Chapter 6
pp. 226–287111 passagespart 2 of 3
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For it would be a great disturbance to him, and interrupt his pleasures. The same thing as if certain licentious Courtiers impatient of being governed should address themselves to their Prince in such a form of speech, that it is beneath him to receive any homage from them, it would too much debase Majesty, that his Dominions afford no place fit for his residence; and therefore it would be convenient for him to betake himself into some other Country that hath better air and accommodation for delight. That Diadems and Sceptres are burdensome things. Which therefore if he will quit to them, he may wholly give up himself to ease and pleasure.
For it would be a great disturbance to him, and interrupt his pleasures. The same thing as if certain licentious Courtiers impatient of being governed should address themselves to their Prince in such a form of speech, that it is beneath him to receive any homage from them, it would too much debase Majesty, that his Dominions afford no place fit for his residence; and therefore it would be convenient for him to betake himself into some other Country that hath better air and accommodation for delight. That Diadems and Scepters are burdensome things. Which therefore if he will quit to them, he may wholly give up himself to ease and pleasure.
Yea and whatsoever would any way tend to evince his necessary existence, is with the same courtship laid aside (although if he do not exist necessarily and of himself, he cannot have any existence at all: For as they do not allow him to be the cause of any thing, so they assign nothing to be the cause of him) that is, with pretence there is no need it should be demonstrated, because all men believe it without a reason; nature having imprest this belief upon the minds of all; or (which is all one) they having agreed to believe it because they believe it. But though they have no reason to believe a Deity, they have a very good one why they would seem to do so, that they may expiate with the people their irreligion by a collusive pretending against Atheism. And because they think it less plausible plainly to deny there is a ⟨p. 246⟩God, they therefore grant one to please the vulgar, yet take care it shall be one as good as none, lest otherwise they should displease themselves. And so their credit and their liberty are both cared for together.
But this covering is too short, and the art 1by which they would fit it to their design, when it should cheat others, deceives themselves. For it is most evident.
- 1V.
3. That the Being with the pretended belief whereof they would mock the world is no God; and that consequently, while they would seem to acknowledge a Deity they really acknowledge none at all.
Our contest hath not all this while been a strife about words; or concerning the name, but the thing it self. And not whether there be such a thing in being to which that name may with whatsoever impropriety be given, but whether there be such a Being as whereto it properly belongs. Supposing and taking for granted, as a matter out of question, that (even in their own sense) if such a Being, as we have described do exist; it is most properly God. And that they will not go about to call it, by another name. Or that they will not pretend this name agrees to any other thing so fitly as to him. And because we have already proved this being doth exist; and that there can be but one such, it plainly follows theirs is in propriety of speech (even though he did exist) no God. And that, much less, should he appropriate the name, and exclude the only true God. For ⟨p. 247⟩since the high and dignifying elogies which they are wont to bestow upon their feigned. Deity do plainly show they would have it thought they esteem him the most excellent of all existent Beings; if we have proved a really existent Being to be more excellent than he, it is evident even upon their own grounds that this is God. Hither the Deity must be deferred. And theirs must yield, and give out. Inasmuch as we cannot suppose them so void of common sense as to say the less excellent Being is God; and the more excellent is no God. But if they should be so, whereas the controversy is not about the name, we have our main purpose in having proved there is, a being actually existent that hath all the real excellencies which they ascribe to their Deities, and infinitely more. And as concerning the name, who made them dictators to all the world? and the sole judges of the propriety of words? Or with what right or pretence will they assume so much to themselves? so as against the rest of the world to name that God, from which they cut off the principal perfections wont to be signified by that name? And if we speak of such perfections as tend to infer and establish Religion and Providence. Who but themselves did ever call that God, in the eminent sense that they supposed could not hear prayers, and thereupon dispense favours, relieve the afflicted, supply the indigent, and receive suitable acknowledgements?
Our contest hath not all this while been a strife about words; or concerning the name, but the thing it self. And not whether there be such a thing in being to which that name may with whatsoever impropriety be given, but whether there be such a Being as whereto it properly belongs. Supposing and taking for granted, as a matter out of question, that (even in their own sense) if such a Being, as we have described do exist; it is most properly God. And that they will not go about to call it, by another name. Or that they will not pretend this name agrees to any other thing so fitly as to him. And because we have already proved this being doth exist; and that there can be but one such, it plainly follows theirs is in propriety of speech (even though he did exist) no God. And that, much less, should he appropriate the name, and exclude the only true God. For
They indeed (saith a famed Writer of Roman History) that exercise ⟨p. 248⟩themselves in the Atheistical sorts of Philosophy 1(if we may call that Philosophy) as they are wont to jeer at all appearances of the Gods, whether among the Greeks or the Barbarians will make themselves matter of laughter of our Histories, not thinking that any God takes care of any man.—Let the story he there tells shift for it self, in the mean time it appears they escaped not the infamy of Atheists, who (what ever Deities they might imagine besides) did deny Gods presence and regard to men. Which sort of persons he elsewhere often animadverts upon.
They indeed (saith a famed Writer of Roman History) that exercise ⟨p. 248⟩themselves in the Atheistical sorts of Philosophy 1(if we may call that Philosophy) as they are wont to jeer at all appearances of the Gods, whether among the Greeks or the Barbarians will make themselves matter of laughter of our Histories, not thinking that any God takes care of any man.—Let the story he there tells shift for it self, in the mean time it appears they escap'd not the infamy of Atheists, who (what ever Deities they might imagine besides) did deny Gods presence and regard to men. Which sort of persons he elsewhere often animadverts upon.
- 1[Greek or Hebrew], &c. D. Halicarnass. Ant. Rom. l 2.〈non-Latin alphabet〉, &c. D. Halicarnass. Ant. Rom. l 2.
But do we need to insist that all the rest of the world acknowledged no Gods, whom they did not also worship? what meant their Temples, and Altars, their Prayers and Sacrifices? or did they take him for God, whom they believed to take no care of them, or from whom they expected no advantage? Even the Barbarous Scythians themselves understood it most inseparably to belong to a Deity to be beneficent when they upbraidingly tell Alexander, That if he were a God (as they it seems had 1heard he vogued himself) he should bestow benefits upon men, and not take from them what was their own.
