Chapter 5
pp. 180–22677 passagespart 1 of 2
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CHAP. V.
Demands in reference to what hath been hitherto discoursed, with some reasonings thereupon: 1. Is is possible, that, upon supposition of This Beings existence, it may be, in any way suitable to our present state, made known to us that it doth exist? Proved 1. That it may. 2. That, since any other fit way, that can be thought on, is as much liable to exception as that we have already: This must be, therefore, sufficient. Strong Impressions. Glorious Apparitions. Terrible Voices. Surprising Transformations. If these necessary. Is it needful they be universal? Frequent? If not, more rare things of this sort not wanting. 2 Demand. Can Subjects, remote from their Prince, sufficiently be assured of his existence? 3 Demand. Can we be sure there are men on earth?
Demands in reference to what hath been hitherto discoursed, with some reasonings thereupon: 1. Is is possible, that, upon supposition of This Beings existence, it may be, in any way sutable to our present state, made known to us that it doth exist? Proved 1. That it may. 2. That, since any other fit way, that can be thought on, is as much liable to exception as that we have already: This must be, therefore, sufficient. Strong Impressions. Glorious Apparitions. Terrible Voices. Surprising Transformations. If these necessary. Is it needful they be universal? Frequent? If not, more rare things of this sort not wanting. 2 Demand. Can Subjects, remote from their Prince, sufficiently be assured of his existence? 3 Demand. Can we be sure there are men on earth?
AND if any should in the mean time, still remain either doubtful, or apt to 1cavil, after all that hath been said, for proof of that Beings existence which we have described, I would only add these few things, by way of enquiry or demand, viz.
- 11.
First, Do they believe, upon supposition of the existence of such a Being, that it is possible ⟨p. 181⟩it may be made known to us, in our present state and circumstances, by means not unsuitable thereto, or inconvenient to the order and government of the world, that it doth exist? It were strange to say or suppose, that a Being of so high perfection as this we have hitherto given an account of, if he is, cannot in any fit way make it known that he is, to an intelligent and apprehensive sort of creatures.
First, Do they believe, upon supposition of the existence of such a Being, that it is possible ⟨p. 181⟩it may be made known to us, in our present state and circumstances, by means not unsutable thereto, or inconvenient to the order and government of the world, that it doth exist? It were strange to say or suppose, that a Being of so high perfection as this we have hitherto given an account of, if he is, cannot in any fit way make it known that he is, to an intelligent and apprehensive sort of creatures.
If, indeed, he is; and be the common cause, Author and Lord of us and all things (which we do now but suppose. And we may defy cavil to allege any thing that is so much as colourable against the possibility of the supposition) surely he hath done greater things than the making of it known that he is. It is no unapprehensible thing. There hath been no inconsistent notion hitherto given of him. Nothing said concerning him; but will well admit that it is possible such a Being may be now existent. Yea we not only can conceive, but we actually have (and cannot but have) some conception, of the several attributes we have ascribed to him; so as to apply them (severally) to somewhat else, if we will not apply them (jointly) to him. We cannot but admit there is some eternal necessary Being; somewhat that is of it self, active; somewhat that is powerful, wise, and good. And these notions have in them no repugnancy to one another; wherefore it is not impossible they may meet and agree together in full perfection to one and the same existent Being. And hence it is manifestly ⟨p. 182⟩no unapprehensible thing, that such a Being doth exist. Now supposing, that it doth exist, and hath been to us the cause and Author of our Being; hath given us the reasonable, intelligent nature which we find our selves possessors of; and that very power whereby we apprehend the existence of such a Being as he is to be possible (all which we for the present do still but suppose) while also his actual existence is not unapprehensible, were it not the greatest madness imaginable to say, that if he do exist, he cannot also make our apprehensive nature understand this apprehensible thing that he doth exist? We will therefore take it for granted, and as a thing which no man well in his wits will deny, that upon supposition such a Being, the Cause and Author of all things do exist, he might, in some convenient way or other, with sufficient evidence, make it known to such creatures as we, so as to beget in us a rational certainty that he doth exist.
If, indeed, he is; and be the common cause, Author and Lord of us and all things (which we do now but suppose. And we may defie cavil to alledge any thing that is so much as colourable against the possibility of the supposition) surely he hath done greater things than the making of it known that he is. It is no unapprehensible thing. There hath been no inconsistent notion hitherto given of him. Nothing said concerning him; but will well admit that it is possible such a Being may be now existant. Yea we not only can conceive, but we actually have (and cannot but have) some conception, of the several attributes we have ascribed to him; so as to apply them (severally) to somewhat else, if we will not apply them (joyntly) to him. We cannot but admit there is some eternal necessary Being; somewhat that is of it self, active; somewhat that is powerful, wise, and good. And these notions have in them no repugnancy to one another; wherefore it is not impossible they may meet and agree together in full perfection to one and the same existent Being. And hence it is manifestly
Upon which presumed ground we will only reason thus or assume to it; That there is no possible, and fit way of doing it; which is not liable to as much exception, as the evidence we already have. Whence it will be consequent, that if the thing be possible to be fitly done, it is done already. That is, that if we can apprehend, how it may be possible such a Being, actually existent, might give us that evidence of his existence that should be suitable to our present state, and sufficient to out-weigh all objections to the contrary (without which it ⟨p. 183⟩were not rationally sufficient.) And that we can apprehend no possible way of doing this, which will not be liable to the same or equal objections as may be made against the present means we have for the begetting of this certainty in us, then we have already sufficient evidence of this Beings existence. That is such as ought to prevail against all objections, and obtain our assent that it doth exist.
