Section
pp. 1–42139 passagespart 4 of 4
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
51 And these things which we have spoken of foreknowledge, pertain also to providence: 1for although in this universality of things, many things are said to be done by chance; yet notwithstanding, because that there is nothing, be it never so small, but it is subject unto the providence of God, therefore also hath it necessity, which we call, necessity of certainty; and others, of consequence. But if, forsomuch as ⟨p. 36⟩things may be called partly necessary, and partly also contingent, or free, as we have declared, thou wilt ask whether condition is most agreeable unto them? I answer, that that is most agreeable, which is natural and inward. Forsomuch therefore as the necessity, whereof we now entreat, cometh outwardly, and is only by supposition; therefore things ought in no wise to be esteemed according to it, but according to those principles, or grounds, which are understood of us: & so our works, which proceed from will, shall be said to be free; & those things, which are so produced in nature (that also their contrary may come to pass) are counted contingent. Howbeit, that necessity of certainty, or of consequence, which we affirm, is never to be denied; neither must we pluck away our works, either from nature, or from foreknowledge, or from the providence of God. And as touching the will of GOD, we must think, that in very deed it governeth and moderateth all things, which thing is of all men commonly granted. For although men perceive and feel, that they by will do decree and choose those things which they are minded to do: yet if they be godly men, they will alway say; This or that will I do, if God permit. But if they be yet without the religion of Christ (as were the Ethnics) yet notwithstanding, they always make mention of fate or destiny, of the three sisters called Parcae, or of chance, which is oftentimes read in the poets. Who (as we have said before) if by the word [Fate] or such like, they understood the connection of causes, over which God himself is the ruler, and moderateth & governeth it, then is there no hurt in that opinion; although, by reason of the abuse of the word, it is better utterly to abstain from it. There are some also, which dream of a certain fatal, mighty, and strong necessity, affixed unto the stars, and unto natural causes, which God himself cannot change:
51 And these things which we haue spoken of foreknowledge, perteine also to prouidence: