If, indeed, he is; and be the common cause, Author and Lord of us and all things (which we do now but suppose. And we may defy cavil to allege any thing that is so much as colourable against the possibility of the supposition) surely he hath done greater things than the making of it known that he is. It is no unapprehensible thing. There hath been no inconsistent notion hitherto given of him. Nothing said concerning him; but will well admit that it is possible such a Being may be now existent. Yea we not only can conceive, but we actually have (and cannot but have) some conception, of the several attributes we have ascribed to him; so as to apply them (severally) to somewhat else, if we will not apply them (jointly) to him. We cannot but admit there is some eternal necessary Being; somewhat that is of it self, active; somewhat that is powerful, wise, and good. And these notions have in them no repugnancy to one another; wherefore it is not impossible they may meet and agree together in full perfection to one and the same existent Being. And hence it is manifestly ⟨p. 182⟩no unapprehensible thing, that such a Being doth exist. Now supposing, that it doth exist, and hath been to us the cause and Author of our Being; hath given us the reasonable, intelligent nature which we find our selves possessors of; and that very power whereby we apprehend the existence of such a Being as he is to be possible (all which we for the present do still but suppose) while also his actual existence is not unapprehensible, were it not the greatest madness imaginable to say, that if he do exist, he cannot also make our apprehensive nature understand this apprehensible thing that he doth exist? We will therefore take it for granted, and as a thing which no man well in his wits will deny, that upon supposition such a Being, the Cause and Author of all things do exist, he might, in some convenient way or other, with sufficient evidence, make it known to such creatures as we, so as to beget in us a rational certainty that he doth exist.
If, indeed, he is; and be the common cause, Author and Lord of us and all things (which we do now but suppose. And we may defie cavil to alledge any thing that is so much as colourable against the possibility of the supposition) surely he hath done greater things than the making of it known that he is. It is no unapprehensible thing. There hath been no inconsistent notion hitherto given of him. Nothing said concerning him; but will well admit that it is possible such a Being may be now existant. Yea we not only can conceive, but we actually have (and cannot but have) some conception, of the several attributes we have ascribed to him; so as to apply them (severally) to somewhat else, if we will not apply them (joyntly) to him. We cannot but admit there is some eternal necessary Being; somewhat that is of it self, active; somewhat that is powerful, wise, and good. And these notions have in them no repugnancy to one another; wherefore it is not impossible they may meet and agree together in full perfection to one and the same existent Being. And hence it is manifestly ⟨p. 182⟩no unapprehensible thing, that such a Being doth exist. Now supposing, that it doth exist, and hath been to us the cause and Author of our Being; hath given us the reasonable, intelligent nature which we find our selves possessors of; and that very power whereby we apprehend the existence of such a Being as he is to be possible (all which we for the present do still but suppose) while also his actual existence is not unapprehensible, were it not the greatest madness imaginable to say, that if he do exist, he cannot also make our apprehensive nature understand this apprehensible thing that he doth exist? We will therefore take it for granted, and as a thing which no man well in his wits will deny, that upon supposition such a Being, the Cause and Author of all things do exist, he might, in some convenient way or other, with sufficient evidence, make it known to such creatures as we, so as to beget in us a rational certainty that he doth exist.