Chapter 3
pp. 44–134134 passagespart 3 of 4
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2. That it owes it self to an intelligent efficient.
As to the former, we need not deal distinctly and severally concerning their original and their nature. For if they are not mere matter, it will be evident enough they do not arise from thence.
As to the former, we need not deal distinctly and severally concerning their original and their nature. For if they are not meer matter, it will be evident enough they do not arise from thence.
So that here all will be summed up in this enquiry, whether Reason can agree to matter? We shall therefore wave the consideration of their conceits, concerning the manner of the first origination of men, as that their whole being was only a production of the earth. Whereof the Philosophical account deserves as much laughter, instead of confutation, as any the most fabulously Poetical. That is, how they were formed (as also the other animals) in certain little bags or wombs of the earth, out of which, when they grew ripe, they broke forth, *&c.
So that here all will be summ'd up in this enquiry, whether Reason can agree to matter? We shall therefore wave the consideration of their conceits, concerning the manner of the first origination of men, as that their whole being was only a production of the earth. Whereof the Philosophical account deserves as much laughter, instead of confutation, as any the most fabulously Poetical. That is, how they were formed (as also the other animals) in certain little bags or wombs of the earth, out of which, when they grew ripe, they broke forth, *&c.
- *Gassend. Epicur. Syntag.
And only consider what is said of the constitution 1and nature of the humane soul it self, Which is said to be composed of very well polished, the smoothest and the roundest atoms; and which are of the neatest fashion, and every way, you must suppose, the best conditioned the whole Country could afford; of a more excellent make, as there is added, than those of the fire it self. And these are the things you must know, which think, study, contemplate, frame syllogisms, make Theorems, lay plots, contrive business, act the Philosopher, the Logician, the Mathematician, Statesman, and every thing else (only you may except the Priest, for of him there was no need.)
And only consider what is said of the constitution 1and nature of the humane soul it self, Which is said to be compos'd of very well polish'd, the smoothest and the roundest atoms; and which are of the neatest fashion, and every way, you must suppose, the best condition'd the whole Country could afford; of a more excellent make, as there is added, than those of the fire it self. And these are the things you must know, which think, study, contemplate, frame syllogisms, make Theorems, lay plots, contrive business, act the Philosopher, the Logician, the Mathematician, Statesman, and every thing else (only you may except the Priest, for of him there was no need.)
- 1As may be seen in the same Syntag. and in Epicurus's Epist. to Herodot. in Laert. [Greek or Hebrew], &c.As may be seen in the same Syntag. and in Epicurus's Epist. to Herodot. in Laert. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, &c.
This therefore is our present theme, whether such things as these be capable of such, or any acts of reason yea or no?
And if such a matter may admit of serious discourse; in this way it may be convenient to proceed, viz. either any such small particle, or atom (for our business is not now with Des Cartes but Epicurus) alone, is rational, or a good convenient number of them assembled, and most happily met together. It is much to be feared the former way will not do. For we have nothing to consider in any of these atoms, in its solitary condition, besides its magnitude, its figure, and its weight, and you may add also its motion (if you could devise how it should come by it.)
And now because it is not to be thought that all atoms are rational (for then the stump of a tree, or a bundle of straw might serve to make a soul of, for ought we know, as good as the best) it is to be considered by which of those properties, an atom shall be entitled to the privilege of being rational, and the rational atoms be distinguished from the rest. Is it their peculiar magnitude or size that so far ennobles them? Epicurus would here have us believe that the least are the fittest for this turn. Now if you consider how little we must suppose them generally to be, according to his account of them; That is, that looking upon any of those little motes a stream whereof you may perceive when the Sun shines in at a window, and he doubts not but many Myriads of even ⟨p. 101⟩ordinary atoms go to the composition of any one of these scarcely discernible motes; how sportful a contemplation were it, to suppose one of those furnished with all the powers, of a reasonable soul (though its likely they would not laugh at the jest that think thousands of souls might be conveniently placed upon the point of a needle.) And yet, which makes the matter more admirable, that very few, except they be very carefully picked and chosen, can be found among those many myriads, but will be too big to be capable of rationality. Here sure the fate is very hard, of those that come nearest the size, but only, by a very little too much corpulency, happen to be excluded, as unworthy to be counted among the rational atoms. But sure if all sober reason be not utterly lost and squandered away among these little entities, it must needs be judged altogether incomprehensible, why, if, upon the account of mere littleness, any atom should be capable of reason, all should not be so. (And then we could not but have a very rational world.) At least, the difference, in this point, being so very small among them; and they being all so very little, methinks they should all be capable of some reason, and have only less or more of it, according as they are bigger and less. But there is little doubt that single property, of less magnitude, will not be stood upon as the characteristical difference of rational and irrational Atoms;
And now because it is not to be thought that all atoms are rational (for then the stump of a tree, or a bundle of straw might serve to make a soul of, for ought we know, as good as the best) it is to be considered by which of those properties, an atom shall be entituled to the priviledge of being rational, and the rational atoms be distinguished from the rest. Is it their peculiar magnitude or size that so far ennobles them? Epicurus would here have us believe that the least are the fittest for this turn. Now if you consider how little we must suppose them generally to be, according to his account of them; That is, that looking upon any of those little motes a stream whereof you may perceive when the Sun shines in at a window, and he doubts not but many Myriads of even
and because their more or less gravity is reckoned necessarily (and so immediately) to ⟨p. 102⟩depend on that (for those Atoms cannot be thought porous, but very closely compacted each one within it self) this, it is likely, will as little be depended on*. And so their peculiar figure must be the more trusted to, as the differencing thing. And because there is in this respect so great a variety among this little sort of people, or Nation as this Author somewhere calls them, whereof he gives so punctual an account, †as if he had been the Generalissimo of all their Armies, and were wont to view them at their Rendezvous, to form them into Regiments and Squadrons, and appoint them to the distinct services he found them aptest for. No doubt it was a difficulty to determine which sort of figure was to be pitched on to make up the rational regiment. But since this power was absolute, and there was none to gain-say or contradict, the round figure was judged best, and most deserving this honour. Otherwise a reason might have been asked (and it might have been a greater difficulty to have given a good one) why some other figure might not have done as well; unless respect were had to fellow-Atoms, and that it was thought, they of this figure could better associate for the present ⟨p. 103⟩purpose; and that we shall consider of by and by; we now proceed on the supposition that, possibly, a single Atom by the advantage of this figure, might be judged capable of this high achievement. And in that case, it would not be impertinent to enquire, whether if an Atom were perfectly round, and so, very rational; but by an unexpected misadventure, it comes to have one little corner somewhere clapped on, it be hereby quite spoiled of its rationality? And again, whether one that comes somewhat near that figure, only it hath some little protuberancies upon it, might not by a little filing, or the friendly rubs of other Atoms become rational? And yet, now we think on't, of this improvement he leaves no hope, because he tells us, though they have parts, yet they are so solidly compacted that they are by no force capable of dissolution. And so whatever their fate is in this particular, they must abide it without expectation of change. And yet, though we cannot really alter it for the better with any of them, yet we may think as favourably of the matter as we please;
and for any thing that yet appears, whatever peculiar claim the round ones lay to rationality, we may judge as well (and shall not easily be disproved) of any of the rest.