- 1See their Ambassadors Oration in Q. Curtius.See their Ambassadours Oration in Q. Curtius.
And by the way it is observable how contradictious and repugnant, the Epicurean sentiments are, in this, even to themselves: that speaking of friendship (of which they say many 1generous and brave things) they (gallantly) profess (as Plutarch testifies of them) that it is ⟨p. 249⟩a more pleasant thing to benefit others than to receive benefits ones self. They yet while they 2seem so greatly concerned that their Gods be every way most perfectly happy deny to them this highest and most excellent part of felicity. that a virtuous man may a great deal more benefit the world, than they; and, consequently, have more pure and lively relishes of a genuine and refined pleasure.
And by the way it is observable how contradictious and repugnant, the Epicurean sentiments are, in this, even to themselves: that speaking of friendship (of which they say many 1generous and brave things) they (gallantly) profess (as Plutarch testifies of them) that it is ⟨p. 249⟩a more pleasant thing to benefit others than to receive benefits ones self. They yet while they 2seem so greatly concern'd that their Gods be every way most perfectly happy deny to them this highest and most excellent part of felicity. that a virtuous man may a great deal more benefit the world, than they; and, consequently, have more pure and lively relishes of a genuine and refined pleasure.
- 1Lib. non posse suaviter vivi, &c.
- 2Vid. & lib. maxime cum princip. viris Pbil. &c.
Upon the whole, it is manifest they so maim the notion of God, as to make it quite another thing. And if they think to wipe off any thing of the foul and odious blot wherewith their avowed irreligion hath stained their name and memory, by the acknowledgement of such a God: They effect the like thing by it, and gain as much to the reputation of their piety, as he should, of his loyalty, who being accused of Treason against his Prince, shall think to vindicate himself, by professing solemnly to own the King. Provided you only mean by it the King of Clubs; or any such painted one the pack affords.
Upon the whole, it is manifest they so maim the notion of God, as to make it quite another thing. And if they think to wipe off any thing of the foul and odious blot wherewith their avow'd irreligion hath stain'd their name and memory, by the acknowledgment of such a God: They effect the like thing by it, and gain as much to the reputation of their piety, as he should, of his loyalty, who being accus'd of Treason against his Prince, shall think to vindicate himself, by professing solemnly to own the King. Provided you only mean by it the King of Clubs; or any such painted one the pack affords.
But here it may be demanded, is every misapprehension of God to be understood as a denial of his Being? If so, whom can we undertake to assoil of Atheism? or who can certainly acquit himself? For how impossible is it to be sure we have no untrue conception of a Being so infinitely, by our own confession, above all our thoughts? Or how is it to be avoided, in somewhat or other to think amiss of so unknown and incomprehensibly excellent ⟨p. 250⟩a Being? Either by detracting somewhat that belongs to it, or attributing somewhat that belongs not? And since many, we are sure, have thought and spoken unworthily of God, besides Epicureans, are all these to go into the account of Atheists? Or whereas it is commonly wont to be said, whatsoever is in God, is God: how can they who deny any thing of him, which is really in him be excused of denying his whole being? or where will we fix the bounds of our censure?
Many things should be said (if we will speak at all) to so manifold an enquiry. But it belongs not to the design of this discourse to examine and discuss all mens sentiments of God, that have been exposed to the view of the world; or arbitrate among the dissenting parties. Much less to explain or abet every School-maxim that hath reference to this theme. The Authors or lovers whereof will be sufficiently prompted by their own Genius to do, at least as much as can be requisite herein. But whatever the real sameness is supposed to be, of the things attributed to God, it is acknowledged we cannot but conceive of them as divers. And so, that our conception of any one is not adequate to the entire object (which is confessed incomprehensible.) Yet any one attribute gives a true notion of the object so far as it reaches, though not a full. As I may be said truly to see a man, when I only see his face, and view not every part and limb; or to know him, while yet I have not had opportunity to ⟨p. 251⟩discern every quality in his temper, and what his dispositions and inclinations in all respects are. Moreover it's one thing to deny any Divine perfection, another only not to know it.
And such mere nescience is so far from being guilty of the horrid crime of Atheism, that it's not so much as culpable further than as it is obstinately persisted in against sufficient evidence: for we are not obliged to know every thing, but what is to us knowable, and what we are concerned to know. Again (and which is most considerable to our purpose) we are not concerned to know what God is in himself, otherwise than as we may thereby know what he is in relation to us, viz. as he is the Author of our Beings, the governor of our lives and actions, and thereupon the object of our Religion. For a religious respect unto him is the very end of that knowledge. Now, if any other than that sort of persons we oppose have taken up apprehensions of him, not so suitable to that end; it were to be wished they saw it, and would unthink all those thoughts? But surely, they who most professedly contend against the very notions themselves which directly influence all our practice toward God, so considered, would suggest such as are wholly inconsistent therewith, who oppose the knowledge of God to the end of that knowledge; and do not merely mistake the way to that end, while they are aiming at it, but most avowedly resist and disclaim the end it self; are to be distinguished from them who ⟨p. 252⟩professedly intend that same end, only see not wherein their misapprehensions are prejudicial and repugnant to it: otherwise are ready to reject them. And the former are therefore most justly to be singled out and designed the objects of our directest opposition. Nor are they so fitly to be opposed under any other notion as that of Atheists. For since our knowledge of God ought chiefly to respect him in that forementioned relative consideration, and the enquiry what is God? signifies, as it concerns us, what is the object of Religion? They denying any such thing, deny there is a God. Nor do they deny him in that relative consideration only; but (as every relation is founded in somewhat that is absolute) the very reason of their denying him, so, is that they deny in him those absolute and positive perfections that render him such, as certain of those do that have been proved to belong to him. Which is that we have next to consider, viz.
