Chapter 6
pp. 226–287111 passagespart 1 of 3
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CHAP. VI.
What is intended by Gods conversableness with men, considered only as fundamental and presupposed to a Temple. An account of the Epicurean Deity. Its existence impossible any way to be proved if it did exist. Nor can be affirmed to any good intent. That such a Being is not God. That the absolute perfection proved of God represents him a fit object of Religion. From thence more particularly deduced to this purpose. His Omniscience, Omnipotency, Unlimited Goodness, Immensity. Curcellaeus's Arguments again this last considered.
What is intended by Gods conversableness with men, considered only as fundamental and presupposed to a Temple. An account of the Epicurean Deity. Its existence impossible any way to be proved if it did exist. Nor can be affirmed to any good intent. That such a Being is not God. That the absolute perfection proved of God represents him a fit object of Religion. From thence more particularly deduced to this purpose. His Omnisciency, Omnipotency, Unlimited Goodness, Immensity. Curcellaeus's Arguments again this last considered.
NOR is the thing here intended less necessary 1to a Temple and Religion, than what we have hitherto been discoursing of. For such a sort of Deity as should shut up it self, and be reclus'd from all converse with men, would leave us as disfurnished of an object of Religion, and would render a Temple on earth as vain a thing, as if there were none at all. ⟨p. 227⟩It were a Being not to be worshipped, nor with any propriety, to be called God more (in some respect less) than an image or statue. We might, with as rational design, worship, for a God, what were scarce worthy to be called the shadow of a man, as dedicate Temples to a wholly unconversable Deity: That is, such a one as not only will not vouchsafe to converse with men; but, that cannot admit it. Or whose nature were altogether uncapable of such converse.
NOR is the thing here intended less necessary 1to a Temple and Religion, than what we have hitherto been discoursing of. For such a sort of Deity as should shut up it self, and be reclus'd from all converse with men, would leave us as disfurnish'd of an object of Religion, and would render a Temple on earth as vain a thing, as if there were none at all. ⟨p. 227⟩It were a Being not to be worshipped, nor with any propriety, to be called God more (in some respect less) than an image or statue. We might, with as rational design, worship, for a God, what were scarce worthy to be called the shadow of a man, as dedicate Temples to a wholly unconversable Deity: That is, such a one as not only will not vouchsafe to converse with men; but, that cannot admit it. Or whose nature were altogether uncapable of such converse.
- 1I.
For that measure and latitude of sense must be allowed unto the expression [conversableness with men] as that it signify both capacity and propension to such converse. That God is both, by his Nature, capable of it, and hath a gracious inclination of will thereunto. Yea and we will add (what is also not without the compass of our present theme, nor the import of this word whereby we generally express it) that he is not only inclined to converse with men, but that he actually doth it. As we call him a conversable person that upon all befitting occasions doth freely converse with such as have any concern with him.
For that measure and latitude of sense must be allowed unto the expression [conversableness with men] as that it signifie both capacity and propension to such converse. That God is both, by his Nature, capable of it, and hath a gracious inclination of will thereunto. Yea and we will add (what is also not without the compass of our present theam, nor the import of this word whereby we generally express it) that he is not only inclined to converse with men, but that he actually doth it. As we call him a conversable person that upon all befitting occasions doth freely converse with such as have any concern with him.
It will indeed be necessary to distinguish Gods converse with men, into,
That which he hath in common with all men: so as to sustain them in their beings, and some way, influence their actions (in which kind he is also conversant with all his creatures) and
That which he more peculiarly hath with good men.
And, though the consideration of the latter of these will belong to the discourse concerning his Temple it self, which he hath with and in them; yet it is the former, only, we have now to consider, as presupposed thereto, and as the ground thereof. Together with his gracious propension to the latter also.
As the great Apostle, in his discourse at Athens, lays the same ground for acquaintance with God (which he intimates should be set afoot and continued in another sort of Temple than is made with hands) that he hath given to all breath, and being, and all things, and that he is near and ready (whence they should therefore seek him, if haply they might feel after him, and find him out) in order to further converse.
And here, our business will have the less in it of labour and difficulty; for that we shall have little else to do, besides only the applying of principles already asserted (or possibly the more express adding of some or other that were implied in what hath been said) to this purpose.
And here, our business will have the less in it of labour and difficulty; for that we shall have little else to do, besides only the applying of principles already asserted (or possibly the more express adding of some or other that were imply'd in what hath been said) to this purpose.
