A53733:218
Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and…
Truth and innocence vindicated in a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and the authority of the civil magistrate over the consciences of subjects in matters of religion.
London : s.n., 1669
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But these things must be a little farther examined, and that very briefly. Here is mention of Liberty of Conscience; but what Conscience is, or what that Liberty is, is not declared. For Conscience it is called sometimes the Mind, sometimes the Understanding, sometimes Opinion, sometimes described by the Liberty of Thinking, sometimes termed an Imperious Faculty, which things without much discourse, and more words, than I can now afford to use, are not reconcilable amongst themselves. Besides, Liberty is no proper•Affection of the Mind, or Understanding. Though I acknowledge the mind, and its Actings to be naturally free from outward Compulsion, or Coaction; yet it is capable of such a Determination from the things proposed unto it, and the manner of their proposal, ⟨p. 252⟩as to make necessary the Elicitation of its Acts. It cannot but judge that two and three make five. It is the will that is the proper seat of Liberty; and what some suppose to be the ultimate determination of the practical understanding, is indeed an Act of the Will. It is so if you speak of Liberty naturally and morally, and not of state and condition, which are here confounded. But suppose what you will to be Conscience, it is Moral Actions or Duties that are here supposed to be the Object of its actings. Now what are, or can be the thoughts, or actings of the Mind of Man about moral Actions, but about their Virtue, or their Vice, their moral good or evil? nor is a conclusion of what is a mans own duty in reference to the practice of them, possibly to be separated from them. That then which is here asserted is, That a man may think, judge, or conceive such or such a thing to be his Duty, and yet have thereby no Obligation put upon him to perform it; for Conscience, we are informed, hath nothing to do beyond the inward thoughts of mens minds.
But these things must be a little farther examined, and that very briefly. Here is mention of Liberty of Conscience; but what Conscience is, or what that Liberty is, is not declared. For Conscience it is called sometimes the Mind, sometimes the Vnderstanding, sometimes Opinion, sometimes described by the Liberty of Thinking, sometimes termed an Imperious Faculty, which things without much discourse, and more words, than I can now afford to use, are not reconcilable amongst themselves. Besides, Liberty is no proper•Affection of the Mind, or Understanding. Though I acknowledge the mind, and its Actings to be naturally free from outward Compulsion, or Coaction; yet it is capable of such a Determination from the things proposed unto it, and the manner of their proposal,