Upon which presumed ground we will only reason thus or assume to it; That there is no possible, and fit way of doing it; which is not liable to as much exception, as the evidence we already have. Whence it will be consequent, that if the thing be possible to be fitly done, it is done already. That is, that if we can apprehend, how it may be possible such a Being, actually existent, might give us that evidence of his existence that should be sutable to our present state, and sufficient to out-weigh all objections to the contrary (without which it ⟨p. 183⟩were not rationally sufficient.) And that we can apprehend no possible way of doing this, which will not be liable to the same or equal objections as may be made against the present means we have for the begetting of this certainty in us, then we have already sufficient evidence of this Beings existence. That is such as ought to prevail against all objections, and obtain our assent that it doth exist.
Here it is only needful to be considered what ways can be thought of, which we will say might assure us in this matter, that we already have not. And what might be objected against them, equally, as against the means we now have.
Will we say such a Being, if he did actually 1exist, might ascertain us of his existence by some powerful impression of that truth upon our minds?
- 1II.
We will not insist, what there is of this already. Let them consider who gainsay, what they can find of it in their own minds. And whether they are not engaged by their Atheistical inclinations in a contention against themselves, and their more natural sentiments: From which they find it a matter of no small difficulty to be delivered? It was not for nothing, that even Epicurus himself calls this of an existing Deity, a Proleptical Notion. But you may say, the impression might have been simply universal, and so irresistible, as to prevent or overbear all doubt or inclination to doubt.
We will not insist, what there is of this already. Let them consider who gainsay, what they can find of it in their own minds. And whether they are not engaged by their Atheistical inclinations in a contention against themselves, and their more natural sentiments: From which they find it a matter of no small difficulty to be delivered? It was not for nothing, that even Epicurus himself calls this of an existing Diety, a Proleptical Notion. But you may say, the impression might have been simply universal, and so irresistable, as to prevent or overbear all doubt or inclination to doubt.
And, first, for the universality of it, why ⟨p. 184⟩may we not suppose it already sufficiently universal? As hath been heretofore alleged. With what confidence can the few dissenting Atheists, that have professed to be of another persuasion, put that value upon themselves, as to reckon their dissent considerable enough to impede the universality of this impression. Or what doth it signify more to that purpose, than some few instances may do, of persons so stupidly foolish as to give much less discovery of any rational faculty, than some beasts, to the impugning the universal rationality of mankind?
And, first, for the universality of it, why ⟨p. 184⟩may we not suppose it already sufficiently universal? As hath been heretofore alledged. With what confidence can the few dissenting Atheists, that have professed to be of another perswasion, put that value upon themselves, as to reckon their dissent considerable enough to implede the universality of this impression. Or what doth it signifie more to that purpose, than some few instances may do, of persons so stupidly foolish as to give much less discovery of any rational faculty, than some beasts, to the impugning the universal rationality of mankind?
Besides that, your contrary profession is no sufficient argument of your contrary persuasion, much less, that you never had any stamp or impression of a Deity upon your minds, or that you have quite razed it out. It is much to be suspected that you hold not your contrary persuasion, with that unshaken confidence, and freedom from all fearful and suspicious mis-givings, as that you have much more reason to brag of your dis-belief for the strength, than you have for the goodness of it. And that you have those qualmish fits, which bewray the impression (at least to your own notice and reflection, if you would but allow your selves the liberty of so much converse with your selves) that you will not confess, and yet cannot utterly deface.
Besides that, your contrary profession is no sufficient argument of your contrary perswasion, much less, that you never had any stamp or impression of a Deity upon your minds, or that you have quite raz'd it out. It is much to be suspected that you hold not your contrary perswasion, with that unshaken confidence, and freedom from all fearful and suspicious mis-givings, as that you have much more reason to brag of your dis-belief for the strength, than you have for the goodness of it. And that you have those qualmish fits, which bewray the impression (at least to your own notice and reflection, if you would but allow your selves the liberty of so much converse with your selves) that you will not confess, and yet cannot utterly deface.
But if in this you had quite won the day, and were masters of your design; were it not pretty to suppose that the common consent of ⟨p. 185⟩mankind would be a good argument of the existence of a Deity. If it be so universal as to include your vote and suffrage (as no doubt it is without you a better than you can answer) but that when you have made an hard shift to withdraw your assent, you have undone the Deity and Religion! Doth this cause stand and fall with you? Unto which you can contribute about as much as the fly to the triumph! was that true before, which now your hard-la-boured dissent hath made false?
But if this impression were simply universal, so as also to include you, it matters not what men would say or object against it; (it is to be supposed they would be in no disposition to object any thing.) But what were to be said; or what the case it self, objectively considered, would admit. And though it would not (as now it doth not) admit of any thing to be said to any purpose; yet the same thing were still to be said that you now say. And if we should but again unsuppose so much of the former supposition, as to imagine that some few should have made their escape, and disburdened themselves of all apprehensions of God. Would they not with the same impudence as you now do, say that all Religion were nothing else but Enthusiastical Fanaticism? And that all mankind, besides themselves, were enslaved fools?
