The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

But will it herehence follow that Austin did deny absolute predestination? Vossius himself acknowledgeth the contrary of him, as ¹well as of Fulgentius, namely, that Gods foreknowledge of perseverance in good, proceeded from Gods absolute decree of saving them. And let every sober reader judge whether upon the same grounds it doth not follow, that Gods foreknowledge of mans perseverance in infidelity, doth not likewise follow from Gods absolute decree of reprobating him. For what is the ground of the former, but this, that God had absolutely decreed to give faith unto some? Now doth it not herehence follow, that God absolutely decreed to deny faith unto others? For as Ambrose saith, and as Austin allegeth out of him, si voluisset ex indevotis fecisset devotos. Yet am not I of Vossius his opinion in this. I say rather, Gods foreknowledge of one mans faith, proceeds from his decree not of saving him, but of giving him faith; and Gods foreknowledge of another mans final perseverance in infidelity, proceeds from Gods decree, not of damning him, but of denying him grace to cure his infidelity. And as for the decree of salvation, I deny it to be in any moment of nature, before the decree of giving grace; in like sort, I deny the decree of damnation to be in any moment ⟨p. 53⟩of nature before the decree of permitting mans infidelity to continue uncured unto the end. And the critical question in this point consists in this, Whether the granting of grace, or denial of grace, be not merely of the pleasure of God, and not according to any different dispositions in man; by grace understanding grace effectual to the working of faith and true repentance. And unless the Ancients be showed to have maintained, either that faith, and repentance, are not the gifts of God; or, that if they be the gifts of God, that God dispenseth his effectual grace for the working of them, not according to the mere pleasure of God, but according to the different dispositions of men; all that they talk of the Ancients in this point, is merely vain and to no purpose.

But will it herehence follow that Austin did deny absolute predestination? Vossius himselfe acknowledgeth the contrary of him, as ¹well as of Fulgentius, namely, that Gods foreknowledge of perseverance in good, proceeded from Gods absolute decree of saving them. And let every sober reader judge whether upon the same grounds it doth not follow, that Gods foreknowledge of mans perseverance in infidelity, doth not likewise follow from Gods absolute decree of reprobating him. For what is the ground of the former, but this, that God had absolutely decreed to give faith unto some? Now doth it not herehence follow, that God absolutely decreed to deny faith unto others? For as Ambrose saith, and as Austin alleageth out of him, si voluisset ex indevotis fecisset devotos. Yet am not I of Vossius his opinion in this. I say rather, Gods foreknowledge of one mans faith, proceeds from his decree not of saving him, but of giving him faith; and Gods foreknowledge of another mans finall perseverance in infidelity, proceeds from Gods decree, not of damning him, but of denying him grace to cure his infidelity. And as for the decree of salvation, I deny it to be in any moment of nature, before the decree of giving grace; in like sort, I deny the decree of damnation to be in any moment ⟨p. 53⟩of nature before the decree of permitting mans infidelity to continue uncured unto the end. And the criticall question in this point consists in this, Whether the granting of grace, or deniall of grace, be not meerely of the pleasure of God, and not according to any different dispositions in man; by grace understanding grace effectuall to the working of faith and true repentance. And unlesse the Ancients be shewed to have maintained, either that faith, and repentance, are not the gifts of God; or, that if they be the gifts of God, that God dispenseth his effectuall grace for the working of them, not according to the meer pleasure of God, but according to the different dispositions of men; all that they talke of the Ancients in this point, is meerly vaine and to no purpose.

1. 1Praef. in Hist. Pelag.

But I come to Prosper, whose relation, I doubt not, this Author takes to be of greatest moment. Now to this I answer.

1. To say that, Penè omnium par invenitur & una sententia, qua propositum & praedestinationem Dei secundum praescientiam receperunt, doth not prove that there is no footing amongst the Ancients for absolute predestination. Neither doth Vossius allege half so many Fathers for this opinion, as were those Bishops who joined with Cyprian in decreeing the Rebaptization of Heretics.

