To that I say, that these examples do as well prove, that the civil Magistrate may be a Bishop, as that the Bishop may be a civil Magistrate: he answereth, that the civil office is accidental to the ministry, and such as may be removed from it, but the ministry is not so unto Princes, onles they be ordinarily called: then which, what can be more confusedly spoken. For, if I should grant, that the Prince might be a Minister of the gospel, and the Minister of the gospel a Prince: why should not (I beseech you) the ministry be as accidental to the princehood, as the princehood unto the ministry. Surely, if it be not accidental to the princehood, and yet such a thing as agreeth unto it: it must needs be essential, that is, that which can not be severed from it, without hurt of that estate. Beside that, in placing the difference of the ⟨p. 23⟩respect of the Ministry, to the princehood, and of the princehood to the Ministry, in that the Prince may not be a Minister without an ordinary calling: you give to understand, that the Minister may bear civil office, without an ordinary calling. For if the Minister may not bear civil office, until he be ordinarily called: then here is yet no distinction made, between the respect of a Minister to a civil office, and the civil officer, to the Ministry. In the end you are compelled, to destroy your own distinction: affirming, that as a minister may join to his Ministry, a civil office, if he be called thereunto by the Prince, so the Prince may join to his office the function of the Minister, if he be called unto it by the Bishop. For so you must needs mean, seeing you make him the Steward of ecclesiastical offices: which absurdity before this birth of yours, I suppose was never heard of: and it is through out the whole discourse confuted. For, as for that you ad, if they be lawfully called, it is to open folly: seeing the question is, whether there be any such election lawful.
To that I say, that these examples doe as vuel proue, that the ciuil Magistrate may be a Bishop, as that the Bishop may be a ciuil Magistrate: he answereth, that the ciuil office is accidental to the ministery, and such as may be remoued from it, but the ministery is not so vnto Princes, onles they be ordinarily called: then which, what can be more confusedly spoken. For, if I should graunt, that the Prince might be a Minister of the gospel, and the Minister of the gospel a Prince: why should not (I besech yow) the ministery be as accidental to the princehood, as the princehood vnto the ministery. Surely, if it be not accidental to the princehood, and yet such a thing as agreeth vnto it: it must needes be essential, that is, that which can not be seuered from it, withowt hurt of that estate. Beside that, in placing the difference of the ⟨p. 23⟩respect of the Ministery, to the princehood, and of the princehood to the Ministery, in that the Prince may not be a Minister withowt an ordinary calling: yow giue to vnderstand, that the Minister may bear ciuil office, withowt an ordinary calling. For if the Minister may not bear ciuil office, vntil he be ordinarily called: then here is yet no distinction made, betwene the respect of a Minister to a ciuil office, and the ciuil officer, to the Ministery. In the end yow are compelled, to destroy your own distinction: affirming, that as a minister may ioyn to his Ministery, a ciuil office, if he be called therevnto by the Prince, so the Prince may ioyn to his office the function of the Minister, if he be called vnto it by the Bishop. For so yow must needes mean, seing yow make him the Stward of ecclesiastical officis: which absurdity before this birth of yours, I suppose was neuer heard of: and it is thorowgh owt the whole discours confuted. For, as for that yow ad, if they be lawfully called, it is to open folly: seing the question is, whether there be any such election lawful.