And for the mere irresistibleness of this impression; 'Tis true it would take away all disposition to oppose, but it may be presumed ⟨p. 186⟩this is none of the rational evidence which we suppose you to mean; when you admit (if you do admit) that, some way or other, the existence of such a Being might be (possibly) made so evident, as to induce a rational certainty thereof. For to believe such a thing to be true only upon a strong impulse (how certain soever the thing be) is not to assent to it upon a foregoing reason. Nor can any, in that case, tell why they believe it, but that they believe it. You will not sure think any thing the truer for this, only, that such and such believe it with a sturdy confidence. 'Tis true that the universality and naturalness of such a persuasion, as pointing us to a common cause thereof, affords the matter of an argument, or is a medium not contemptible nor capable of answer, as hath been said before.
And for the meer irresistableness of this impression; 'Tis true it would take away all disposition to oppose, but it may be presumed ⟨p. 186⟩this is none of the rational evidence which we suppose you to mean; when you admit (if you do admit) that, some way or other, the existence of such a Being might be (possibly) made so evident, as to induce a rational certainty thereof. For to believe such a thing to be true only upon a strong impulse (how certain soever the thing be) is not to assent to it upon a foregoing reason. Nor can any, in that case, tell why they believe it, but that they believe it. You will not sure think any thing the truer for this, only, that such and such believe it with a sturdy confidence. 'Tis true that the universality and naturalness of such a perswasion, as pointing us to a common cause thereof, affords the matter of an argument, or is a medium not contemptible nor capable of answer, as hath been said before.
But to be irresistibly captivated into an assent, is no medium at all; but an immediate persuasion of the thing it self without a reason.
But to be irresistibly captivated into an assent, is no medium at all; but an immediate perswasion of the thing it self without a reason.
Therefore must it yet be demanded of Atheistical persons, what means, that you yet 1have not, would you think sufficient to have put this matter out of doubt? Will you say some kind of very glorious apparitions, becoming the majesty of such a one as this Being is represented, would have satisfied? But if you know how to fancy, that such a thing as the Sun, and other luminaries, might have been compacted of a certain peculiar sort of atoms, coming together of their own accord; without the direction of a wise Agent: yea ⟨p. 187⟩and consist so long, and hold so strangely regular motions;
Therefore must it yet be demanded of Atheistical persons, what means, that you yet 1have not, would you think sufficient to have put this matter out of doubt? Will you say some kind of very glorious apparitions, becoming the majesty of such a one as this Being is represented, would have satisfied? But if you know how to phansie, that such a thing as the Sun, and other luminaries, might have been compacted of a certain peculiar sort of atoms, coming together of their own accord; without the direction of a wise Agent: yea ⟨p. 187⟩and consist so long, and hold so strangely regular motions;
- 1III.
How easy would it be to object that, with much advantage, against what any temporary apparition, be it as glorious as you can imagine, might seem to signify to this purpose.
How easie would it be to object that, with much advantage, against what any temporary apparition, be it as glorious as you can imagine, might seem to signifie to this purpose.
Would dreadful loud voices proclaiming him to be of whose existence you doubt have served the turn? It is likely, if your fear would have permitted you to use your wit, you would have had some subtle inventions how by some odd rencounter of angry atoms, the air or clouds might become thus terribly vocal. And when you know already, that they do sometimes salute your ears with very loud sounds (as when it thunders) there is little doubt, but your great wit can devise a way, how possibly such sounds might become articulate. And for the sense and coherent import of what were spoken; you that are so good at conjecturing how things might casually happen, would not be long in making a guess that might serve that turn also. Except you were grown very dull and barren; and that fancy that served you to imagine how the whole frame of the universe: and the rare structure of the bodies of animals, yea and even the reasonable soul it self might be all casual productions, cannot now devise how, by chance, a few words (for you do not say you expect long orations) might fall out to be sense, though there were no intelligent speaker.
Would dreadful loud voices proclaiming him to be of whose existence you doubt have serv'd the turn? It is likely, if your fear would have permitted you to use your wit, you would have had some subtil inventions how by some odd rancounter of angry atoms, the air or clouds might become thus terribly vocal. And when you know already, that they do sometimes salute your ears with very loud sounds (as when it thunders) there is little doubt, but your great wit can devise a way, how possibly such sounds might become articulate. And for the sense and coherent import of what were spoken; you that are so good at conjecturing how things might casually happen, would not be long in making a guess that might serve that turn also. Except you were grown very dull and barren; and that fancy that served you to imagine how the whole frame of the universe: and the rare structure of the bodies of animals, yea and even the reasonable soul it self might be all casual productions, cannot now devise how, by chance, a few words (for you do not say you expect long orations) might fall out to be sense, though there were no intelligent speaker.
But would strange and wonderful effects that might surprise and amaze you do the business? we may challenge you to try your faculty, and stretch it to the uttermost; and then tell us, what imagination you have formed of any thing more strange and wonderful, than the already extant frame of nature in the whole, and the several parts of it. Will he that hath a while considered the composition of the world; the exact and orderly motions of the Sun, Moon, and Stars; the fabric of his own body, and the powers of his soul, expect yet a wonder to prove to him there is a God?
But would strange and wonderful effects that might surprise and amaze you do the business? we may challenge you to try your faculty, and stretch it to the uttermost; and then tell us, what imagination you have formed of any thing more strange and wonderful, than the already extant frame of nature in the whole, and the several parts of it. Will he that hath a while considered the composition of the world; the exact and orderly motions of the Sun, Moon, and Stars; the fabrick of his own body, and the powers of his soul, expect yet a wonder to prove to him there is a God?