From which principles it will appear, that he not only can, but that (in the former sense) he doth converse with men, and is graciously inclined thereto (in the latter.) And yet because the former is more deeply fundamental, as whereon all depends, and that the act of it is not denied for any other reason than an imagined impossibility; that is, 'tis not said he doth not sustain and govern the world, upon any other pretence, but that he cannot (as ⟨p. 229⟩being inconsistent with his nature and felicity,) This we shall therefore more directly apply our selves to evince, That his nature doth not disallow it, but necessarily includes an aptitude thereto.
From which principles it will appear, that he not only can, but that (in the former sense) he doth converse with men, and is graciously inclin'd thereto (in the latter.) And yet because the former is more deeply fundamental, as whereon all depends, and that the act of it is not deny'd for any other reason than an imagined impossibility; that is, 'tis not said he doth not sustain and govern the world, upon any other pretence, but that he cannot (as ⟨p. 229⟩being inconsistent with his nature and felicity,) This we shall therefore more directly apply our selves to evince, That his nature doth not disallow it, but necessarily includes an aptitude thereto.
Nor yet though it may be a less laborious work than the former that we have dispatched, is it altogether needless to deal somewhat more expressly in this matter. Inasmuch as what opposition hath been made to Religion in the world hath for the most part been more expressly directed against this ground of it. I say more expressly; For indeed by plain and manifest consequence it impugns that also of Gods existence: That is through this, it strikes at the other. For surely (howsoever any may arbitrarily, and with what impropriety and latitude of speech they please, bestow titles and elogies here or there) That being is not God, that cannot converse with men; supposing them such as what purely and peculiarly belongs to the nature of man would bespeak them. So that they who have imagined such a being, and been pleased to call it God, have at once said and unsaid the same thing. That Deity was but a creature, and that, only, of their own fancy; and they have by the same breath blown up and blasted their own bubble, made it seem something, and signify nothing. Have courted it into being, and rioted it again quite out of it. In their conceit created it a God, in their practice a mere nullity. And it equally served their turn, and as much favoured the design of ⟨p. 230⟩being wicked, to acknowledge only a God they could imagine and dis-imagine at their own pleasure; as to have acknowledged none at all. It could do no prejudice to their affairs to admit of this fictitious Deity that they could make be what, or where they pleased. That should affect ease and pleasure, and (lest his pleasures and theirs should interfere) that they could confine to remote territories, and oblige to keep at an obedient and untroublesome distance. Nor, though no imagination could be more madly extravagant, than that of a God no way concerned in the forming and governing of the world; and, notwithstanding whom men might take their liberty to do what they listed; yet, as hath been observed long ago, that no opinion was ever so monstrously absurd, as not to be owned by some of the Philosophers) hath not this wanted patronage, and even among them who have obtained to be esteemed (not to say idolized) under that name.
Nor yet though it may be a less laborious work than the former that we have dispatcht, is it altogether needless to deal somewhat more expresly in this matter. Inasmuch as what opposition hath been made to Religion in the world hath for the most part been more expresly directed against this ground of it. I say more expresly; For indeed by plain and manifest consequence it impugns that also of Gods existence: That is through this, it strikes at the other. For surely (howsoever any may arbitrarily, and with what impropriety and latitude of speech they please, bestow titles and elogies here or there) That being is not God, that cannot converse with men; supposing them such as what purely and peculiarly belongs to the nature of man would bespeak them. So that they who have imagined such a being, and been pleased to call it God, have at once said and unsaid the same thing. That Deity was but a creature, and that, only, of their own fancy; and they have by the same breath blown up and blasted their own bubble, made it seem something, and signifie nothing. Have courted it into being, and rioted it again quite out of it. In their conceit created it a God, in their practice a meer nullity. And it equally serv'd their turn, and as much favoured the design of
Which would be seen if it were worth the while to trouble the Reader with an account of the Epicurean Deity. As it can only be with this design, that the representation may render it (as it cannot but do) ridiculous, to sober men; and discover to the rest the vanity of their groundless, and self-contradicting hope (still too much fostered in the breasts of not a few) who promise themselves impunity in the most licentious course of wickedness, upon the security only of this their own idle dream. ⟨p. 231⟩That is, that if there be a God (which they reckon it not so plausible flatly to deny) he is a Being of either so dull and phlegmatic a temper that he cannot be concerned in the actions and affairs of men, or so soft and easy that he will not.
