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Mercy is a grief of the mind, which we take for the adversity of other men,1 or (as Cicero saith) a grief taken for an others mans misery. Aristotle teacheth, ⟨image 149⟩that Mercy is stirred up, if we see any suffer grievous things which they have not deserved. For if wicked men be justly punished, Mercy is not therefore stirred up. Farther he thinketh, that those cases which we pity, should be terrible, otherwise if they be but light, we are by them little or nothing moved. Lastly that they are touched with mercy, which do think that such things may sometimes happen either unto themselves or to some of their friends. Which is the cause, that Aristotle supposeth, that they which are in prosperity, and do judge themselves happy, are not prone unto mercy, yea they are wont to scoff & mock those which are in misery, as they which think nothing can hurt them. Likewise he removeth this affection from such as are desperate and in a most miserable state, because they are not afraid that any worse thing can happen unto them, then that which they have already. Wherefore they seem in that desperate fortune to have become men without senses. But if this were true, a man might doubt, by what means mercy can be ascribed unto God, forasmuch as he without controversy is most blessed, and nothing can hurt him. But to this might be answered, that mercy is not properly attributed unto god, but by a metaphor taken of man, because he doth those things,2 which merciful men are wont to do. For they help the afflicted, which self same thing god also doeth. But in this thing I agree not unto Aristotle, which will not have mercy to be showed unto those which are justly punished. For Samuel mourned long time for Saul, whom God rejected not unworthily, but most justly. Christ also wept over the destruction of Jerusalem which was at hand unto that City, not undoubtedly without desert, but justly. Neither think I this true, that sins, which some men commit, do not stir up mercy, but only calamities & adversities do stir up mercy. For holy men are no less grieved for other mens causes, when they fall into grievous sins, than they are when they be oppressed with evil fortune, yea they are so much the more grieved, as that evil is more pernicious, and less able to be cured.
MErcy is a grief of the minde, which we take for the aduersity of other men,1 or (as Cicero saith) a grief takē for an others mās misery. Aristotle teacheth, ⟨image 149⟩that Mercy is stirred vp, if we see any suffre greuous things which they haue not deserued. For if wicked men be iustly punished, Mercy is not therfore stirred vp. Farther he thinketh, that those cases whiche we pitye, should be terrible, otherwise if they be but light, we are by them litle or nothing moued. Lastly that they are touched with mercy, which do thinke that such things may sometymes happen either vnto themselues or to some of their friendes. Which is the cause, that Aristotle supposeth, that they which are in prosperity, and do iudge themselues happy, are not prone vnto mercy, yea they ar wont to scoffe & mocke those which are in misery, as they which thinke nothing can hurte them. Likewise he remoueth this affection from such as are desperate and in a most miserable state, bycause they are not afrayd that any worse thing can happen vnto them, then that whiche they haue already. Wherfore they seme in that desperate fortune to haue become men without senses. But if this were true, a man might doubt, by what meanes mercy can be ascribed vnto God, for asmuch as he without controuersy is most blessed, and nothing can hurt hym. But to this might be answered, that mercy is not properly attributed vnto god, but by a metaphore taken of man, bycause he doth those things,2 which mercifull men are wont to do. For they helpe the afflicted, which self same thing god also doeth. But in this thing I agree not vnto Aristotle, whiche will not haue mercy to be shewed vnto those whiche are iustly punished. For Samuel mourned long time for Saul, whō God reiected not vnworthily, but most iustly. Christ also wept ouer the destruction of Ierusalem which was at hand vnto that City, not vndoubtedly without deserte, but iustly. Neither thinke I this true, that sinnes, which some mē commit, do not stirre vp mercy, but onely calamityes & aduersityes do stirre vp mercy. For holy men are no lesse grieued for other mēs causes, whē they fal into grieuous sinnes, thē they are when they be oppressed with euil fortune, yea they ar so much the more grieued, as that euil is more pernicious, and lesse able to be cured.
Wherefore we can not deny, but that mercy is a good affection, for as much as it obeyeth the word of God and reason, especially seeing the Lord by his own mouth hath pronounced, that the merciful are blessed, because they also shall obtain mercy.
Wherfore we can not deny, but that mercy is a good affection, for as much as it obeyeth the worde of God and reason, especially seyng the Lord by his own mouth hath pronounced, that the mercifull are blessed, bycause they also shall obtayne mercy.
