A44683:464
The Living Temple
The living temple, or, A designed improvement of that notion that a good man is the temple of God by John Howe ...
London: printed for John Starkey, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But more strictly; all impossibility is either natural and absolute, or moral and conditional. ⟨p. 268⟩What is absolutely or naturally impossible, or repugnant in it self, is not properly any thing. Whatsoever simple being not yet existent we can form any conception of is producible, and so within the compass of omnipotency; for there is no repugnancy in simplicity. That wherein therefore we place natural impossibility, is the inconsistency of being this thing, whose notion is such, and another wholly and entirely; whose notion is divers, at the same time (that which, more barbarously than insignificantly, hath been wont to be called incompossibility) But surely all things are properly enough said to be naturally possible to God, while all simple beings are producible by him, of which any notion can be formed; yea and compounded so as by their composition to result into a third thing. So that it is not an exception to say that it is naturally impossible this thing should be another thing, and yet be wholly it self still at once, that it should be and not be, or be without it self. There is not within the compass of actual or conceivable being, such a thing. Nor is it reasonable to except such actions as are naturally possible to other Agents, but not to him; As to walk, for instance, or the like. Inasmuch as, though the excellency of his nature permits not they should be done by him; yet since their power of doing them proceeds wholly from him, he hath it virtually and eminently in himself. As was formerly said of the infiniteness of his Being. And for moral impossibility, as to lye, to ⟨p. 269⟩do an unjust act; That God never does them proceeds not from want of power, but an eternal aversion of will. It cannot be said he is not able to do such a thing, if he would, but so is his will qualified and conditioned, by its own unchangeable rectitude, that he most certainly never will, or such things as are in themselves evil are never done by him, not through the defect of natural power, but from the permanent stability and fullness of all moral perfection. And it is not without the compass of absolute omnipotency to do what is but conditionally impossible. The absence of which restrictive condition, would rather bespeak impotency and imperfection than omnipotency. Therefore the object of omnipotence is simply all things. Why not of omniscience as well?
But more strictly; all impossibility is either natural and absolute, or moral and conditional.