Which would be seen if it were worth the while to trouble the Reader with an account of the Epicurean Deity. As it can only be with this design, that the representation may render it (as it cannot but do) ridiculous, to sober men; and discover to the rest the vanity of their groundless, and self-contradicting hope (still too much fostered in the breasts of not a few) who promise themselves impunity in the most licentious course of wickedness, upon the security only of this their own idle dream. ⟨p. 231⟩That is, that if there be a God (which they reckon it not so plausible flatly to deny) he is a Being of either so dull and phlegmatick a temper that he cannot be concerned in the actions and affairs of men, or so soft and easie that he will not.
But, because his good will alone was not so safely to be relied on, it was thought the securer way not to let it be in his power, to intermeddle with their concernments. And therefore being to frame their own God to their own turn. Thus the matter was, of old, contrived.
But, because his good will alone was not so safely to be rely'd on, it was thought the securer way not to let it be in his power, to intermeddle with their concernments. And therefore being to frame their own God to their own turn. Thus the matter was, of old, contriv'd.
First, great care was taken that he be set at a distance remote enough; that he be complemented out of this world, as a place too mean for his reception, and unworthy such a presence. They being indeed unconcerned where he had his residence. So it were not too near them. So that a confinement of him somewhere 1was thought altogether necessary.
- 1Ac designare quidem non licet quibus in locis Dii degant. Cum ne noster quidem hic mundus, digna sit illorum sedes. Phil. Epicur. Syntag.
Secondly, and then, with the same pretence of great observance and respect, it is judged too great a trouble to him, and inconsistent with the felicity of his nature and being, that he should have given himself any diversion or disturbance, by making the world. From the care and labour whereof he is with all ceremony to be excused. It being too painful and laborious ⟨p. 232⟩an undertaking for an immortal and an happy Being. Besides that he was altogether 1destitute of instruments, and utensils requisite to so great a performance.
Secondly, and then, with the same pretence of great observance and respect, it is judg'd too great a trouble to him, and inconsistent with the felicity of his nature and being, that he should have given himself any diversion or disturbance, by making the world. From the care and labour whereof he is with all ceremony to be excused. It being too painful and laborious ⟨p. 232⟩an undertaking for an immortal and an happy Being. Besides that he was altogether 1destitute of instruments, and utensils requisite to so great a performance.
- 1[Greek or Hebrew]. Laertius, l. 10. Epist. Epicur. ad Pyth•ci—Quae molitio, quae ferramenta, qui vectes, quae machinae, qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? Vell. apud Cicer. de natura Deorum.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Laertius, l. 10. Epist. Epicur. ad Pyth•ci—Quae molitio, quae ferramenta, qui vectes, quae machinae, qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? Vell. apud Cicer. de natura Deorum.
Whence also, thirdly, he was with the same 1reason to be excused of all the care and incumbrance of government (as indeed, what right or pretence could he have to the government of a world that chose him not, which is not his inheritance, and which he never made?) But all is very plausibly shadowed over with a great appearance of reverence and veneration, with magnificent elogies of his never interrupted ⟨p. 233⟩felicity. Whence also it is made a very great crime not to free even the Divine Nature it self, from business. Though yet the true ground and root of this Epicurean Faith doth, sometime more apparently discover it self; even an impatience of the Divine Government, and a regret of that irksome bondage which the acknowledgement of a Deity that were to be feared by men would infer upon them.
Whence also, thirdly, he was with the same 1reason to be excused of all the care and incumbrance of government (as indeed, what right or pretence could he have to the government of a world that chose him not, which is not his inheritance, and which he never made?) But all is very plausibly shadowed over with a great appearance of reverence and veneration, with magnificent elogies of his never interrupted ⟨p. 233⟩felicity. Whence also it is made a very great crime not to free even the Divine Nature it self, from business. Though yet the true ground and root of this Epicurean Faith doth, sometime more apparently discover it self; even an impatiency of the Divine Government, and a regret of that irksom bondage which the acknowledgment of a Deity that were to be feared by men would infer upon them.
