The riches of Gods love unto the vessels of mercy, consistent with his absolute…The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute…

Nevertheless we willingly profess, that upon supposition of the will of God, that this or that shall come to pass, it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come ⟨p. 95⟩to pass; like as upon supposition, that God knows such a thing shall come to pass, it followeth necessarily, that such a thing shall come to pass; but how? not necessarily: but either necessarily according as some things are brought to pass by natural agents, working necessarily after the manner aforesaid; or contingently and freely according as some things are brought to pass, by rational agents, working contingently and freely. And therefore as touching the Question of the Schools about the root of contingency, Aquinas and Scotus concur in resolving it into the Will of God, but with this difference; Scotus relates it into the will of God as a free agent. Aquinas resolves it into the Will of God, as an efficacious agent. For the will of God is so efficacious, that he can effectually procure, both that things necessary shall be brought to pass necessarily, and things contingent, contingently; and according he hath provided congruous causes hereof, to wit, both agents natural for the producing of necessary things necessarily, and agents rational for the producing of contingent things, contingently and freely. Thus God preordained that Josiah should burn the Prophets bones upon the Altar, that Cyrus should proclaim liberty to the Jews, to return into their Country; yet what sober Divine hath made doubt, whether Josiah and Cyrus did not herein, that which they did freely. And as in doing, so in abstaining from doing. For God ordained that Christs bones should not be broken; as also that when the Jews, all the Males, came up to the Lord thrice in the year to Jerusalem, None of their neighbours should desire their land. Exod. 34. 24. Yet what sober man should make question, whether the Soldiers did non as freely abstain from breaking Christs bones, as from ought else, and so likewise the bordering Nations did as freely abstain, from invading the land of Israel. And how often is this phrase used in Scripture, Necesse est, of some things coming to pass, which yet came to pass as contingently and freely, as ought else.

Neverthelesse we willingly professe, that upon supposition of the will of God, that this or that shall come to passe, it followeth necessarily that such a thing shall come ⟨p. 95⟩to passe; like as upon supposition, that God knowes such a thing shall come to passe, it followeth necessarily, that such a thing shall come to passe; but how? not necessarily: but either necessarily according as some things are brought to passe by naturall agents, working necessarily after the manner aforesaid; or contingently and freely according as some things are brought to passe, by rationall agents, working contingently and freely. And therefore as touching the Question of the Schooles about the root of contingency, Aquinas and Scotus concurre in resolving it into the Will of God, but with this difference; Scotus relates it into the will of God as a free agent. Aquinas resolves it into the Will of God, as an efficacious agent. For the will of God is so efficacious, that he can effectually procure, both that things necessary shall be brought to passe necessarily, and things contingent, contingently; and according he hath provided congruous causes hereof, to wit, both agents naturall for the produceing of necessary things necessarily, and agents rationall for the producing of contingent things, contingently and freely. Thus God preordained that Josias should burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar, that Cyrus should proclaim liberty to the Jewes, to returne into their Country; yet what sober Divine hath made doubt, whether Josias and Cyrus did not herein, that which they did freely. And as in doing, so in abstaining from doing. For God ordained that Christs bones should not be broken; as also that when the Jewes, all the Males, came up to the Lord thrice in the year to Jerusalem, None of their neighbours should desire their land. Exod. 34. 24. Yet what sober man should make question, whether the Souldiers did non as freely abstaine from breaking Christs bones, as from ought else, and so likewise the bordering Nations did as freely abstaine, from invading the land of Israel. And how often is this phrase used in Scripture, Necesse est, of some things coming to passe, which yet came to passe as contingently and freely, as ought else.

And unless this be granted, that Gods determination is nothing prejudicial to the freedom of the creatures will, either we must deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, or that they are works produced freely, and so every action pleasing in the sight of God. For the Scripture expressly professeth, that God it is, who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight. And whatsoever God works in us, or bestows upon us in time, the same he determined, to work in us, and to bestow upon us from everlasting. For he worketh all things according to the counsel of his will Ephes. 1. 11. and the counsel of his Will was everlasting, it being the same with God himself.

And unlesse this be granted, that Gods determination is nothing prejudiciall to the freedome of the creatures will, either we must deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, or that they are works produced freely, and so every action pleasing in the sight of God. For the Scripture expressely professeth, that God it is, who worketh in us every thing that is pleasing in his sight. And whatsoever God workes in us, or bestows upon us in time, the same he determined, to work in us, and to bestow upon us from everlasting. For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his will Ephes. 1. 11. and the counsell of his Will was everlasting, it being the same with God himselfe.

