Of that which is Voluntary.Of that which is Voluntarie.
pp. 289–29316 passages
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Of that which is Voluntary.
Of that which is Voluntarie.
155 As touching Voluntary, the definition standeth of two parts. First (saith Aristotle) the beginning thereof must be inward. Secondly, the circumstances must be known: for if voluntary be contrary to that, which is against the will; and that which is against the will, consist of two parts: then is it necessary, that the contraries to them must be placed in the definition of voluntary. Hereupon we see the excellent method of Aristotle: for except he had before hand showed the nature of violence and ignorance, he could not so easily have defined what voluntary was. Moreover, Aristotle was the rather moved to write of these things, because that those things, which are done of angry men, or men that are moved with desire, are comprehended in the definition of voluntary. For both the original of the doing is in the man himself, which is the doer, and they do understand and very well know the particulars: for they use deliberations, and sharp judgement, either to revenge or to compass that which they desire: which would not be done if they were ignorant of the circumstances. Whereupon it is concluded, that those things are voluntary; and that those do err, which have thought such things to be done against the will. And what moved them to think, that those things are against the will, it may easily be perceived. They saw that it was altogether difficult, 2to resist those two affections; namely, anger and desire, as those which are more violent than the residue; and therefore they thought that men are constrained by them. Wherefore Heraclitus said, [Greek or Hebrew], that is, It is hard wrestling against anger. And Plato in his second book De republica, saith; [Greek or Hebrew], that is; Anger is neither to be striven with, nor to be subdued. But if there can be no striving against the same, nor that it can be conquered, it seemeth to compel, and to make that the actions be done against the will. For which cause the same Plato in his ninth book De legibus saith, that An angry man, [Greek or Hebrew], that is to say, Is like to one that doth against his will. He saith not that he doth altogether against his will, but like unto him. And Cato the Censor said, that he which is angry, differeth from a mad man only in time. Yea and other men, as Evenus, have been bold to say, that Wrath is much worse than madness.