1. To say that, Penè omnium par invenitur & una sententia, qua propositum & praedestinationem Dei secundum praescientiam receperunt, doth not prove that there is no footing amongst the Ancients for absolute predestination. Neither doth Vossius alleage halfe so many Fathers for this opinion, as were those Bishops who joyned with Cyprian in decreeing the Rebaptization of Hereticks.

3. Observe, When Prosper urged them to expound those passages in St Paul, after what meaning they thought best, they forthwith professed ingeniously that they found nothing in the Fathers that gave them content: their words related by Prosper are these, Nihil se invenisse quod placeret.

4. Bellarmine, De Grat. & liber. Arbit. lib. 2. cap. 14. takes notice of this objection drawn out of Prosper and answereth it, according unto Austin in this manner, Augustinus ipse in libr. de Bono Persev. cap. 20. dicit Veteres Patres, qui ante Pelagium floruerunt, quaestionem istam nunquam acuratè tractasse sed incidenter solùm & quasi per transitum illam attigisse. Addit verò in fundamento hujus sententiae quod est, Gratiam Dei non praeveniri ab ullo opere nostro; sed contrà, ab illo omnia opera nostra praeveniri, ita ut nihil omninò boni quod attinet ad salutem, sit in nobis quod non sit nobis ex Deo, convenire Catholicos omnes; & ibidem citat Cyprianum, Ambrosium, Nazianzenum. So that it appears hereby, that Austin did not acknowledge the former Writers to have embraced this opinion, though the Massilienses pretended so much. And herewithall he openeth unto us, a way how to conceive aright of their opinion in predestination; namely, that as many as acknowledge Gods grace preventing us in every good work, they all are to be accounted to agree with him in the doctrine of predestination. For it is apparent, that in the contrary doctrine Pelagius grounded his opinion concerning predestination. And Austin himself sometime thought that God, quem sibi crediturum esse praescivit, ipsum elegit, cui spiritum sanctum daret, ut bona operando vitam aeternam consequeretur: and why so? because forsooth he at that time conceived it to be mans work to believe, which saith he, I had never said, had I known faith it self to have been amongst the gifts of the holy Ghost. Retract. lib. 1. cap. 25. and therefore De Praedesti. Sanct. cap. 1. in his answer to the Letter of Hilarius, mark what course Austin takes for the justifying of his own doctrine concerning predestination. Prius fidem quâ Christiani sumus donum Dei esse debemus ostendere. And Bellarmine in the place above cited professeth, that Austin did herehence rightly collect out of the Fathers, Gratuitae praedestinationis sententiam & fidem in Ecclesiâ Catholicâ semper fuisse. Neque olim (saith he) defendi potest praedestinatio ex operibus praevisis, nisi aliquid boni ponatur in homine justo, quo discernatur ab impio quod non sit illi à Deo; quod sanè (saith he) Patres omnes cum summâ consensione rejiciunt.

4. Bellarmine, De Grat. & liber. Arbit. lib. 2. cap. 14. takes notice of this objection drawn out of Prosper and answereth it, according unto Austin in this manner, Augustinus ipse in libr. de Bono Persev. cap. 20. dicit Veteres Patres, qui ante Pelagium floruerunt, quaestionem istam nunquam acuratè tractasse sed incidenter solùm & quasi per transitum illam attigisse. Addit verò in fundamento hujus sententiae quod est, Gratiam Dei non praeveniri ab ullo opere nostro; sed contrà, ab illo omnia opera nostra praeveniri, ita ut nihil omninò boni quod attinet ad salutem, sit in nobis quod non sit nobis ex Deo, convenire Catholicos omnes; & ibidem citat Cyprianum, Ambrosium, Nazianzenum. So that it appears hereby, that Austin did not acknowledge the former Writers to have embraced this opinion, though the Massilienses pretended so much. And herewithall he openeth unto us, a way how to conceive aright of their opinion in predestination; namely, that as many as acknowledge Gods grace preventing us in every good work, they all are to be accounted to agree with him in the doctrine of predestination. For it is apparent, that in the contrary doctrine Pelagius grounded his opinion concerning predestination. And Austin himselfe sometime thought that God, quem sibi crediturum esse praescivit, ipsum elegit, cui spiritum sanctum daret, ut bona operando vitam aeternam consequeretur: and why so? because forsooth he at that time conceived it to be mans work to believe, which saith he, I had never said, had I known faith it selfe to have been amongst the gifts of the holy Ghost. Retract. lib. 1. cap. 25. and therefore De Praedesti. Sanct. cap. 1. in his answer to the Letter of Hilarius, mark what course Austin takes for the justifying of his own doctrine concerning predestination. Prius fidem quâ Christiani sumus donum Dei esse debemus ostendere. And Bellarmine in the place above cited professeth, that Austin did herehence rightly collect out of the Fathers, Gratuitae praedestinationis sententiam & fidem in Ecclesiâ Catholicâ semper fuisse. Neque olim (saith he) defendi potest praedestinatio ex operibus praevisis, nisi aliquid boni ponatur in homine justo, quo discernatur ab impio quod non sit illi à Deo; quod sanè (saith he) Patres omnes cum summâ consensione rejiciunt.