And such meer nescience is so far from being guilty of the horrid crime of Atheism, that it's not so much as culpable further than as it is obstinately persisted in against sufficient evidence: for we are not obliged to know every thing, but what is to us knowable, and what we are concerned to know. Again (and which is most considerable to our purpose) we are not concerned to know what God is in himself, otherwise than as we may thereby know what he is in relation to us, viz. as he is the Author of our Beings, the governour of our lives and actions, and thereupon the object of our Religion. For a religious respect unto him is the very end of that knowledge. Now, if any other than that sort of persons we oppose have taken up apprehensions of him, not so sutable to that end; it were to be wisht they saw it, and would unthink all those thoughts? But surely, they who most professedly contend against the very notions themselves which directly influence all our practice toward God, so considered, would suggest such as are wholly inconsistent therewith, who oppose the knowledge of God to the end of that knowledge; and do not meerly mistake the way to that end, while they are aiming at it, but most avowedly resist and disclaim the end it self; are to be distinguished from them who
4. That it may evidently be deduced from what hath been said, tending to prove those 1things of God which are included in the notion of him, and from that notion it self, that he is such as can converse with men.
- 1VI.
That is, having proved [that there is an eternal self-subsisting independent necessary being of so great activity, life, power, wisdom, and goodness as to have been the maker of this world] And by this medium [that we see this world is in being, which otherwise could never have been, much less such as we see it is.] It plainly follows ⟨p. 253⟩that this great Creator can have influence upon the Creatures he hath made in a way suitable to their natures. It follows I say from the same medium [the present visible existence of this world which could not otherwise be now in being] that he can thus have influence upon his creatures: For it is hence manifest that he doth; they depend on him; and are sustained by him: Nor could more subsist by themselves than they could make themselves, or of themselves have sprung out of nothing.
That is, having proved [that there is an eternal self-subsisting independent necessary being of so great activity, life, power, wisdom, and goodness as to have been the maker of this world] And by this medium [that we see this world is in being, which otherwise could never have been, much less such as we see it is.] It plainly follows ⟨p. 253⟩that this great Creator can have influence upon the Creatures he hath made in a way sutable to their natures. It follows I say from the same medium [the present visible existence of this world which could not otherwise be now in being] that he can thus have influence upon his creatures: For it is hence manifest that he doth; they depend on him; and are sustained by him: Nor could more subsist by themselves than they could make themselves, or of themselves have sprung out of nothing.
And if it were possible they could, being raised up into Being, continue in Being of themselves: Yet since our present question is not concerning what they need, but what God can do. And our adversaries in the present cause, do not (as hath been noted) upon any other pretence deny that he doth concern himself in the affairs of the universe, but that he cannot, (that is, that it consists not with his felicity, and he cannot, not be happy.) Is it not plain that he can with the same facility, continue the influence which he at first gave forth? And with as little prejudice to his felicity? For if it be necessary to him to be happy, or impossible not to be so; he must be ever so. His happiness was not capable of being discontinued so long as while he made the world, settled the several orders and kinds, and formed the first individuals of every kind of creatures. Therefore having done this, and without diminution to his happiness, was it a more toilsome and less tolerable labour to keep things ⟨p. 254⟩as they were, than to make them so? If it was (which no man that understands common sense would say) surely that blind thing which they more blindly call nature (not understanding or being able to tell what they mean by it) and would have be the only cause of all things, acting at first to the uttermost, and having no way to recruit its vigour and reinforce it self, its labour and business being so much increased, had jaded and grown weary; had given out, and patiently suffered all things to dissolve and relapse into the old chaos long ago. But if the labour was not greater to continue things in the state wherein they were made than to make them, surely a wise intelligent Deity, which we have proved made them, could as well sustain them being made; as their brutal and (as unintelligible as) unintelligent nature do both.
And if it were possible they could, being raised up into Being, continue in Being of themselves: Yet since our present question is not concerning what they need, but what God can do. And our adversaries in the present cause, do not (as hath been noted) upon any other pretence deny that he doth concern himself in the affairs of the universe, but that he cannot, (that is, that it consists not with his felicity, and he cannot, not be happy.) Is it not plain that he can with the same facility, continue the influence which he at first gave forth? And with as little prejudice to his felicity? For if it be necessary to him to be happy, or impossible not to be so; he must be ever so. His happiness was not capable of being discontinued so long as while he made the world, setled the several orders and kinds, and formed the first individuals of every kind of creatures. Therefore having done this, and without diminution to his happiness, was it a more toilsome and less tollerable labour to keep things
So much then of intercourse, God could have with his creatures as his continual communication of his influence to be received by them amounts to. And then, man, not being excluded their number, must share in this possible privilege according to the capacity of his nature.
So much then of intercourse, God could have with his creatures as his continual communication of his influence to be received by them amounts to. And then, man, not being excluded their number, must share in this possible priviledge according to the capacity of his nature.
And inasmuch as we have also proved (more particularly) concerning man, that he immediately owes the peculiar excellencies of his intelligent nature, as it's such to God only. It is apparently consequent, that having formed this his more excellent creature according to his own more express likeness, stamped it with ⟨p. 255⟩the glorious characters of his living image, given it a nature suitable to his own, and thereby made it capable of rational and intelligent converse with him. He hath it ever in his power to maintain a continual converse with this creature, by agreeable communications. By letting in upon it the vital beams and influences of his own light and love, and receiving back the return of its grateful acknowledgements and praises. Wherein its manifest he should do no greater thing than he hath done. For who fees not that it is a matter of no greater difficulty to converse with, than to make a reasonable creature? Or who would not be ashamed to deny that he who hath been the only Author of the soul of man, and of the excellent powers and faculties belonging to it, can more easily sustain what he hath made? And converse with that his creature suitably to the way wherein he hath made it capable of his converse?
And inasmuch as we have also proved (more particularly) concerning man, that he immediately owes the peculiar excellencies of his intelligent nature, as it's such to God only. It is apparently consequent, that having formed this his more excellent creature according to his own more express likeness, stampt it with ⟨p. 255⟩the glorious characters of his living image, given it a nature sutable to his own, and thereby made it capable of rational and intelligent converse with him. He hath it ever in his power to maintain a continual converse with this creature, by agreeable communications. By letting in upon it the vital beams and influences of his own light and love, and receiving back the return of its grateful acknowledgements and praises. Wherein its manifest he should do no greater thing than he hath done. For who fees not that it is a matter of no greater difficulto converse with, than to make a reasonable creature? Or who would not be ashamed to deny that he who hath been the only Author of the soul of man, and of the excellent powers and faculties belonging to it, can more easily sustain what he hath made? And converse with that his creature sutably to the way wherein he hath made it capable of his converse?