and for any thing that yet appears, whatever peculiar claim the round ones lay to rationality, we may judge as well (and shall not easily be disprov'd) of any of the rest.
Upon the whole matter no one of these properties hitherto alone is likely to make a rational Atom: what they will all do meeting together may yet seem a doubt. That is, supposing we could hit upon one single Atom, that is at once ⟨p. 104⟩of a very little size, and consequently very light and nimble, and most perfectly and unexceptionably round (and possibly there may be found a good many such) will not this do the business? May we not now hope to have a rational sort of people among them, that is, those of the peculiar family or tribe? And yet still the matter will be found to go very hard; for if we cannot imagine or devise how any one of these properties should contribute anything (as upon our utmost disquisition we certainly cannot) towards the power of reasoning, it is left us altogether unimaginable how all together should make a rational Atom. There is only one relief remaining, that is, what if we add to these other properties some peculiarly-brisk sort of actual motion: For to be barely movable will not serve, inasmuch as all are so; But will not actual motion (added to its being irreprehensibly little, light, and round) especially if it be a very freakish one, and made up of many odd unexpected windings and turns effect the business? Possibly it might do something to actual reasoning, supposing the power were there before; for who can tell but the little thing was fallen asleep, and by this means its power might be awakened into some exercise? But that it should give the power it self, is above all comprehension. And there is nothing else to give it. These that have been mentioned being all the prime qualities that are assigned to Atoms singly considered. All other that can be supposed, belonging to concrete ⟨p. 105⟩bodies, that are composed of many of them meeting together.
Upon the whole matter no one of these properties hitherto alone is likely to make a rational Atom: what they will all do meeting together may yet seem a doubt. That is, supposing we could hit upon one single Atom, that is at once ⟨p. 104⟩of a very little size, and consequently very light and nimble, and most perfectly and unexceptionably round (and possibly there may be found a good many such) will not this do the business? May we not now hope to have a rational sort of people among them, that is, those of the peculiar family or tribe? And yet still the matter will be found to go very hard; for if we cannot imagine or devise how any one of these properties should contribute anything (as upon our utmost disquisition we certainly cannot) towards the power of reasoning, it is left us altogether unimaginable how all together should make a rational Atom. There is only one relief remaining, that is, what if we add to these other properties some peculiarly-brisk sort of actual motion: For to be barely movable will not serve, inasmuch as all are so; But will not actual motion (added to its being irreprehensibly little, light, and round) especially if it be a very freakish one, and made up of many odd unexpected windings and turns effect the business? Possibly it might do something to actual reasoning, supposing the power were there before; for who can tell but the little thing was faln asleep, and by this means its power might be awaken'd into some exercise? But that it should give the power it self, is above all comprehension. And there is nothing else to give it. These that have been mentioned being all the prime qualities that are assigned to Atoms singly considered. All other that can be supposed, belonging to concrete
And therefore hither in the next place our enquiry must be directed, whether any number of Atoms (definite or indefinite) being in themselves severally irrational, can become rational by association, or compose and make up a rational soul?
Hitherto it must be acknowledged we have not fought with any adversary; not having met with any that have asserted the rationality of single corporeal Atoms; yet because we know not what time may produce, and whither the distress and exigency of a desperate cause may drive the maintainers of it; 'twas not therefore fit to say nothing to that (supposable or possible) assertion (I mean possible to be asserted, howsoever impossible it is to be true.) Nor yet could it well admit of any thing to be said to it, but in that ludicrous and sportful way. If we will suppose any to be so foolish, they are to be dealt with according to their folly.
Hitherto it must be acknowledg'd we have not fought with any adversary; not having met with any that have asserted the rationality of single corporeal Atoms; yet because we know not what time may produce, and whither the distress and exigency of a desperate cause may drive the maintainers of it; 'twas not therefore fit to say nothing to that (supposable or possible) assertion (I mean possible to be asserted, howsoever impossible it is to be true.) Nor yet could it well admit of any thing to be said to it, but in that ludicrous and sportful way. If we will suppose any to be so foolish, they are to be dealt with according to their folly.
But now as to this other conceit, that Atoms (provided they be of the right stamp or kind) may, a competent number of them, assembled together, compose a reasonable soul is an express Article of the Epicurean Creed. And therefore here we are to deal more cautiously; not that this is any whit a wiser fancy than the other; but that the Truth in this matter is surer to meet with opposition in the minds of some persons already formed unto that wild apprehension and tinctured with it.
But now as to this other conceit, that Atoms (provided they be of the right stamp or kind) may, a competent number of them, assembled together, compose a reasonable soul is an express Article of the Epicurean Creed. And therefore here we are to deal more cautiously; not that this is any whit a wiser fansie than the other; but that the Truth in this matter is surer to meet with opposition in the minds of some persons already formed unto that wild apprehension and tinctur'd with it.
Wherefore such must be desired to consider in the first place, if they will be true Disciples of Epicurus throughout, what he affirms of all Atoms universally, that they must be simple uncompounded bodies (or if you will corpuscles) not capable of division or section, by no force dissoluble, and therefore immutable, or in themselves void of any mutation.
