A14350:2196
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
140 There be some so importunate men, as although God have heaped his benefits upon them, yet are they always complaining; We have borne the burden and heat of the day, 2and yet doest thou make us equal unto them? Some also be so modest, as even in prosperity they humble themselves. Others be broken with misery, and are become more humble. But they, which in their losses and afflictions retain still the fierceness of nature, be too insolent and obstinate. Humility is like a bridle, 3wherewith the insolencie of our nature must be held in his duty. And men be most of all reclaimed unto modesty, when they begin to consider how very little they have of themselves. Howbeit, the same humbling of our selves ought to be joined with the acknowledging of Gods benefits. For many, while they be either ignorant thereof, or else dissemble it, become like unto beasts; as they, which cannot one whit understand, with what benefits they be endued by God. But there must be a special regard had, that we do not counterfeit that modesty; and that the same consist not only in words, but in the mind also.
140 There be some so importunate men, as although God haue heaped his benefits vpon them, yet are they alwaies complaining; We haue borne the burthen and heate of the daie, 2and yet dooest thou make vs equall vnto them? Some also be so modest, as euen in prosperitie they humble themselues. Others be broken with miserie, and are become more humble. But they, which in their losses and afflictions reteine still the fearsenes of nature, be too insolent and obstinate. Humilitie is like a bridle, 3wherewith the insolencie of our nature must be held in his dutie. And men be most of all reclaimed vnto modestie, when they begin to consider how verie little they haue of themselues. Howbeit, the same humbling of our selues ought to be ioined with the acknowledging of Gods benefits. For manie, while they be either ignorant thereof, or else dissemble it, become like vnto beasts; as they, which cannot one whit vnderstand, with what benefits they be indued by God. But there must be a speciall regard had, that we doo not counterfet that modestie; and that the same consist not onelie in words, but in the mind also.
Yet to retain that virtue, 1it is not lawful for thee to make a lie upon thy self for modesty sake. For Aristotle himself, in his Ethics, reckoneth a lie among unhonest things. And (as Paul saith; We must not do evil, that good may come of it. Augustine, in his 8. epistle to Jerome, touching this matter, citeth the words of Paul to the Corinthians;2) If Christ be not risen, in vain is our preaching, and your faith also is in vain. For we be found false witnesses of God, when we say, that God raised up Christ from the dead; whom he raised not up, if the dead do not rise again. But here (saith Augustine) a man might say unto Paul; Why doest thou so much detest lying, since the same tendeth to the setting forth of the glory of God? And he maketh Paul to answer, that he doth detest such lies, and that it is no less evil, to commend things that be not true concerning God, than not to believe things that be true of him. Hereby we gather this argument; If it be not lawful to lie for the honour of God, it is much less lawful to lie for the retaining of any virtue. Yea, and it is no less evil to ascribe to thy self evil, which thou hast not committed, than to arrogate unto thy self any good, which thou hast not done.
Yet to reteine that vertue, 1it is not lawfull for thée to make a lie vpon thy selfe for modestie sake. For Aristotle himselfe, in his Ethiks, reckoneth a lie among vnhonest things. And (as Paule saith; Wee must not doo euill, that good may come of it. Augustine, in his 8. epistle to Ierom, touching this matter, citeth the words of Paule to the Corinthians;2) If Christ be not risen, in vaine is our preaching, and your faith also is in vaine. For we be found false witnesses of God, when we saie, that God raised vp Christ from the dead; whom he raised not vp, if the dead doo not rise againe. But here (saith Augustine) a man might saie vnto Paule; Why dooest thou so much detest lieng, since the same tendeth to the setting foorth of the glorie of God? And he maketh Paule to answer, that he dooth detest such lies, and that it is no lesse euill, to commend things that be not true concerning God, than not to beléeue things that be true of him. Hereby we gather this argument; If it be not lawfull to lie for the honour of God, it is much lesse lawfull to lie for the reteining of anie vertue. Yea, and it is no lesse euill to ascribe to thy selfe euill, which thou hast not committed, than to arrogate vnto thy selfe anie good, which thou hast not doone.