Whereto, the consideration being added of his gracious nature (manifested in this creation it self) it is further evident, that he is (as things are now ordered whereof more hereafter) not only able, but apt and ready to converse with men in such a way as shall tend to the improving of their being unto that blessedness whereof he hath made them naturally capable. If their own voluntary alienation and aversion to him (yet not overcome) do not obstruct the way of that intercourse.
And even this were sufficient to give foundation to a Temple, and both afford encouragement and infer an obligation to Religion; although no other perfection had been or could be demonstrated of the Divine Being, than what is immediately to be collected from his works, and the things whereof he hath been the sole and most arbitrary Author. For what if no more were possible to be proved, have we not, even by thus much, a representation of an object sufficiently worthy of our homage and adoration? He that could make and sustain such a world as this, how unexpressibly doth he surpass in greatness the most excellent of all mortal creatures! To some or other, of whom, upon some (merely accidental) dignifying circumstances, we justly esteem our selves to owe a dutiful observance and subjection.
And even this were sufficient to give foundation to a Temple, and both afford encouragement and infer an obligation to Religion; although no other perfection had been or could be demonstrated of the Divine Being, than what is immediately to be collected from his works, and the things whereof he hath been the sole and most arbitrary Author. For what if no more were possible to be proved, have we not, even by thus much, a representation of an object sufficiently worthy of our honiage and adoration? He that could make and sustain such a world as this, how unexpressibly doth he surpass in greatness the most excellent of all mortal creatures! To some or other, of whom, upon some (meerly accidental) dignifying circumstances, we justly esteem our selves to owe a dutiful observance and subjection.
If he did not comprehend within his own Being simply all perfection: If there were many Gods, and Worlds besides; and he only the Creator and absolute Lord of our vortex, were not that enough to entitle him to all the obedience and service we could give him? and enable him sufficiently to reward it? and render his presence and cherishing influences (which he could every where diffuse within this circle and limited portion of the universe) even infinitely covetable and desirable to us?
Yea, if he were only the entire Author of our own particular Being, how much more is that then the partial subordinate interest of an humane Parent? To whom (as even an Epicurean ⟨p. 257⟩would confess) nature it self urges and exacts a duty. The refusal whereof, even Barbarian ingenuity would abhor, yea and brutal instinct condemn? How much greater and more absolute is the right which the parentage of our whole being challenges? If every man were created by a several God, whose creative power were confined to only one such creature, and each one were the solitary product, and the charge of an appropriate Deity; whose dominion the state of things would allow to be extended so far, only, and no further, were there therefore no place left for Religion? Or no tie unto love, reverence, obedience, and adoration, because the Author of my being comprehended not in himself all perfection? when as yet he comprehended so much as to be the sole cause of all that is in me? And his power over me, and his goodness to me, are hereby supposed the same, which the only one God, truly hath and exerciseth towards all? If all that I am and have be from him, I cannot surely owe to him less than all?
Such as have either had, or supposed themselves to have, their particular tutelary Genii, (of whom there will be more occasion to take notice hereafter) though they reckoned them but a sort of deputed or vicarious Deities, underling Gods whom they never accounted the causes of their being; yet how have they coveted and gloried to open their breasts, to become their Temples, and entertain the converse of those (supposed) Divine inhabitants? ⟨p. 258⟩If they had taken one of these, to be their alone Creator, how much greater had their veneration and their homage been? This it may be hoped, will be thought sufficiently proved in this discourse (at least to have been so by some or other) that we are not of our selves; and that our extraction is to be fetched higher than from matter, or from only humane progenitors. Nothing that is terrene and mortal could be the author of such powers as we find in our selves. We are most certainly the offspring of some or other Deity. And he that made us knows us throughly, can apply himself inwardly to us, receive our addresses and applications, our acknowledgements and adoration. Whereunto we should have even upon these terms great and manifest obligation, although nothing more of the excellency and perfection of our Creator were certainly known to us.
Such as have either had, or supposed themselves to have, their particular tutelary Genii, (of whom there will be more occasion to take notice hereafter) though they reckoned them but a sort of deputed or vicarious Deities, underlin Gods whom they never accounted the causes of their being; yet how have they coveted and gloried to open their breasts, to become their Temples, and entertain the converse of those (supposed) Divine inhabitants? ⟨p. 258⟩If they had taken one of these, to be their alone Creator, how much greater had their veneration and their homage been? This it may be hoped, will be thought sufficiently proved in this discourse (at least to have been so by some or other) that we are not of our selves; and that our extraction is to be fetcht higher than from matter, or from only humane progenitors. Nothing that is terrene and mortal could be the author of such powers as we find in our selves. We are most certainly the offspring of some or other Deity. And he that made us knows us throughly, can apply himself inwardly to us, receive our addresses and applications, our acknowledgments and adoration. Whereunto we should have even upon these terms great and manifest obligation, although nothing more of the excellency and perfection of our Creator were certainly known to us.
But it hath been further shown that the necessary being from whence we sprang, is also 1an absolutely and infinitely perfect Being. That necessary Being cannot be less perfect, than to include the entire and inexhaustible fullness of all being and perfection. That therefore the God to whom this notion belongs, must, consequently, be every way sufficient to all, and be himself but one. The only source and fountain of all life and Being; the common basis and support of the universe; The absolute Lord of this great Creation, and the central object of the common concurrent Trust, fear, love, and ⟨p. 259⟩other worship of his Intelligent and reasonable creatures.
But it hath been further shewn that the necessary being from whence we sprang, is also 1an absolutely and infinitely perfect Being. That necessary Being cannot be less perfect, than to include the entire and inexhaustible fulness of all being and perfection. That therefore the God to whom this notion belongs, must, consequently, be every way sufficient to all, and be himself but one. The only source and fountain of all life and Being; the common basis and support of the universe; The absolute Lord of this great Creation, and the central object of the common concurrent Trust, fear, love, and ⟨p. 259⟩other worship of his Intelligent and reasonable creatures.