Hereupon let it be next considered, if there were in them (those that are of the right size, shape, and weight) severally, some certain sparks or seeds of reason (that we may make the supposition as advantageous as we can) or dispositions thereto, yet how shall it be possible to them to communicate? or have that communion with one another, as together, to constitute an actually and completely rational, or thinking thing. If every one could bring somewhat to a common stock, that might be serviceable to that purpose; how shall each ones proportion or share be imparted? They can none of them emit any thing, there can possibly be no such thing as an effluvium from any of them, inasmuch as they are incapable of diminution; and are themselves each of them as little as the least imaginable effluvium that we would suppose to proceed from this or that particular Atom. They can at the most but touch one another, penetrate, or get into one another they cannot. Insomuch as if any one have a treasure in it, which is in readiness for the making up an intellective faculty or power among them, that should be common ⟨p. 107⟩to them all; yet each one remains so locked up within it self, and is so reserved and incommunicative, that no other, much less the whole body of them, can be any jot the wiser. So that this is like to be a very dull assembly.
Hereupon let it be next considered, if there were in them (those that are of the right size, shape, and weight) severally, some certain sparks or seeds of reason (that we may make the supposition as advantagious as we can) or dispositions thereto, yet how shall it be possible to them to communicate? or have that communion with one another, as together, to constitute an actually and completely rational, or thinking thing. If every one could bring somewhat to a common stock, that might be serviceable to that purpose; how shall each ones proportion or share be imparted? They can none of them emit any thing, there can possibly be no such thing as an effluvium from any of them, inasmuch as they are incapable of diminution; and are themselves each of them as little as the least imaginable effluvium that we would suppose to proceed from this or that particular Atom. They can at the most but touch one another, penetrate, or get into one another they cannot. Insomuch as if any one have a treasure in it, which is in readiness for the making up an intellective faculty or power among them, that should be common ⟨p. 107⟩
But then, if there be nothing of reason to be communicated, we are yet at a greater loss. For, if it be said having nothing else to communicate, they communicate themselves, but what is that self? is it a rational self? or is every single Atom, that enters this composition, reason? or is it a principle of reason? is it a seed? or is it a part? is it a thought? what shall we suppose? or what is there in the properties assigned to this sort of Atoms that can bespeak it any of these? And if none of these can be supposed; what doth their association signify towards ratiocination? They are little, what doth that contribute? therefore there may need the more of them to make a good large soul; but why must a little thing, devoid of reason, contribute more towards it than another somewhat bigger? They are light, doth that mend the matter? they are the sooner blown away, they can the less co-here, or keep together; they are the more easily capable of dissipation, the less of keeping their places in solemn counsel. They are round, and exactly smooth. But why do they the more conveniently associate upon that account for this purpose? They cannot therefore come so close together as they might have done, had they been of various figures. They cannot, indeed, give or receive so rude touches. ⟨p. 108⟩This signifies somewhat towards the keeping of state, but what doth it to the exercise of reason? Their being so perfectly and smoothly round makes them the more uncapable of keeping a steady station, they are the more in Janger of rolling away from one another, they can upon this account lay no hold of each other. Their counsels and resolves are likely to be the more lubricous, and liable to an uncertain volubility. It is not to be imagined what a collection of individuals only thus qualified can do when they are come together, an assembly thus constituted. Are we hence to expect Oracles, philosophical Determinations? Maxims of State? And since they are supposed to be so much alike, how are the Mathematical Atoms to be distinguished from the Moral? those from the Political? the Contemplative from the Active? or when the assembly thinks fit to entertain it self with matters of this or that kind, what must be its different composure or posture? into what mould or figure must it cast it self for one purpose? and into what for another?
But then, if there be nothing of reason to be communicated, we are yet at a greater loss. For, if it be said having nothing else to communicate, they communicate themselves, but what is that self? is it a rational self? or is every single Atom, that enters this composition, reason? or is it a principle of reason? is it a seed? or is it a part? is it a thought? what shall we suppose? or what is there in the properties assigned to this sort of Atoms that can bespeak it any of these? And if none of these can be supposed; what doth their association signifie towards ratiocination? They are little, what doth that contribute? therefore there may need the more of them to make a good large soul; but why must a little thing, devoid of reason, contribute more towards it than another somewhat bigger? They are light, doth that mend the matter? they are the sooner blown away, they can the less co-here, or keep together; they are the more easily capable of dissipation, the less of keeping their places in solemn counsel. They are round, and exactly smooth. But why do they the more conveniently associate upon that account for this purpose? They cannot therefore come so close together as they might have done, had they been of various figures. They cannot, indeed, give or receive so rude touches.
It's hard to imagine that these little globular bodies, that we may well suppose to be as like as one egg can be to another, should by the mere alteration of their situation in respect of one another (and no alteration besides can be so much as imagined among them) make so great a change in the complexion of this assembly; so that now it shall be disposed to seriousness, and by some transposition of the spherical particles, to mirth, now to business, ⟨p. 109⟩and by and by to pleasure: And seeing all humane souls are supposed made of the same sort of material, how are the Atoms modelled in one man, and how in another? what Atoms are there to dispose to this sect more, and what to another? or if a good reason can be assigned for their difference, what shall be given for their agreement? Whence it is that there are so unquestionable common notions every where received? why are not all things transposed in some minds, when such a posture of the Atoms as might infer it, is as supposable as any other? Yea, and since men are found not always to be of one mind, with themselves, it is strange and incomprehensible that such a situation of these Atoms that constitute his soul should dispose him to be of one opinion, and another of another. How are they to be ranged when for the affirmative? how for the negative? And yet a great deal more strange, that since their situation is so soon changed, and so continually changing (the very substance of the soul being supposed nothing else than a thing very like, but a little finer than a busy and continually moving flame of fire) any man should ever continue to be of the same opinion with himself one quarter of an hour together; that all notions are not confounded and jumbled; that the same thing is not thought and unthought, resolved and unresolved a thousand times in a day. That is, if any thing could be thought or resolved at all. Or if this were a subject capable of framing or receiving any sort of notion.
