A44683:201
The Living Temple
The living temple, or, A designed improvement of that notion that a good man is the temple of God by John Howe ...
London: printed for John Starkey, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
that we have proved it is not. It is therefore a contingent, and its being depended on a free cause, into whose pleasure, only, it was resolvable, that it should be or not be. And which therefore had a dominion over its own acts. If this bespeak not an intelligent Agent, what doth?
And though this might also be said concerning every thing else which is not necessarily; and so might yield a more general argument to evince a free designing cause; yet it concludes with greater evidence concerning the reasonable soul; whose powers and operations it is so manifestly impossible should have proceeded from matter. And therefore even that vain (and refuted) pretence it self, that other things might, by the necessary laws of its motion, become what they are, can have less place here. Whence it is more apparent that the reasonable soul must have had a free and intelligent cause that used liberty and counsel in determining that it should be, and especially that it should be such a sort of thing as we find it is. For when we see how aptly its powers and faculties serve for their proper and peculiar operations, ⟨p. 125⟩who that is not besides himself can think that such a thing was made by one that knew not what he was doing? or that such powers were not given on purpose for such operations? And what is the capacity but a power that should sometime be reduced into act, and arrive to the exercise of reason it self?
Now was it possible any thing should give that power that had it not any way? that is in the same kind, or in some more excellent and noble kind? For we contend not that this Agent whereof we speak is in the strict and proper sense rational, taking that term to import an ability or faculty of inferring what is less known from what is more. For we suppose all things equally known to him (which so far as is requisite to our present design that is the representing him the proper object of Religion, or of that honour which the dedication of a Temple to him imports, we may in due time come more expressly to assert.) And that the knowledge, which is, with us, the end of reasoning, is in him, in its highest perfection without being at all beholden to that means; that all the connection of things with one another lie open to one comprehensive view; and are known to be connected; but not because they are so. We say, is it conceivable that mans knowing power should proceed from a cause that hath it not, in the same, or this more perfect kind? And may use those words to this purpose, not for their authority (which we expect