41 Contrariwise nevertheless, 1Paul unto Timothy seemeth somewhat to make a lie of himself; Christ (saith he) came to save sinners, 2of whom I am the chief. For Paul was not the chief, or the greatest sinner. And in the 30. chapter of the Proverbs, the prophet Agur, whether he were Solomon himself, or some other man; 3I am (saith he) more foolish than all men, and the wisdom of man is not in me; I have learned no knowledge, neither have I the understanding of holy things. Yet was he both a prophet, and a wise man, and answered prudently unto questions. And Christ himself, of himself; I am (saith he) a worm and no man, 4a very scorn of men, and the outcast of the people. Some defend these speeches on this wise, saying; that They, which have thus amplified their sins, ⟨p. 548⟩they only respected their own strength, which they themselves had by themselves, and a certain natural inclination of their own unto evil. For they themselves saw, that they should grievously have fallen, unless God had stayed them. These in very deed be no small provocations, to make us judge humbly and lowly of our own selves. But it is one thing for a man to say that he is prone and ready bent unto evil; and an other thing to confess that he hath done some evil, which he hath not done. For there is as much difference between these, as there is between act and power. Certainly, we may every one of us slip, yet no man ought to say that he hath slipped, when he hath not. We ought all to confess our selves to be sinners, but none ought to ascribe unto himself any sin by name, which he hath not committed.
41 Contrariwise neuerthelesse, 1Paule vnto Timothie séemeth somwhat to make a lie of himselfe; Christ (saith he) came to saue sinners, 2of whom I am the cheefe. For Paule was not the chéefe, or the greatest sinner. And in the 30. chapter of the Prouerbs, the prophet Agur, whether he were Salomon himselfe, or some other man;
I say therefore, that those speeches, which I have made mention of, if they be throughly weighed, they be true. For some be uttered after that sort, because absolutely they be so; some, for that they be extolled by an excessive speech; some, because they be compared with an other thing by contention. 1Paul calleth himself the principal sinner, either because he was the first that came unto Christ, among those that persecuted the church of GOD; or because he judged himself in very deed to be chief and greatest of the sinners. Not as if there had been no man that had sinned more heinously (for there were such as had sinned against the holy Ghost, there were those which had sinned without any repentance:) but because that among all them, which were redeemed by Christ, and had obtained the mercy of God, he thought himself to have sinned most grievously. For some had sinned of infirmity, some of plain error and incredulity; some had proceeded so far, as they crucified Christ, who nevertheless were afterward, by the preaching of the word of God, called home unto repentance. 2Therefore saith Peter in the Acts; I know brethren that ye did it by ignorance, even as did your rulers. But Paul had no recourse unto the sermons of the apostles: there was need of greater bonds for the drawing of him unto Christ. Whereupon Christ spake thus unto him from heaven; 3Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? With these men therefore he compareth himself: and of these he saith he is the principal.
I saie therefore, that those spéeches, which I haue made mention of, if they be throughlie weighed, they be true. For some be vttered after that sort, bicause absolutelie they be so; some, for that they be extolled by an excessiue spéech; some, bicause they be compared with an other thing by contention. 1Paule calleth himselfe the principall sinner, either bicause he was the first that came vnto Christ, among those that persecuted the church of GOD; or bicause he iudged himselfe in verie déed to be chéefe and greatest of the sinners. Not as if there had béene no man that had sinned more heinouslie (for there were such as had sinned against the holie Ghost, there were those which had sinned without anie repentance:) but bicause that among all them, which were redéemed by Christ, and had obteined the mercie of God, he thought himselfe to haue sinned most gréeuouslie. For some had sinned of infirmitie, some of plaine error and incredulitie; some had procéeded so farre, as they crucified Christ, who neuerthelesse were afterward, by the preaching of the word of God, called home vnto repentance.