- 1VII.
And therefore there remains no greater or other difficulty in apprehending how he can, without disturbance to himself, or interruption of his own felicity, intend all the concernments of his creatures, apply himself to them according to their several exigencies, satisfy their desires and cravings, inspect and govern their actions and affairs; than we have to apprehend a Being absolutely and every way perfect. Whereof if we cannot have a distinct apprehension all at once, i. e. though we cannot comprehend every particular perfection of God in the same thought (as our eye cannot behold at one view every part of an over-large object unto which however, part by part, it may be successively applied) we can yet in the general apprehend him absolutely perfect,; or such to whom we are sure no perfection is wanting. And can successively contemplate this or that, as we are occasionally led to consider them: And can answer to our selves difficulties that occur to us, with this easy, sure, and ever ready solution; that he can do all things, That nothing is too hard for him, That he is full, allsufficient, and every way perfect. Whereof we are the more confirmed that we find we cannot by the utmost range of our most enlarged thoughts, ever reach any bound or end of that perfection which yet we must conclude is necessarily to be attributed to an absolutely perfect Being.
And therefore there remains no greater or other difficulty in apprehending how he can, without disturbance to himself, or interruption of his own felicity, intend all the concernments of his creatures, apply himself to them according to their several exigencies, satisfie their desires and cravings, inspect and govern their actions and affairs; than we have to apprehend a Being absolutely and every way perfect. Whereof if we cannot have a distinct apprehension all at once, i. e. though we cannot comprehend every particular perfection of God in the same thought (as our eye cannot behold at one view every part of an over-large object unto which however, part by part, it may be successively apply'd) we can yet in the general apprehend him absolutely perfect,; or such to whom we are sure no perfection is wanting. And can successively contemplate this or that, as we are occasionally led to consider them: And can answer to our selves difficulties that occur to us, with this easie, sure, and ever ready solution; that he can do all things, That nothing is too hard for him, That he is full, allsufficient, and every way perfect. Whereof we are the more confirmed that we find we cannot by the utmost range of our most enlarged thoughts, ever reach any bound or end of that perfection which yet we must conclude is necessarily to be attributed to an absolutely perfect Being.
And this we have reason to take for a very sufficient answer to any doubt that can arise, concerning the possibility of his converse with us, unless we will be so unreasonable as to pretend that what is brought for solution hath greater difficulty in it than the doubt. Or that because we cannot apprehend at once, infinite perfection, therefore it cannot be, which were as much as to say, that it cannot be because it is infinite; for it were not infinite if we could distinctly apprehend it. And so were to make it a reason against it self, which is most injuriously and with no pretence attempted, except we could show an inconsistency in the terms which it is plain we can never do; and should most idly attempt. And it were to make our present apprehension the measure of all reality; against our experience, which (if our indulgence to that self-magnifying conceit do not suspend our farther enquiries and researches) would daily bring to our notice things we had no apprehension of before.
And this we have reason to take for a very sufficient answer to any doubt that can arise, concerning the possibility of his converse with us, unless we will be so unreasonable as to pretend that what is brought for solution hath greater difficulty in it than the doubt. Or that because we cannot apprehend at once, infinite perfection, therefore it cannot be, which were as much as to say, that it cannot be because it is infinite; for it were not infinite if we could distinctly apprehend it. And so were to make it a reason against it self, which is most injuriously and with no pretence attempted, except we could shew an inconsistency in the terms which it is plain we can never do; and should most idly attempt. And it were to make our present apprehension the measure of all reality; against our experience, which (if our indulgence to that self-magnifying conceit do not suspend our farther enquiries and researches) would daily bring to our notice things we had no apprehension of before.
It were instead of that just and laudable ambition of becoming our selves like God in his imitable perfections, to make him like our selves. The true model of the Epicurean Deity.
Nor can any thing be more easy than that wherein we pretend so great a difficulty; that is to apprehend somewhat may be more perfect than we can apprehend. What else but proud ignorance can hinder us from seeing that the more we know, the more there is that we know not? How often are we out-done by creatures ⟨p. 261⟩of our own order in the Creation! How many men are there whom we are daily constrained to admire, as unspeakably excelling us, and whom we cannot but acknowledge to be far more knowing, discerning, apprehensive of things, of more composed minds, of more penetrating judgments, of more quick and nimble wits, easily turning themselves to great variety of objects and affairs without distraction and confusion, of more equal and dispassionate tempers, less liable to commotion and disturbance than our selves.
Nor can any thing be more easie than that wherein we pretend so great a difficulty; that is to apprehend somewhat may be more perfect than we can apprehend. What else but proud ignorance can hinder us from seeing that the more we know, the more there is that we know not? How often are we out-done by creatures ⟨p. 261⟩of our own order in the Creation! How many men are there whom we are daily constrain'd to admire, as unspeakably excelling us, and whom we cannot but acknowledge to be far more knowing, discerning, apprehensive of things, of more composed minds, of more penetrating judgments, of more quick and nimble wits, easily turning themselves to great variety of objects and affairs without distraction and confusion, of more equal and dispassionate tempers, less liable to commotion and disturbance than our selves.
How absurd and senseless a pretence is it, against the thing it self, that we cannot apprehend an infinite perfection in one common fountain of all perfection; or because we cannot go through a multitude of businesses without distraction, that therefore he that made us and all things cannot. If we would make our selves the measure, 'tis likely we should confess we were out-stripped, when we are told that Julius Caesar could dictate letters when he was intent upon the greatest affairs to four (and if 1he had nothing else to divert him to seven) Secretaries at once. That Cyrus could call by name all the Soldiers in his numerous Army. With divers other strange instances of like nature. And since the perfections of some so far ⟨p. 262⟩exceed the measure of the most, why is it then unconceivable that Divine perfection should so far surpass all, as that God may intend the affairs of the world according to the several exigencies of his creatures without any ungrateful diversion to himself, or diminution to his felicity? And since they who partake of some and but a small portion of perfection only; can be concerned in many affairs with little trouble, why cannot he that comprehends all perfection be concerned in all without any? For though we have in what hath been last said endeavoured to represent it as not so unapprehensible as is pretended that it may be so, we take it in the mean time as formerly sufficiently proved that so it is, That God is a being absolutely perfect, or that includes eminently all perfection in himself.