Now I come to the second.

1. Now this is most untrue, there being a vast difference between the actions of men, and the ends of men; The ends of men being the works of God. And what a monster shall he be in the Church of God, that with Vorstius shall dare to affirm, that all the works of God, were not determined from everlasting; or being determined, they are alterable, and that in such sort, as to be otherwise determinable by the wills of men; especially considering that the very acts of mens wills, being wrought by God, (as all sides now a days confess) it consequently follows that they were also determined from everlasting, by the Will and Counsel of God. What should I allege the 11th Article of Ireland for this? God from all eternity did by his unchangeable Counsel ordain, whatsoever in time should come to pass: yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. There is no Arminian that I know dares deny, either that every act of man is wrought by God, or that, look what God doth work in time, the same he did before all time decree, and that from everlasting. I know there is a main, and a most Atheistical difference between us on one part, but I do not find them willing to show their horns directly therein, but carry the matter so, as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement, either of the temporal (not eternal) condition of decrees divine, or at least of their alterable nature; whereas themselves dare not plainly manifest themselves, to be of any such Atheistical belief. Let us instance in particular: Let the salvation of some, and damnation of others, be the ends this Author meaneth. Now dare any of them with open ⟨p. 96⟩face profess, that the salvation of the elect, and damnation of the reprobate was not from everlasting determined by God. Be the supreme ends of God concerning man, the manifestation of his glory in the way of mercy on some, in the way of vindicative justice on others. Dare any of them profess, that any of these ends are not from everlasting determined by God; or being so determined, dare they profess, that these divine decrees are alterable, or possible to be undetermined by the will of the creature? What a prodigious assertion were either of these?

1. Now this is most untrue, there being a vast difference between the actions of men, and the ends of men; The ends of men being the works of God. And what a monster shall he be in the Church of God, that with Vorstius shall dare to affirme, that all the works of God, were not determined from everlasting; or being determined, they are alterable, and that in such sort, as to be otherwise determinable by the wills of men; especially considering that the very acts of mens wills, being wrought by God, (as all sides now a daies confesse) it consequently followes that they were also determined from everlasting, by the Will and Counsell of God. What should I alleage the 11th Article of Ireland for this? God from all eternity did by his unchangeable Counsell ordaine, whatsoever in time should come to passe: yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. There is no Arminian that I know dares deny, either that every act of man is wrought by God, or that, look what God doth work in time, the same he did before all time decree, and that from everlasting. I know there is a main, and a most Atheisticall difference between us on one part, but I doe not find them willing to shew their hornes directly therein, but carry the matter so, as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement, either of the temporall (not eternall) condition of decrees divine, or at least of their alterable nature; whereas themselves dare not plainly manifest themselves, to be of any such Atheisticall beliefe. Let us instance in particular: Let the salvation of some, and damnation of others, be the ends this Author meaneth. Now dare any of them with open

If they dare not say, Gods will is changeable, What an unshamefac'd course is this, to obtrude upon us an alterable, that is, a changeable condition of Gods decrees? But perhaps you may say, here is no mention at all made of Gods decrees, but of mans ends. And I willingly confess there is not. And I am persuaded, this Author dares not in plain terms profess, that Gods decrees are alterable. But hereby you may perceive, and have a manifest document of the illusions of Satan, and how mens carnal affections, which are more in love with error then truth, do make them to shut their eyes against the one, and open them unto the other. It were a very harsh thing to say plainly, that Gods decrees are alterable, and that being determined by him, they might be undone, or made undetermined by the wills of men. Therefore the Devil finds a means to draw us, to entertain the same blasphemous opinion, not barefaced, but hoodwickt as it were, and that is by changing the phrase. For though it be uncouth to hear of an alterable condition of Gods decrees, yet it seems nothing harsh to discourse of the alterable condition of mens ends. But give me leave to unmask the Witch, and make it appear how the Devil gulls us in this.