- 1Nihil beatius nihil omnino bonis omnibus affluentius excogitari potest. Nihil enim agit, nullis occupationibus est implicatus, &c. Id. [Greek or Hebrew]. Laert. ibid. Itaque imposuistis cervicibis nostris sempiternum aominum, quem, dies & noctes, timeremus. Quis cnim non timeat omnia providentem, & cogitantem, & animadvertentem, & omnia ad se pertinere putantem, curiosum & plenum negotii Deum? Vell. ubi supra. Humana ante oculos foede cum vita jacere. In terris oppressa gravi sub religione Primum Graius homo mortalis (meaning Epicurus the first champion of Irreligion.) Lucret. To which purpose, besides what we have in Laert. [Greek or Hebrew], l. 10. Much more is collected in the Syntagm. Nam & praestans Deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum aeterna esset & beatissima. Habet enim venerationem justam quicquid excellit. Et metus omnis, a vi atque ira Deorum pulsus esset. Intelligitur enim a beata immortalique natura, & iram & gratiam segregari. Quibus remotis, nullos a superis impendere metus &c. Sect. 1. cap. 3. An & mundum fecit, & in mundo homines ut ab hominibus coleretur? At quid Deo cultus hominum confert, beato, & nulla re indigenti? Sect. 2. cap. 3.
And therefore fourthly, he is further expressly asserted to be such as need not be feared; as cares not to be worshipped, as with whom neither anger nor favour hath any place.
And therefore fourthly, he is further expresly asserted to be such as need not be feared; as cares not to be worshipped, as with whom neither anger nor favour hath any place.
So that nothing more of duty is owing to him than a certain kind of arbitrary veneration, which we give to any thing, or person that we apprehend to excel us, and to be in some respect better than our selves. An observance merely upon courtesy. But obedience and subjection to his Government, fear of his displeasure, expectation of his favour and benefits have no place left them. We are not obliged to worship him as one with whom we have any concern, and do owe him no more homage than to the great Mogul, or the Cham of Tartary, and indeed are less liable to his severity, or capable of his favours than theirs; for of theirs we are in some remote possibility, of his in none at all. In one word, all converse between him and man on his part by providence, and on ours by Religion, is quite cut off. Which evidently appears (from what hath been already collected out of his own ⟨p. 234⟩words and theirs who pretended to speak that so adored Authors mind and sense) to be the scope and sum of the Epicurean doctrine in this matter, and was indeed observed to be so long ago; by one that we may suppose to have had better opportunity and advantages to know it, than we: Who discoursing that a man cannot live pleasantly, according to the principles of Epicurus. And that according to his doctrine beasts are more happy than men; plainly gives this reason why he says so, viz. that the Epicureans took away providence. And that 1the design of their discoursing concerning God was that we might not fear him.
So that nothing more of duty is owing to him than a certain kind of arbitrary veneration, which we give to any thing, or person that we apprehend to excel us, and to be in some respect better than our selves. An observance meerly upon courtesie. But obedience and subjection to his Government, fear of his displeasure, expectation of his favour and benefits have no place left them. We are not obliged to worship him as one with whom we have any concern, and do owe him no more homage than to the great Mogul, or the Cham of Tartary, and indeed are less liable to his severity, or capable of his favours than theirs; for of theirs we are in some remote possibility, of his in none at all. In one word, all converse between him and man on his part by providence, and on ours by Religion, is quite cut off. Which evidently appears (from what hath been already collected out of his own ⟨p. 234⟩
Unto which purpose also much more may be seen in the same Author elsewhere, when he more directly pleads (among divers more philosophical subjects) on behalf of Religion against the Epicurean Doctrine which he saith they leave to us in word and show, but, by their 1principles, take away in deed, as they do nature, and the soul, &c.
Unto which purpose also much more may be seen in the same Author elsewhere, when he more directly pleads (among divers more philosophical subjects) on behalf of Religion against the Epicurean Doctrine which he saith they leave to us in word and shew, but, by their 1principles, take away in deed, as they do nanature, and the soul, &c.
- 1Adversus Colotem [Greek or Hebrew]. Unto which purpose is that also in Tully. At etiam de sanctitate, de pietate adversus Deos libros scripsit Epicurus. At quomodo in his loquitur? ut Coruncanium aut Scaevulam Pontifices maximos te audire dicas non eum, qui subtulerit omnem funditus religionem: Nec manibus ut Xerxes, sed rationibus Templa Deorum & aras averterit. De natura Deorum.Adversus Colotem 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Unto which purpose is that also in Tully. At etiam de sanctitate, de pietate adversus Deos libros scripsit Epicurus. At quomodo in his loquitur? ut Coruncanium aut Scaevulam Pontifices maximos te audire dicas non eum, qui subtulerit omnem funditus religionem: Nec manibus ut Xerxes, sed rationibus Templa Deorum & aras averterit. De natura Deorum.