In like sort, Junius in his answer to Baro for the justifying of gratuitous predestination, counts it sufficient to prove, Fidem esse donum praedestinantis & miserentis Dei ex praedestinatione ipsius. And adds saying, Hoc omnes Patres uno consensu ex Christo & Paulo agnoverunt. Ipse Justinus Martyr Apolog. 2. & alii. Gravissimè verò Clemens Alexandrinus (in hac alioqui palestrâ non ita exercitatus) ut sequentia saecula. Stromat. lib. 2. Basilidis & Valentimi dogma esse dicit, quod fides ⟨p. 54⟩à naturâ sit. In my poor judgement, the Fathers, as many as stated predestination according to the prescience of mens works, had no other meaning but this, that God did predestinate no man to eternal life, but such as coming to ripe years should believe in Christ and repent; no man unto eternal death, but such as should finally persevere in infidelity and impenitency; so making works foreseen the cause of salvation, but not of Gods decree. And Aquinas was bold to profess that, Nemo fuit it a insanae mentis qui diceret merita esse causam praedestinationis divinae quoad actum praedestinantis. And 'tis a good rule that Gerson gives, that holy mens Writings are not to be urged precisely according to the letter, De Vitâ Spirituali animae Sect. 1. co. 11. Notet his quód Doctores etiam sancti sunt magis reverenter glossandi in multis, quàm ampliandi: quoniam non omnes semper adverterunt, aut advertere cogitaverunt ad proprietatem locutionis. Improprietas autem non ampliari debet, sed ad proprietatem reduci, alioquin quid mirum si augetur deceptio.

In like sort, Junius in his answer to Baro for the justifying of gratuitous predestination, counts it sufficient to prove, Fidem esse donum praedestinantis & miserentis Dei ex praedestinatione ipsius. And adds saying, Hoc omnes Patres uno consensu ex Christo & Paulo agnoverunt. Ipse Justinus Martyr Apolog. 2. & alii. Gravissimè verò Clemens Alexandrinus (in hac alioqui palestrâ non ita exercitatus) ut sequentia saecula. Stromat. lib. 2. Basilidis & Valentimi dogma esse dicit, quod fides ⟨p. 54⟩à naturâ sit. In my poor judgement, the Fathers, as many as stated predestination according to the prescience of mens works, had no other meaning but this, that God did predestinate no man to eternall life, but such as coming to ripe years should believe in Christ and repent; no man unto eternall death, but such as should finally persevere in infidelity and impenitency; so making works foreseen the cause of salvation, but not of Gods decree. And Aquinas was bold to professe that, Nemo fuit it a insanae mentis qui diceret merita esse causam praedestinationis divinae quoad actum praedestinantis. And 'tis a good rule that Gerson gives, that holy mens Writings are not to be urged precisely according to the letter, De Vitâ Spirituali animae Sect. 1. co. 11. Notet his quód Doctores etiam sancti sunt magis reverenter glossandi in multis, quàm ampliandi: quoniam non omnes semper adverterunt, aut advertere cogitaverunt ad proprietatem locutionis. Improprietas autem non ampliari debet, sed ad proprietatem reduci, alioquin quid mirum si augetur deceptio.