If they dare not say, Gods will is changeable, What an unshamefac'd course is this, to obtrude upon us an alterable, that is, a changeable condition of Gods decrees? But perhaps you may say, here is no mention at all made of Gods decrees, but of mans ends. And I willingly confesse there is not. And I am perswaded, this Author dares not in plain termes professe, that Gods decrees are alterable. But hereby you may perceive, and have a manifest document of the illusions of Satan, and how mens carnall affections, which are more in love with errour then truth, doe make them to shut their eyes against the one, and open them unto the other. It were a very harsh thing to say plainly, that Gods decrees are alterable, and that being determined by him, they might be undone, or made undetermined by the wills of men. Therefore the Devill finds a means to draw us, to entertain the same blasphemous opinion, not barefac'd, but hoodwickt as it were, and that is by changing the phrase. For though it be uncouth to heare of an alterable condition of Gods decrees, yet it seems nothing harsh to discourse of the alterable condition of mens ends. But give me leave to unmask the Witch, and make it appeare how the Devill gulls us in this.

Mens ends are either so called, as intended by man himself, or as appointed by God. If this Author speak of mens ends, as intended by man himself, we willingly grant, that they are alterable at his pleasure; as for example, Man intends one thing to day, he may intend another thing to morrow, he intends one thing this hour, he may intend another thing the next, and at his pleasure reverse his former intentions. And no marvel, considering that man partly is of a fickle disposition in respect of his affections, studious of change, and subject to innovation as the Moon; partly of an improvident disposition, he knows not what a Year, what a Month, what a Day, what an hour may bring forth. And therefore though never so wise and constant in his courses, yet may he have just cause to change his resolutions and purposes. But of such ends of man, to wit, as intended by man, it is manifest this Author speaks not.

Mens ends are either so called, as intended by man himselfe, or as appoynted by God. If this Author speak of mens ends, as intended by man himselfe, wee willingly grant, that they are alterable at his pleasure; as for example, Man intends one thing to day, he may intend another thing to morrow, he intends one thing this houre, he may intend another thing the next, and at his pleasure reverse his former intentions. And no marvail, considering that man partly is of a fickle disposition in respect of his affections, studious of change, and subject to innovation as the Moone; partly of an improvident disposition, he knows not what a Yeare, what a Month, what a Day, what an houre may bring forth. And therefore though never so wise and constant in his courses, yet may he have just cause to change his resolutions and purposes. But of such ends of man, to wit, as intended by man, it is manifest this Author speaks not.

But of ends appointed by God, these be the ends he will have to be alterable and determinable anew by the wills of men, which cannot be without the alteration and change of Gods purposes and intentions, which is as much as to say, without the change and revocation of Gods decrees. And an end not yet actually existing, but only in intention, can admit of no other alteration then in intention, which this Author considering not, though perhaps he abhors to say Gods decrees are changeable and alterable, and shuts out so uncouth an assertion at the fore-door, yet as it were by a back-door to receive it in, and in the dark and muffled, or veiled only with a different phrase, a different expression; Yet forthwith he takes a new course; For whereas by the word unalterable, he did imply that Gods decrees concerning mens ends, should be of an alterable condition; in the words following he changeth his tone, and will not have the ends of man to be determined by God at all, but left unto man to be determined; as when he saith, In vain is our freedom in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined. Whereby it is manifest, he will not have the end whereunto men drive to be determined. And this end can be no other then salvation; for that alone I take to be that whereto men drive, and which they labour to attain, every one naturally seeking after Summum bonum, after happiness. So that in the issue it comes to this, The salvation of this Author is not yet determined by God, but left to be determined by his will, and that I take to be in the way of a moving cause, and that moving cause I guess to be, his final perseverance in faith and repentance, whereupon and not till then, shall this mans salvation be determined by God, as much as to say, that Gods decrees are as merely temporal as are the executions of them. And herein this Author doth exactly agree with Doctor Jackson perhaps being so happy as to understand him, or perhaps being so happy as to light upon an interpreter of him ⟨p. 97⟩some one that breaths the same spirit of opposition to Gods truth, and that after the same way. For sometimes the Doctor pleads for a revocable condition of the divine decrees. For the Pope never binds his hands by any Grant he makes; and why should God bind his hands by any decree he makes?