How absurd and sensless a pretence is it, against the thing it self, that we cannot apprehend an infinite perfection in one common fountain of all perfection; or because we cannot go through a multitude of businesses without distraction, that therefore he that made us and all things cannot. If we would make our selves the measure, 'tis likely we should confess we were out-stript, when we are told that Julius Caesar could dictate letters when he was intent upon the greatest affairs to four (and if 1he had nothing else to divert him to seven) Secretaries at once. That Cyrus could call by name all the Souldiers in his numerous Army. With divers other strange instances of like nature. And since the perfections of some so far ⟨p. 262⟩
Which general perfection of his Being as it modifies all his attributes, so we shall particularly take notice that it doth so, as to those that have a more direct influence upon, and tend more fully to evince, his conversableness with men. As first: His wisdom or knowledge 1(for we need not be so curious as at present to distinguish them) must be omniscience. About which, if any place were left for rational doubt, it would be obvious to them to allege it, who are of slower inclinations towards Religion. And object (against all applications to, or expectations from him) That if we be not sure he knows simply all things so as wisely to consider them, and resolve fitly about them, ⟨p. 263⟩it will be no little difficulty to determine, which he doth, and which not; or to be at a certainty that this or that concernment of theirs about which they might address themselves to him be not among the unknown things. At least, we shall the less need to be curious in distinguishing, or to consider what things may be supposed rather than other, to be without the compass of his knowledge; if it appear that it universally encompasses all things. Or that nothing can be without its reach. And because we suppose it, already, out of doubt, that the true notion of God imports a Being absolutely or every way perfect; nothing else can be doubted in this matter, but, whether the knowledge of all things be a perfection?
Which general perfection of his Being as it modifies all his attributes, so we shall particularly take notice that it doth so, as to those that have a more direct influence upon, and tend more fully to evince, his conversableness with men. As first: His wisdom or knowledge 1(for we need not be so curious as at present to distinguish them) must be omniscience. About which, if any place were left for rational doubt, it would be obvious to them to alledge it, who are of slower inclinations towards Religion. And object (against all applications to, or expectations from him) That if we be not sure he knows simply all things so as wisely to consider them, and resolve fitly about them, ⟨p. 263⟩it will be no little difficulty to determine, which he doth, and which not; or to be at a certainty that this or that concernment of theirs about which they might addgess themselves to him be not among the unknown things. At least, we shall the less need to be curious in distinguishing, or to consider what things may be supposed rather than other, to be without the compass of his knowledge; if it appear that it universally encompasses all things. Or that nothing can be without its reach. And because we suppose it, already, out of doubt, that the true notion of God imports a Being absolutely or every way perfect; nothing else can be doubted in this matter, but, whether the knowledge of all things be a perfection?
The greatest difficulty that hath troubled some in this matter hath been, How it is possible there should be any certain knowledge of events yet to come, that depend upon a free and self-determining cause. But methinks we should not make a difficulty to acknowledge that to know these things, imports greater perfection, than not to know them; and then it would be very unreasonable, because we cannot show how this or that thing was performed, which manifestly is done; therefore to deny that it is done at all. So far is it that we can with any show of reason conclude against any act of God from our ignorance of the manner of it, that we should reckon it very absurd to conclude so, concerning any act of our own, or our ability thereto. What if it were hitherto an unknown ⟨p. 264⟩thing, and impossible to be determined; how the act of vision is performed by us: were it a wise conclusion, that therefore we neither do nor can see? r How much more rash and presuming a confidence were it to reason thus concerning the Divine acts and perfections! would we not in any such case be determined rather by that which is more evident, than by what is more obscure? As in the assigned instance: we should have but these two propositions to compare [that I do (or have such a perfection belonging to me that I can) see] and [that whatsoever act I do or can do, I am able to understand the course and method of natures operation therein.] And thereupon to judge which of these two is more evident. Wherein it may be supposed there's no man in his wits to whom the determination would not be easy. Accordingly in the present case we have only these two assertions that can be in competition in point of evidence, between which we are to make a comparison and a (consequent) judgment, viz. [whatsoever perfection belongs to a Being absolutely perfect, enabling it to do this or that, the wit of man can comprehend the distinct way and manner of doing it] and [it imports greater perfection to know all things, than to be ignorant of some] and here surely whosoever shall think the determination difficult, accounts the wit of man so exceeding great that he discovers his own to be very little. For what can the pretence of evidence be in the former assertion?
The greatest difficulty that hath troubled some in this matter hath been, How it is possible there should be any certain knowledge of events yet to come, that depend upon a free and self-determining cause. But methinks we should not make a difficulty to acknowledge that to know these things, imports greater perfection, than not to know them; and then it would be very unreasonable, because we cannot shew how this or that thing was performed, which manifestly is done; therefore to deny that it is done at all. So far is it that we can with any shew of reason conclude against any act of God from our ignorance of the manner of it, that we should reckon it very absurd to conclude so, concerning any act of our own, or our ability thereto. What if it were hitherto an unknown
Was it necessary that he in whose choice it was whether we should ever know any thing or no, should make us capable of knowing every thing belonging to his own being? Or will we adventure to be so assuming, as while we deny it to God that he knows all things, to attribute to our selves that we do? But if we will think it not altogether unworthy of us to be ignorant of some thing, what is there of which we may with more probability or with less disparagement be thought so, than the manner of Gods knowing things? And what place is there for complaint of inevidence in the latter? Is not that knowledge more perfect, which so fully already comprehends all things, as upon that account to admit of no increase; than that which shall be every day growing, and have a continual succession of new objects emerging and coming into view, before, altogether unknown? And will not that be the case if we suppose future contingencies to lie concealed from the penetrating eye of God? For whatsoever is future, will some time be present, and then we will allow such contingencies to be known to him. That is, that God may know them when we our selves can! And that nothing of that kind is known to him which is not at least knowable some way or other to our selves, at least successively, and one thing after another. We will perhaps, allow that prerogative to God in point of this knowledge, that he can know these things, now fallen out, all at once, we but by degrees, ⟨p. 266⟩while yet there is not any one that is absolutely unknowable to us. But why should it be thought unreasonable to attribute an excellency to the knowledge of God above ours, as well in respect of the manner of knowing, as the multitude of objects, at once, known? we will readily confess in some creatures an excellency of their visive faculty above our own; that they can see things in that darkness, wherein they are, to us, invisible. And will we not allow that to the eye of God, which is as a flame of fire to be able to penetrate into the abstrusest darkness of futurity, though we know not the way how it is done; when yet we know that whatsoever belongs to the most perfect being, must belong to his? And that knowledge of all things, imports more perfection, than if it were lessened by the ignorance of any thing.
