A44683:463
The Living Temple
The living temple, or, A designed improvement of that notion that a good man is the temple of God by John Howe ...
London: printed for John Starkey, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But against this there seems to lie this reasonable exception, that the two cases appear not sufficiently alike: Inasmuch as the supposition ⟨p. 267⟩of the former will be found not to leave the blessed God equally entitled to omniscience, as the latter to omnipotency. For [all things] should not be alike the object of both. And why should not that be understood to signify the knowledge of simply all things; as well as this the power of doing simply all things? Or why should all things included in these two words, signify so very diversly, that is there properly all things, here some things only. And why must we so difference the object of omniscience and omnipotency? as to make that so much narrower than this? And then how is it all things, when so great a number of things will be left excluded? Whereas from the object of omnipotency (that we may prevent what would be replied) there will be no exclusion of any thing. Not of the things which are actually already made; for they are still momently reproduced by the same power. Not of the actions and effects of free causes yet future; for when they become actual God doth certainly perform the part of the first cause (even by common consent) in order, to their becoming so; which is certainly doing somewhat though all be not agreed what that part is. Therefore they are in the mean time to be esteemed within the object of omnipotency, or to be of the things which God can do, viz. as the first cause virtually including the power of the second.
But against this there seems to lie this reasonable exception, that the two cases appear not sufficiently alike: Inasmuch as the supposition ⟨p. 267⟩of the former will be found not to leave the blessed God equally entitled to omnisciency, as the latter to omnipotency. For [all things] should not be alike the object of both. And why should not that be understood to signifie the knowledge of simply all things; as well as this the power of doing simply all things? Or why should all things included in these two words, signifie so very diversly, that is there properly all things, here some things only. And why must we so difference the object of omnisciency and omnipotency? as to make that so much narrower than this? And then how is it all things, when so great a number of things will be left excluded? Whereas from the object of omnipotency (that we may prevent what would be reply'd) there will be no exclusion of any thing. Not of the things which are actually already made; for they are still momently reproduc'd by the same power. Not of the actions and effects of free causes yet future; for when they become actual God doth certainly perform the part of the first cause (even by common consent) in order, to their becoming so; which is certainly doing somewhat though all be not agreed what that part is. Therefore they are in the mean time to be esteemed within the object of omnipotency, or to be of the things which God can do, viz. as the first cause virtually including the power of the second.