But of ends appointed by God, these be the ends he will have to be alterable and determinable anew by the wills of men, which cannot be without the alteration and change of Gods purposes and intentions, which is as much as to say, without the change and revocation of Gods decrees. And an end not yet actually existing, but only in intention, can admit of no other alteration then in intention, which this Author considering not, though perhaps he abhorres to say Gods decrees are changeable and alterable, and shuts out so uncouth an assertion at the fore-doore, yet as it were by a back-doore to receive it in, and in the dark and mufled, or veyled only with a different phrase, a different expression; Yet forthwith he takes a new course; For whereas by the word unalterable, he did imply that Gods decrees concerning mens ends, should be of an alterable condition; in the words following he changeth his tone, and will not have the ends of man to be determined by God at all, but left unto man to be determined; as when he saith, In vaine is our freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined. Whereby it is manifest, he will not have the end whereunto men drive to be determined. And this end can be no other then salvation; for that alone I take to be that whereto men drive, and which they labour to attaine, every one naturally seeking after Summum bonum, after happinesse. So that in the issue it comes to this, The salvation of this Author is not yet determined by God, but left to be determined by his will, and that I take to be in the way of a moving cause, and that moving cause I guesse to be, his finall perseverance in faith and repentance, whereupon and not till then, shall this mans salvation be determined by God, as much as to say, that Gods decrees are as meerly temporall as are the executions of them. And herein this Author doth exactly agree with Doctor Jackson perhaps being so happy as to understand him, or perhaps being so happy as to light upon an interpreter of him

especially considering that God hath more wisdom and goodness to manage such authority then the Pope. But if it be dishonesty for a man to take liberty to break his promises, I pray what goodness is required to the managing thereof? Yet that Doctor keeps his course in discoursing of an impotent immutability, and saith, it is indecent to attribute any such immutability unto God; whereas immutability is a notion which connotates no power of doing at all, but only a power of suffering, and formally denotes the negation thereof. And what madness is it to say, that the less power God hath of receiving change, the less power he hath of working? Yet this is not all; He hath another device answerable to the latter course of this Author, and that is, that Nothing, concerning any mans salvation or damnation, is determined by God before he is borne, or before his death: and to that purpose he saith that God is still decreeing, as if hitherto he had not decreed ought. And would you know of whom he learned this? Rogers in his exposition of the Articles of the Church of England, a Book dedicated to Arch-Bishop Bancroft, & allowed by the lawful authority of the Church of England, writing upon the 17th Article, and delivering his second proposition, collected therehence, in this form, Predestination hath been from everlasting; when he comes to set forth the Adversaries of this truth, Those wrangling Sophisters, saith he, are deceived, who because God is not included within the compass of any time, but hath all things to come as present before his eyes, do say, that God he did not in the time long ago past only, but still in the time present likewise doth Predestinate.

especially considering that God hath more wisdome and goodnesse to manage such authority then the Pope. But if it be dishonesty for a man to take liberty to break his promises, I pray what goodnesse is required to the managing thereof? Yet that Doctor keeps his course in discoursing of an impotent immutability, and saith, it is indecent to attribute any such immutability unto God; whereas immutability is a notion which connotates no power of doing at all, but only a power of suffering, and formally denotes the negation thereof. And what madnesse is it to say, that the lesse power God hath of receiving change, the lesse power he hath of working? Yet this is not all; He hath another device answerable to the latter course of this Author, and that is, that Nothing, concerning any mans salvation or damnation, is determined by God before he is borne, or before his death: and to that purpose he saith that God is still decreeing, as if hitherto he had not decreed ought. And would you know of whom he learned this? Rogers in his exposition of the Articles of the Church of England, a Book dedicated to Arch-Bishop Bancroft, & allowed by the lawfull authority of the Church of England, writing upon the 17th Article, and delivering his second proposition, collected therehence, in this forme, Predestination hath been from everlasting; when he comes to set forth the Adversaries of this truth, Those wrangling Sophisters, saith he, are deceived, who because God is not included within the compasse of any time, but hath all things to come as present before his eyes, doe say, that God he did not in the time long agoe past only, but still in the time present likewise doth Predestinate.

2. Consider we the reason he gives for so shameful an assertion, as touching the alterable condition of Gods decrees, or as touching the ends of men, as yet undetermined by God, In vain, saith he, is freedom in the actions, if the end which they drive at, be determined. Here, First, we have a wild phrase Freedom in actions. For by freedom we understand an active power of working after a certain manner, which power is found in the will, not in the actions. Secondly, a bare avouching that unless God as yet hath left the ends of men living undetermined, or in case he hath determined them, unless these determinations of his be alterable, Freedom of Will is given in vain; as much as to say, unless we admit of such monstrous assertions, the freedom of mans Will is in vain. But we say this consequence is most untrue, and we give our reason for it. For whether salvation or damnation be the ends he meaneth, no creature is capable of either, but only creatures rational; and the one being bestowed by way of reward, and the other inflicted by way of punishment, each of these presupposeth freedom of Will in the parties thus proceeded with: Or whether the ends are the manifestation of Gods vindicative and remunerative justice, for the same reason now specified, each of these doth necessarily bespeak freedom of Will in them, who after either way are made useless on whom the glory of God is to be manifested. When he addes saying Omnis actio is propter sinem. This altogether concerns the ends intended, and proposed by the author of the action, nothing concerns the ends proposed by another. And the ends of a man proposed by himself, are either supreme or intermediate, still every action deliberate (for so alone it holds) tends to one end or other, which man himself intends. The supreme end of every one is his chief good; but as touching that wherein this consists, all do not agree. Some place it in wealth, some in pleasure, some in honour, some in virtuous life. By the light of Grace we are taught, that as we are creatures, our end, which we should propose unto our selves, is the glorifying of God our Creator, though there were neither reward nor punishment.

