginning, as supposing them to be produced by the bodies they animate by the same generation, and that such generation did sometimes begin. That only rude and wildly moving matter was from eternity, and that by infinite alterations and commixtures in that eternity, it fell at last into this orderly frame and state wherein things now are, and became prolifick, so as to give beginning to the several ⟨p. 95⟩sorts of living things, which do now continue to propagate themselves. The mad folly of which random fancy we have been so largely contending against hitherto. The other sort who were for an eternal succession of generations have been sufficiently refuted by divers others, and partly by what hath been already said in this discourse; and we may further meet with them ere it be long. We in the mean time find not any professing Atheism to make humane souls as such necessary and self-original beings.
Yet it is requisite to consider not only what persons of Atheistical persuasions have said, but what also they, possibly, may say. And moreover some that have been remote from Atheism have been prone upon the contemplation of the excellencies of the humane soul to over-magnify, yea and even no less than deify it. 'Tis therefore needful to say somewhat in this matter. For if nothing of direct and down-right Atheism had been: The rash hyperboles (as we will charitably call them) and unwarrantable rhetorications of these latter, should they obtain to be looked upon and received as severe and strict assertions of Truth, were equally destructive of Religion, as the other more strangely bold and avowed opposition to it.
Yet it is requisite to consider not only what persons of Atheistical perswasions have said, but what also they, possibly, may say. And moreover some that have been remote from Atheism have been prone upon the contemplation of the excellencies of the humane soul to over-magnifie, yea and even no less than deifie it. 'Tis therefore needful to say somewhat in this matter. For if nothing of direct and down-right Atheism had been: The rash hyperboles (as we will charitably call them) and unwarrantable rhetorications of these latter, should they obtain to be lookt upon and received as severe and strict assertions of Truth, were equally destructive of Religion, as the other more strangely bold and avowed opposition to it.
Such, I mean, as have spoken of the Souls 1of men, as parts of God, one thing with him; a particle of Divine breath; an extract, or derivation of himself. That have not feared to ⟨p. 96⟩apply to them his most peculiar attributes, or 2say that of them which is most appropriate, and incommunicably belonging to him alone. Nay, to give them his very name, and say in plain words they were God.
- 1Sen. Ep. 92. Hor. Serm. M. Anton. [Greek or Hebrew].Sen. Ep. 92. Hor. Serm. M. Anton. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
- 2The Pythagoreans concerning whom it is said they were wont to admonish one another to take heed lest they should rent God in themselves. [Greek or Hebrew]. Jamblicb. de vit. Pythag. Pla'o, who undertakes to prove the immortafity of the Soul by such arguments as if they did conclude any thing, would conclude it to be God. That it is the fountain, the principie [[Greek or Hebrew]] of motion; and adds that the principle is unbegotten, &c. in Phaedro. Makes it the cause of all things, and the ruler of all, De Leg. l. 10. though his words there seem meant of the soul of the world. Concerning which soul afterwards enquiring whether all ought not to account it God? He answers, Yes certainly, except any one be come to extreme madness. And whether an identity were not imagined of our souls with that of the world, or with God is too much left in doubt; both as to him, and some of his followers. To say nothing of modern Enthusiasts.The Pythagoreans concerning whom it is said they were wont to admonish one another to take heed lest they should rent God in themselves. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Jamblicb. de vit. Pythag. Pla'o, who undertakes to prove the immortafity of the Soul by such arguments as if they did conclude any thing, would conclude it to be God. That it is the fountain, the principie [〈non-Latin alphabet〉] of motion; and adds that the principle is unbegotten, &c. in Phaedro. Makes it the cause of all things, and the ruler of all, De Leg. l. 10. though his words there seem meant of the soul of the world. Concerning which soul afterwards enquiring whether all ought not to account it God? He answers, Yes certainly, except any one be come to extreme madness. And whether an identity were not imagined of our souls with that of the world, or with God is too much left in doubt; both as to him, and some of his followers. To say nothing of modern Enthusiasts.
