A53733:194
Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and…
Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and the authority of the civil magistrate over the consciences of subjects in matters of religion.
London : s.n., 1669
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But he gives in his Exceptions, pag. 71. But when, saith he, we have set aside all manner of virtue, let them tell me what remains to be called Grace, and give me any notion of it distinct from all morality, that consists in the right order and government of our actions in all our Relations, and so comprehends all our Duty; and therefore if Grace be not included in it, it is but a phantasm and an imaginary thing. I say first; where Grace is, we cannot set aside virtue, because it will and doth produce and effect it in the minds of men. But Virtue may be, where Grace is not, in the sense so often declared. Secondly, Take moral virtue in the notion of it here received and explained by our Author, and I have given sundry Instances before, of Gracious Duties, that come not within the verge or compass of the Scheme given us of it. ⟨p. 224⟩Thirdly, The whole aimed at, lies in this, that virtue that governs our actions in all our Duties may be considered either as the Duty we owe to the Law of nature, for the ends of it, to be performed in the strength of nature, and by the direction of it, or it may be considered as it is an especial effect of the grace of God in us, which gives it a new principle, and a new end, and a new respect unto the Covenant of Grace Wherein we walk with God, the consideration where of frustrates the intention of our Author in this discourse.
But he gives in his Exceptions, pag. 71. But when, saith he, we have set aside all manner of vertue, let them tell me what remains to be called Grace, and give me any notion of it distinct from all morality, that consists in the right order and government of our actions in all our Relations, and so comprehends all our Duty; and therefore if Grace be not included in it, it is but a phantasme and an imaginary thing. I say first; where Grace is, we cannot set aside vertue, because it will and doth produce and effect it in the minds of men. But Vertue may be, where Grace is not, in the sense so often declared. Secondly, Take moral vertue in the notion of it here received and explained by our Author, and I have given sundry Instances before, of Gracious Duties, that come not within the verge or compass of the Scheme given us of it. ⟨p. 224⟩Thirdly, The whole aimed at, lies in this, that vertue that governs our actions in all our Duties may be considered either as the Duty we owe to the Law of nature, for the ends of it, to be performed in the strength of nature, and by the direction of it, or it may be considered as it is an especial effect of the grace of God in us, which gives it a new principle, and a new end, and a new respect unto the Covenant of Grace Wherein we walk with God, the consideration where of frustrates the intention of our Author in this discourse.