But if that be the complexion of your minds, that it is not the greatness of any work, but the novelty and surprisingness of it, that will convince you; It is not rational evidence you seek. Nor is it your Reason, but your idle curiosity you would have gratified; which deserves no more satisfaction than that fond wish, that one might come from the dead to warn men on earth lest they should come into the place of torment.
And if such means as these that have been mentioned should be thought necessary, I would ask, are they necessary to every individual person? so as that no man shall be esteemed to have had sufficient means of conviction who hath not with his own eyes beheld some such glorious apparition; or himself heard some such terrible voice, or been the immediate witness or subject of some prodigious wonderful ⟨p. 189⟩work? Yea, or will that once seeing, hearing, or feeling them suffice? Is it not necessary there should be a frequent repetition and renewal of these amazing things, lest the impression wearing off, there be a relapse, and a gradual sliding into an oblivion and unapprehensiveness of that Beings existence, whereof they had, sometime received a conviction. Now if such a continual iteration of these strange things were thought necessary, would they not hereby soon cease to be strange? And then if their strangeness was necessary, by that very thing wherein their sufficiency for conviction is said to consist, they should become useless. Or, if by their frequent variations (which it is possible to suppose) a perpetual amusement be still kept up in the minds of men: and they be always full of consternation and wonder. Doth this temper so much befriend the exercise of Reason? or contribute to the sober consideration of things? As if men could not be rational without being half mad. And, indeed, they might soon become altogether so, by being, but a while, beset with objects so full of terror, as are, by this supposition, made the necessary means to convince them of a Deity. †And were this a fit means of ruling the world, of preserving order among mankind? what business could then be followed? who could intend the affairs of their callings? ⟨p. 190⟩who could either be capable of governing, or of being governed while all mens minds should be wholly taken up either in the amazed view or the suspenseful expectation of nought else but strange things? To which purpose much hath been of late, with so excellent reason, discoursed by a worthy Author, that it is 2needless here to say more. And the aspect and influence of this state of things would be most pernicious upon Religion, that should be most served thereby. And which requires the greatest severity and most peaceful composure of mind to the due managing the exercises of it.
How little would that contribute to pious and devout converses with God, that should certainly keep mens minds in a continual commotion and hurry? This course, as our present condition is, what could it do but craze mens understandings, as a too bright and dazzling light causeth blindness, or any over-excelling sensible object destroys the sense; so that we should soon have cause to apply the Arabian Proverb, Shut the windows that the house may be light. And might learn to put a sense, not intolerable, upon those passages of some mystical Writers *that God is to be seen in a Divine cloud or darkness, as one†; and with closed eyes, as another *speaks (though what was their very sense I will not pretend to tell.)
How little would that contribute to pious and devout converses with God, that should certainly keep mens minds in a continual commotion and hurry? This course, as our present condition is, what could it do but craze mens understandings, as a too bright and dazling light causeth blindness, or any over-excelling sensible object destroys the sense; so that we should soon have cause to apply the Arabian Proverb, Shut the windows that the house may be light. And might learn to put a sense, not intollerable, upon those passages of some mystical Writers *that God is to be seen in a Divine cloud or darkness, as one†; and with closed eyes, as another *speaks (though what was their very sense I will not pretend to tell.)
- *D. Areop. l. de myster. Theol. c. 1.
- †[Greek or Hebrew]〈non-Latin alphabet〉
- *
Besides that, by this means, there would naturally ensue the continual excitation of so vexatious and enthralling passions, so servile and tormenting fears and amazements; as ⟨p. 191⟩could not but hold the souls of men under a constant and comfortless restraint, from any free and ingenuous access to God, or conversation with him. Wherein the very life of Religion consists. And then to what purpose doth the discovery and acknowledgement of the Deity serve? Inasmuch as it is never to be thought that the existence of God is a thing to be known only that it may be known. But that the end it serves for is Religion. A complacential and cheerful adoration of him and application of our selves with at once both dutiful and pleasant affections towards him. That were a strange means of coming to know that he is, that should only tend to destroy or hinder the very end it self of that knowledge.
Besides that, by this means, there would naturally ensue the continual excitation of so vexatious and enthralling passions, so servile and tormenting fears and amazements; as ⟨p. 191⟩could not but hold the souls of men under a constant and comfortless restraint, from any free and ingenuous access to God, or conversation with him. Wherein the very life of Religion consists. And then to what purpose doth the discovery and acknowledgment of the Deity serve? Inasmuch as it is never to be thought that the existence of God is a thing to be known only that it may be known. But that the end it serves for is Religion. A complacential and chearful adoration of him and application of our selves with at once both dutiful and pleasant affections towards him. That were a strange means of coming to know that he is, that should only tend to destroy or hinder the very end it self of that knowledge.
Wherefore all this being considered, it is likely it would not be insisted upon as necessary to our being persuaded of Gods existence, that he should so multiply strange and astonishing things, as that every man might be a daily amazed beholder and witness of them.
Wherefore all this being considered, it is likely it would not be insisted upon as necessary to our being perswaded of Gods existence, that he should so multiply strange and astonishing things, as that every man might be a daily amazed beholder and witness of them.
