A14350:1179
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But Plato in his treatise of Cratylus, writing of desire, compared the same to a very strong bond. Wherefore we also doubt not, but that these two affections are vehement, and of great force; but yet that they are not so strong, as they cannot be bridled by reason. Which we see come to pass in temperate men, and those which be endued with meekness, and other virtues. But yet would I not deny, that those actions are more voluntary, which be done without the enforcement of such affects: which nevertheless is no cause, that these should be excluded from the number of them.
But Plato in his treatise of Cratylus, writing of desire, compared the same to a verie strong bond. Wherefore we also doubt not, but that these two affections are vehement, and of great force; but yet that they are not so strong, as they cannot be bridled by reason. Which we sée come to passe in temperate men, and those which be indued with méekenesse, and other vertues. But yet would I not denie, that those actions are more voluntarie, which be doon without the inforcement of such affects: which neuerthelesse is no cause, that these should be excluded from the number of them.
56 Aristotle saith, that none of the rest of the living creatures do any thing against their wills, no not children. The proposition is to be confirmed; Those things that are done by enforcement or by desire, be voluntary. That was declared before by the definition. Now are other reasons added hereunto, whereof the first is this; If they were actions against the will, neither brute beasts nor children should do any thing of their own accord; But those do many things of their own accord; Therefore those things are done against the will. The argument is conditional of the consequent, taken to overthrow the antecedent. The conclusion is proved; Because brute beasts and children, since they be without reason, whatsoever they do, 1they do it through those affects. But how absurd the consequent is, hereby it appeareth; insomuch as we see, that these living creatures and children do certain things against their wills. As when they be overcome and shut up in any place: but on the other side, when they be loosed and set at liberty, they do many things willingly and of their own accord. They choose themselves