It's hard to imagine that these little globular bodies, that we may well suppose to be as like as one egg can be to another, should by the meer alteration of their situation in respect of one another (and no alteration besides can be so much as imagined among them) make so great a change in the complexion of this assembly; so that now it shall be dispos'd to seriousness, and by some transposition of the spherical particles, to mirth, now to business, ⟨p. 109⟩and by and by to pleasure: And seeing all humane souls are supposed made of the same sort of material, how are the Atoms model'd in one man, and how in another? what Atoms are there to dispose to this sect more, and what to another? or if a good reason can be assigned for their difference, what shall be given for their agreement? Whence it is that there are so unquestionable common notions every where received? why are not all things transposed in some minds, when such a posture of the Atoms as might infer it, is as supposable as any other? Yea, and since men are found not always to be of one mind, with themselves, it is strange and incomprehensible that such a situation of these Atoms that constitute his soul should dispose him to be of one opinion, and another of another. How are they to be rang'd when for the affirmative? how for the negative? And yet a great deal more strange, that since their situation is so soon chang'd, and so continually changing (the very substance of the soul being supposed nothing else than a thing very like, but a little finer than a busie and continually moving flame of fire) any man should ever continue to be of the same opinion with himself one quarter of an hour together; that all notions are not confounded and jumbled; that the same thing is not thought and unthought, resolved and unresolved a thousand times in a day. That is, if any thing could be thought or resolved at all. Or if this were a subject capable of framing or receiving any sort of notion.
But still that is the greatest difficulty, how there can be such a thing as thinking, or forming of notions. The case is plain of such notions as have no relation to matter, or dependence upon external sense (as what doth that contribute to my contemplation of my own mind, and its acts and powers to my animadversion, or knowing that I think or will this or that?)
But still that is the greatest difficulty, how there can'be such a thing as thinking, or forming of notions. The case is plain of such notions as have no relation to matter, or dependence upon external sense (as what doth that contribute to my contemplation of my own mind, and its acts and powers to my animadversion, or knowing that I think or will this or that?)
But besides, and more generally what proportion is there between a thought, and the motion of an Atom? Will we appeal to our faculties, to our reason it self? and whither else will we? Is there any cognation or kindred between the Idea's we have of these things, the casual agitation of a small particle of matter (be it as little or as round as we please to imagine) and an act of intellection or judgment? And what if there be divers of them together? what can they do more towards the composing an intelligent thing, than many ciphers to the Arithmetical composition of a number. It would be as rational to suppose an heap of dust by long lying together might at last become rational. Yes, these are things that have (some way or other) the power of motion; and what can they effect by that? they can frisk about, and ply to and fro, and interfere among themselves, and hit, and jostle and tumble over one another, and that will contribute a great deal; about as much, we may suppose, as the shaking of such dust well in a bag, by which means it ⟨p. 111⟩might possibly become finer and smaller something; and by continuing that action, at length rational!
But besides, and more generally what proportion is there between a thought, and the motion of an Atom? Will we appeal to our faculties, to our reason it self? and whither else will we? Is there any cognation or kindred between the Idaea's we have of these things, the casual agitation of a small particle of matter (be it as little or as round as we please to imagine) and an act of intellection or judgment? And what if there be divers of them together? what can they do more towards the composing an intelligent thing, than many ciphers to the Arithmetical composition of a number. It would be as rational to suppose an heap of dust by long lying together might at last become rational. Yes, these are things that have (some way or other) the power of motion; and what can they effect by that? they can frisk about, and ply to and fro, and interfere among themselves, and hit, and justle and tumble over one another, and that will contribute a great deal; about as much, we may suppose, as the shaking of such dust well in a bag, by which means it ⟨p. 111⟩might possibly become finer and smaller something; and by continuing that action, at length rational!
No; but these Atoms, of which the soul is made, have a great advantage by their being disposed into a so well-contrived and fitly-organized receptacle as the body is. It is indeed true and admirable that the body is (as hath been before observed) so fitly framed for the purposes whereto the whole of it, and its several parts are designed. But how unfitly is that commodious structure of it, so much as mentioned by such as will not allow themselves to own and adore the wisdom and power of its great Architect.
No; but these Atoms, of which the soul is made, have a great advantage by their being dispos'd into a so well-contriv'd and fitly-organiz'd receptacle as the body is. It is indeed true and admirable that the body is (as hath been before observed) so fitly framed for the purposes whereto the whole of it, and its several parts are designed. But how unfitly is that commodious structure of it, so much as mentioned by such as will not allow themselves to own and adore the wisdom and power of its great Architect.
And what if the composure of the body be so apt and useful, so excellent in its own kind; Is it so in every kind, or to all imaginable purposes? or what purpose can we possibly imagine more remote, or foreign to the composition of the body, than that the power of ratiocination should be derived thence? It might as well be said it was so made, to whirl about the Sun, or to govern the motions of the Moon and Stars; as to confer the power of reason, or enable the soul to think, to understand, to deliberate, to will, &c. Yea, its organs, some of them, are much more proportionable to those actions, than any of them unto these. Which though a well habited body (while the soul remains in this imprisoned state) do less hinder, yet how doth it help? and that it might perform these acts without ⟨p. 112⟩bodily organs, is much more apprehensible than how they can properly be said to be performed by them. And that, though they are done in the body, they would be done much better out of it.
And what if the composure of the body be so apt and useful, so excellent in its own kind; Is it so in every kind, or to all imaginable purposes? or what purpose can we possibly imagine more remote, or foreign to the composition of the body, than that the power of ratiocination should be derived thence? It might as well be said it was so made, to whirle about the Sun, or to govern the motions of the Moon and Stars; as to confer the power of reason, or inable the soul to think, to understand, to deliberate, to will, &c. Yea, its organs, some of them, are much more proportionable to those actions, than any of them unto these. Which though a well habited body (while the soul remains in this imprison'd state) do less hinder, yet how doth it help? and that it might perform these acts without ⟨p. 112⟩bodily organs, is much more apprehensible than how they can properly be said to be performed by them. And that, though they are done in the body, they would be done much better out of it.