5. We know what answer Austin himself makes unto this, De Praedestin. Sanct. cap. 14. Quid igitur opus est ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui priusquam ista Haeresis oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum quaestione versari, quod proculdubio facerent si respondere talibus cogerentur.

5. We know what answer Austin himselfe makes unto this, De Praedestin. Sanct. cap. 14. Quid igitur opus est ut eorum scrutemur opuscula, qui priusquam ista Haeresis oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem in hac difficili ad solvendum quaestione versari, quod proculdubio facerent si respondere talibus cogerentur.

6. As before I showed, Fulgentius himself maintains predestination to be secundum praescientiam; yet Vossius acknowledgeth him as well as Austin, to have maintained the absoluteness of predestination.

6. As before I shewed, Fulgentius himselfe maintaines predestination to be secundum praescientiam; yet Vossius acknowledgeth him as well as Austin, to have maintained the absolutenesse of predestination.

7. Lastly, this passage concerneth predestination alone, as it signifies the divine decree of conferring glory; but who ever was known to maintain the divine decree of conferring grace to have been secundum praescientiam, according to foresight of any work in man? For this is plainly to maintain, that grace is given according unto works, which in the Ancients phrase is all one, as to acknowledge, that grace is given according unto merits, which is direct Pelagianism, and condemned 1200 years ago in the Synod of Palestine.

7. Lastly, this passage concerneth predestination alone, as it signifies the divine decree of conferring glory; but who ever was known to maintaine the divine decree of conferring grace to have been secundum praescientiam, according to foresight of any work in man? For this is plainly to maintain, that grace is given according unto works, which in the Ancients phraise is all one, as to acknowledge, that grace is given according unto merits, which is direct Pelagianisme, and condemned 1200 years agoe in the Synod of Palestine.

As for that of Minutius Felix, We deny that God doth, sortem in hominibus punire, non voluntatem. We do not say, Genitura plectitur; we say that in every one who is punished by God, ingenii natura punitur; We confess that Fatum illud est quod de unoquoque Deus fatus est; and that pro meritis & singulorum qualitatibus, etiam fata determinat. Yet the holy Ghost professeth in the mouths of all his Apostles, that both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and People of Israel, were gathered together against the holy Son of God, to do that which Gods hand, and Gods counsel predetermined to be done; and yet this predetermination divine, I should think, was nothing prejudicial to the liberty of their wills.

As for that of Minutius Foelix, We deny that God doth, sortem in hominibus punire, non voluntatem. We doe not say, Genitura plectitur; we say that in every one who is punished by God, ingenii natura punitur; Wee confesse that Fatum illud est quod de unoquoque Deus fatus est; and that pro meritis & singulorum qualitatibus, etiam fata determinat. Yet the holy Ghost professeth in the mouthes of all his Apostles, that both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and People of Israel, were gathered together against the holy sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand, and Gods councell predetermined to be done; and yet this predetermination divine, I should think, was nothing prejudiciall to the liberty of their wills.

As for Hierome, this Author saith that he was an eager opposer of the Pelagians, but no where doth it appear, that the point of predestination comes in question between them. These very passages out of Hierome are proposed by Grotius in his Pietas Ordinum Hollandiae, and answered by Gratianus Civilis punctually, and long before by Bellarmine Lib. 2. de Grat. & lib. arb. cap. 14.

As for Hierome, this Author saith that he was an eager opposer of the Pelagians, but no where doth it appeare, that the point of predestination comes in question between them. These very passages out of Hierome are proposed by Grotius in his Pietas Ordinum Hollandiae, and answered by Gratianus Civilis punctually, and long before by Bellarmine Lib. 2. de Grat. & lib. arb. cap. 14.

