A44683:465
The Living Temple
The living temple, or, A designed improvement of that notion that a good man is the temple of God by John Howe ...
London: printed for John Starkey, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
It may be said [all things] as it signifies the object of omniscience is only restrained by the act or faculty, signified therewith in the same word, so as to denote the formal object of that faculty or act, viz. all knowable things. But surely that act must suppose some Agent, whereto that knowable hath reference. Knowable? to whom? to others, or to God himself? If we say the former, it is indeed a great honour we put upon God, to say he can know as much as others: if the latter, we speak absurdly, and only say he can know all that he can know. It were fairer to deny omniscience than so interpret it.
But if it be denied, what shall the pretence be? why, that it implies a contradiction future ⟨p. 270⟩contingents should be certainly known: 1For they are uncertain, and nothing can be otherwise truly known than as it is.
- 1Qualis res est talis est rei cognitio. Si itaque resisit incerta (puta incertum est locus sit futurum, an non) non datur ulla certa ejus notitia. Quomodo enim fieri potest ut certo sciatur, ad fore quod certo futurum non est, &c. Strangius de voluntate & Actionibus Dei, &c. l. 3. c. 6. (as he there objects to himself.)
And it must be acknowledged that to whom any thing is uncertain, it is a contradiction that to him it should be certainly known. But that such things are uncertain to God needs other proof than I have met with, in what follows in that cited Author or elsewhere. All which will amount to no more than this, that such things as we cannot tell how God knows them, must needs be unknown to him. But since we are sure many such things have been certainly foretold by God (and, of them, such as, we may be also sure, he never intended to effect) we have reason enough to be confident that such things are not unknowable to him. And for the manner of his knowing them, it is better to profess ignorance about it, than attempt the explication thereof, either unintelligibly, as some have, to no purpose, or dangerously and impiously, as others have adventured to do, to very bad purpose. And it well becomes us to suppose an infinite understanding may have ways of knowing things which we know nothing of. To my apprehension, that last mentioned Author doth, with ill success, attempt