But shall it be granted that these soul-constituting Atoms till they be (or otherwise than as they are) united with a duly organized body, are utterly destitute of any reasoning or intelligent power? or are they, by themselves, apart from this grosser body irrational? If this be not granted, the thing we intend must be argued out. Either then they are, or they are not. If the latter be said, Then they have it of themselves, without dependence on the organized body; and so we are fairly agreed to quit that pretence, without more ado, of their partaking reason from thence. And are only left to weigh over again what hath been already said to evince the contrary, that is, how manifestly absurd it is, to imagine that particles of matter by their peculiar size, or weight, or shape, or motion, or all of these together, and that whether single or associated, should be capable of reasoning. If the former be the thing which is resolved to be stuck to, that is, that they are of themselves irrational, but they become reasonable by their being united in such a prepared and organized body. This requires to be a little further considered: And to this purpose it is necessary to obviate a pitiful shift that it is possible some may think fit to use for the avoiding the force of this dilemma, and may ⟨p. 113⟩rely upon as a ground why they may judge this choice the more secure; that is, that they say they are rational by dependence on the body they animate; because they are only found so united with one another there; that there, they have the first coalition; there, they are severed from such as serve not this turn; there, they are pent in and held together as long as its due temperament lasts; which when it fails they are dissipated, and so lose their great advantage for the acts of reason which they had in such a body. What pleasure soever this may yield, it will soon appear it does them little service.
But shall it be granted that these soul-constituting Atoms till they be (or otherwise than as they are) united with a duly organiz'd body, are utterly destitute of any reasoning or intelligent power? or are they, by themselves, apart from this grosser body irrational? If this be not granted, the thing we intend must be argued out. Either then they are, or they are not. If the latter be said, Then they have it of themselves, without dependance on the organiz'd body; and so we are fairly agreed to quit that pretence, without more ado, of their partaking reason from thence. And are only left to weigh over again what hath been already said to evince the contrary, that is, how manifestly absurd it is, to imagine that particles of matter by their peculiar size, or weight, or shape, or motion, or all of these together, and that whether single or associated, should be capable of reasoning. If the former be the thing which is resolv'd to be stuck to, that is, that they are of themselves irrational, but they become reasonable by their being united in such a prepared and organized body. This requires to be a little further considered: And to this purpose it is necessary to obviate a pittiful shift that it is possible some may think fit to use for the avoiding the force of this dilemma, and may
For it only implies that they have their rationality of themselves, so be it that they were together; and not immediately from the body, or any otherwise than that they are somewhat beholding to it, for a fair occasion of being together; as if it were else an unlawful assembly; or that they knew not otherwise how to meet and hold together. They will not say that the body gives them being, for they are eternal, and self-subsisting, as they will have it. Yea & of themselves (though the case be otherwise with the Cartesian particles) undiminishable as to their size, and, as to their figure and weight, unalterable. So that they have neither their littleness, their roundness, nor their lightness from the body, but only their so happy meeting. Admit this, and only suppose them to be met out of the body. And why may not this be thought supposable? If they be not rational ⟨p. 114⟩till they be met, they cannot have wit enough to scruple meeting, at least, somewhere else than in the body. And who knows but such a chance may happen; As great as this are by these persons supposed to have happened before the world could have come to this pass it is now at, who can tell but such a number of the same sort of Atoms (it being natural for things so much of a complexion and temper to associate and find out another) might ignorantly, and thinking no harm come together? And having done so, why might they not keep together? Do they need to be pent in? How are they pent in whilst in the body? If they be disposed, they have ways enough to get out. And if they must needs be inclined to scatter when the crasis of the body fails, surely a way might be found to hem them in, if that be all; at the time of expiration more tightly and closely than they could be in the body. And what reason can be devised why being become rational by their having been assembled in the body, they may not agree to hold together, and do so in spite of fate, or maugre all ordinary accidents, when they find it convenient to leave it. And then upon these no-way impossible suppositions (according to their principles, so far as can be understood, with whom we have to do) will they now be rational out of the body? Being still endowed (as they cannot but be) with the same high privileges of being little, round, and light, and being still also together;
For it only implies that they have their rationality of themselves, so be it that they were together; and not immediately from the body, or any otherwise than that they are somewhat beholding to it, for a fair occasion of being together; as if it were else an unlawful assembly; or that they knew not otherwise how to meet and hold together. They will not say that the body gives them being, for they are eternal, and self-subsisting, as they will have it. Yea & of themselves (though the case be otherwise with the Cartesian particles) undiminishable as to their size, and, as to their figure and weight, unalterable. So that they have neither their littleness, their roundness, nor their lightness from the body, but only their so happy meeting. Admit this, and only suppose them to be met out of the body. And why may not this be thought supposable? If they be not rational
and somewhat more, it ⟨p. 115⟩may be, at liberty, to roll and tumble, and mingle with one another, than in the body? If it be now affirmed they will in this case be rational, at least as long as they hold together, then we are but where we were. And this shift hath but diverted us a little, but so as it was easy to bring the matter, again, about, to the same point we were at before. Wherefore the shelter of the body being thus quite again forsaken, this poor expulsed crew, of dislodging Atoms are exposed to fight, in the open air, for their rationality, against all that was said before.
and somewhat more, it ⟨p. 115⟩may be, at liberty, to roll and tumble, and mingle with one another, than in the body? If it be now affirmed they will in this case be rational, at least as long as they hold together, then we are but where we were. And this shift hath but diverted us a little, but so as it was easie to bring the matter, again, about, to the same point we were at before. Wherefore the shelter of the body being thus quite again forsaken, this poor expulsed crew, of dislodging Atoms are exposed to fight, in the open air, for their rationality, against all that was said before.
But if this refuge and sanctuary of the body be not merely pretended to, but really and plainly trusted in and stuck to. Then are we sincerely and honestly to consider what a body so variously organized can do, to make such a party of Atoms (that of themselves are not so, singly, nor together) become rational. And surely if the cause were not saved before, it is now deplorate and lost without remedy. For what do they find here that can thus beyond all expectation improve them to so high an excellency? Is it flesh, or blood, or bones that puts this stamp upon them? Think, what is the substance of the nobler parts, the liver, or heart, or brain, that they should turn these, before, rational Atoms, when they fall into them, into irrational, any more than if they were well soaked in a quagmire, or did insinuate themselves into a piece of soft dough? But here they meet with a benign and kindly ⟨p. 116⟩heat and warmth which comfortably fosters and cherishes them, till at length it hath hatched them into rational. But methinks they should be warm enough of themselves, since they are supposed so much to resemble fire. And however, wherein do we find a flame of fire more rational than a piece of ice? Yea, but here they find a due temper of moisture as well as heat. And that surely doth not signify much; for if the common maxim be true, that the dry soul is the wisest, they might have been much wiser if they had kept themselves out of the body. And since its necessary the soul should consist of that peculiar sort of Atoms before described; and the organical body (which must be said for distinction sake, the soul being all this while supposed a body also) consists of Atoms too, that are of a much courser alloy, methinks a mixture should not be necessary, but an hinderance and great debasement rather to this rational composition, Besides that it cannot be understood, if it were necessary these Atoms should receive any tincture from the body in order to their being rational, what they can receive, or how they can receive any thing. They have not pores that can admit an adventitious moisture though it were of the divinest nectar, and the body could never so plentifully furnish them with it. Wherein then lies the great advantage these Atoms have by being in the body to their commencing rational? If there be such advantage, why can it not be understood? why is it not ⟨p. 117⟩assigned?
