A53733:207
Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and…
Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and the authority of the civil magistrate over the consciences of subjects in matters of religion.
London : s.n., 1669
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Secondly, It may be enquired what is the Power and Authority over Moral Virtues, which is here ascribed unto the Civil Magistrate, and over the Consciences of men, with respect unto them. Is it such as to make that to be Virtue which was not Virtue before, or which was Vice, and oblige men in Conscience to practise it as Virtue? This would go a great way indeed, and answer somewhat of what is, or as it is said, may be done ⟨p. 240⟩in the Worship of God, when that is made a part of it which was not so before. But what name shall these new Virtues be called by? A new Virtue both as to its Acts and Objects, will as much fly the imaginations of men, as a sixth sense doth. It may be our Author will satisfy us as to this enquiry; for he tells us, pag. 80. That he hath power to make that a particular of the Divine Law, that God hath not made so. I wish he had declared himself how, and wherein; for I am afraid this expression as here it lies, is offensive. The Divine Law is Divine, and so is every particular of it•; and how a man can make a thing Divine, that is not so of it self, nor by Divine Institution, is hard to find out. It may be that only the subject matter of the Law, and not the Law it self formally is intended; and to make a thing a particular of the Divine Law, is no more but to make the Divine Law require, that in particular of a man which it did not require of him before. But this Particular, refers to the Nature, Essence and Being of the thing, or to the acting, and occasion of it in particular. And if it be taken in the latter sense, here is no more ascribed unto the Magistrate, than is common with him to every man in the World. For every ⟨p. 241⟩one that puts himself into new circumstances, or new Relations, doth so make that unto him to be a particular of the Divine Law, which was not so before; for he is bound and obliged unto the actual performance of many Duties, which as so circumstantiated, he was not bo••• unto before.
Secondly, It may be enquired what is the Power and Authority over Moral Vertues, which is here ascribed unto the Civil Magistrate, and over the Consciences of men, with respect unto them. Is it such as to make that to be Vertue which was not Vertue before, or which was Vice, and oblige men in Conscience to practise it as Vertue? This would go a great way indeed, and answer somewhat of what is, or as it is said, may be done