And so Chrysostom, upon this place, saith; that These words be against other words of his in the epistle to the Philippians. 1For there he saith, that he was conversant in the Jewish religion, without crime, and without complaint. But these things (saith he) are nothing repugnant. For even they themselves, which had performed the righteousness of the law, yet were they sinners nevertheless. And although Paul spake those things modestly of himself, yet did he not ascribe an untruth unto himself. For, notwithstanding he granteth himself to have been a persecutor, and a blasphemer; yet he saith not, that he was an adulterer, or a fornicator, or a thief; seeing these things should not have been true. The things objected out of the Proverbs, touching Agur the prophet, 2were true by way of comparing them unto those things, whereof a demand was made. He saith that he had no wisdom; not in respect that the wisdom which he had, was no wisdom; but because the same, being compared unto so great matters, might seem to be none. So Socrates was wont to say; This only I know, that I know nothing: because that knowledge, which he had, would be nothing, in comparison of the multitude of those things that he knew not. 3So Christ called himself a worm, and a reproach of the people; because men so accounted of him, by reason of his afflictions and cross. Also in speaking, there happeneth sometime an excessive or hyperbolical speech; such indeed as is not joined with a a lie, but which may serve for the better setting forth of the matter.
And so Chrysostome, vpon this place, saith; that These words be against other words of his in the epistle to the Philippians. 1For there he saith, that he was conuersant in the Iewish religion, without crime, and without complaint. But these things (saith he) are nothing repugnant. For euen they themselues, which had performed the righteousnesse of the lawe, yet were they sinners neuerthelesse. And although Paule spake those things modestlie of himselfe, yet did he not ascribe an vntruth vnto himselfe. For, notwithstanding he granteth himselfe to haue béene a persecuter, and a blasphemer; yet he saith not, that he was an adulterer, or a fornicatour, or a théefe; séeing these things should not haue béene true. The things obiected out of the Prouerbs, touching Agur the prophet,
42 In the beginning of the ninth chapter of the second book of Samuel, David demandeth; 1Is there any man left alive of the family of Saul, to whom I may do good for Jonathans sake? When he speaketh of Jonathan, he excludeth not God; nay rather, that which he did for Jonathans sake, he did chiefly for God and godliness sake. So God saith, that he would do well to the people of the Jews, for the covenant which he had made with Abraham; yet doth he not exclude his own goodness. Nay rather, he chiefly includeth the same therein; seeing that covenant proceeded of the mere goodness and mercy of God. But thou wilt demand, why David saith that he will do good unto any of the house of Saul, for Jonathans sake; and not for Sauls own sake. For in the 24. chapter of the first book of Samuel, what time as he had cut off the skirt of Sauls cloak, 2he being enforced by Saul to swear, promised, that he would not root out his seed. Whereby he was bound, not only unto Jonathan, but also unto Saul. Some answer, that David was now discharged of his oath; because Saul kept not promise with him, but had done him exceeding great wrong. For he that breaketh his faith (say they) let faith be broken with him. And Cicero, in his third book of Offices, ⟨p. 549⟩citeth a verse out of Accius an old Poet; Hast thou broken thy faith? Atreus, whom he bringeth in to speak, answereth; Neither have I given neither do I give my faith to any faithless person.