But if this refuge and sanctuary of the body be not meerly pretended to, but really and plainly trusted in and stuck to. Then are we sincerely and honestly to consider what a body so variously organiz'd can do, to make such a party of Atoms (that of themselves are not so, singly, nor together) become rational. And surely if the cause were not saved before, it is now deplorate and lost without remedy. For what do they find here that can thus beyond all expectation improve them to so high an excellency? Is it flesh, or bloud, or bones that puts this stamp upon them? Think, what is the substance of the nobler parts, the liver, or heart, or brain, that they should turn these, before, rational Atoms, when they fall into them, into irrational, any more than if they were well soak'd in a quagmire, or did insinuate themselves into a piece of soft dough? But here they meet with a benign and kindly
why should we further spend our guesses what may possibly be said? But yet, may not much be attributed to the convenient and well fenced cavity of the brains receptacle, or the more secret chambers within that? where the studious Atoms may be very private and free from disturbance? Yet sure it is hard to say, why they that are wont to do it here, might not as well philosophize in some well-chosen cavern or hole of a Rock; nor were it impossible to provide them there, of as soft a bed. And yet would it not be some relief to speak of the fine slender pipes, winding to and fro, wherein they may be conveyed, so conveniently, from place to place; that if they do not fall into a reasoning humour in one place, they may in another? why what can this do? It seems somewhat like Balaam's project to get into a vein of incantation by changing stations. And transplace them as you will, it requires more magic than ever he was master of, to make those innocent harmless things masters of reason.
why should we further spend our guesses what may possibly be said? But yet, may not much be attributed to the convenient and well fenced cavity of the brains receptacle, or the more secret chambers within that? where the studious Atoms may be very private and free from disturbance? Yet sure it is hard to say, why they that are wont to do it here, might not as well philosophize in some wellchosen cavern or hole of a Rock; nor were it impossible to provide them there, of as soft a bed. And yet would it not be some relief to speak of the fine slender pipes, winding to and fro, wherein they may be conveyed, so conveniently, from place to place; that if they do not fall into a reasoning humour in one place, they may in another? why what can this do? It seems somewhat like Balaam's project to get into a vein of incantation by changing stations. And transplace them as you will, it requires more magick than ever he was master of, to make those innocent harmless things masters of reason.
For do but consider, what if you had a large phial capable of as great a quantity as you can think needful, of very fine particles, and, replenished with them, closely stopped, and well luted; suppose these as pure and fit for the purpose as you can imagine, only not yet rational; will their faring to and fro through very close and stanch tubes from one such receptacle to another, make them at last become so? It seems then, do what you will with them, toss and ⟨p. 118⟩tumble them hither and thither, rack them from vessel to vessel, try what methods you can devise of sublimation or improvement, every thing looks like a vain and hopeless essay. For indeed, do what you please or can think of, they are such immutable entities, you can never make them less or finer than they originally were: And rational they were not before their meeting in the body; wherefore it were a strange wonder if that should so far alter the case with them, that they should become rational by it.
For do but consider, what if you had a large phial capable of as great a quantity as you can think needful, of very fine particles, and, replenish'd with them, closely stopt, and well luted; suppose these as pure and fit for the purpose as you can imagine, only not yet rational; will their faring to and fro through very close and stanch tubes from one such receptacle to another, make them at last become so? It seems then, do what you will with them, toss and ⟨p. 118⟩tumble them hither and thither, rack them from vessel to vessel, try what methods you can devise of sublimation or improvement, every thing looks like a vain and hopeless essay. For indeed, do what you please or can think of, they are such immutable entities, you can never make them less or finer than they originally were: And rational they were not before their meeting in the body; wherefore it were a strange wonder if that should so far alter the case with them, that they should become rational by it.
And now, I must, upon the whole profess 1not to be well pleased with the strain of this discourse; not that I think it unsuitable to its subject (for I see not how it is fitly to be dealt with in a more serious way) but that I dislike the subject. And were it not that it is too obvious how prone the minds of some are to run themselves into any the grossest absurdities rather than admit the plain and easy sentiments of Religion: It were miserable trifling to talk at this rate, and a loss of time not to be endured. But when an unaccountable aversion to the acknowledgement and adoration of the ever-blessed Deity hurries away men, affrighted and offended at the lustre of his so manifest appearances, to take a bad, but the only, shelter the case can admit, under the wings of any the most silly foolish figment; though the ill temper and dangerous state of the persons is to be thought on with much pity; yet the things which they pretend being in themselves ⟨p. 119⟩ridiculous, if we will entertain them into our thoughts at all, can not fitly be entertained but with derision. Nor doth it more unbecome a serious person to laugh at what is ridiculous, than gravely to weigh and ponder what is weighty and considerable. Provided he do not seek occasions of that former sort, on purpose to gratify a vain humour; but only allow himself to discourse suitably to them, when they occur. And their dotage who would fain serve themselves of so wildly extravagant and impossible suppositions; for the fostering their horrid misbelief, that they have no God to worship, would certainly justify as sharp ironies, as the Prophet Elijah bestows upon them who worshipped Baal, instead of the true God.
