A14350:2720
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
But afterward Cicero himself in his book De divinatione, under his own person, 1denieth God to have the foreknowledge of things to come; and maketh answer to his brother Quintus, who in the whole course of the first book, had confirmed prophesies and oracles. But why denieth he foreknowledge? He was therefore driven unto it; for that he saw that he must needs grant an order of causes, and of effects, which is unmoveable and constant: for otherwise, things to come could not be foretold. Now, if such an order be granted, he supposeth that nothing remaineth in our hands & power. But as in God, we must affirm to be a most singular will, joined with a most singular power; even so unto him must be attributed the knowledge of all things: yet let us not therefore be afraid, but that we may do the things which we do, by our own will and choice. The Stoics, which did appoint fate or destiny, seem also to have been somewhat moved with Ciceros reason: 2for they did place the motions of the will of man, not to be under fate or the connection of causes. Not that they utterly made free the will of man, but only they affirmed, that in it lay, at the choice thereof, to meddle or not to meddle with some things: which if it meddle with, straightway it should be wrapped in the necessity of fate. By an example the thing may be made manifest; 3They say that it lay in Oedipus to company with a woman, or to abstain: but if he once company, he could not choose but commit incest; of which incest children should be begotten, which should pollute themselves with murdering of their brother, and should overthrow their fathers kingdom. The ancienter philosophers, as Democritus & Empedocles, affirm, that The will also is subject to fate or to the connection of causes. But Chrysippus the Stoic hereunto rather inclined to exempt mans will, as Oenomaris the Cynic by report of Eusebius Caesariensis De praeparatione evangelica saith, that Democritus made men bond-men, and Chrysippus half bond-men.
But afterward Cicero himselfe in his booke De diuinatione, vnder his owne person, 1denieth God to haue the foreknowledge of things to come; and maketh answer to his brother Quintus, who in the whole course of the first booke, had confirmed prophesies and oracles. But why denieth he foreknowledge? He was therefore driuen vnto it; for that he sawe that he must néeds grant an order of causes, and of effects, which is vnmooueable and constant: for otherwise, things to come could not be foretold. Now, if such an order be granted, he supposeth that nothing remaineth in our hands & power. But as in God, we must affirme to be a most singular will, ioined with a most singular power; euen so vnto him must be attributed the knowledge of all things: yet let vs not therfore be afraid, but that we may doo the things which we doo, by our owne will and choise. The Stoiks, which did appoint fate or destinie, séeme also to haue béene somewhat mooued with Ciceros reason: