Here only we may by the way annex, as a just corollary from the foregoing discourse, that as the supposition of necessary self-subsisting matter was before shown to be a vain, it now also appears plainly to be altogether an impossible supposition. For since the necessary self-subsisting Being, is infinite, and all-comprehensive; and if matter were supposed necessary, we must have another necessary being to form the world inasmuch as matter is not self-active, much less intelligent (as it hath ⟨p. 175⟩both been proved it cannot be, and that the Former of this world must be.) It is therefore out of question, that because both cannot be all-comprehensive, they cannot both be necessary; Nor can the vastly different kinds or natures of these things salve the business; for be they of what kinds they will, they are still Beings. Besides, if matter were necessary, and self-subsisting, every particle of it must be so. And then we shall have not only two, but an infinite number of such infinites, and all of the same kind. But Being only of this or that sort (as is apparent where more sorts do exist than one) could not be simply infinite, except as the other depends thereon; and as this one is radically comprehensive of all the rest, that can come under the general and most common notion of Being. For that there is some general notion, wherein all being agrees, and by which it differs from no being, is, I think, little to be doubted; how unequally soever, and dependently, the one upon the other, the distinct sorts do partake therein. Whereupon the expressions [super-essential] and others like it, spoken of God, must be understood, as rhetorical strains, importing more reverence, than rigid truth. Except by essence (as was formerly said) only that which is created be meant. And that only a purer and more noble kind of essence were intended to be asserted to him, ⟨p. 176⟩*which yet seems also unwarrantable and injurious that a word of that import should be so misapplied and transferred from the substance, to signify nothing but the shadow, rather, of Being. And that they who would seem zealously concerned to appropriate all Being unto God, should, in the height of their transport, so far forget themselves, as to set him above all being, and so deny him any at all. For surely that which simply is above all being is no being.
Here only we may by the way annex, as a just corollary from the foregoing discourse, that as the supposition of necessary self-subsisting matter was before shewn to be a vain, it now also appears plainly to be altogether an impossible supposition. For since the necessary self-subsisting Being, is infinite, and all-comprehensive; and if matter were supposed necessary, we must have another necessary being to form the world inasmuch as matter is not self-active, much less intelligent (as it hath ⟨p. 175⟩both been proved it cannot be, and that the Former of this world must be.) It is therefore out of question, that because both cannot be all-comprehensive, they cannot both be necessary; Nor can the vastly different kinds or natures of these things salve the business; for be they of what kinds they will, they are still Beings. Besides, if matter were necessary, and self-subsisting, every particle of it must be so. And then we shall have not only two, but an infinite number of such infinites, and all of the same kind. But Being only of this or that sort (as is apparent where more sorts do exist than one) could not be simply infinite, except as the other depends thereon; and as this one is radically comprehensive of all the rest, that can come under the general and most common notion of Being. For that there is some general notion, wherein all being agrees, and by which it differs from no being, is, I think, little to be doubted; how unequally soever, and dependently, the one upon the other, the distinct sorts do partake therein. Whereupon the expressions [super-essential] and others like it, spoken of God, must be understood, as rhetorical strains, importing more reverence, than rigid truth. Except by essence (as was formerly said) only that which is created be meant. And that only a purer and more noble kind of essence were intended to be asserted to him, ⟨p. 176⟩*which yet seems also unwarrantable and injuririous that a word of that import should be so misapplied and transferr'd from the substance, to signifie nothing but the shadow, rather, of Being. And that they who would seem zealously concern'd to appropriate all Being unto God, should, in the height of their transport, so far forget themselves, as to set him above all being, and so deny him any at all. For surely that which simply is above all being is no being.
- *And we must suppose somewhat agreeable to this to be, Plottinus his meaning when he denies knowledge to be in God, and yet also denies that there is in him any ignorance, that is that he means his intelligence is of an infinitely distinct and more excellent sort from that which he causes in us, as appears by his annexed reason, [Greek or Hebrew], Enn. 6. l. 9. c. 6.And we must suppose somewhat agreeable to this to be, Plottinus his meaning when he denies knowledge to be in God, and yet also denies that there is in him any ignorance, that is that he means his intelligence is of an infinitely distinct and more excellent sort from that which he causes in us, as appears by his annexed reason, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, Enn. 6. l. 9. c. 6.