Secondly, we consider sin according 1to the property and natural being thereof, that is, sin as it is sin; And this way also we weigh sin either so far forth as it is sin in it self in regard of men, or as it is sin to God. But God himself neither willeth, nor approveth, nor effecteth sin, as it is sin in it self in regard of the creatures that offend; and yet he willeth as touching the event, not simply, as those things that are good in themselves, but only by willing to permit that it may be. For there is a threefold action of Gods will, the first is that whereby God willeth any thing by willing it, that is, when he willeth it with his whole and absolute will, as Tertullian saith, and this way he willeth that which is good in it ⟨p. 53⟩self. The second action is that, whereby he nilleth any thing by nilling it, as that which shall never come to pass, because God doth utterly nill the being thereof. The third and last action is remiss and in the middest between both, whereby he willeth some thing by nilling it slackly or remissly, that is, when he partly willeth it and partly nilleth it, or else so far forth wills it, as that for just causes he nills it. And after this sort we say, that God willeth the event of evil, as it is evil in it self in respect of men; because evil as it is evil after this sort, is not absolutely evil: and God draweth good out of evil as it is evil in the nature thereof or in it self: as he brought forth light out of darkness, even as it was darkness in it self. And if so be that evil were absolutely evil, as God is absolutely good, he would in no wise will the event of evil, neither should there be any evil existent at all. For that which God utterly nilleth, hath not any being or existence. But sin as it is sin to God, (now that is a sin to God which is in it self sin, in his decree whereby all things are ordained as it considereth ⟨p. 54⟩sin) he neither willeth it, nor approveth it, nor worketh it, no in this respect he doth not so much as permit it. I do not deny but that God permitteth and suffereth evil, as it is evil in it self, (otherwise there were not evil properly and naturally) but I deny that he permitteth it, because it is evil. For God never suffereth evil for it self, but for the good that is therewith conjoined. And this is the meaning of that saying of Beza:
Secondly, we consider sinne according 1to the propertie and naturall being thereof, that is, sinne as it is sinne; And this way also we weigh sinne either so far forth as it is sinne in it selfe in regard of men, or as it is sinne to God. But God himselfe neither willeth, nor approueth, nor effecteth sinne, as it is sinne in it selfe in regard of the creatures that offend; and yet hee willeth as touching the euent, not simplie, as those things that are good in themselues, but only by willing to permit that it may be. For there is a threefold action of Gods wil, the first is that whereby God willeth any thing by willing it, that is, when he willeth it with his whole and absolute will, as Tertullian saith, and this way he willeth that which is good in it ⟨p. 53⟩selfe. The second action is that, whereby he nilleth any thing by nilling it, as that which shall neuer come to passe, because God doth vtterly nill the being thereof. The third and last action is remisse and in the middest betweene both, whereby hee willeth some thing by nilling it slackely or remissely, that is, when hee partly willeth it and partly nilleth it, or else so far forth wills it, as that for iust causes he nills it. And after this sorte wee say, that God willeth the euent of euill, as it is euill in it selfe in respect of men; because euill as it is euill after this sorte, is not absolutely euill: and God draweth good out of euill as it is euill in the nature thereof or in it selfe: as hee brought forth light out of darkenesse, euen as it was darkenesse in it selfe. And if so be that euill were absolurely euill, as God is absolutely good, he would in no wise will the euent of euill, neither should there be any euill existent at all. For that which God vtterly nilleth, hath not any being or existence. But sin as it is sin to God, (now that is a sinne to God which is in it selfe sinne, in his decree whereby all things are ordained as it considereth ⟨p. 54⟩sinne) hee neither willeth it, nor approueth it, nor worketh it, no in this respect he doth not so much as permit it. I doe not denie but that God permitteth and suffreth euill, as it is euill in it selfe, (otherwise there were not euill properly and naturally) but I denie that he permitteth it, because it is euill. For God neuer suffreth euill for it selfe, but for the good that is therewith conioyned. And this is the meaning of that saying of Beza:
- 1God did n•t decree the fall of Adam, nor any sin as it is […] unto God.God did n•t decree the fall of Adam, nor any sin as it is 〈…〉 vnto God.