And now, I must, upon the whole profess 1not to be well pleased with the strain of this discourse; not that I think it unsutable to its subject (for I see not how it is fitly to be dealt with in a more serious way) but that I dislike the subject. And were it not that it is too obvious how prone the minds of some are to run themselves into any the grossest absurdities rather than admit the plain and easie sentiments of Religion: It were miserable trifling to talk at this rate, and a loss of time not to be endured. But when an unaccountable aversion to the acknowledgement and adoration of the ever-blessed Deity hurries away men, affrighted and offended at the lustre of his so manifest appearances, to take a bad, but the only, shelter the case can admit, under the wings of any the most silly foolish figment; though the ill temper and dangerous state of the persons is to be thought on with much pity; yet the things which they pretend being in themselves
Nor is any thing here said intended as a reflection on such as being unfurnished with a 1notion of created intelligent spirits that might distinguish them from the most subtle matter, have therefore thought them capable of being involved in the same common notion therewith, thinking them material; and yet, in the mean time doubted not their immortality, much less the existence of a Deity, the Author and Former of them and all things. For they are no way guilty of that blasphemous nonsense, to make them consist of necessary self-subsistent matter, every minute particle whereof is judged eternal and immutable, and in themselves, for ought we can find asserted, destitute of reason, and which yet acquire it by no one knows what coalition, without the ⟨p. 120⟩help of a wise efficient that shall direct and and order it to so unimaginable an improvement. The persons do only think more refined matter capable of that impression and stamp; or of having such a power put into it by the Creators all-disposing hand, Wherein, to do them right, though they should impose somewhat hardly upon themselves if they will make this estimate of the natural capacity of matter; or if they think the acts and power of reason in man altogether unnatural to him. Yet they do in effect the more befriend the cause we are pleading for (as much as it can be befriended by a mis-apprehension; which yet is a thing of that untoward genius, and doth so ill consort with truth, that it's never admitted as a friend in any one in respect, but it repays it with a mischievous revenge in some other, as might many ways be shown in this instance, if it were within the compass of our present design.) It being evident that if any portion of matter shall indeed be certainly found the actual subject of such powers, and to have such operations belonging to it, there is the plainer and more undeniable necessity and demonstration of his power and wisdom, who can make any thing of any thing, and who shall then have done that which is so altogether impossible, except to him to whom all things are possible. There is the more manifest need of his hand to heighten dull matter to a qualifiedness for performances so much above its nature; To make the loose and independent parts of so ⟨p. 121⟩fluid matter cohere and hold together, that, if it were once made capable of knowledge, and the actual subject of it;
whatsoever notions were imprest thereon, might not be in a moment confounded and lost. As indeed they could not but be if the particles of matter were the immediate seat of reason; and so steady a hand did not hold them in a settled composure, that they be not disordered, and men have, thence, the necessity of beginning afresh to know any thing every hour of the day. Though yet it seems a great deal more reasonable to suppose the souls of men to be of a substance in it self more consistent; and more agreeable to our experience, who find a continual ebbing and flowing of spirits, without being sensible of any so notable and sudden changes in our knowledge, as we could not but thereupon observe in our selves, if they, or any as fluid finer matter, were the immediate subjects of it.
whatsoever notions were imprest thereon, might not be in a moment confounded and lost. As indeed they could not but be if the particles of matter were the immediate seat of reason; and so steady a hand did not hold them in a setled composure, that they be not disordered, and men have, thence, the necessity of beginning afresh to know any thing every hour of the day. Though yet it seems a great deal more reasonable to suppose the souls of men to be of a substance in it self more consistent; and more agreeable to our experience, who find a continual ebbing and flowing of spirits, without being sensible of any so notable and sudden changes in our knowledge, as we could not but thereupon observe in our selves, if they, or any as fluid finer matter, were the immediate subjects of it.
It is therefore however sufficiently evident, and out of question that the humane soul (be its own substance what it will) must have an efficient divers from matter, which it was our present intendment to evince. And so our way is clear to proceed to.
The second enquiry whether it be not also manifest from the powers and operations which 1belong to it as it is reasonable, that it must have had an intelligent efficient? That is since we find and are assured that there is a sort of Being in the world (yea somewhat of our selves, and that hath best right of any thing else about us ⟨p. 122⟩to be called our selves) that can think, understand, deliberate, argue, &c. And which we can most certainly assure our selves (whether it were pre-existent in any former state or no) is not an independent or uncaused Being; and hath therefore been the effect of some cause, whether it be not apparently the effect of a wise Cause.
- 1XIV.
And this upon supposition of what hath been before proved seems not liable to any the least rational doubt. For it is already apparent that it is not it self matter; and if it were, it is however the more apparent, that its cause is not matter. Inasmuch as if it be it self matter, its powers and operations are so much above the natural capacity of matter, as that it must have had a cause so much more noble, and of a more perfect nature than that, as to be able to raise and improve it beyond the natural capacity of matter: which it was impossible for that it self, to do. Whence it is plain, it must have a cause divers from matter.
Wherefore this its immaterial cause must either be wise and intelligent, or not so. But is it possible any man should ever be guilty of a greater absurdity than to acknowledge, some certain immaterial Agent destitute of Wisdom, the only cause and fountain of all that wisdom, that is, or hath ever been in the whole race of mankind. That is as much as to say that all the wisdom of mankind hath been caused without a cause. For it is the same thing after we have acknowledged any thing to be caused, to say it ⟨p. 123⟩was caused by no cause, as to say it was caused by such a cause as hath nothing of that in it, whereof we find somewhat to be in the effect. Nor can it avail any thing, to speak of the disproportion or superior excellency in some effects to their second, or to their only partial causes. As that there are sometimes learned children of unlearned parents. For who did ever, in that case, say the parents were the productive causes of that learning? or of them as they were learned? Sure that learning comes from some other cause. But shall it then be said the souls of men have received their being from some such immaterial Agent destitute of wisdom; and afterward their wisdom and intellectual ability came some other way; by their own observation, or by institution and precept from others? whence then came their capacity of observing, or of receiving such instruction? Can any thing naturally destitute even of seminal reason (as we may call it) or of any aptitude or capacity tending thereto, ever be able to make observations, or receive instructions, whereby at length it may become rational? And is not that capacity of the soul of man a real something? or is there no difference between being capable of reason and uncapable? what then, did this real something proceed from nothing? or was the soul it self caused, and this its capacity uncaused? or was its cause only capable of intellectual perfection, but not actually furnished therewith? But if it were only capable, surely its advantages ⟨p. 124⟩for the actual attainment thereof have been much greater than ours. Whence it were strange if that capacity should never have come into act. And more strange that we should know or have any ground to pretend that it hath not. But that there was an actual exercise of wisdom in the production of the reasonable soul is most evident. For is it a necessary being?
