A44683:466
The Living Temple
The living temple, or, A designed improvement of that notion that a good man is the temple of God by John Howe ...
London: printed for John Starkey, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But if it be denied, what shall the pretence be? why, that it implies a contradiction future ⟨p. 270⟩contingents should be certainly known: 1For they are uncertain, and nothing can be otherwise truly known than as it is.
- 1Qualis res est talis est rei cognitio. Si itaque resisit incerta (puta incertum est locus sit futurum, an non) non datur ulla certa ejus notitia. Quomodo enim fieri potest ut certo sciatur, ad fore quod certo futurum non est, &c. Strangius de voluntate & Actionibus Dei, &c. l. 3. c. 6. (as he there objects to himself.)
And it must be acknowledged that to whom any thing is uncertain, it is a contradiction that to him it should be certainly known. But that such things are uncertain to God needs other proof than I have met with, in what follows in that cited Author or elsewhere. All which will amount to no more than this, that such things as we cannot tell how God knows them, must needs be unknown to him. But since we are sure many such things have been certainly foretold by God (and, of them, such as, we may be also sure, he never intended to effect) we have reason enough to be confident that such things are not unknowable to him. And for the manner of his knowing them, it is better to profess ignorance about it, than attempt the explication thereof, either unintelligibly, as some have, to no purpose, or dangerously and impiously, as others have adventured to do, to very bad purpose. And it well becomes us to suppose an infinite understanding may have ways of knowing things which we know nothing of. To my apprehension, that last mentioned Author doth, with ill success, attempt ⟨p. 271⟩an explication of Gods manner of knowing this sort of things, by the far less intelligible notion, of the indivisibility of eternity, comprehending (as he says) all the parts of time, not successively, but together. And though he truly say that the Scotists way of expressing how future contingents are present to God, i. e. according to their objective and intentional being, only, affords us no account why God knows them, for which cause he rejects it; and follows that of the Thomists, who will have them to be present according to their real and actual existence. I should yet prefer the deficiency of the former way, before the contradictiousness and repugnancy of the latter; and conceive those words in the Divine