2. Consider we the reason he gives for so shamefull an assertion, as touching the alterable condition of Gods decrees, or as touching the ends of men, as yet undetermined by God, In vaine, saith he, is freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at, be determined. Here, First, we have a wild phrase Freedome in actions. For by freedome we understand an active power of working after a certain manner, which power is found in the will, not in the actions. Secondly, a bare avouching that unlesse God as yet hath left the ends of men living undetermined, or in case he hath determined them, unlesse these determinations of his be alterable, Freedome of Will is given in vaine; as much as to say, unlesse we admit of such monstrous assertions, the freedome of mans Will is in vaine. But we say this consequence is most untrue, and we give our reason for it. For whether salvation or damnation be the ends he meaneth, no creature is capable of either, but only creatures rationall; and the one being bestowed by way of reward, and the other inflicted by way of punishment, each of these presupposeth freedome of Will in the parties thus proceeded with: Or whether the ends are the manifestation of Gods vindicative and remunerative justice, for the same reason now specified, each of these doth necessarily bespeak freedome of Will in them, who after either way are made uselesse on whom the glory of God is to be manifested. When he addes saying Omnis actio is propter sinem. This altogether concernes the ends intended, and proposed by the author of the action, nothing concernes the ends proposed by another. And the ends of a man proposed by himselfe, are either supreame or intermediate, still every action deliberate (for so alone it holds) tends to one end or other, which man himselfe intends. The supream end of every one is his chief good; but as touching that wherein this consists, all doe not agree. Some place it in wealth, some in pleasure, some in honour, some in virtuous life. By the light of Grace we are taught, that as we are creatures, our end, which we should propose unto our selves, is the glorifying of God our Creator, though there were neither reward nor punishment.

But if there be a glorious reward to be gotten by it, and a dreadful punishment to be suffered of them, that seek the satisfying of their own lusts, and not the glory of God, this is a double hedge unto us, to keep us in the good ways of the Lord, and to move us to make strait steps unto him; but surely the end of the creature, still is the glorifying or God that made him. God makes it his care to provide for us, let our care be to glorify him; for seeing all things are from him, therefore all things must be for him; and seeing we are reasonable creatures, and know this we must go on, in conforming our selves hereunto, and seeking his glory. And albeit this Author may conceive, that salvation is the end he aims at, yet can I ⟨p. 98⟩not believe that he makes damnation the end that any man drives at. Nothing being fit to be a mans end, but that which hath rationem Boni, which surely damnation hath not.

But if there be a glorious reward to be gotten by it, and a dreadfull punishment to be suffered of them, that seek the satisfying of their own lusts, and not the glory of God, this is a double hedge unto us, to keep us in the good waies of the Lord, and to move us to make strait stepps unto him; but surely the end of the creature, still is the glorifying or God that made him. God makes it his care to provide for us, let our care be to glorify him; for seeing all things are from him, therefore all things must be for him; and seeing we are reasonable creatures, and know this we must goe on, in conforming our selves hereunto, and seeking his glory. And albeit this Author may conceive, that salvation is the end he aimes at, yet can I ⟨p. 98⟩not beleeve that he makes damnation the end that any man drives at. Nothing being fit to be a mans end, but that which hath rationem Boni, which surely damnation hath not.

3. His Annotations as touching the three Opinions proposed by him, come to be considered in the next place; and these are two.