And if their frequency, and constant iteration be acknowledged not necessary, but shall 1indeed be judged wholly inconvenient, more rare discoveries of him in the very ways we have been speaking of have not been wanting. What would we think of such an appearance of God as that was upon Mount Sinai? when he came down (or caused a sensible Glory to descend) in the sight of all that great people! wherein the several things concurred that were above-mentioned! Let us but suppose such an ⟨p. 192⟩appearance in all the concurrent circumstances of it as that is said to have been. That is, we will suppose an equally great assembly or multitude of people is gathered together, and a solemn forewarning is given and proclaimed among them by appointed Heralds or Officers of State, that, on such a prefixed day, now very nigh at hand, the Divine Majesty and Glory (even his Glory set in Majesty) will visibly appear and show it self to them. They are most severely enjoined to prepare themselves and be in readiness against that day. Great care is taken to sanctify the people, and the place, Bounds are set about the designed Theatre of this great appearance. All are strictly required to observe their due and awful distances, and abstain from more audacious approaches and gazings; lest that terrible glory break out upon them and they perish. An irreverent or disrespectful look, they are told, will be mortal to them, or a very touch of any part of this sacred enclosure. In the morning of the appointed day, there are thunders and lightnings, and a thick cloud upon the hallowed Mount. The exceeding loud sound of Trumpet proclaims the Lords descent. He descends in fire, the flames whereof envelop the trembling Mount (now floored with a Sapphire pavement clear as the body of heaven.) And ascend into the middle region or (as it is expressed) into the midst or heart of the heavens. The voice of words (a loud and dreadful voice) audible to all that mighty Assembly, in which ⟨p. 193⟩were 600000 men (probably more than a million of persons) issues forth from amidst that terrible glory pronouncing to them, that I am Jehovah thy God.—And thence proceeding to give them precepts, so plain and clear, so comprehensive and full, so unexceptionably just and righteous, so agreeable to the nature of man, and subservient to his good;
And if their frequency, and constant iteration be acknowledged not necessary, but shall
that nothing could be more worthy the great Creator, or more aptly suitable to such a sort of creatures.
that nothing could be more worthy the great Creator, or more aptly sutable to such a sort of creatures.
It is very likely, indeed, that such a demonstration would leave no spectator in doubt concerning the existence of God; and would puzzle the Philosophy of the most sceptical Atheist to give an account, otherwise, of the Phenomenon. And if such could devise to say any thing that should seem plausible to some very easy half-witted persons that were not present, they would have an hard task of it to quiet the minds of those that were; or make them believe this was nothing else but some odd conjuncture of certain fiery atoms, that by some strange accident happened into this occursion and conflict with one another; or some illusion of fancy, by which so great a multitude were all at once imposed upon. So as that they only seemed to themselves to hear and see what they heard and saw not. Nor is it likely they would be very confident of the truth of their own conjecture, or be apt to venture much upon it themselves, having been the eye and ear-witnesses of these things.
It is very likely, indeed, that such a demonstration would leave no spectator in doubt concerning the existence of God; and would puzzle the Philosophy of the most sceptical Atheist to give an account, otherwise, of the Phaenomenon. And if such could devise to say any thing that should seem plausible to some very easie half-witted persons that were not present, they would have an hard task of it to quiet the minds of those that were; or make them believe this was nothing else but some odd conjuncture of certain fiery atoms, that by some strange accident happened into this occursion and conflict with one another; or some illusion of phansie, by which so great a multitude were all at once imposed upon. So as that they only seemed to themselves to hear and see what they heard and saw not. Nor is it likely they would be very confident of the truth of their own conjecture, or be apt to venture much upon it themselves, having been the eye and ear-witnesses of these things.
But is it necessary this course shall be taken to make the world know there is a God? such an appearance indeed would more powerfully strike sense; but unto sober and considerate Reason were it a greater thing than the making such a world as this? And the disposing this great variety of particular Beings in it, into so exact and elegant an order? And the sustaining and preserving it in the same state through so many ages? Let the vast and unknown extent of the whole, the admirable variety, the elegant shapes, the regular motions, the excellent faculties and powers of that unconceivable number of creatures contained in it, be considered. And is there any comparison between that temporary transient occasional, and this steady permanent and universal discovery of God? Nor (supposing the truth of the History) can it be thought the design of this appearance to these Hebrews was to convince them of the existence of a Deity to be worshipped; when both they had so convincing evidence thereof many ways before; and the other Nations, that, which they left, and those whither they went, were not without their Religion and worship, such as it was. But to engage them by so majestic a representation thereof, to a more exact observance of his will, now made known. Though, had there been any doubt of the former (as we can hardly suppose they could, before, have more doubted of the being of a God, than that there were men on earth) this might collaterally and besides its ⟨p. 195⟩chief intention, be a means to confirm them concerning that alse: But that it was necessary for that end, we have no pretence to imagine. The like may be said concerning other Miracles heretofore wrought, that the intent of them was to justify the Divine Authority of him who wrought them, to prove him sent by God, and so countenance the Doctrine or Message delivered by him. Not that they tended (otherwise than on the by) to prove Gods existence. Much less was this so amazing an appearance needful or intended for that end, and least of all was it necessary, that this should be Gods ordinary way of making it known to men that he doth exist: So as that for this purpose he should often repeat so terrible representations of himself. And how inconvenient it were to mortal men, as well as unnecessary, the astonishment wherewith it possessed that people is an evidence.