Was it necessary that he in whose choice it was whether we should ever know any thing or no, should make us capable of knowing every thing belonging to his own being? Or will we adventure to be so assuming, as while we deny it to God that he knows all things, to attribute to our selves that we do? But if we will think it not altogether unworthy of us to be ignorant of some thing, what is there of which we may with more probability or with less disparagement be thought so, than the manner of Gods knowing things? And what place is there for complaint of inevidence in the latter? Is not that knowledge more perfect, which so fully already comprehends all things, as upon that account to admit of no increase; than that which shall be every day growing, and have a continual succession of new objects emerging and coming into view, before, altogether unknown? And will not that be the case if we suppose future contingencies to lie conceal'd from the penetrating eye of God? For whatsoever is future, will some time be present, and then we will allow such contingencies to be known to him. That is, that God may know them when we our selves can! And that nothing of that kind is known to him which is not at least knowable some way or other to our selves, at least successively, and one thing after another. We will perhaps, allow that prerogative to God in point of this knowledge, that he can know these things, now fall'n out, all at once, we but by degrees,
Some who have thought the certain foreknowledge of future contingencies not attributable to God, have reckoned the matter sufficiently excused; by this that it no more detracts from the Divine omniscience, to state without the object of it, things not possible, or that imply a contradiction (as they suppose these to do) to be known, than it doth from his omnipotency, that it cannot do what is impossible, or that implies a contradiction to be done.
But against this there seems to lie this reasonable exception, that the two cases appear not sufficiently alike: Inasmuch as the supposition ⟨p. 267⟩of the former will be found not to leave the blessed God equally entitled to omniscience, as the latter to omnipotency. For [all things] should not be alike the object of both. And why should not that be understood to signify the knowledge of simply all things; as well as this the power of doing simply all things? Or why should all things included in these two words, signify so very diversly, that is there properly all things, here some things only. And why must we so difference the object of omniscience and omnipotency? as to make that so much narrower than this? And then how is it all things, when so great a number of things will be left excluded? Whereas from the object of omnipotency (that we may prevent what would be replied) there will be no exclusion of any thing. Not of the things which are actually already made; for they are still momently reproduced by the same power. Not of the actions and effects of free causes yet future; for when they become actual God doth certainly perform the part of the first cause (even by common consent) in order, to their becoming so; which is certainly doing somewhat though all be not agreed what that part is. Therefore they are in the mean time to be esteemed within the object of omnipotency, or to be of the things which God can do, viz. as the first cause virtually including the power of the second.
But against this there seems to lie this reasonable exception, that the two cases appear not sufficiently alike: Inasmuch as the supposition ⟨p. 267⟩of the former will be found not to leave the blessed God equally entitled to omnisciency, as the latter to omnipotency. For [all things] should not be alike the object of both. And why should not that be understood to signifie the knowledge of simply all things; as well as this the power of doing simply all things? Or why should all things included in these two words, signifie so very diversly, that is there properly all things, here some things only. And why must we so difference the object of omnisciency and omnipotency? as to make that so much narrower than this? And then how is it all things, when so great a number of things will be left excluded? Whereas from the object of omnipotency (that we may prevent what would be reply'd) there will be no exclusion of any thing. Not of the things which are actually already made; for they are still momently reproduc'd by the same power. Not of the actions and effects of free causes yet future; for when they become actual God doth certainly perform the part of the first cause (even by common consent) in order, to their becoming so; which is certainly doing somewhat though all be not agreed what that part is. Therefore they are in the mean time to be esteemed within the object of omnipotency, or to be of the things which God can do, viz. as the first cause virtually including the power of the second.
But more strictly; all impossibility is either natural and absolute, or moral and conditional. ⟨p. 268⟩What is absolutely or naturally impossible, or repugnant in it self, is not properly any thing. Whatsoever simple being not yet existent we can form any conception of is producible, and so within the compass of omnipotency; for there is no repugnancy in simplicity. That wherein therefore we place natural impossibility, is the inconsistency of being this thing, whose notion is such, and another wholly and entirely; whose notion is divers, at the same time (that which, more barbarously than insignificantly, hath been wont to be called incompossibility) But surely all things are properly enough said to be naturally possible to God, while all simple beings are producible by him, of which any notion can be formed; yea and compounded so as by their composition to result into a third thing. So that it is not an exception to say that it is naturally impossible this thing should be another thing, and yet be wholly it self still at once, that it should be and not be, or be without it self. There is not within the compass of actual or conceivable being, such a thing. Nor is it reasonable to except such actions as are naturally possible to other Agents, but not to him; As to walk, for instance, or the like. Inasmuch as, though the excellency of his nature permits not they should be done by him; yet since their power of doing them proceeds wholly from him, he hath it virtually and eminently in himself. As was formerly said of the infiniteness of his Being. And for moral impossibility, as to lye, to ⟨p. 269⟩do an unjust act; That God never does them proceeds not from want of power, but an eternal aversion of will. It cannot be said he is not able to do such a thing, if he would, but so is his will qualified and conditioned, by its own unchangeable rectitude, that he most certainly never will, or such things as are in themselves evil are never done by him, not through the defect of natural power, but from the permanent stability and fullness of all moral perfection. And it is not without the compass of absolute omnipotency to do what is but conditionally impossible. The absence of which restrictive condition, would rather bespeak impotency and imperfection than omnipotency. Therefore the object of omnipotence is simply all things. Why not of omniscience as well?
But more strictly; all impossibility is either natural and absolute, or moral and conditional.