42 In the beginning of the ninth chapter of the second booke of Samuel, Dauid demandeth; 1Is there anie man left aliue of the familie of Saule, to whom I may doo good for Ionathans sake? When he speaketh of Ionathan, he excludeth not God; naie rather, that which he did for Ionathans sake, he did chéefelie for God and godlinesse sake. So God saith, that he would doo well to the people of the Iews, for the couenant which he had made with Abraham; yet dooth he not exclude his owne goodnesse. Naie rather, he chéefelie includeth the same therein; séeing that couenant procéeded of the méere goodnesse and mercie of God. But thou wilt demand, whie Dauid saith that he will doo good vnto anie of the house of Saule, for Ionathans sake; and not for Saules owne sake. For in the 24. chapter of the first booke of Samuel, what time as he had cut off the skirt of Saules cloke,
But this is no sure rule at all times. For if one be wicked, and false of promise: yet oughtest not thou for that cause to shrink from thy promises; seeing God doth oftentimes keep promise even with us that do evil. He promised, that he would continue the kingdom, or else some great honour in the family of David, even unto Messiah. He promised that he would give a son which should redeem mankind. Men undoubtedly were evil, unfaithful, and unworthy to have the promises kept with them: yet did he perform these things to them, according to his excellent faithfulness. Some answer on this wise, that faith in deed must be kept with an evil and unfaithful man, if he be unfaithful towards other, so he be no such towards us; or else, if he do hurt us, so it be not in the self same thing, wherein it was agreed upon between us. Nay rather, if he fail even in the very same thing which is agreed upon, yet must we keep promise: if by that means, neither his naughtiness be increased; nor a greater power to do hurt be given unto him. We be therefore loosed of our promise, if the thing cannot be, which we have promised; or else, if it should fall out ill unto himself, to whom the promise is made: as if thou deliver a sword unto a furious man, which thou didst promise unto a man of sobriety; or if he wax worse and worse, as though, through thy patience, he meaneth to reap a benefit of his unfaithfulness: or else, if thou shalt promise such a thing, as is against the word of God, or the profit of the Church or Common-weal. Therefore it is written in the 22. cause, question second; In evil promises break thy faith.
But this is no sure rule at all times. For if one be wicked, and false of promise: yet oughtest not thou for that cause to shrinke from thy promises; séeing God dooth oftentimes kéepe promise euen with vs that doo euill. He promised, that he would continue the kingdome, or else some great honour in the familie of Dauid, euen vnto Messias. He promised that he would giue a sonne which should redéeme mankind. Men vndoubtedlie were euill, vnfaithfull, and vnworthie to haue the promises kept with them: yet did he performe these things to them, according to his excellent faithfulnes. Some answer on this wise, that faith in déed must be kept with an euill and vnfaithfull man, if he be vnfaithfull towards other, so he be no such towards vs; or else, if he doo hurt vs, so it be not in the selfe same thing, wherein it was agréed vpon betwéene vs. Naie rather, if he faile euen in the verie same thing which is agréed vpon, yet must we kéepe promise: if by that meanes, neither his naughtinesse be increased; nor a greater power to doo hurt be giuen vnto him. We be therefore loosed of our promise, if the thing cannot be, which we haue promised; or else, if it should fall out ill vnto himselfe, to whom the promise is made: as if thou deliuer a sword vnto a furious man, which thou didst promise vnto a man of sobrietie; or if he wax woorse and woorse, as though, through thy patience, he meaneth to reape a benefit of his vnfaithfulnesse: or else, if thou shalt promise such a thing, as is against the word of God, or the profit of the Church or Common-weale. Therfore it is written in the 22. cause, question second; In euill promises breake thy faith.
But most of all, we be at liberty of our promise, if we being circumvented by any fraud, have promised any thing that we ought not to have done; or else, if the things themselves be now changed. Some have added; If thou being compelled either by force or fear, doest promise any thing that thou wouldest not. But it can scarcely be perceived, how so great a fear and compulsion can happen unto a courageous and good man, that he should promise that, which might be against either his duty, or the word of God. Howbeit, if a man be fallen in such wise, he is at liberty. But above all, we must take heed, that we do not craftily colour our promises, and seek by fraud and counterfeit means to unwind our selves out: seeing fraud (as Cicero very rightly said) doth not undo perjury, but it tieth it fast. David, when as perhaps he might have invented many things to break his promises; yet would he do no such thing. For being a godly prince, he was rather minded to follow truth and faithfulness.
But most of all, we be at libertie of our promise, if we being circumuented by anie fraud, haue promised anie thing that we ought not to haue doone; or else, if the things themselues be now changed. Some haue added; If thou being compelled either by force or feare, dooest promise anie thing that thou wouldest not. But it can scarselie be perceiued, how so great a feare and compulsion can happen vnto a couragious and good man, that he should promise that, which might be against either his dutie, or the word of God. Howbeit, if a man be fallen in such wise, he is at libertie. But aboue all, we must take héed, that we doo not craftilie colour our promises, and séeke by fraud and counterfet meanes to vnwind our selues out: séeing fraud (as Cicero verie rightlie said) dooth not vndoo periurie, but it tieth it fast. Dauid, when as perhaps he might haue inuented manie things to breake his promises; yet would he doo no such thing. For being a godlie prince, he was rather minded to followe truth and faithfulnesse.