It is then out of question that the Doctrine of Epicurus utterly takes away all intercourse between God and man. Which yet were little worth our notice or consideration: nor would it answer any valuable end or purpose to revive the mention of such horrid opinions, or tell the world what such a one said or thought two thousand years ago. If their grave had been faithful to its trust and had retained their filthy poisonous savour within its own unhallowed Cell.
It is then out of question that the Doctrine of Epicurus utterly takes away all intercourse between God and man. Which yet were little worth our notice or consideration: nor would it answer any valuable end or purpose to revive the mention of such horrid opinions, or tell the world what such a one said or thought two thousand years ago. If their grave had been faithful to its trust and had retain'd their filthy poisonous savour within its own unhallowed Cell.
But since (against what were so much to have been desired, that their womb might have been their Grave) their Grave becomes their womb, where they are conceived and formed anew, and whence by a second birth they spring forth afresh to the great annoyance of the world, the debauching and endangering of mankind. And that it is necessary some remedy be endeavoured of so mortal an evil, it was also convenient to run it up to its original. And contend against it as in its primitive state and vigour.
Wherefore this being a true (though it be a very short) account of the Epicurean God; resulting all into this shorter sum, That he is altogether unconversable with men (and such therefore as cannot inhabit their Temple, and for whom they can have no obligation or rational design to provide any) it will be requisite in reference hereto, and suitable to our present scope and purpose, severally to evince these things.
Wherefore this being a true (though it be a very short) account of the Epicurean God; resulting all into this shorter sum, That he is altogether unconversable with men (and such therefore as cannot inhabit their Temple, and for whom they can have no obligation or rational design to provide any) it will be requisite in reference hereto, and sutable to our present scope and purpose, severally to evince these things.
1. That the existence of such a Being as this were impossible ever to be proved unto men, if it did exist.
2. That, Being supposed, without any good ground; 'tis equally unimaginable that the supposition of it ean intend any valuable or good end.
3. That this supposed Being cannot be God, and is most abusively so called; as hereby, the true God, the cause and author of all things is intended to be excluded.
4. That it belongs to, and may be deduced from the true notion of God, which hath been given (and proved by parts of a really existent Being) that he is such as can converse with men.
For the first, That there is no way to prove the existence of such a Being, is evident. For what ways of proving it can be thought of, which the supposition it self doth not forbid, and reject? Is it to be proved by Revelation? But that supposes converse with men, and destroys what it should prove, that such a Being, having no converse with men doth exist. And where is that Revelation? Is it written or unwritten? Or who are its vouchers? Upon what authority doth it rest? who was appointed to inform the world in this matter? was Epicurus himself the common Oracle? why did he never tell men so? did he ever pretend to have seen any of these his vogued Gods? No, they are confessed not to be liable to our ⟨p. 237⟩sense any more than the Inane it self. And what Miracles did he ever work to confirm the truth of his Doctrine in this matter? which sure was reasonably to be expected from one who would gain credit to dictates so contrary to the common sentiments of the rest of mankind; And that were not to be proved any other way. And what other way can be devised? can it admit of rational demonstration? what shall be the medium? shall it be from the cause? But what cause can (or ever did) he or his followers assign of God? Or from effects? And what shall they be? When the matter of the whole universe is supposed ever to have been of it self, and the particular frame of every thing made thereof to have resulted only of the casual coalition of the parts of that matter? And no real Being is supposed besides? or shall it be that their Idea which they have of God includes existence as so belonging to him that he cannot but exist. But by what right do they affix such an Idea to their petite and fictitious Deities? How will they prove their Idea true? or are we bound to to take their words for it? Yea it is easily proved false and repugnant to it self, while they would have that to be necessarily existent (as they must if they will have it existent at all) unto which in the mean time they deny the other perfections which necessary existence hath been proved to include. But how vain and idle trifling is it, arbitrarily, and by a random fancy to imagine any thing what we please, and attributing of ⟨p. 238⟩our own special grace and favour necessary existence to it, thence to conclude that it doth exist, only because we have been pleased to make that belong to the notion of it?
What so odd and uncouth composition can we form any conception of which we may not make exist at this rate?
