N05663:94
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of…
A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]A careful and strict enquiry into the modern prevailing notions of that freedom of will, which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, vertue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame. By Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Pastor of the church in Stockbridge. ; [One line from Romans]
printed by S. Kneeland, 1754
Part 1 › Section 4: Of the Distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I suppose, that Necessity which is called natural, in Distinction from moral Necessity, is so called, because mere Nature, as the Word is vulgarly used, is concerned, without any Thing ⟨p. 23⟩of Choice. The Word Nature is often used in Opposition to Choice; not because Nature has indeed never any Hand in our Choice; But this probably comes to pass by Means that we first get our Notion of Nature from that discernible and obvious Course of Events, which we observe in many Things that our Choice has no Concern in; and especially in the material World; which, in very many Parts of it, we easily perceive to be in a settled Course; the stated Order and Manner of Succession being very apparent. But where we don't readily discern the Rule and Connection, (tho' there be a Connection, according to an established Law, truly taking Place) we signify the Manner of Event by some other Name. Even in many Things which are seen in the material and inanimate World, which don't discernably and obviously come to pass according to any settled Course, Men don't call the Manner of the Event by the Name of Nature, but by such Names as Accident, Chance, Contingence &c. So Men make a Distinction between Nature and Choice; as tho' they were completely and universally distinct. Whereas, I suppose none will deny but that Choice, in many Cases, arises from Nature, as truly as other Events. But the Dependence & Connection between Acts of Volition or Choice, and their Causes, according to established Laws, is not so sensible and obvious. And we observe that Choice is as it were a new Principle of Motion and Action, different from that established Law & Order of Things which is most obvious, that is seen especially in corporeal and sensible Things; And also that Choice often interposes, interrupts and alters the Chain of Events in these external Objects, and causes 'em to proceed otherwise than they would do, if let alone, and left to go on according to the Laws of Motion among themselves. Hence it is spoken of, as if it were a Principle of Motion entirely distinct from Nature, and properly set in Opposition to it. Names being commonly given to Things, according to what is most obvious, and is suggested by what appears to the Senses without Reflection & Research.
I suppose, that Necessity which is called natural, in Distinction from moral Necessity, is so called, because meer Nature, as the Word is vulgarly used, is concerned, without any Thing ⟨p. 23⟩