43 Certainly, the nature and consideration of these two virtues; [namely, truth and faith] is both alike, yet is it not altogether the self-same: wherein they do agree, and how they differ, I will in few words declare. 1Truth is a virtue, whereby we are ready to speak those things, which the meanings and cogitations of our mind do express: for hereby, because we speak those things which we think, are we called faithful and true of our word. And faith is a virtue, whereby is brought to pass, that our deeds be answerable to our promises. There is some conformity on both parts. In truth there is a conformity of words with the meaning of the mind, and in faith a conformity of deeds with promises. So as lying is contrary unto truth, and falsehood unto faith. For Cicero thinketh; that Faith is so called, because that is done which is spoken. And he defined the same after a sort on this manner; 2Faith is a constancy of words and of covenants. In another place he saith, that Faith is the truth of a mans word.
43 Certeinlie, the nature and consideration of these two vertues; [namelie, truth and faith] is both alike, yet is it not altogither the selfe-same: wherein they doo agree, and how they differ, I will in few words declare. 1Truth is a vertue, whereby we are readie to speake those things, which the meanings and cogitations of our mind doo expresse: for hereby, bicause we speake those things which we thinke, are we called faithfull and true of our word. And faith is a vertue, whereby is brought to passe, that our déeds be answerable to our promises. There is some conformitie on both parts. In truth there is a conformitie of words with the meaning of the mind, and in faith a conformitie of déeds with promises. So as lieng is contrarie vnto truth, and falsehood vnto faith. For Cicero thinketh; that Faith is so called, bicause that is doone which is spoken. And he defined the same after a sort on this maner; 2Faith is a constancie of words and of couenants. In another place he saith, that Faith is the truth of a mans word.
But thus the definition will be more full; Faith is a good habit, according to right reason, whereby we are ready to do those things that we have promised. This definition (as I have said) is more perfect, and it consisteth of a general word, and of a difference. For faith appertaineth unto justice, and it causeth us to yield unto every man, that which pertaineth to him; seeing what thou shalt promise to any man, that is now become his, to whom thou hast promised. And the same unless thou perform in time, thou withholdest that, which is another mans. And so great is the force of faith, as it comprehendeth in one all the parts of mans life: because neither matrimony, neither the bargains which citizens have among themselves, neither any part of the Common-weal can consist without faith. It differeth (as I said) from truth, although with the same it hath many things that be like. The matter of truth is infinite: for all things that we speak, are either true or false; whether they be past, whether they be present, or whether they be to come. But faith hath to do only in promises: nevertheless, those promises must be of the thing that is good; and not of that, which is evil, or a hinderance to good: otherwise they ought not to be firm.
But thus the definition will be more full; Faith is a good habit, according to right reason, whereby we are readie to doo those things that we haue promised. This definition (as I haue said) is more perfect, and it consisteth of a generall word, and of a difference. For faith apperteineth vnto iustice, and it causeth vs to yéeld vnto euerie man, that which perteineth to him; séeing what thou shalt promise to anie man, that is now become his, to whom thou hast promised. And the same vnlesse thou performe in time, thou withholdest that, which is another mans. And so great is the force of faith, as it comprehendeth in one all the parts of mans life: bicause neither matrimonie, neither the bargains which citizens haue among themselues, neither anie part of the Common-weale can consist without faith. It differeth (as I said) from truth, although with the same it hath manie things that be like. The matter of truth is infinite: for all things that we speake, are either true or false; whether they be past, whether they be present, or whether they be to come. But faith hath to doo onelie in promises: neuerthelesse, those promises must be of the thing that is good; and not of that, which is euill, or a hinderance to good: otherwise they ought not to be firme.