The other affection which hath his beginning of Heaviness or Grief, is called Nemesis: 1the same hath no Latin word, although of some it be called Indignatio, that is Indignation, which yet by that word do not express all that affection: for Indignation extendeth farther than Nemesis. 2But leaving the word, let us thus define the thing. Nemesis is a grief, which is taken for the prosperity of wicked men, because they seem unworthy of that fortune. Just and holy men are sick oftentimes of this affection. David when he saw the ungodly flourishing, said: My feet were almost moved. Habakkuk also, was grieved that the ungodly were of such force, that they could oppress the saints, and devour the just. And Job seemeth in a manner to complain unto his friends for the same thing. Farther Plutarch in the life of Homer praiseth this affection,3 and by occasion thereof he far preferreth the Peripatetics in disputing of Affections before the Stoics, & especially by the judgement of Homer, who affirmeth that God at the length will angerly punish, after that the wicked have a certain while flourished. Howbeit this is to be observed, that men are not grieved with this affection, for that they shall suffer any loss, by reason of the prosperous success of the wicked, or because that they by their power can hurt them. For if they were in this manner grieved, they should not be troubled with Nemesis, but rather with fear. But Nemesis is then, when a man for the lucky success of the wicked, is moved with astomake & hatred of the unworthiness of the person.
The other affection which hath his beginning of Heuinesse or Grief, is called Nemesis: 1the same hath no Lattin worde, although of some it be called Indignatio, that is Indignation, which yet by that word do not expresse all that affectiō: for Indignation extendeth farther than Nemesis. 2But leauyng the word, let vs thus define the thing. Nemesis is a grief, which is taken for ye prosperity of wicked men, bycause they seme vnworthy of that fortune. Iust and holy men are sicke oftentymes of this affectiō. Dauid when he saw the vngodly florishing, said: My fete were almost moued. Abacuk also, was grieued that the vngodly were of such force, that they could oppresse the saintes, and deuoure the iust. And Iob semeth in a maner to complayne vnto his friends for the same thing. Farther Plutarche in the lyfe of Homere praiseth this affection,
1This affection in two things communicateth with Mercy: first because either of them is a Heaviness: farther, because each of them is stirred up by the unworthiness of the thing. Mercy, because good men are grieved and oppressed, and Nemesis, because wicked men live haply. But in this afterward they differ, because ⟨p. 143⟩Nemesis hath a respect unto prosperous fortune, & Mercy unto sharp fortune. Wherefore Nemesis is in a manner a mean affection between Envy & Mercy, for of either it seemeth to take somewhat: of mercy it taketh unworthiness: of Envy prosperity, which it hath a respect unto.2 Farthermore Aristotle teacheth that none are affected with Nemesis for other mens virtues: for if otherwise they of vicious and corrupt men, become just, moderate, strong, and temperate men, we are not then angry, because when they are adorned with virtues, they are no longer counted wicked men. But then at the last we are affected with Nemesis, when those good things come unto wicked men, with which we think ye good men ought to be rewarded, as are riches, honours, power, favour, & such like. But godly men must wisely deal with this affection, that when their minds are affected with it, because of the felicity of the ungodly, let them have a regard unto God, which is the true governor and distributer of all good things. Wherefore if men should bestow these outward goods upon the unworthy, their uniustice might justly be reproved. But such a reprehension hath no place in God, because he doth all things most justly. This thing David when he did not diligently consider, said: My feet were almost moved. As though he should have said: By reason of this Nemesis I had almost grievously fallen.3 Wherefore we must seldom give place to this affection, least we seem to reprehend the Providence of God.
1This affection in two things cōmunicateth with Mercy: first bycause either of them is a Heuinesse: farther, bycause eche of thē is stirred vp by the vnworthinesse of the thing. Mercy, bycause good men are grieued and oppressed, and Nemesis, bycause wicked men lyue happely. But in this afterwarde they differ, bycause ⟨p. 143⟩
Now must we speak of envy. Cicero thinketh that it should rather be called Enuidence, for they among Latin men are said to be sick with Envy, which are envied. But Enuidence pertaineth to them, which consume away with this disease. And therefore he thinketh that Envy or Enuidence is therefore so called, because that they which are envious, do to much look upon other mens fortune. Envy therefore is a grief which is taken for an other mans prosperity, especially of those which are equal & like unto us. For a poor man envieth not a king, neither do beggars envy noble men. We envy those that are like & equal unto us. And the likeness is to be understand, as touching kindred, riches, beauty, age, wit, dignity, and such like. The cause of Enuidence is not, because we fear that some hurt is at hand of those whom we envy: for that should be fear. But of a certain hatred and stomach we can not abide the prosperity of other men, especially of our matches and like. And thereof Envy is the cause.