1. The Substance and Formality of them, which, as he saith is an unavoidableness of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be. And in this, he saith, all of them agree, all holding that in all things, undeclinable Fates, and insuperable necessity do domineer. Whereunto I answer, that this is contradictory to his own premises, as touching the third Opinion. For against the Maintainers of Gods absolute decree, he did formerly object only disjunctively, that either all mens actions were absolutely necessary, that is unavoidable, or at least, that mens ends were unavoidable; which is to infer, that but one of them is avoidable; but here he professeth (as upon that which he had formerly delivered) that by the Third Opinion, both mens actions and their ends were unavoidable. And as for the second Opinion of the Manichees, I find no mention of the unavoidable condition, either of mans actions or ends at all, in the Relation thereof, by those who have most studied their History. And as for the Stoics, I no where find, that they denied the liberty of mens will, or that it was in mans power, either to forbear the doing of that he doth, or to do the things he forbears to do; but rather the contrary, that they made choice, some of them at least, (though Austin delivers it without any such distinction) to exempt the wills of men from subjection unto Fate: though I deny not, but that many vain discourses might be differently entertained by them, having no better light to guide them, then the light of nature, and wanting that which God hath in great mercy vouchsafed unto us, the light of grace, and that in very plentiful manner. Much less do I find by them, that any thing came to passe, invito Deo. Though I willingly confess, that such a generation hath risen up in these days, affirming that God willeth and desireth the salvation of all men, and yet the greater part of men are damned. And what is to come to passe, invito Deo, if this be not, I willingly profess I know not.

1. The Substance and Formality of them, which, as he saith is an unavoidablenesse of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be. And in this, he saith, all of them agree, all holding that in all things, undeclinable Fates, and insuperable necessity doe domincere. Whereunto I answer, that this is contradictory to his own premises, as touching the third Opinion. For against the Maintainers of Gods absolute decree, he did formerly object only disjunctively, that either all mens actions were absolutely necessary, that is unavoidable, or at least, that mens ends were unavoidable; which is to inferre, that but one of them is avoidable; but here he professeth (as upon that which he had formerly delivered) that by the Third Opinion, both mens actions and their ends were unavoidable. And as for the second Opinion of the Manichees, I find no mention of the unavoidable condition, either of mans actions or ends at all, in the Relation thereof, by those who have most studied their History. And as for the Stoicks, I no where find, that they denied the liberty of mens will, or that it was in mans power, either to forbeare the doing of that he doth, or to doe the things he forbears to doe; but rather the contrary, that they made choyce, some of them at least, (though Austin delivers it without any such distinction) to exempt the wills of men from subjection unto Fate: though I deny not, but that many vain discourses might be differently entertained by them, having no better light to guide them, then the light of nature, and wanting that which God hath in great mercy vouchsafed unto us, the light of grace, and that in very plentifull manner. Much lesse doe I find by them, that any thing came to passe, invito Deo. Though I willingly confesse, that such a generation hath risen up in these daies, affirming that God willeth and desireth the salvation of all men, and yet the greater part of men are damned. And what is to come to passe, invito Deo, if this be not, I willingly professe I know not.

But Melanchthon, he saith, doth not spare to call this absolute decree, Fatum Stoicum, Tabulas Parcarum, and to charge the Church of Ceneva, with labouring to bring in the Stoics errors, as appears by Melancthon's Epistle to Peucer, and Beza's confession in the life of Calvin. To all which I answer.

But Melancthon, he saith, doth not spare to call this absolute decree, Fatum Stoicum, Tabulas Parcarum, and to charge the Church of Ceneva, with labouring to bring in the Stoicks errours, as appears by Melancthons Epistle to Peucer, and Beza's confession in the life of Calvin. To all which I answer.

1. That this Author either was better read in Melanchthon then in Luther, or no so just matter could he find in Luther, to cry down the absolute nature of Gods decrees.

1. That this Author either was better read in Melancthon then in Luther, or no so just matter could he find in Luther, to cry down the absolute nature of Gods decrees.

2. Beza reports what Melanchthon seems to some, and that Epistle of his to Peucer might be their ground. Now therein he delivers his mind merely upon Laelius his relation, which was this, De Stoico Fato usque adeò litem Genevae moveri, ut Quidam in carcerem conjectus sit propterea quod a ••one differret. This I say is Laelius his relation made unto Melanchthon, whereupon Melanchthon saith no more then this, O Mijera tempora! doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam disputationibus obscuratur.

2. Beza reports what Melancthon seems to some, and that Epistle of his to Peucer might be their ground. Now therein he delivers his mind meerly upon Laelius his relation, which was this, De Stoico Fato usque adeò litem Genevae moveri, ut Quidam in carcerem conjectus sit propterea quod a ••one differret. This I say is Laelius his relation made unto Melancthon, whereupon Melancthon saith no more then this, O Mijera tempora! doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam disputationibus obscuratur.