Wherefore, faith should have the very same companions joined therewith, that an oath hath; namely, truth, righteousness, and judgement. So as he, that breaketh his promise, doth not only sin in so doing; but he must also make amends for the hinderance, which through his ⟨p. 550⟩unfaithfulness the other party receiveth, to whom the promise is made. David, being singularly adorned with these virtues, would not depart from the promises. For he made the promise of his own accord, being not forced thereto by any fear or violence: and that, which he promised, was neither repugnant to the word of God, nor yet hurtful to the Common-weal. For is was a matter of good example, that so notable a king did fulfil his promise: neither was there any danger, least they, to whom he had promised, should become the worse by his promise: for they were already dead. Wherefore, there was no cause, why he should shrink from it. And because he would perform his promise unto Saul, therefore he demanded, whether any of his family were remaining, whom he might do good unto. But he speaketh of Jonathan by name, because he was bound unto him; not only by the bond of promise, but also of friendship, and most near acquaintance. Undoubtedly, he that faileth of his faith, is unworthy to have faith kept with him. Howbeit, we must have a special regard unto these circumstances; least for the naughtiness of another, we also should become naught our selves, and seek corners for perjury.
Wherefore, faith should haue the verie same companions ioined therewith, that an oth hath; namelie, truth, righteousnesse, and iudgement. So as he, that breaketh his prom•se, dooth not onelie sinne in so dooing; but he must also make amends for the hinderance, which through his ⟨p. 550⟩vnfaithfulnesse the other partie receiueth, to whom the promise is made. Dauid, being singularlie adorned with these vertues, would not depart from the promises. For he made the promise of his owne accord, being not forced thereto by anie feare or violence: and that, which he promised, was neither repugnant to the word of God, nor yet hurtfull to the Common-weale. For is was a matter of good example, that so notable a king did fulfill his promise: neither was there anie danger, least they, to whom he had promised, should become the woorse by his promise: for they were alreadie dead. Wherefore, there was no cause, why he should shrinke from it. And bicause he would performe his promise vnto Saule, therefore he demanded, whether anie of his familie were remaining, whom he might doo good vnto. But he speaketh of Ionathan by name, bicause he was bound vnto him; not onelie by the bond of promise, but also of fréendship, and most néere acquaintance. Vndoubtedlie, he that faileth of his faith, is vnwoorthie to haue faith kept with him. Howbeit, we must haue a speciall regard vnto these circumstances; least for the naughtinesse of another, we also should become naught our selues, and séeke corners for periurie.
144 They say that an apology is a kind of fable: 2and a fable they define to be a narration of a false thing, devised for commodity or delight sake. Or (as Augustine, in his second book, & 11. chapter De soliloquijs saith;) A fable is a lie, made for delectation sake, although properly it cannot be called a lie. For the falsehood of it is straightway found out, and especially in apologies. For in them are brought in insensible and unreasonable creatures talking one with another, and entreating of very weighty matters. And so soon as the hearer perceiveth this, he straightway understandeth, that the matter is feigned, 3and not so done [as it is uttered.] And doubtless some fables are likely to be true, and some are far from probability. For it is very likely, that once there fell a contention between Ajax and Ulysses for the armour of Achilles, which at the length was judged unto Ulysses: and that Ajax took so great displeasure thereat, as becoming mad, he slue himself. But contrariwise, it is without all probability, that a woman was turned into a plant, or into a stone: 4so as an apology may be likened to a fable that is not likely to be true.