Now must we speake of enuy. Cicero thinketh that it should rather be called Enuidence, for they among Lattin men are sayd to be sicke with Enuy, whiche are enuied. But Enuidence pertayneth to them, which consume away with this disease. And therfore he thinketh that Enuy or Enuidence is therfore so called, bycause that they which are enuious, do to much looke vpō other mens fortune. Enuy therfore is a grief which is takē for an other mās prosperity, especially of those which are equal & like vnto vs. For a poore mā enuieth not a king, neither do beggers enuy noble men. We enuy those that are like & equall vnto vs. And the likenesse is to be vnderstand, as touching kinred, riches, beawty, age, witte, dignity, and such like. The cause of Enuidence is not, bycause we feare that some hurte is at hand of those whom we enuy: for that should be feare. But of a certayne hatred and stomacke we can not abide the prosperity of other men, especially of our matches and like. And therof Enuy is the cause.
Envy is evermore counted evil, and it is by the holy scriptures grievously reproved. For it is most manifestly against Charity. For the Apostle said unto the Corinth. the 1. chap. Charity envieth not.1 For Paul taketh not properly there the word [Greek or Hebrew] which is turned envy. But to the Galatians he more plainly forbiddeth envy, writing: Be not ye made desirous of vain glory, provoking one an other, and envying one an other: Where not only Envy is reproved,2 but the mother of it is also showed, namely desire of glory. As also we may in this history perceive. For the Ephraites envied Gideon, because the glory of so great a victory seemed to redound unto him. And this affection is of force in all those things, wherein we desire to excel. Neither abstaineth it also from virtues: for the envious persons would not that his matches and like should excel him in any ornament of virtues. But the cause why envy is conversant among like, is this, because although the prosperous fortune of like or matches, doth take away none of our goods, neither maketh us lesser then we are, yet the Envious person so thinketh of the good things of other men, as though by them his honour & dignity, gain,3 and other ornaments were darkened. And this is not to be left unspoken of, that every envious person is one that rejoiceth in an other mans hurt: for he rejoiceth in the adversity of his equal.4 Yet are not these to be counted for one and the self same vice, seeing they pertain unto contrary motions of the mind. For Enuidence is a grief or sorrow, when he that rejoiceth in an other mans hurt is affected with joy. Yet are these vices, although they be diverse, otherwise so joined together, that there is no envious man which is not moved with the rejoicing ⟨image 150⟩in the hurt of an other. And hereby it manifestly appeareth that Enuidence plainly is contrary unto Mercy. For it lamenteth an other mans misery, but the envious man rejoiceth therein, because of the disease of rejoicing in the hurt of an other wherewith he is sick.5 They that are affected with Nemesis want not also this motion of the mind. For he which is sorry for the prosperous success of wicked men, the same man is also affected with pleasure, when he seeth them oppressed and vexed.
The Latins have no word to express this kind of joy, wherewith both the envious man, and he that hath Nemesis is affected, in beholding an others mans prosperity.
The Latines haue no worde to expresse this kynde of ioye, wherewith both the enuious man, and he that hath Nemesis is affected, in beholding an others mans prosperity.
1Lastly we must entreat of Emulation, which is a grief of the mind, which we conceive for good things which happen unto other, which we want, which we think should beautify us, & would gladly attain unto them. By this motion of the mind we desire not, that other men should be deprived of their ornaments, but that grieveth us, because we our selves are destitute of them. And it is a point of a good nature, in this manner to be affected: therefore Emulation is numbered among laudable Affections.2 Cicero in his Tusculan questions, defineth it to be a grief, which proceedeth of that, that an other enjoyeth that good thing which we desire. The same writer observeth also, that Emulation is sometimes so taken, that it nothing differeth from Enuidence: wherefore it is sometimes reproved. But if the definition thereof be received, as it is now alleged, it is an affection laudable, because it maketh men better: for it useth to bring forth the imitation of good things.3 But we must take heed, which undoubtedly is easily done, that it degenerate not into Envy, and Emulation proceed not so far, that we should wish that men fortunate and noble, and also wise men, might be spoiled of their ornaments & good things. Wherefore Cicero said, that that Emulation is laudable, which is not like unto rivality. For this is the nature of those that be Rivals, so to enjoy their delights, that they utterly exclude all other. But adding these cautions, Emulation is both good and holy. Wherefore Paul exhorted the Corinthians to emulate Charity, and the chiefest gifts. This affection is chiefly occupied about virtues, and all things which are had in honour and admiration. For that which a man contemneth and despiseth, he useth not to emulate. Emulation hath Hope continually joined with it, of obtaining that which it desireth. For if a man should despair, it is not possible that he should emulate. And thus much of these affections.