It may be said [all things] as it signifies the object of omniscience is only restrained by the act or faculty, signified therewith in the same word, so as to denote the formal object of that faculty or act, viz. all knowable things. But surely that act must suppose some Agent, whereto that knowable hath reference. Knowable? to whom? to others, or to God himself? If we say the former, it is indeed a great honour we put upon God, to say he can know as much as others: if the latter, we speak absurdly, and only say he can know all that he can know. It were fairer to deny omniscience than so interpret it.
But if it be denied, what shall the pretence be? why, that it implies a contradiction future ⟨p. 270⟩contingents should be certainly known: 1For they are uncertain, and nothing can be otherwise truly known than as it is.
- 1Qualis res est talis est rei cognitio. Si itaque resisit incerta (puta incertum est locus sit futurum, an non) non datur ulla certa ejus notitia. Quomodo enim fieri potest ut certo sciatur, ad fore quod certo futurum non est, &c. Strangius de voluntate & Actionibus Dei, &c. l. 3. c. 6. (as he there objects to himself.)
And it must be acknowledged that to whom any thing is uncertain, it is a contradiction that to him it should be certainly known. But that such things are uncertain to God needs other proof than I have met with, in what follows in that cited Author or elsewhere. All which will amount to no more than this, that such things as we cannot tell how God knows them, must needs be unknown to him. But since we are sure many such things have been certainly foretold by God (and, of them, such as, we may be also sure, he never intended to effect) we have reason enough to be confident that such things are not unknowable to him. And for the manner of his knowing them, it is better to profess ignorance about it, than attempt the explication thereof, either unintelligibly, as some have, to no purpose, or dangerously and impiously, as others have adventured to do, to very bad purpose. And it well becomes us to suppose an infinite understanding may have ways of knowing things which we know nothing of. To my apprehension, that last mentioned Author doth, with ill success, attempt ⟨p. 271⟩an explication of Gods manner of knowing this sort of things, by the far less intelligible notion, of the indivisibility of eternity, comprehending (as he says) all the parts of time, not successively, but together. And though he truly say that the Scotists way of expressing how future contingents are present to God, i. e. according to their objective and intentional being, only, affords us no account why God knows them, for which cause he rejects it; and follows that of the Thomists, who will have them to be present according to their real and actual existence. I should yet prefer the deficiency of the former way, before the contradictiousness and repugnancy of the latter; and conceive those words in the Divine 1Dialogues, as good an explication of the manner of his knowledge, as the case can admit, (which yet is but the Scotists sense) That the whole evolution of times and ages, is so collectedly, and presentifickly represented to God, at once, as if all things and actions which ever were, are, or shall be, were at this very instant, and so always really present and existent before him. Which is no wonder, the animadversion and intellectual comprehension of God, being absolutely infinite, according to the truth of his Idea:
- 1Dr. More.
I do therefore think that a sober resolution in 1this matter, That it seems more safe, to allow this privilege to the infinite understanding of God, than to venture at all to circumscribe his omniscience: For though it ⟨p. 272⟩may safely be said, that he knows not any thing that really implies a contradiction to be known; yet we are not assured but that may seem a contradiction to us, that is not so really in it self.
I do therefore think that a sober resolution in 1this matter, That it seems more safe, to allow this priviledge to the infinite understanding of God, than to venture at all to circumscribe his omniscience: For though it ⟨p. 272⟩may safely be said, that he knows not any thing that really implies a contradiction to be known; yet we are not assured but that may seem a contradiction to us, that is not so really in it self.
- 1Of Bathymus in the same Dialogues.
Only, as to that instance of the commensurableness of the diagonal line of a Quadrate to one of the sides; whereas, though there are great difficulties on both sides, viz. that these are commensurable, and that they are not; yet any mans judgment would rather incline to the latter as the easier part: I should therefore also think it more safe, to make choice of that, as the parallel of the present difficulty.
Only, as to that instance of the commensurableness of the diagonial line of a Quadrate to one of the sides; whereas, though there are great difficulties on both sides, viz. that these are commensurable, and that they are not; yet any mans judgment would rather incline to the latter as the easier part: I should therefore also think it more safe, to make choice of that, as the parallel of the present difficulty.
Upon the whole we may conclude that the knowledge of God is every way perfect; and being so, extends to all our concernments. And that nothing remains, upon that account to make us decline applying our selves to Religious converses with him; or deny him the honour and entertainment of a Temple. For which we shall yet see further cause, when we consider next, That his power is also omnipotence. Which (though the discourse of it 1have been occasionally somewhat mingled with that of the last) might be directly spoken of for the fuller eviction of that his conversableness with men which Religion and a Temple do suppose. Nor indeed is it enough that he knows our concernments, except he can also provide effectually about them, and dispose of them to our advantage. And we cannot doubt, but he, who could create us, ⟨p. 273⟩and such a world as this, can do so, even though he were supposed not omnipotent. But even that, it self, seems a very unreasonable supposition; that less than infinite power should suffice to the creation of any thing. For however liable it may be to controversy, what a second cause might do herein; being assisted by the infinite power of the first: It seems altogether unimaginable, to us, how, though the power of all men were not in one (which we will easily suppose to be a very vast power) it could, alone, be sufficient to make the minutest atom arise into being out of nothing. And that all the matter of the universe hath been so produced out of nothing, it will be no great presumption to suppose already fully proved; in that, though any such thing as necessary matter were admitted, yet its essential unalterableness would render it impossible it should be the matter of the universe. Therefore when we cannot devise what finite power can ever suffice (suppose we it never so much increased, but still finite) to the doing of that which we are sure is done, what is left us to suppose, but that the power which did it is simply infinite: much more when we consider, not only that something actually is produced out of nothing, but do also seriously contemplate the nature of the production. Which carries so much of amazing wonder in it every where, that even the least and most minute things might serve for sufficient instances of the unlimited greatness of that power which made them. As would be seen;
Upon the whole we may conclude that the knowledge of God is every way perfect; and being so, extends to all our concernments. And that nothing remains, upon that account to make us decline applying our selves to Religious converses with him; or deny him the honour and entertainment of a Temple. For which we shall yet see further cause, when we consider next, That his power is also omnipotence. Which (though the discourse of it