A53733:205
Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and…
Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and the authority of the civil magistrate over the consciences of subjects in matters of religion.
London : s.n., 1669
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
namely, that every particular Virtue is therefore such, because it is are semblance and imitation of some of the Divine Attributes, which I suppose they are not, whose Rules and forms are alterable upon accidents and occasions. And we are taught also, pag. 68. that the practice of Virtue consists in living suitable to the dictates of Reason and Nature; which are Rules not variable and Changeable. There must be some new distinction to reconcile these things, which I cannot at present think of. That which I would enquire from hence is, whether the Magistrates have power over the Consciences of men in reference unto those things in Morality, whose Rules of good and evil are of an Eternal obligation. That he hath not is evidently implied in this place. And I shall not enter into the confusion of the ensuing Discourse, where the latter sort of Rules for Virtue, the other member of the distinction, are turned into various Methods of executing Laws about outward acts of Virtue or Vice; and the Virtues themselves into outward expressions and significations of Duty; for I have at present no contest with this Author about his manner of writing, nor do intend to have. It is enough that here at once all the principal and most important ⟨p. 238⟩Virtues are vindicated to their own unalterable Rules as such, and the Consciences of Men in reference unto them put under another jurisdiction. And what then becomes of this Argument, That the Magistrate must have power over the Consciences of Men in matters of Divine Worship, because he hath so in things Moral which are of greater importance, when what is so of importance, is exempted from his power.
namely, that every particular Vertue is therefore such, because it is are semblance and imitation of some of the Divine Attributes, which I suppose they are not, whose Rules and formes are alterable upon accidents and occasions. And we are taught also, pag. 68. that the practice of Vertue consists in living suitable to the dictates of Reason and Nature; which are Rules not variable and Changeable. There must be some new distinction to reconcile these things, which I cannot at present think of. That which I would enquire from hence is, whether the Magistrates have power over the Consciences of men in reference unto those things in Morality, whose Rules of good and evil are of an Eternal obligation. That he hath not is evidently implyed in this place. And I shall not enter into the confusion of the ensuing Discourse, where the latter sort of Rules for Vertue, the other member of the distinction, are turned into various Methods of executing Laws about outward acts of Vertue or Vice; and the Vertues themselves into outward expressions and significations of Duty; for I have at present no contest with this Author about his manner of writing, nor do intend to have. It is enough that here at once all the principal and most important