pp. 1425 passages
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But I think it good somewhat to speak of the affections, namely of Envy & Emulation, & such like. Affections (as it is well known) pertain unto the general word of quality, & are contained in that form, which is commonly called Passio, & passibilis qualitas. And amongst those there are two more gross & very common,1 Delectation (I say) & Sorrow. Their chief place is in the sinews, which are dispersed in a manner throughout the whole body. Unto which, when either agreeable things to nature, or things contrary are applied, then either we have a delectation, or else a grief. Farther, there are other affections which follow knowledge, ⟨p. 142⟩by which as their nature is, the heart altereth his motion by moving the pulse either upward or downward, according as knowledge doth received good or evil, & that either present or else nigh at hand. For when we feel that good is present, §1the heart therewith is jocund, and is affected pleasantly.2 And this affection is called Gladness. But if we perceive that the good is not present, but not far §2from us, yea at hand and very nigh to be obtained,3 then are we stirred up by hope to attain it, and the heart is in like sort pleasantly moved. But when §3we see that evil is present, the heart flieth away with a heavy motion,4 for it is contracted, it abhorred it, and is vexed: and this affection is wont to be called both pain, and grief, in Greek it is called [Greek or Hebrew], so called as the Stoics think, as though it were [Greek or Hebrew]: that is consumption: for even as the body of him that is sick wasteth away by sickness, so the mind seemeth in a manner to wear away with sorrow. There is also an other knowledge of evil, not now being present, §4but which already is at hand. The heart flieth from that also,5 and by his moving very manifestly declineth from it: and such an affection is called Fear.
BVt I thinke it good somewhat to speake of the affections, namely of Enuye & Emulation, & such like. Affections (as it is wel knowen) pertain vnto the general word of quality, & ar contayned in that forme, which is cōmonly called Passio, & passibilis qualitas. And amongst those ther are two more grosse & very cōmon,1 Delectation (I say) & Sorow. Their chief place is in the synowes, which are dispersed in a maner throughout the whole body. Vnto which, when either agreable things to nature, or things contrary ar applied, then either we haue a delectatiō, or els a grief. Farther, ther ar other affectiōs which folow knowlege, ⟨p. 142⟩by whiche as their nature is, the heart altereth hys mocion by mouing the pulse either vpwarde or downeward, accordyng as knowledge doth receaued good or euil, & that either present or els nye at hand. For when we fele that good is present, §1the heart therewith is ioconde, and is affected pleasauntly.2 And this affectiō is called Gladnesse. But if we perceaue that the good is not present, but not far §2from vs, yea at hand and very nyghe to be obteyned,3 then are we stirred vp by hope to attayne it, and the heart is in like sorte pleasauntly moued. But when §3we see that euill is present, the heart flieth awaye with a heauy mocion,4 for it is contracted, it abhorred it, and is vexed: and this affection is wont to be called both payne, and grief, in Greeke it is called 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, so called as the Stoikes thinke, as thoughe it were 〈non-Latin alphabet〉: that is consumption: for euen as the body of him that is sicke wasteth away by sickenesse, so the mynde semeth in a maner to weare away with sorow. There is also an other knowledge of euill, not now beyng present, §4but whiche already is at hand. The heart flyeth from that also,5 and by hys mouyng very manifestly declineth from it: and such an affection is called Feare.
Of those four principal affections, these are now to be entreated of, which have their beginning of Heaviness, or Grief. And they also are reckoned to be four. Mercy, Nemesis, Envy, and Emulation, of which Aristotle in his Rhetorics hath written many goodly things.
Of those foure principall affections, these are now to be entreated of, whiche haue their begynnyng of Heuynesse, or Grief. And they also are reckened to be foure. Mercy, Nemesis, Enuy, and Emulation, of whiche Aristotle in his Rethorikes hath written many goodly thinges.
But before we entreat particularly of them, one thing is to be enquired of: Whether Affections are to be counted good or evil. The Stoics affirm that they are evil, and they have universally condemned affections,1 this reason leading them thereunto, because by them the mind, judgement, and sound Counsel is troubled. For they so distract and shake the mind or reason, that it can not at pleasure and quietly have the contemplation of things natural and divine, neither orderly and rightly determine of things to be done. Farther, because by their weight they oftentimes drive men to perpetrate filthy and unjust things: yea and they hurt the body also, when they are very vehement. These in a manner are the reasons of the Stoics. The Peripatetics teach much otherwise, that is, that those things are not true, which the Stoics affirm,2 but when affections are not chastised & kept under by reason, then are they suffered immoderately to run at random. For even the affections, if they be kept in with certain bonds, are both good and profitable, as being the matter of virtues, and which are by nature appointed for their whetstones. For anger bringeth no small help unto strength, and mercy is set under the virtue of clemency. And in the same manner it may be said of many other.
But before we entreate particularly of them, one thing is to be enquired of: Whether Affections are to be counted good or euill. The Stoikes affirme that they are euill, and they haue vniuersally condemned affections,1 this reason leadyng them thereunto, bycause by them the mynde, iudgement, and sound Counsell is troubled. For they so distract and shake the mynde or reason, that it can not at pleasure and quietly haue the contēplatiō of thinges naturall and diuine, neither orderly and rightly determine of things to be done. Farther, bicause by their wayght they oftentymes driue men to perpetrate filthy and vniust things: yea and they hurte the body also, when they are very vehement. These in a maner are the reasons of the Stoikes. The Peripatecians teache muche otherwise, that is, that those things are not true, which the Stoikes affirme,2 but when affections are not chastised & kept vnder by reason, then are they suffred immoderatly to runne at randon. For euē ye affections, if they be kept in with certain bondes, are both good and profitable, as beyng the matter of vertues, and whiche are by nature appoynted for their whetstones. For anger bringeth no small helpe vnto strength, and mercy is set vnder the vertue of clemency. And in the same maner it may be sayd of many other.
But this sentence wherein the Philosophers do so disagree,1 must be decided by the judgement of the holy scriptures. They write, ye man both as touching soul and as touching body was created of God. And they add, that all things were good, what soever God created. Wherefore forasmuch as he planted affections in man, but not evil and corrupt, as now we have them, but right and sound, which should obey and serve reason, they must of necessity be good. Farther the law of God doth every where commend unto us mercy, and preacheth repentance, which can not consist without pain and grief of the mind. David also writeth, and Paul repeateth it, be ye angry, but sin not. Yea and which more is, affections are ascribed even unto God, as Anger, Mercy, Grief, Repentance, &c. which things although they are not properly spoken of him, yet this must we mark, that in the holy scriptures that is never attributed unto God, which in a man is of it self vice, or of his own nature sin. This so discussed, let us now entreat of mercy.
But this sentence wherin the Philosophers do so disagre,1 must be decided by the iudgement of the holy scriptures. They write, ye man both as touching soule and as touching body was created of God. And they adde, that all things were good, what soeuer God created. Wherfore for asmuch as he planted affections in man, but not euill and corrupt, as now we haue them, but right and sound, which should obey and serue reason, they must of necessity be good. Farther the lawe of God doth euery where commend vnto vs mercy, and preacheth repentaunce, whiche can not consiste without payne and grief of the minde. Dauid also writeth, and Paul repeteth it, be ye angry, but sinne not. Yea and whiche more is, affections are ascribed euen vnto God, as Anger, Mercy, Grief, Repentance, &c. which things althoughe they are not properly spokē of him, yet this must we marke, that in the holy scriptures that is neuer attributed vnto God, whiche in a man is of it selfe vice, or of his owne nature sinne. This so discussed, let vs nowe entreate of mercy.