But is it necessary this course shall be taken to make the world know there is a God? such an appearance indeed would more powerfully strike sense; but unto sober and considerate Reason were it a greater thing than the making such a world as this? And the disposing this great variety of particular Beings in it, into so exact and elegant an order? And the sustaining and preserving it in the same state through so many ages? Let the vast and unknown extent of the whole, the admirable variety, the elegant shapes, the regular motions, the excellent faculties and powers of that unconceivable number of creatures contained in it, be considered. And is there any comparison between that temporary transient occasional, and this steady permanent and universal discovery of God? Nor (supposing the truth of the History) can it be thought the design of this appearance to these Hebrews was to convince them of the existence of a Deity to be worshipped; when both they had so convincing evidence thereof many ways before; and the other Nations, that, which they left, and those whither they went, were not without their Religion and worship, such as it was. But to engage them by so majestick a representation thereof, to a more exact observance of his will, now made known. Though, had there been any doubt of the former (as we can hardly suppose they could, before, have more doubted of the being of a God, than that there were men on earth) this might collaterally and besides its
And their passionate affrighted wish thereupon, Let not God any more speak to us, lest we die. They apprehended it impossible for them to out-live such an other sight!
And if that so amazing an appearance of the Divine Majesty (sometime afforded) were not necessary, but some way, on the by, useful for the confirming that people in the persuasion of Gods existence, why may it not be useful also for the same purpose even now to us? Is it that we think that can be less true now which was so gloriously evident to be true four thousand years ago? Or is it that we ⟨p. 196⟩can dis-believe or doubt the truth of the History? what should be the ground or pretence of doubt? If it were a fiction, it is manifest it was feigned by some person that had the use of his understanding, and was not besides himself, as the coherence and contexture of parts doth plainly show. But would any man not besides himself, designing to gain credit to a forged report of a matter of fact ever say there were 600000 persons present at the doing of it?. Would it not rather have been pretended done in a corner? Or is it imaginable it should never have met with contradiction? That none of the pretended by-standers should disclaim the avouchment of it? and say they knew of no such matter? Especially if it be considered that the laws said to be given at that time; chiefly those which were reported to have been written in the two Tables, were not so favourable to vicious inclinations, nor that people so strict and scrupulous observers of them. But that they would have been glad to have had any thing to pretend against the authority of the legislature, if the case could have admitted it. When they discovered, in that, and succeeding time, so violently prone, and unretractable a propension to Idolatry and other wickednesses directly against the very letter of that Law. How welcome and covetable a plea had it been, in their frequent and sometimes almost universal apostasies, could they have had such a thing to pretend that the Law it self that curbed them was a cheat. But ⟨p. 197⟩we always find, that though they laboured, in some of their degeneracies, and when they were lapsed into a more corrupted state, to render it more easy to themselves by favourable glosses and interpretations. Yet, even in the most corrupt, they never went about to deny or implead its Divine original; whereof they were ever so Religious asserters as no people under heaven could be more.
And if that so amazing an appearance of the Divine Majesty (sometime afforded) were not necessary, but some way, on the by, useful for the confirming that people in the perswasion of Gods existence, why may it not be useful also for the same purpose even now to us? Is it that we think that can be less true now which was so gloriously evident to be true four thousand years ago? Or is it that we
And the awful apprehension whereof prevailed so far with them, as that care was taken (as is notoriously known) by those appointed to that charge that the very letters should be numbered of the sacred Writings, lest there should happen any the minutest alteration in them. Much more might be said if it were needful for the evincing the truth of this particular piece of History; and its little to be doubted but any man who with sober and impartial reason considers the circumstances relating to it, the easily evidenceable antiquity of the Records whereof this is a part. The certain nearness of the time of writing them to the time when this thing is said to have been done, the great reputation of the Writer even among Pagans, the great multitude of the alleged witnesses and spectacles, the no-contradiction ever heard of. The universal consent and suffrage of that Nation through all times to this day, even when their practice hath been most contrary to the Laws then given; the securely confident and unsuspicious reference of later pieces of sacred Scripture thereto (even some parts of the New ⟨p. 198⟩Testament) as a most known and undoubted thing. The long series and tract of time through which that people are said to have had extraordinary and sensible indications of the Divine Presence, (which if it had been false could not in so long a time but have been evicted of falsehood.) Their miraculous and wonderful eduction out of Egypt not denied by any, and more obscurely acknowledged by some Heathen Writers, their conduct through the Wilderness, and settlement in Canaan; their constitution and form of Polity known for many Ages to have been a Theocracy; their usual ways of consulting God upon all more important occasions. Whosoever I say shall soberly consider these things (and many more might easily occur to such as would think fit to let their thoughts dwell a while upon this subject) will, not only, from some of them think it highly improbable, but, from others of them, plainly impossible that the history of this appearance should have been a contrived piece of falsehood.
And the awful apprehension whereof prevailed so far with them, as that care was taken (as is notoriously known) by those appointed to that charge that the very letters should be numbred of the sacred Writings, lest there should happen any the minutest alteration in them. Much more might be said if it were needful for the evincing the truth of this particular piece of History; and its little to be doubted but any man who with sober and impartial reason considers the circumstances relating to it, the easily evidenceable antiquity of the Records whereof this is a part. The certain nearness of the time of writing them to the time when this thing is said to have been done, the great reputation of the Writer even among Pagans, the great multitude of the alledged witnesses and spectacles, the no-contradiction ever heard of. The universal consent and suffrage of that Nation through all times to this day, even when their practice hath been most contrary to the Laws then given; the securely confident and unsuspicious reference of later pieces of sacred Scripture thereto (even some parts of the New
Yea, and though as was said, the view of such a thing with ones own eyes would make a more powerful impression upon our fancy or imagination, yet if we speak of rational evidence (which is quite another thing) of the truth of a matter of fact that were of this astonishing nature, I should think it were much (at least if I were credibly told that so many hundred thousand persons saw it at once, as if I had been the single unaccompanied spectator of it my self. Not to say ⟨p. 199⟩that it were apparently in some respect much greater; could we but obtain of our selves to distinguish between the pleasing of our curiosity and the satisfying of our reason.
