Was it necessary that he in whose choice it was whether we should ever know any thing or no, should make us capable of knowing every thing belonging to his own being? Or will we adventure to be so assuming, as while we deny it to God that he knows all things, to attribute to our selves that we do? But if we will think it not altogether unworthy of us to be ignorant of some thing, what is there of which we may with more probability or with less disparagement be thought so, than the manner of Gods knowing things? And what place is there for complaint of inevidence in the latter? Is not that knowledge more perfect, which so fully already comprehends all things, as upon that account to admit of no increase; than that which shall be every day growing, and have a continual succession of new objects emerging and coming into view, before, altogether unknown? And will not that be the case if we suppose future contingencies to lie concealed from the penetrating eye of God? For whatsoever is future, will some time be present, and then we will allow such contingencies to be known to him. That is, that God may know them when we our selves can! And that nothing of that kind is known to him which is not at least knowable some way or other to our selves, at least successively, and one thing after another. We will perhaps, allow that prerogative to God in point of this knowledge, that he can know these things, now fallen out, all at once, we but by degrees, ⟨p. 266⟩while yet there is not any one that is absolutely unknowable to us. But why should it be thought unreasonable to attribute an excellency to the knowledge of God above ours, as well in respect of the manner of knowing, as the multitude of objects, at once, known? we will readily confess in some creatures an excellency of their visive faculty above our own; that they can see things in that darkness, wherein they are, to us, invisible. And will we not allow that to the eye of God, which is as a flame of fire to be able to penetrate into the abstrusest darkness of futurity, though we know not the way how it is done; when yet we know that whatsoever belongs to the most perfect being, must belong to his? And that knowledge of all things, imports more perfection, than if it were lessened by the ignorance of any thing.
Was it necessary that he in whose choice it was whether we should ever know any thing or no, should make us capable of knowing every thing belonging to his own being? Or will we adventure to be so assuming, as while we deny it to God that he knows all things, to attribute to our selves that we do? But if we will think it not altogether unworthy of us to be ignorant of some thing, what is there of which we may with more probability or with less disparagement be thought so, than the manner of Gods knowing things? And what place is there for complaint of inevidence in the latter? Is not that knowledge more perfect, which so fully already comprehends all things, as upon that account to admit of no increase; than that which shall be every day growing, and have a continual succession of new objects emerging and coming into view, before, altogether unknown? And will not that be the case if we suppose future contingencies to lie conceal'd from the penetrating eye of God? For whatsoever is future, will some time be present, and then we will allow such contingencies to be known to him. That is, that God may know them when we our selves can! And that nothing of that kind is known to him which is not at least knowable some way or other to our selves, at least successively, and one thing after another. We will perhaps, allow that prerogative to God in point of this knowledge, that he can know these things, now fall'n out, all at once, we but by degrees, ⟨p. 266⟩while yet there is not any one that is absolutely unknowable to us. But why should it be thought unreasonable to attribute an excellency to the knowledge of God above ours, as well in respect of the manner of knowing, as the multitude of objects, at once, known? we will readily confess in some creatures an excelency of their visive faculty above our own; that they can see things in that darkness, wherein they are, to us, invisible. And will we not allow that to the eye of God, which is as a flame of fire to be able to penetrate into the abstrusest darkness of futurity, though we know not the way how it is done; when yet we know that whatsoever belongs to the most perfect being, must belong to his? And that knowledge of all things, imports more perfection, than if it were lessened by the ignorance of any thing.