A14350:1180
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
56 Aristotle saith, that none of the rest of the living creatures do any thing against their wills, no not children. The proposition is to be confirmed; Those things that are done by enforcement or by desire, be voluntary. That was declared before by the definition. Now are other reasons added hereunto, whereof the first is this; If they were actions against the will, neither brute beasts nor children should do any thing of their own accord; But those do many things of their own accord; Therefore those things are done against the will. The argument is conditional of the consequent, taken to overthrow the antecedent. The conclusion is proved; Because brute beasts and children, since they be without reason, whatsoever they do, 1they do it through those affects. But how absurd the consequent is, hereby it appeareth; insomuch as we see, that these living creatures and children do certain things against their wills. As when they be overcome and shut up in any place: but on the other side, when they be loosed and set at liberty, they do many things willingly and of their own accord. They choose themselves ⟨p. 290⟩meat, when they will they enter into chambers & dens, & from thence, when it seemeth good, they go forth. They defend their young ones, they fly to their nests; and infinite such other things they do willingly and of their own accord. They rejoice in liberty, and on the other side, when they be constrained to any thing, it grieveth them, and they are not a little disquieted. Alexander's horse Bucephalus admitted no man to sit upon him but Alexander, which without doubt he did not by constraint. The elephants do love their masters, they obey them, yea they kneel down when they be commanded. But what should we speak of elephants? Dogs in a house do fawn upon their masters, but do bark at strangers; they hunt cheerfully, they follow those which feed them: & all these things certainly they do of their own accord. Many things belonging to this matter might be rehearsed of birds, fishes, and other brute creatures, which are so wonderful things, and are done of them with so great an inclination; that sometimes many have thought, that in brute beasts there is a will, whereby they choose those things which like them most, refusing other things, which do displease them.
56 Aristotle saith, that none of the rest of the liuing creatures doo anie thing against their wils, no not children. The proposition is to be confirmed; Those things that are doone by inforcement or by desire, be voluntarie. That was declared before by the definition. Now are other reasons added herevnto, whereof the first is this; If they were actions against the will, neither brute beasts nor children should doo anie thing of their owne accord; But those doo manie things of their owne accord; Therefore those things are doon against the will. The argument is conditionall of the consequent, taken to ouerthrowe the antecedent. The conclusion is prooued; Bicause brute beasts and children, since they be without reason, whatsoeuer they doo,