Chapter 2
pp. 17–4450 passagespart 2 of 2
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
If this signify any thing to the present purpose, it must mean the infinite or eternal changes of a necessary being. And how these very terms do clash with one another, methinks any sound mind might apprehend at the first mention of them; And how manifestly repugnant the things are, may be collected from what hath been said; and especially from what was thought more fit to be annexed in the Margin.
If this signifie any thing to the present purpose, it must mean the infinite or eternal changes of a necessary being. And how these very terms do clash with one another, methinks any sound mind might apprehend at the first mention of them; And how manifestly repugnant the things are, may be collected from what hath been said; and especially from what was thought more fit to be annexed in the Margin.
But now since we find that the present state ⟨p. 41⟩of things is changeable, and actually changing, and that what is changeable is not necessarily, and of it self.
But now since we find that the present state ⟨p. 41⟩of things is changeable, and actually changing, and that what is changable is not necessarily, and of it self.
And since it is evident that there is some necessary Being, otherwise nothing could ever have been, and that without action nothing could be from it. Since also all change imports somewhat of passion, and all passion supposes action, and all action, active power, and active power an original seat or subject, that is self-active, or that hath the power of action in and of it self. For there could be no derivation of it from that which hath it not, and no first derivation, but from that which hath it originally of it self. And a first derivation there must be, since all things that are or ever have been furnished with it, and not of themselves must either mediately or immediately have derived it from that which had it of it self. It is therefore manifest, that there is a necessary self-active Being, The cause and Author of this perpetually variable state and frame of things. And hence,
And since it is evident that there is some necessary Being, otherwise nothing could ever have been, and that without action nothing could be from it. Since also all change imports somewhat of passion, and all passion supposes action, and all action, active power, and active power an original seat or subject, that is selfactive, or that hath the power of action in and of it self. For there could be no derivation of it from that which hath it not, and no firstderivation, but from that which hath it originally of it self. And a first derivation there must be, since all things that are or ever have been furnisht with it, and not of themselves must either mediately or immediately have derived it from that which had it of it self. It is therefore manifest, that there is a necessary selfactive Being, The cause and Author of this perpetually variable state and frame of things. And hence,
6. Since we can frame no notion of life which self-active power doth not, at least, comprehend 1(as upon trial we shall find that we cannot) it is consequent that this Being is also originally vital, and the root of all vitality, such as hath life in or of it self, and from whence it is propagated to every other living thing.†
- 1XV.
- †Which will also prove it to be a Spirit; unto which order of Beings essential vitality, or that life be essential to them, seems as distinguishing a property between it and a body, as any other we can fasten upon, that is, that though a body may be truly said to live; yet it lives by a life that is accidental, and separable from it. So as that it may cease to live, and yet be a body still; whereas a Spirit lives by its own essence; so that it can no more cease to live than to be. And as, where that essence is borrowed and derived only, as 'tis with all created Spirits, so its life must needs be therewithal. So the eternal self-subsisting Spirit, lives necessarily, and of it self, according as, necessarily and of it self, it is, or hath its being. Which is only annoted, with a design not to trouble this discourse with any disquisition concerning the nature and other properties of a spiritual Being. Of which enough hath been, with great evidence, said, by the incomparable Dr. More.
And so as we plainly see that this sensible world did sometime begin to be, 'tis also evident it took its beginning from a Being essentially vital, and active, that had it self no beginning. Nor can we make a difficulty to conclude that this Being, (which now we have shown, is active, and all action implies some power) is
And so as we plainly see that this sensible world did sometime begin to be, 'tis also evident it took its beginning from a Being essentially vital, and active, that had it self no beginning. Nor can we make a difficulty to conclude that this Being, (which now we have shewn, is active, and all action implies some power) is
7. Of vast and mighty Power (we will not 1say infinite, lest we should step too far at once; not minding now to discuss whether creation require infinite power) when we consider and contemplate the vastness of the work performed by it. Unto which (if we were to make our estimate by nothing else) we must, at least, judge this power to be proportionable. For when our eyes behold an effect exceeding the power of any cause which they can behold, our mind must step in and supply the defect of our feebler sense; so as to make a judgment there is a cause we see not, equal to this effect. As when we behold a great and magnificent fabric, and entering in we see not the master or ⟨p. 43⟩any living thing (which was Cicero's Observation 2in reference to this present purpose) besides Mice or Weasels, we will not think that Mice or Weasels built it. Nor need we, in a matter so obvious, insist further. But only when our severer Reason hath made us confess, our further contemplation should make us admire a power which is at once both so apparent, and so stupendous.
7. Of vast and mighty Power (we will not 1say infinite, lest we should step too far at once; not minding now to discuss whether creation require infinite power) when we consider and contemplate the vastness of the work performed by it. Unto which (if we were to make our estimate by nothing else) we must, at least, judge this power to be proportionable. For when our eyes behold an effect exceeding the power of any cause which they can behold, our mind must step in and supply the defect of our feebler sense; so as to make a judgment there is a cause we see not, equal to this effect. As when we behold a great and magnificent fabrick, and entring in we see not the master or ⟨p. 43⟩any living thing (which was Cicero's Observation 2in reference to this present purpose) besides Mice or Weasles, we will not think that Mice or Weasels built it. Nor need we, in a matter so obvious, insist further. But only when our severer Reason hath made us confess, our further contemplation should make us admire a power which is at once both so apparent, and so stupendous.
Corollary. And now from what hath been hitherto discoursed, it seems a plain and necessary consectary, That this world had a cause divers from the matter whereof it is composed.
For otherwise matter that hath been more generally taken to be of it self altogether unactive, must be stated the only cause and fountain of all the action and motion that is now to be found in the whole Universe. Which is a conceit wild and absurd enough; not only as it opposes the common judgment of such as have with the greatest diligence enquired into things of this nature, But as being in it self manifestly impossible to be true.
As would easily appear if it were needful to press farther Dr. More's reasonings 1to this purpose; which he hath done sufficiently for himself.
- 1Both in his Immortality of the Soul: and Enchirid. Metaphys.
And also that otherwise all the great and undeniable changes which continually happen in it must proceed from its ⟨p. 44⟩own constant and eternal action upon it self, while it is yet feigned to be a necessary being; with the notion whereof they are notoriously inconsistent. Which therefore we taking to be most clear, may now the more securely proceed to what follows.