Now it would render a Temple alike insignificant to suppose no worshipper, as to suppose none who should be worshipped. And what should be the worshipper when our souls are thought the same thing with what should be the object of our worship?
Now it would render a Temple alike insignificant to suppose no worshipper, as to suppose none who should be worshipped. And what should be the worshiper when our souls are thought the same thing with what should be the object of our worship?
But methinks when we consider their necessitous indigent state, their wants and cravings, their pressures and groans, their grievances and complaints, we should find enough to convince us they are not the self-originate or self-sufficient being. And might even despair any thing should be plain and easy to them with whom it is a difficulty to distinguish themselves from God. Why are they in a state which they ⟨p. 97⟩dislike? wherefore are they not full and satisfied? why do they wish, and complain, is this God-like? But if any have a doubt hanging in their minds concerning the unity of souls with one another, or with the soul of the world, let them read what is already extant. And supposing them thereupon, distinct Beings; 1there needs no more to prove them not to be necessary, independent, uncaused ones, than their subjection to so frequent changes; their ignorance, doubts, irresolution, and gradual progress to knowledge, certainty, and stability in their purposes; their very being united with these bodies in which they have been but a little while, as we all know; whereby they undergo no small change (admitting them, to have been, pre-existent) and wherein they experience so many. Yea, whether those changes import any immutation of their very essence or no; the repugnancy being so plainly manifest of the very terms, necessary and changeable. And inasmuch as it is so evident that a necessary being can receive no accession to it self; than it must always have or keep it self, after the same manner, and in the same state; that if it be necessarily such, or such, (as we cannot conceive it to be, but we must, in our own thoughts, affix to it some determinate state or other) it must be eternally such, and ever in that particular unchanged state.
But methinks when we consider their necessitous indigent state, their wants and cravings, their pressures and groans, their grievances and complaints, we should find enough to convince us they are not the self-originate or selfsufficient being. And might even despair any thing should be plain and easie to them with whom it is a difficulty to distinguish themselves from God. Why are they in a state which they ⟨p. 97⟩dislike? wherefore are they not full and satisfied? why do they wish, and complain, is this God-like? But if any have a doubt hanging in their minds concerning the unity of souls with one another, or with the soul of the world, let them read what is already extant. And supposing them thereupon, distinct Beings;
Therefore be the perfection of our souls as great as our most certain knowledge of them can possibly allow us to suppose it, 'tis not yet ⟨p. 98⟩so great, but that we must be constrained to confess them no necessary self-criginate Beings, and by consequence, dependent ones, that owe themselves to some cause.
Nor yet (that we may pass over to the other 1strangely distant extreme) is the perfection of our souls so little, as to require less than an intelligent cause, endowed with the wisdom which we assert and challenge unto the truly necessary uncaused Being.
Nor yet (that we may pass over to the other 1strangely distant extreme) is the perfection of our souls so little, as to require less than an intelligent cause, endow'd with the wisdom which we assert and challenge unto the truly necessary uncaused Being.
- 1XII.
Which, because he hath no other rival or competitor for the glory of this production, than only the fortuitous jumble of the blindly moving particles of matter, our enquiry here will only be whose image the thing produced bears; or which it more resembles, stupid, senseless unactive matter (or at the best only supposed moving, though no man upon the Atheists terms, can imagine how it came to be so) or the active intelligent Being, whom we affirm the cause of all things, and who hath peculiarly entitled himself the Father of Spirits.
Which, because he hath no other rival or competitor for the glory of this production, than only the fortuitous jumble of the blindly moving particles of matter, our enquiry here will only be whose image the thing produced bears; or which it more resembles, stupid, sensless unactive matter (or at the best only supposed moving, though no man upon the Atheists terms, can imagine how it came to be so) or the active intelligent Being, whom we affirm the cause of all things, and who hath peculiarly entituled himself the Father of Spirits.
That is, we are to consider whether the powers and operations belonging to the Reasonable Soul do not plainly argue,
1. That it neither rises from nor is mere matter; whence it will be consequent it must have an efficient divers from matter?
1. That it neither rises from nor is meer matter; whence it will be consequent it must have an efficient divers from matter?