1Lastly we must entreate of Emulation, which is a grief of the minde, whiche we conceaue for good things whiche happen vnto other, whiche we want, which we thinke should beautify vs, & would gladly attayne vnto them. By this motiō of the minde we desire not, that other mē should be depriued of their ornamēts, but that grieueth vs, bycause we our selues are destitute of thē. And it is a point of a good nature, in this maner to be affected: therfore Emulation is numbred among laudable Affections.
Wherefore we gather that the Ephraites were moved with envy against Gideon, because they would have him deprived of the glory which he had gotten. Neither contended they so, because they studied to do the like, although peradventure they made that their pretence. But Gideon maketh not mention unto them of his vocation, labour, industry, love of his country, his good act, & such other things, which might have served to the amplifying of his desert toward the people, and of his dignity. For by that means he should the more have moved them to envy: but after a sort he gave place unto them, & interpreteth their affection, as though it were an honest emulation. And teacheth them, that they have now the fruit of this affection, because they had not only imitated him, but they had done more then he had accomplished. But now let us return unto the History.
Wherfore we gather that the Ephraites were moued with enuy against Gideon, bycause they would haue him depriued of the glory whiche he had gotten. Neither contended they so, bycause they studyed to do the like, although peraduē ture they made that their pretence. But Gideon maketh not mentiō vnto them of his vocation, labour, industry, loue of his countrey, his good acte, & such other thinges, which might haue serued to the amplifieng of hys deserte towarde the people, and of his dignity. For by that meanes he should the more haue moued them to enuy: but after a sort he gaue place vnto them, & interpreteth their affection, as though it were an honest emulatiō. And teacheth them, yt they haue now ye fruit of this affectiō, bycause they had not only imitated him, but they had done more then he had accomplished. But now let vs returne vnto the History.
Enuy is euermore counted euill, and it is by the holy scriptures grieuously reproued. For it is most manifestly against Charity. For the Apostle said vnto the Corinth. the 1. chap. Charity enuieth not.1 For Paul taketh not properly there ye worde 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 whiche is turned enuy. But to the Galathians he more playnly forbiddeth enuy, writing: Be not ye made desirous of vayne glory, prouoking one an other, and enuieng one an other: Where not only Enuy is reproued,2 but the mother of it is also shewed, namely desire of glory. As also we may in this history perceaue. For the Ephraites enuied Gideon, bycause the glory of so great a victory semed to redound vnto him. And this affectiō is of force in all those things, wherin we desire to excel. Neither absteyneth it also from vertues: for ye enuious persons would not that his matches and like should excell him in any ornament of vertues. But the cause why enuy is conuersant among like, is this, bycause although the prosperous fortune of like or matches, doth take away none of our goods, neither maketh vs lesser then we are, yet the Enuious person so thinketh of the good things of other men, as though by them his honor & dignity, gayne,3 and other ornamentes were darkened. And this is not to be left vnspoken of, yt euery enuious person is one that reioyseth in an other mans hurte: for he reioyseth in the aduersity of his equall.4 Yet are not these to be counted for one and the selfe same vice, seyng they pertayne vnto contrary mocions of the mynde. For Enuidence is a grief or sorow, when he that reioyseth in an other mans hurte is affected with ioy. Yet are these vices, although they be diuerse, otherwise so ioyned together, that there is no enuious man whiche is not moued with the reioysing ⟨image 150⟩in the hurt of an other. And hereby it manifestly appeareth that Enuidēce plainly is contrary vnto Mercy. For it lamenteth an other mās misery, but the enuious man reioyseth therin, bicause of the disease of reioysing in the hurt of an other wherewith he is sicke.5 They that are affected with Nemesis want not also this motion of the mynde. For he which is sory for ye prosperous successe of wicked men, the same man is also affected with pleasure, when he seeth them oppressed and vexed.