Yea, and though as was said, the view of such a thing with ones own eyes would make a more powerful impreson upon our phansie or imagination, yet if we speak of rational evidence (which is quite another thing) of the truth of a matter of fact that were of this astonishing nature, I should think it were much (at least if I were credibly told that so many hundred thousand persons saw it at once, as if I had been the single unaccomcompanied spectator of it my self. Not to say ⟨p. 199⟩that it were apparently in some respect much greater; could we but obtain of our selves to distinguish between the pleasing of our curiosity and the satisfying of our reason.
So that, upon the whole, I see not why it may not be concluded, with the greatest confidence, that both the (supposed) existence of a Deity is possible to be certainly known to men on earth, in some way that is suitable to their present state, that there are no means fitter to be ordinary than those we already have, and that more extraordinary additional confirmations are partly therefore not necessary, and partly not wanting.
So that, upon the whole, I see not why it may not be concluded, with the greatest confidence, that both the (supposed) existence of a Deity is possible to be certainly known to men on earth, in some way that is sutable to their present state, that there are no means fitter to be ordinary than those we already have, and that more extraordinary additional confirmations are partly therefore not necessary, and partly not wanting.
Again it may be further demanded (as 1that which may both immediately serve our main purpose, and may also show the reasonableness of what was last said. Is it sufficiently evident to such Subjects of some great Prince as live remote from the Royal Residence that there is such a one now ruling over them?
Again it may be further demanded (as 1that which may both immediately serve our main purpose, and may also shew the reasonableness of what was last said. Is it sufficiently evident to such Subjects of some great Prince as live remote from the Royal Residence that there is such a one now ruling over them?
- 1VI.
To say no, is to raze the foundation of civil Government, and reduce it wholly to domestical, by such a Ruler as may ever be in present view. Which yet is, upon such terms, never possible to be preserved also. It is plain many do firmly enough believe that there is a King reigning over them; who not only never saw the King, but never saw the splendour of his Court, the pomp of his attendance, or it may be, never saw the man that had seen the King? And is not all dutiful and loyal obedience wont to be challenged, and paid of ⟨p. 300⟩such as well as his other Subjects. Or would it be thought a reasonable excuse of disloyalty, that any such persons should say they had never seen the King or his Court? Or a reasonable demand, as the condition of required subjection, that the Court be kept sometime in their Village, that they might have the opportunity of beholding at least some of the Insignia of Regality, or more splendid appearances of that Majesty which claims subjection from them? much more would it be deemed unreasonable and insolent, that every Subject should expect to see the face of the Prince every day, otherwise they will not obey nor believe there is any such person. Whereas it hath been judged rather more expedient and serviceable to the continuing the veneration of Majesty (and in a Monarchy of no mean reputation for wisdom and greatness) that the Prince did very rarely offer himself to the view of the people. Surely more ordinary and remote discoveries of an existing Prince and Ruler over them (the effects of his power, and the influences of his government) will be reckoned sufficient even as to many parts of his Dominions, that, possibly through many succeeding generations never had other. And yet how unspeakably less sensible, less immediate, less constant, less necessary, less numerous are the effects and instances of regal humane power, and wisdom than of the Divine; which latter we behold which way soever we look, and feel in every thing we touch or have any sense ⟨p. 201⟩of, and may reflect upon in our very senses themselves, and in all the parts and powers that belong to us. And so certainly that if we would allow our selves the liberty of serious thoughts, we might soon find it were utterly impossible such effects should ever have been without that only cause.
To say no, is to raze the foundation of civil Government, and reduce it wholly to domestical, by such a Ruler as may ever be in present view. Which yet is, upon such terms, never possible to be preserved also. It is plain many do firmly enough believe that there is a King reigning over them; who not only never saw the King, but never saw the splendor of his Court, the pomp of his attendance, or it may be, never saw the man that had seen the King? And is not all dutiful and loyal obedience wont to be challenged, and paid of
That without its influence, it had never been possible, that we could hear, or see, or speak, or think, or live, or be any thing, nor that any other thing could ever have been, when as the effects that serve so justly to endear and recommend to us civil Government (as peace, safety, order, quiet possession of our rights) we cannot but know are not inseparably and incommunicably appropriate or to be attributed to the person of this or that particular and mortal Governor; but may also proceed from another: yea and the same benefits may (for some short time at least) be continued without any such government at all. Nor is this intended merely as a rhetorical scheme of speech to beguile or amuse the unwary Reader: But, without arrogating any thing, or attributing more to it, than that it is an (altogether inartificial and very defective, but) true and naked representation of the very case it self as it is. 'Tis professedly propounded as having somewhat solidly argumentative in it. That is that, (whereas there is most confessedly sufficient yet) there is unspeakably less evidence to most people in the world under civil government; that there actually is such a government existent over them; and ⟨p. 202⟩that they are under obligation to be subject to it; than there is of the existence of a Deity, and the (consequent) reasonableness of Religion. If therefore the ordinary effects and indications of the former, be sufficient, which have so contingent and uncertain a connection with their causes (while those which are more extraordinary are so exceeding rare with the most) why shall not the more certain ordinary discoveries of the latter be judged sufficient, though the most have not the immediate notice of any such extraordinary appearances as those are which have been before mentioned?