But the notion of God is not arbitrary, but is natural, proleptical, and common to men, imprest upon the minds of all: whence they say it ought not to be drawn into controversy. What? the Epicurean notion of him? we shall enquire further into that anon. And in the mean time, need not doubt to say, any man might, with as good pretence, imagine the ridiculous sort of Gods described in Cicero's 1Ironical supposition, and affirm them to exist as they those they have thought fit to feign, and would impose upon the belief of men. And when they have fancied these to exist, is not that a mighty proof that they indeed do so?
But the notion of God is not arbitrary, but is natural, proleptical, and common to men, imprest upon the minds of all: whence they say it ought not to be drawn into controversie. What? the Epicurean notion of him? we shall enquire further into that anon. And in the mean time, need not doubt to say, any man might, with as good pretence, imagine the ridiculous sort of Gods described in Cicero's 1Ironical supposition, and affirm them to exist as they those they have thought fit to feign, and would impose upon the belief of men. And when they have fancied these to exist, is not that a mighty proof that they indeed do so?
- 1Deos, Strabones, paetulos, naevum habentes, Silos, Flaccos, Frontones, Capitones, de Natura Deorum, l. 1.
But that, which for the present we allege, is, that, supposing their notion were never so absolutely universal and agreeing with the common sentiments of all other men, they have, yet, precluded themselves of any right to argue, from its commonness, to the existence of the thing it self. Nor can they, upon their principles, form an argument thence, that shall conclude or signify any thing to this purpose. None can be drawn hence, that will conclude immediately, and, it self, reach the mark; without the addition of some further thing, ⟨p. 239⟩which so ill sorts with the rest of their Doctrine that it would subvert the whole frame. That is, it follows not, that because men generally hold that there is a God, that therefore there is one, otherwise than as that consequence can be justified by this plain and irrefragable proof. That no reason can be devised of so general an agreement, or of that so common an impression upon the minds of men, but this only; that it must have proceeded from one common cause, viz. God himself; who having made man, so prime a part of his Creation, hath stamped with his own signature this nobler piece of his workmanship; and purposely made and framed him to the acknowledgement and adoration of his Maker.
But that, which for the present we alledge, is, that, supposing their notion were never so absolutely universal and agreeing with the common sentiments of all other men, they have, yet, precluded themselves of any right to argue, from its commonness, to the existence of the thing it self. Nor can they, upon their principles, form an argument thence, that shall conclude or signifie any thing to this purpose. None can be drawn hence, that will conclude immediately, and, it self, reach the mark; without the addition of some further thing, ⟨p. 239⟩which so ill sorts with the rest of their Doctrine that it would subvert the whole frame. That is, it follows not, that because men generally hold that there is a God, that therefore there is one, otherwise than as that consequence can be justified by this plain and irrefragable proof. That no reason can be devised of so general an agreement, or of that so common an impression upon the minds of men, but this only; that it must have proceeded from one common cause, viz. God himself; who having made man, so prime a part of his Creation, hath stampt with his own signature this nobler piece of his workmanship; and purposely made and fram'd him to the acknowledgment and adoration of his Maker.
But how shall they argue so, who while they acknowledge a God, deny man to be his creature? and will have him and all things be by chance, or without dependence on any Maker? what can an impression infer to this purpose that comes no one can tell whence or how? But is plainly denied to be from him, whose being they would argue from it?
The observation of so common an apprehension in the minds of men, might (upon their supposition) beget much wonder, but no knowledge; and may perplex men much, how such a thing should come to pass, without making them any thing the wiser, and would infer astonishment sooner than a good conclusion: or than it would solidly prove any important truth.