144 They saie that an apollogie is a kind of fable: 2and a fable they define to be a narration of a false thing, deuised for commoditie or delite sake. Or (as Augustine, in his second booke, & 11. chapter De soliloquijs saith;) A fable is a lie, made for delectation sake, although properlie it cannot be called a lie. For the falsehood of it is straitwaie found out, and especiallie in apollogies. For in them are brought in insensible and vnreasonable creatures talking one with another, and intreating of verie weightie matters. And so soone as the hearer perceiueth this, he straitwaie vnderstandeth, that the matter is feigned, 3and not so doone [as it is vttered.] And doubtlesse some fables are likelie to be true, and some are far from probabilitie. For it is verie likelie, that once there fell a contention betwéene Aiax and Vlysses for the armor of Achilles, which at the length was iudged vnto Vlysses: and that Aiax tooke so great displeasure thereat, as becomming mad, he slue himselfe. But contrariewise, it is without all probabilitie, that a woman was turned into a plant, or into a stone:
45 The kinds or sorts of a fable, are comedies, tragedies, satyrs, and narrations of harping and h•dicall poets, and also apologies. But which of these feignings be lawful, and which be not lawful, may thus be defined. Those, which have unmannerliness and scurrility; that is, a mirth joined with dishonesty, ought not to be admitted. But those, which are written honestly, and with shamefastness, so that they can refresh the mind with some pleasure, and are also profitable to teach good manners, are not to be despised. That such, as be uncivil, must be put away, it is confirmed by two testimonies of the apostle. To the Corinthians he writeth; Evil talk corrupteth good manners. 1And unto the Ephesians, the fifth chapter, it is written; Let not whoredom, nor any uncleanness, 2nor covetousness be named among you, as it becometh saints. Then is added [Greek or Hebrew], filthiness; [Greek or Hebrew], foolish talking; and [Greek or Hebrew], jesting; which are not comely. By these words he reproveth all communications, which are defiled either with dishonesty or scurrility.
45 The kinds or sorts of a fable, are comedies, tragedies, satyrs, and narrations of harping and h•dicall poets, and also apollogies. But which of these feignings be lawfull, and which be not lawfull, may thus be defined. Those, which haue vnmanerlines and scurrilitie; that is, a mirth ioined with dishonestie, ought not to be admitted. But those, which are written honestlie, and with shamefastnesse, so that they can refresh the mind with some pleasure, and are also profitable to teach good maners, are not to be despised. That such, as be vnciuill, must be put awaie, it is confirmed by two testimonies of the apostle. To the Corinthians he writeth; Euill talke corrupteth good maners. 1And vnto the Ephesians, the fift chapter, it is written; Let not whooredome, nor anie vncleannesse, 2nor couetousnesse be named among you, as it becommeth saints. Then is added 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, filthinesse; , foolish talking; and , iesting; which are not comelie. By these words he reprooueth all communications, which are defiled either with dishonestie or scurrilitie.
The very same saw Plato, 1in his third book De Repub. where he excludeth poets that spake of gods, as though they should speak of men: because they, in so writing, do both dishonourably treat of the nature of God, which is the best and most excellent; and also excuse the sins of common men, when as they testify, that both the gods, and also noble men, did things alike. Which certainly we may perceive in the comedy of Eunuchus in Terence, where Chaerea, 2a wicked young man, beholding a wanton table in the harlots house (wherein was painted Jupiter coming into Danae by a shower) began to have a pleasure in himself; seeing he, being but a silly man, did those things, which he perceived by that table, that the chief god in old time had committed; I did it (saith he,) yea I did it with good will. Also, Cicero saith, 3that Homer feigned these things, and translated humane things unto the gods. But I would rather they had transferred divine things unto us!
The verie same sawe Plato, 1in his third booke De Repub. where he excludeth poets that spake of gods, as though they should speake of men: bicause they, in so writing, doo both dishonourablie treate of the nature of God, which is the best and most excellent; and also excuse the sinnes of common men, when as they testifie, that both the gods, and also noble men, did things alike. Which certeinlie we may perceiue in the comedie of Eunuchus in Terence, where Chaerea, 2a wicked yoong man, beholding a wanton table in the harlots house (wherein was painted Iupiter comming into Danae by a shower) began to haue a pleasure in himselfe; séeing he, being but a séelie man, did those things, which he perceiued by that table, that the chéefe god in old time had committed; I did it (saith he,) yea I did it with good will. Also, Cicero saith, 3that Homer feigned these things, and translated humane things vnto the gods. But I would rather they had transferred diuine things vnto vs!