That without its influence, it had never been possible, that we could hear, or see, or speak, or think, or live, or be any thing, nor that any other thing could ever have been, when as the effects that serve so justly to endear and recommend to us civil Government (as peace, safety, order, quiet possession of our rights) we cannot but know are not inseparably and incommunicably appropriate or to be attributed to the person of this or that particular and mortal Governour; but may also proceed from another: yea and the same benefits may (for some short time at least) be continued without any such government at all. Nor is this intended meerly as a rhetorical scheme of speech to beguile or amuse the unwary Reader: But, without arrogating any thing, or attributing more to it, than that it is an (altogether inartificial and very defective, but) true and naked representation of the very case it self as it is. 'Tis professedly propounded as having somewhat solidly argumentative in it. That is that, (whereas there is most confessedly sufficient yet) there is unspeakably less evidence to most people in the world under civil government; that there actually is such a government existent over them; and
Moreover, I yet demand further, whether it may be thought possible for any one to have 1a full rational certainty that another person is a reasonable creature, and hath in him a rational soul, so as to judge he hath sufficient ground and obligation to converse with him, and carry towards him as a man? without the supposition of this, the foundation of all humane society and civil conversation is taken away. And what evidence have we of it, whereunto that which we have of the being of God (as the foundation of religious and godly conversation) will not at least be found equivalent?
- 1VII.
Will we say that mere humane shape is enough to prove such a one a man? A Philosopher would deride us, as the Stagirites Disciples are said to have done the Platonic man. But we will not be so nice. We acknowledge it is, if no circumstances concur (as sudden appearing, vanishing, transformation or the ⟨p. 203⟩like) that plainly evince the contrary; so far as to infer upon us an obligation, not to be rude, and uncivil; that we use no violence, or carry our selves abusively towards one, that, only thus, appears an humane creature. Yea, and to perform any duty of Justice or Charity towards him within our power, which we owe to a man as a man. As suppose we see him wronged, or in necessity, and can presently right, or relieve him; though he do not, or cannot represent to us more of his case, than our own eyes inform us of. And should an act of Murder be committed upon one whose true humanity was not otherwise evident, would he not be justly liable to the known and common punishment of that offence? Nor could he acquit himself of transgressing the laws of humanity, if he should only neglect any seasonable act of Justice or Mercy towards him, whereof he beholds the present occasion.
Will we say that meer humane shape is enough to prove such a one a man? A Philosopher would deride us, as the Stagyrites Disciples are said to have done the Platonick man. But we will not be so nice. We acknowledge it is, if no circumstances concurr (as suddain appearing, vanishing, transformation or the ⟨p. 203⟩like) that plainly evince the contrary; so far as to infer upon us an obligation, not to be rude, and uncivil; that we use no violence, or carry our selves abusively towards one, that, only thus, appears an humane creature. Yea, and to perform any duty of Justice or Charity towards him within our power, which we owe to a man as a man. As suppose we see him wronged, or in necessity, and can presently right, or relieve him; though he do not, or cannot represent to us more of his case, than our own eyes inform us of. And should an act of Murther be committed upon one whose true humanity was not otherwise evident, would he not be justly liable to the known and common punishment of that offence? Nor could he acquit himself of transgressing the laws of humanity, if he should only neglect any seasonable act of Justice or Mercy towards him, whereof he beholds the present occasion.
But if any one were disposed to cavil or play the Sophister; how much more might be said, even by infinite degrees, to oppose this single evidence of any ones true humanity; than ever was, or can be brought against the entire concurrent evidence we have of the existence of God. It is, here, most manifestly just and equal thus to state the case, and compare the whole evidence we have of the latter, with that one of the former; Inasmuch as that one alone, is apparently enough to oblige us to carry towards such a one as a man. And if that alone ⟨p. 204⟩be sufficient to oblige us to acts of Justice or Charity towards man, he is strangely blind that cannot see infinitely more to oblige him to acts of Piety towards God.
But if we would take a nearer and more strict view of this parallel, we would state the general and more obvious aspect of this world, on the one hand, and the external aspect and shape of a man on the other; and should then see the former doth evidence to us an in-dwelling Deity, diffused through the whole, and actuating every part, with incomparably greater certainty, than the latter doth an in-dwelling reasonable soul. In which way we shall find, what will aptly serve our present purpose, though we are far from apprehending any such union of the blessed God with this world, as is between the soul and body of a man. It is manifestly possible, to our understandings, that there may be, and (if any history or testimony of others be worthy to be believed) certain to experience and sense, that there, often, hath been, the appearance of humane shape, and of agreeable actions, without a real man. But it is no way possible such a world as this should have ever been without God. That there is a world, proves that eternal Being to exist whom we take to be God; suppose we it as rude an heap as at first it was, or as we can suppose it; as external appearance represents to us that creature which we take to be a man; But that, as a certain infallible discovery, necessarily true. This, but as a probable ⟨p. 205⟩and conjectural one, and (though highly probable) not impossible to be false.