And do they think they have salved the business, and given us a satisfying account of this matter, by telling us, this impression is from nature (as they speak.) It were to be wished some of them had told us, or could yet tell us, what they meant by nature. Is it any intelligent principle? Or was it guided by any such? If yea, whence came this impression, but from God himself? For surely an intelligent Being, that could have this universal influence upon the minds of all men, is much liker to be God than the imaginary entities they talk of, that are bodies and no bodies, have blood and no blood, members and no members, are some where, and no where; or if they be any where, are confined to some certain places remote enough from our world; with the affairs whereof, or any other, they cannot any way concern themselves without quite undoing and spoiling their felicity. If they say no, and that nature which put this stamp upon the minds of men, is an utterly unintelligent thing, nor was ever governed by any thing wiser than it self. Strange! that blind and undesigning nature, should, without being prompted, become thus ignorantly officious to these idle voluptuary Godlings; and should so effectually take course they might be known to the world, who no way ever obliged it; nor were ever like to do! But to regress a little, fain I would know what is this thing they call nature? Is it any thing else than the course and inclination of conspiring Atoms, which ⟨p. 241⟩singly are not pretended to bear any such impression; but as they luckily club and hit together in the composition of an humane soul; by the merest and strangest chance that ever happened? But would we ever regard what they say whom we believe to speak by chance? were it to be supposed that characters and words serving to make up some proposition or other, were by some strange agitation of wind and waves imprest and figured on the sand; would we if we really believed the matter came to pass only by such an odd casualty; think that proposition any whit the truer for being there, or take this for a demonstration of its truth, any more than if we had seen it in a Ballad? Because men have casually come to think so, therefore there are such beings (to be called Gods) between whom, and them, there never was, or shall be any intercourse or mutual concern.
And do they think they have salved the business, and given us a satisfying account of this matter, by telling us, this impression is from nature (as they speak.) It were to be wish'd some of them had told us, or could yet tell us, what they meant by nature. Is it any intelligent principle? Or was it guided by any such? If yea, whence came this impression, but from God himself? For surely an intelligent Being, that could have this universal influence upon the minds of all men, is much liker to be God than the imaginary entities they talk of, that are bodies and no bodies, have bloud and no bloud, members and no members, are some where, and no where; or if they be any where, are confined to some certain places remote enough from our world; with the affairs whereof, or any other, they cannot any way concern themselves without quite undoing and spoiling their felicity. If they say no, and that nature which put this stamp upon the minds of men, is an utterly unintelligent thing, nor was ever governed by any thing wiser than it self. Strange! that blind and undesigning nature, should, without being prompted, become thus ignorantly officious to these idle voluptuary Godlings; and should so effectually take course they might be known to the world, who no way ever obliged it; nor were ever like to do! But to regress a little, fain I would know what is this thing they call nature? Is it any thing else than the course and inclination of conspiring Atoms, which
It follows as well as that because the staff stands in the corner, the morrow will be a rainy day. The dictates of nature are indeed most regardable things, taken as expressions of his mind, or emanations from him who is the Author and God of Nature. But abstracted from him, they are and signify as much as a beam cut off from the body of the Sun. Or a person that pretends himself an Ambassador without credentials.
It follows as well as that because the staff stands in the corner, the morrow will be a rainy day. The dictates of nature are indeed most regardable things, taken as expressions of his mind, or emanations from him who is the Author and God of Nature. But abstracted from him, they are and signifie as much as a beam cut off from the body of the Sun. Or a person that pretends himself an Ambassadour without credentials.
Indeed (as is imported in the words noted 1from that grave Pagan a little before) the principles of these men destroy quite nature it self as well as every thing of Religion. And leave ⟨p. 242⟩us the names and show of them, but take away the things themselves. In sum, Though there be no such impression upon the minds of men as that which they talk of; yet if there were, no such thing can be inferred from it, as they would infer. Their principles taking away all connection between the argument and what they would argue by it.
Indeed (as is imported in the words noted 1from that grave Pagan a little before) the principles of these men destroy quite nature it self as well as every thing of Religion. And leave ⟨p. 242⟩us the names and shew of them, but take away the things themselves. In sum, Though there be no such impression upon the minds of men as that which they talk of; yet if there were, no such thing can be inferr'd from it, as they would infer. Their principles taking away all connexion between the argument and what they would argue by it.
- 1Plutarch.
2. We have also too much reason to add, 1That as the supposition of such a Being or sort of Beings can have no sufficient ground; so it is equally unconceivable that it can be intended for any good end. Not that we think the last assertion a sufficient sole proof of this. For we easily acknowledge that it is possible enough men may harmlessly and with innocent intentions attempt the building very weighty and important Truths upon weak and insufficient foundations. Hoping they have offered that as a support unto Truth which proves only an useless cumber. Nor were it just to impute Treachery where there is ground for the more charitable censure that the misadventure proceeded only from want of judgment and shortness of discourse. But it is neither needful, nor seemly, the charity which can willingly wink, in some cases, should therefore be quite blind. Or that no difference should be made of well-meant mistakes, and mischief thinly hid, and covered over with specious pretences.