Wherefore this its immaterial cause must either be wise and intelligent, or not so. But is it possible any man should ever be guilty of a greater absurdity than to acknowledge, some certain immaterial Agent destitute of Wisdom, the only cause and fountain of all that wisdom, that is, or hath ever been in the whole race of mankind. That is as much as to say that all the wisdom of mankind hath been caused without a cause. For it is the same thing after we have acknowledged any thing to be caused, to say it
that we have proved it is not. It is therefore a contingent, and its being depended on a free cause, into whose pleasure, only, it was resolvable, that it should be or not be. And which therefore had a dominion over its own acts. If this bespeak not an intelligent Agent, what doth?
And though this might also be said concerning every thing else which is not necessarily; and so might yield a more general argument to evince a free designing cause; yet it concludes with greater evidence concerning the reasonable soul; whose powers and operations it is so manifestly impossible should have proceeded from matter. And therefore even that vain (and refuted) pretence it self, that other things might, by the necessary laws of its motion, become what they are, can have less place here. Whence it is more apparent that the reasonable soul must have had a free and intelligent cause that used liberty and counsel in determining that it should be, and especially that it should be such a sort of thing as we find it is. For when we see how aptly its powers and faculties serve for their proper and peculiar operations, ⟨p. 125⟩who that is not besides himself can think that such a thing was made by one that knew not what he was doing? or that such powers were not given on purpose for such operations? And what is the capacity but a power that should sometime be reduced into act, and arrive to the exercise of reason it self?
Now was it possible any thing should give that power that had it not any way? that is in the same kind, or in some more excellent and noble kind? For we contend not that this Agent whereof we speak is in the strict and proper sense rational, taking that term to import an ability or faculty of inferring what is less known from what is more. For we suppose all things equally known to him (which so far as is requisite to our present design that is the representing him the proper object of Religion, or of that honour which the dedication of a Temple to him imports, we may in due time come more expressly to assert.) And that the knowledge, which is, with us, the end of reasoning, is in him, in its highest perfection without being at all beholden to that means; that all the connection of things with one another lie open to one comprehensive view; and are known to be connected; but not because they are so. We say, is it conceivable that mans knowing power should proceed from a cause that hath it not, in the same, or this more perfect kind? And may use those words to this purpose, not for their authority (which we expect ⟨p. 126⟩not should be here significant) but the convincing evidence they carry with them, He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know? That we may derive this matter to an issue, 'tis evident, the soul of man is not a necessary self-originate thing: And had therefore some cause. We find it to have knowledge, or the power of knowing belonging to it. Therefore we say, so had its cause. We rely not here upon the credit of vulgar maxims (whereof divers might be mentioned) but the reason of them; or of the thing it self we allege. And do now speak of the whole entire cause of this being, the humane soul, or of whatsoever is causal of it; or of any perfection naturally appertaining to it. It is of an intelligent nature. Did this intelligent nature proceed from an unintelligent, as the whole and only cause of it? That were to speak against our own eyes, and most natural common sentiments. And were the same thing as to say that something came of nothing. For it is all one to say so, and to say that any thing communicated what it had not to communicate.
Now was it possible any thing should give that power that had it not any way? that is in the same kind, or in some more excellent and noble kind? For we contend not that this Agent whereof we speak is in the strict and proper sense rational, taking that term to import an ability or faculty of inferring what is less known from what is more. For we suppose all things equally known to him (which so far as is requisite to our present design that is the representing him the proper object of Religion, or of that honour which the dedication of a Temple to him imports, we may in due time come more expresly to assert.) And that the knowledge, which is, with us, the end of reasoning, is in him, in its highest perfection without being at all beholden to that means; that all the connexion of things with one another lie open to one comprehensive view; and are known to be connected; but not because they are so. We say, is it conceivable that mans knowing power should proceed from a cause that hath it not, in the same, or this more perfect kind? And may use those words to this purpose, not for their authority (which we expect
Or (which is alike madly absurd) to say that the same thing was such and not such, intelligent and not intelligent, able to communicate an intelligent nature (for sure what it doth it is able to do) and not able (for it is not able to communicate what it hath not) at the same time.
It is hardly here, worth the while to spend time in countermining that contemptible Refuge (which is as uncapable of offending us, as ⟨p. 127⟩of being defended) that humane souls may perhaps only have proceeded in the ordinary course of Generation from one another. For that none have ever said any thing to that purpose, deserving a confutation except that some sober and pious persons, for the avoiding of some other difficulties, have thought it more safe to assert the traduction of humane souls; who yet were far enough from imagining that they could be total, or first causes to one another: And doubted not but they had the constant necessary assistance of that same Being we are pleading for, acting in his own sphere as the first cause in all such (as well as any other) productions. Wherein they nothing oppose the main design of this discourse. And therefore it is not in our way to offer at any opposition unto them.
But if any have a mind to indulge themselves the liberty of so much dotage as to say the souls of men were first and only causes to one another. Either they must suppose them to be material beings. And then we refer them to what hath been already said, showing that their powers and operations cannot belong to matter, nor arise from it. Or immaterial, and then, they cannot produce one another in the way of generation. For of what pre-existent substance are they made? Theirs who beget them? of that they can part with nothing, separability, at least, of parts being a most confessed property of matter. Or some other? where will they find that other spiritual substance, ⟨p. 128⟩that belonged not inseparably to some individual being before. And besides, if it were pre-existent, as it must be if a soul be generated out of it, then they were not the first and only causes of this production.
But if any have a mind to indulge themselves the liberty of so much dotage as to say the souls of men were first and only causes to one another. Either they must suppose them to be material beings. And then we refer them to what hath been already said, shewing that their powers and operations cannot belong to matter, nor arise from it. Or immaterial, and then, they cannot produce one another in the way of generation. For of what pre-existent substance are they made? Theirs who beget them? of that they can part with nothing, separability, at least, of parts being a most confessed property of matter. Or some other? where will they find that other spiritual subsubstance, ⟨p. 128⟩that belong'd not inseparably to some individual being before. And besides, if it were pre-existent, as it must be if a soul be generated out of it, then they were not the first and only causes of this production.