I answer, what is this any other, but that which the Fathers many of them have professed in saying, that predestination is secundum praescientiam; And doth not Fulgentius affirm the same? Yet is he acknowledged by Vossius, a maintainer of the absoluteness of predestination as well as Austin. Did Hierome deny faith to be the gift of God? or granting it to be the gift of God, did he maintain, that God gave it according unto works? If not, but according to the mere pleasure of his will, having mercy on some, while he hardened others; the case is clear, that he maintained absolute election unto faith. As for Gods decree of salvation and damnation, we willingly profess, that God decreed to save no man but upon his final perseverance in faith and piety; to damn none, but such as finally persevere in infidelity and impenitency. Now compare we these decrees together, the decree of giving faith, and the decree of saving; which of these are most likely to be the foremost; it is apparent that salvation is more likely to be the end in respect of faith, and faith the means in respect of salvation, then the contrary. And the general and most received rule of Schools is, that the intention of the end is before the intention of the means. I think the glory of God in the way of mercy, mixed with justice is the end of both; and that the decrees of giving faith and salvation are simultaneous, as decrees of means tending to the same end, and so neither before the other. But Hierome saith, that, ex Praescientia futurorum nascitur dilectio vel odium. I confess he doth in a disjunctive manner thus, vel ex praescientia vel ex operibus. And we know that passions such as Love and Hatred, are ⟨p. 55⟩commonly said to be attributed to God, not quoad affectum but quoad effectum, and so they may fairly stand for salvation and damnation, which proceed ex operibus in Hieroms phrase. But admit he means hereby, decretum salvandi which rising expraescientia fidei, must presuppose the decree of giving faith to precede. I answer then, there is to be acknowledged an impropriety of speech, and here is place for Gersons rule, Sancti non semper adverterunt ad proprietatem locutionis. And the rather because Hierome we never find exercised in this Controversy. And it is against common reason, that faith should be intended before salvation.

I answer, what is this any other, but that which the Fathers many of them have professed in saying, that predestination is secundum praescientiam; And doth not Fulgentius affirm the same? Yet is he acknowledged by Vossius, a maintainer of the absolutenesse of predestination as well as Austin. Did Hierome deny faith to be the gift of God? or granting it to be the gift of God, did he maintaine, that God gave it according unto works? If not, but according to the meer pleasure of his will, having mercy on some, while he hardned others; the case is cleare, that he maintained absolute election unto faith. As for Gods decree of salvation and damnation, we willingly professe, that God decreed to save no man but upon his finall perseverance in faith and piety; to damne none, but such as finally persevere in infidelity and impenitency. Now compare we these decrees together, the decree of giving faith, and the decree of saving; which of these are most likely to be the foremost; it is apparent that salvation is more likely to be the end in respect of faith, and faith the means in respect of salvation, then the contrary. And the generall and most received rule of Schooles is, that the intention of the end is before the intention of the means. I think the glory of God in the way of mercy, mixed with justice is the end of both; and that the decrees of giving faith and salvation are simultaneous, as decrees of means tending to the same end, and so neither before the other. But Hierome saith, that, ex Praescientia futurorum nascitur dilectio vel odium. I confesse he doth in a disjunctive manner thus, vel ex praescientia vel ex operibus. And we know that passions such as Love and Hatred, are

And lastly, this were to impute unto him to acknowledge 2 motive cause of Predestination quoad actum praedestinantis: which Aquinas professeth against, as a thing impossible; namely, that there should be a cause of Gods will quoad actum volentis; Nay he is bold to say that, No man was so mad to say that merits are the cause of Predestination quoad actum praedestinantis.

The last part of this Authors performance in the point of Antiquity is the Council of Arles, subscribing as he saith, the letter which was written by Faustus against Lucidus the Predestinarian (for so he styles him) and in his Epistle he insists upon two Anathema's, the one this, Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui periit non accepisse ut salvus esse possit. The other this, Anathema illi qui dixerit quod vas contumcliae non possit affurgere, ut sit vas in honorem.

The last part of this Authors performance in the poynt of Antiquity is the Councell of Arles, subscribing as he saith, the letter which was written by Faustus against Lucidus the Predestinarian (for so he styles him) and in his Epistle he insists upon two Anathema's, the one this, Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui periit non accepisse ut salvus esse possit. The other this, Anathema illi qui dixerit quod vas contumcliae non possit affurgere, ut sit vas in honorem.

First, I will answer as touching the Anathema's themselves, then as touching the credit and authority of this story.