2. We have also too much reason to add, 1That as the supposition of such a Being or sort of Beings can have no sufficient ground; so it is equally unconceivable that it can be intended for any good end. Not that we think the last assertion a sufficient sole proof of this. For we easily acknowledge that it is possible enough men may harmlesly and with innocent intentions attempt the building very weighty and important Truths upon weak and insufficient foundations. Hoping they have offered that as a support unto Truth which proves only an useless cumber. Nor were it just to impute Treachery where there is ground for the more charitable censure that the misadventure proceeded only from want of judgment and shortness of discourse. But it is neither needful, nor seemly, the charity which can willingly wink, in some cases, should therefore be quite blind. Or that no difference should be made of well-meant mistakes, and mischief thinly hid, and covered over with specious pretences.
- 1IV.
And let it be soberly considered, what can the design be, after the cashiering of all solid grounds for the proving of a Deity, at length ⟨p. 243⟩to acknowledge it upon none at all? As if their acknowledgement must owe it self, not to their reason, but their courtesy. And when they have done what they can, to make the rest of men believe they have no need to own any God at all, and they can tell how all that concerns the making and governing the world, may well enough be dispatched without any. Yet at last they will be so generous as to be content there shall be one however.
And let it be soberly considered, what can the design be, after the cashiering of all solid grounds for the proving of a Deity, at length ⟨p. 243⟩to acknowledge it upon none at all? As if their acknowledgment must oweit self, not to their reason, but their courtesie. And when they have done what they can, to make the rest of men believe they have no need to own any God at all, and they can tell how all that concerns the making and governing the world, may well enough be dispatcht without any. Yet at last they will be so generous as to be content there shall be one however.
What, I say, can the design of this be, that they who have contended with all imaginable obstinacy against the most plain and convincing evidences, that do even defy cavil; have quite fought themselves blind, and lost their eyes in the encounter: so that they are ready to swear the Sun is a cold of dirt, and noonday light is to them the very blackness of darkness. They cannot see a Deity encircling them with the brightest beams and shining upon them with the most conspicuous glory, through every thing that occurs, and all things that encompass them on every side. And yet when all is done, and their thunder-struck eyes make them fancy they have put out the Sun, they have won the day, have cleared the field, and are absolute victors; they have vanquished the whole power of their most dreaded enemy, the light that reveals God in his works. After all this without any inducement at all, and having triumphed over every thing that looked like an argument to prove it. They vouchsafe to say however of their own accord There is a God. ⟨p. 244⟩Surely if this have any design at all, it must be a very bad one. And see whither it tends. They have now a God of their own making. And all the Being he hath depends upon their grace and favour. They are not his creatures, but he is theirs. A precarious Deity, that shall be as long, and what, and where they please to have him. And if he displease them, they can think him back into nothing. Here seems the depth of the design. For see with what cautions and limitations they admit him into being. There shall be a God provided he be not meddlesome, nor concern himself in their affairs, to the crossing of any inclinations or humours which they are pleased shall command and govern their lives. Being conscious that if they admit of any at all, that shall have to do with their concernments, he cannot but be such as the ways they resolve on will displease. Their very shame will not permit them to call that God, which if he take any cognisance at all of their course will dislike it. And herein that they may be the more secure, they judge it the most prudent course not to allow him any part or interest in the affairs of the world at all.
What, I say, can the design of this be, that they who have contended with all imaginable obstinacy against the most plain and convincing evidences, that do even defie cavil; have quite fought themselves blind, and lost their eyes in the encounter: so that they are ready to swear the Sun is a cold of dirt, and noonday light is to them the very blackness of darkness. They cannot see a Deity incircling them with the brightest beams and shining upon them with the most conspicuous glory, through every thing that occurs, and all things that encompass them on every side. And yet when all is done, and their thunder-struck eyes make them fancy they have put out the Sun, they have won the day, have cleared the field, and are absolute victors; they have vanquished the whole power of their most dreaded enemy, the light that reveals God in his works. After all this without any inducement at all, and having triumpht over every thing that look'd like an argument to prove it. They vouchsafe to say however of their own accord There is a God.
Yet all this while they court him at a great rate, and all Religion is taken away, under pretence of great piety: Worship they believe he cares not for, because he is full and needs nothing. In this world he must not be, for it is a place unworthy of him. He must have had no hand in framing. Nor can they think it fit he should have any in the government of it.