A44683:203
The Living Temple
The living temple, or, A designed improvement of that notion that a good man is the temple of God by John Howe ...
London: printed for John Starkey, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Now was it possible any thing should give that power that had it not any way? that is in the same kind, or in some more excellent and noble kind? For we contend not that this Agent whereof we speak is in the strict and proper sense rational, taking that term to import an ability or faculty of inferring what is less known from what is more. For we suppose all things equally known to him (which so far as is requisite to our present design that is the representing him the proper object of Religion, or of that honour which the dedication of a Temple to him imports, we may in due time come more expressly to assert.) And that the knowledge, which is, with us, the end of reasoning, is in him, in its highest perfection without being at all beholden to that means; that all the connection of things with one another lie open to one comprehensive view; and are known to be connected; but not because they are so. We say, is it conceivable that mans knowing power should proceed from a cause that hath it not, in the same, or this more perfect kind? And may use those words to this purpose, not for their authority (which we expect ⟨p. 126⟩not should be here significant) but the convincing evidence they carry with them, He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know? That we may derive this matter to an issue, 'tis evident, the soul of man is not a necessary self-originate thing: And had therefore some cause. We find it to have knowledge, or the power of knowing belonging to it. Therefore we say, so had its cause. We rely not here upon the credit of vulgar maxims (whereof divers might be mentioned) but the reason of them; or of the thing it self we allege. And do now speak of the whole entire cause of this being, the humane soul, or of whatsoever is causal of it; or of any perfection naturally appertaining to it. It is of an intelligent nature. Did this intelligent nature proceed from an unintelligent, as the whole and only cause of it? That were to speak against our own eyes, and most natural common sentiments. And were the same thing as to say that something came of nothing. For it is all one to say so, and to say that any thing communicated what it had not to communicate.
Now was it possible any thing should give that power that had it not any way? that is in the same kind, or in some more excellent and noble kind? For we contend not that this Agent whereof we speak is in the strict and proper sense rational, taking that term to import an ability or faculty of inferring what is less known from what is more. For we suppose all things equally known to him (which so far as is requisite to our present design that is the representing him the proper object of Religion, or of that honour which the dedication of a Temple to him imports, we may in due time come more expresly to assert.) And that the knowledge, which is, with us, the end of reasoning, is in him, in its highest perfection without being at all beholden to that means; that all the connexion of things with one another lie open to one comprehensive view; and are known to be connected; but not because they are so. We say, is it conceivable that mans knowing power should proceed from a cause that hath it not, in the same, or this more perfect kind? And may use those words to this purpose, not for their authority (which we expect